



SVERIGES AMBASSAD

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UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET, dnr 405 ✓

För EC

INKOM UD		
2002 -07- 23 ²²		
Avd. <i>HA</i>	Gr. <i>1</i>	Mål <i>EC</i>

P 2 EWI a

Raoul Wallenberg-fallet: Svar på note om Iosif Chatsinskij

Vårt fax 339 10/6

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Ambassaden har idag mottagit bifogad *note* från ryska utrikesministeriet med svar på vissa frågor om polske medborgaren Iosif Antonovitj Chatsinskij, som arresterades i Polen av NKVD den 30 mars 1945. Det framgår att Chatsinskij rehabiliterades 1990.

SALAND

← namnet till
kretsledet?

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Министерство Иностранных Дел Российской Федерации свидетельствует свое уважение Посольству Королевства Швеция и, ссылаясь на ноту Посольства № 129/02 от 21 мая 2002 года, имеет честь сообщить следующее.

Иосиф Антонович Хапинский, 1889 года рождения, поляк, уроженец города Варшава, гражданин Польши, председатель «Партии труда». Арестован 30 марта 1945 года органами НКВД СССР по обвинению в подрывной деятельности против частей Красной Армии на территории Польши. Дело вело Главное управление по борьбе с бандитизмом (ГУББ) НКВД СССР.

21 июня 1945 года Военной коллегией Верховного суда СССР осужден к четырем месяцам лишения свободы. После отбытия срока заключения 30 июля 1945 года освобожден из Внутренней тюрьмы НКВД СССР. Реабилитирован в 1990 году.

Министерство пользуется случаем, чтобы возобновить Посольству уверения в своем высоком уважении.

Москва, "18" июля 2002 года



ПОСОЛЬСТВУ КОРОЛЕВСТВА ШВЕЦИЯ

г. Москва

2002-08-13

Enheten för Central- och Östeuropa (EC)
Ambassadör Harald Hamrin
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Delges:
Ch UD-EC
Amb. Moskva (Stefan Gullgren)
Nina Lagergren

Samtal med rysk kvinna som tror sig vara dotter till Raoul Wallenberg
1 bil.

Den 5 augusti 2002 blev jag uppringd av en viss Larissa Andersson, rysk kvinna, gift och arbetande inom resebranschen i Stockholm. Hon hade ombetts att förmedla kontakt mellan mig och en viss Nina Nikolajevna Ditinitj. Denna hade enligt egen uppgift för något år sedan i Stockholm sammanträffat med Jan Lundvik och för denne förklarat att hon trodde sig vara dotter till Raoul Wallenberg. Lundvik hade bett henne att sammanställa sin berättelse i skriftlig form och lämna in berättelsen till ambassaden i Moskva. Något spår av denna berättelse finns dock inte i UD:s arkiv. Jag bad Larissa Andersson att uppmana Ditinitj att lämna in berättelsen på nytt hos vakten i Fredsgatan 6, vilket hon gjorde samma dag. Den 9 augusti sammanträffade jag under ca. 45 minuter med Ditinitj, som sade sig ha kommit till Stockholm enbart i detta syfte. Detaljerna i Ditinitj historia framgår av bil. 1, som utgör den berättelse hon säger sig ha inlämnat till ambassaden i Moskva någon gång under hösten 2001.

Nedan följer ett kort sammandrag av hennes berättelse samt av vårt muntliga samtal.

Ditinitj föddes 1951 och växte som barn upp i tron att den man som hennes mamma från mitten av 1950-talet var gift med var hennes köttslige far. Senare gick det dock upp för henne att hennes riktige far var en viss Nikolaj Zadorozjennyj, som hennes mamma levat ihop med under några år 1950-52 i Karaganda och i staden Kumertau i Baskirien. Ditinitj säger sig senare under sin tonårstid och som vuxen ha sökt få fram information om denne Zadorozjennyj av sin moder och dennas släktingar. Hon misstänker nu att Zadorozjennyj i själva verket var Raoul Wallenberg, som under den tid han sägs ha sammanlevt med modern skall ha arbetat som ingenjör.

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Ditinitj säger sig i samtal med mig bygga sina förmodanden på en rad uppgifter och omständigheter, av vilka de viktigaste enligt henne själv är följande.

1. Modern skall till Ditinitj ha sagt att Zadorozjennyjs riktiga förnamn var Raul. Hon skall också ha uppgett efternamnet, som Ditinitj dock inte kunde erinra sig eftersom det "var så konstigt".
2. Mamman hade för Ditinitj berättat att pappan (alltså "Raoul Wallenberg") vid ett tillfälle sagt att den nyfödda flickan var en "baronessa".
3. År 1992 hade Ditinitjs mamma till sin dotter sagt att hon nyligen på rysk TV sett att "de bär din pappas porträtt i USA" (underförstått i en demonstration). Mamman hade vid samma tillfälle också berättat att hennes pappa ("Raoul Wallenberg") en gång sagt att "hans syster Nina bor i det land där gudinnan Freja finns".
4. År 1994 hade en kusin till Ditinitj för denna berättat att hon sett en film om Raoul Wallenberg och att hon känt igen honom som Nikolaj Zadorozjennyj.

Det kan för klarhetens skull tilläggas att de flesta släktingar, inklusive mamman, som Ditinitj nämner i sin skriftliga berättelse har avlidit, varför deras uppgifter svårligen kan kontrolleras.

Mitt muntliga samtal med Ditinitj bestod av två delar.


I den första delen bad jag Ditinitj att ur sin långa skriftliga berättelse lyfta fram de enligt henne själv viktigaste uppgifterna som skulle kunna stödja hennes teori (se punkterna 1-4 ovan).

I den andra och avslutande delen av samtalet framförde jag följande. Teorin att Ditinitj skulle vara RW:s dotter går inte att förena med sovjetiska/ryska uppgifter att RW skulle ha avlidit 1947. Inte heller går den att förena med de uppgifter som förekommit om att han skulle ha vistats i olika sovjetiska fängelser/läger lång tid efter 1947. Teorin förutsätter alltså att RW skulle ha frigivits någon gång före 1950 och därefter tillåtits leva i frihet i Sovjetunionen. Men hur sannolikt är det,

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frågade jag, att en person, som kring 1950 väckt stor och för Sovjetunionen negativ uppmärksamhet och som av Sovjetunionen officiellt förklarats vara okänd i landet, kunde tillåtas leva i frihet där? Och hur sannolikt är det att denna person, alltså Raoul Wallenberg, skulle avstå från att i en dylik situation ta kontakt med exempelvis Sveriges ambassad i Moskva? Ditinitjs svar på dessa frågor var att "om Ni känner till Sovjetunionen på denna tid, så vet Ni att allt var möjligt".

Ditinitj avslutade med att muntligen upprepa sin begäran i den skriftliga berättelsen om att Sverige skulle företa en "undersökning för att fastställa om inte Nikolaj Zadorozjennyj var Raoul Wallenberg". Hon förklarade sig också villig att ställa sig till förfogande för ett blodtest i syfte att fastställa hennes släktskap med RW. Jag svarade att jag ämnade återkomma med ett svar.



Harald Hamrin

JAN LUNDAVIK
U.D.
FREDSGATAN 6
STOCKHOLM
SWEDEN

Уважаемый господин Ян Лундвик!

Я, Дитинич Наталья Николаевна, девичья фамилия Рефлексина, родилась 11 мая 1951 г. в г. Караганда Казахской ССР.

Проживаю по адресу: 119285, Москва, ул. Мосфильмовская, д. 32, кв. 75, тел.: 143-73-43.

Противаю по адресу: 111024, Москва, ул. Красноказарменная, д. 23, кв. 133, тел.: 362-57-05, у мужа, Чеснокова Николая Александровича.

Моя мать Рефлексина Анна Васильевна родилась в 1926 г. В 1931 г. она вместе с родителями были выселены из Мордовской АССР в связи с их антипролетарскими наклонностями в Казахстан, в г. Караганда.

Мой отец Захарович Николай Иванович, познакомился с моей матерью в мае 1950 г. в г. Караганда. Его пригласили в дом на праздник мужа мамочки старшей сестры Остроушко Николай Петрович (умер в 1980 г.).

3 августа 1950 г. мама по просьбе отца увольняется с работы и живет с моей бабушкой,

маленькой мамой но удивительной еще в г. Караганда.

9 мая 1951г., перед мамой рожденьем нахо-
везет маму на озеро Балхаш, где 11 мая в г.
Балхаш рожденья я.

14 июля 1951г. мамма получает свою тру-
довую книжку с местом своей бывшей рабо-
ты и летом того же года отец увозит
меня и маму в г. Кушертная Башкирской
АССР.

Город Кушертная тогда только начал строит-
ся в основном силами заключенных. Люди жили
в нарамиках, но мамма сразу же дала двухкомнат-
ную квартиру.

14 января 1952г. мамма устроилась на
работу. В это время к маме из Караганды
приехали маленькие родственники, бабушка,
тетя Катя (маленькая старшая сестра - Острожи-
ко Екатерина Васильевна, девичья фамилия Ре-
флексина), с мужем и дочерью, мамин старший
брат Рефлексин Александр Васильевич со своей
семьей, женой и двумя дочерьми 12 и 14 лет,
который освободился из карагандинского лагеря
"Домино". Он происходил из разных лагерей Караганды 10 лет.
(Умер в 1973г.).

Приехал также младший брат маммы
Рефлексин Николай Васильевич, который
проживает в настоящее время в Казахстане;
Новосарская обл. г. Жибаснуз, ул. Строительная 57, кв. 6.

Машин младший брат Всеволод Тимофеевич Васильев очень сдружился с моим отцом, а старшему брату, который освободился из лагеря, мой отец очень не понравился. Его раздражало, что мой отец другой, не такой как них, его раздражал образ жизни моего отца. От тети Катки и других родственников я слышала, что маленький старший брат кем-то угрожал моему отцу, для того, чтобы он расстался с мамой.

Мои родители расстались, мама переехала со мной жить к своему старшему брату, которой к этому времени купил дом.

В 1954 г. по настоянию родственников, мама выходит замуж за Соловьева Николая Михайловича (1919-1985). Он один занимал трехкомнатную квартиру в Кулмертау.

В 1955 г. у мамы рождаются две мои сестры Таня и Оле. Мама вскоре выходит на работу. И, со слов тети Катки, украдкой продолжает встречаться с моим отцом, до тех пор пока он не уезжает из Кулмертау (примерно в 1956 г.).

В 1956 г. маме с отчимом дают отдельный дом с большим садом на окраине города, у леса.

Нашим неприятели оказались с года 1954. Первое по иррациональной случайности умер мальчик Сергей наш дальний родственник, племян-

ник жены Федосея Тимофеевича Васильевича, младшего брата мамы. Все говорили, что папа Серен (Позняков Иван Иванович) был арестован в Москве на I-ой Американской выставке, за то, что пытался передать какие-то записки американцу, но тот оказался сотрудником КГБ. Видел он в лагере в Сывьеваре 10 лет. Когда вышел из тюрьмы, то, по словам родственников, собирался в Америку. Сгорел в своей даче в 1992 г.

Тогда-то в 1957 г. на операционном столе умирает очень хороший друг семьи Григорьев Михаил Александрович - Секретарь Горисполкома Партии г. Кузнецкого.

А летом 1958 г. я получила сильную травму ноги. На меня, похотев с удовольствием, наехал некто вельсшере неизвестный мальчик лет 14-ти. С моей стороны у него вместо бедра торчало острие. Как сказали врачи, мне очень повезло, что я не стала инвалидом.

Летом 1959 г. дома было все как обычно, к маме пришло письмо маленького старшего брата Федосея Яков Федоровича (умерев в 1997 г.) и попросило разрешения взять меня в гости. Когда я была в гостях маму внезапно увезли в психиатрическую больницу в г. Уфу.

Я, пролежав в семье деду месяца два.

Как-то утром, заметая мне косички, Анка Геро-ровна сказала: "Теперь ты полная сирота". Я спро-сила почему. Она ответила, что маму свою я не скоро увижу, что ее не скоро выкусят, она больна. Тогда я ей сказала, что у меня есть те-пака. Она мне ответила, что Соловьев Н.М. не мой отец, а своего родного отца я никогда не уви-жу потому, что он уехал очень далеко.

Тогда я переехала к деду, мои сестры переехали в больницу с ветряной оспой. Оттуда переехали в больницу тоже. У него на нервной почве за-болели ноги. Вскоре сестер выписали, и мы с ними втроем стали жить дома. В это время к маме пришло Познякова Ольга Николаевна (теперь Познякова И.И.) и спро-сила где родители держат документы, ксивы. Мы показали. Она начала осма-тривать содержимое ящиков комода и шка-фов, читала все ксивы, осматривала бу-маги, фотографии, и часть фотографий и бумаг складывала в мешок, который принесла с собой. Затем она проверила ящики с вещами, взяла пару мелких вещей, положила их сверху и сказала "Это вашей сестры больше не по-надобится", взяла свой мешок и ушла.

В новогодние канюны, когда у нас в гостях были родственники, я слышала, как отчим расска-зывает родственникам, как он ездил навещая в Чоре

в больницю маму. Когда маму привезли в больницу, то ее сначала положили в палату с буйными больными, а потом перенесли в электромом. Очень сожалел, что согласился на то, что ее положили в больницу.

Маму привезли из больницы в конце зимы 1960г. Она очень худела, была бледная, с короткой стрижкой.

Как только я снова остался с ней наедине, то сразу же стала спрашивать ее об отце. Она спросила, кто мне сказал, что у меня другой отец, я ответил, что Анна Федоровна. Тогда мама сказала, что она хотела сделать лучше для меня, и что мне взрослой она бы обязательно все рассказала сама.

Мы не раз разговаривали потом об отце, и она мне рассказывала, что Никой от меня назван потому что так зовут его сестру, что Никой живет за границей. Как мама работала, что я родился именно в мае. Мама говорила, что у него в роду дипломаты и государственные деятели, что он работал в консульстве, что он проектировал города и многое другое. Мама предупредила меня, что все это должно остаться в тайне. Как-то сказала, что мой папа барон, что Николой Иванович Задорожский — не настоящее имя отца, что имя его Рауль, и она называла его грами-

яню, но фраза была для меня страшной, и я ее не запомнила.

Когда я спрашивала родственников о Задо-
рожном И.И., они с ужасом вспоминали свои
вопросы и говорили, что он был "красивую
жену" любил маленькое, женушину, играл
в карты. И далее ставили ему в вину, что
он много читал.

И когда я носила этого ребенка в маме,
она мне говорила, что она просто слухи, по-
тому что боялся, что мама жила в Америке
и в других странах, спасая людей.

Как то мама сосрала Коммунистическую
Ивановна, которая тоже пришла из Караган-
ды, сказала, что мой отец некоротко пос-
тупил по отношению к Жене, и в страхе,
которая жила в Караганде с ее мамой,
он оставил ее ради моей мамы. Жене ни сло-
ва не знала по русски и только он мог с
ней говорить на ее языке.

Когда я спросила маму про Женю, мама
сказала, что мама познакомилась маму с ней.
Женя была замечательная и необыкновенно красивая
женщина. Мама сказала, что она была по
национальности словачка, ее муж генерал, был
расстрелян во время войны. Мама с Женей
очень подружилась, Женя очень радовалась мое-
му рождению, брала меня на руки, называла ко

имени "Нина" и улыбалась. Мама говорила, что Нине меня очень любила.

Как-то, когда мне было лет 10-11, к нам в гости пришел старший брат мамы Феодосий А.В. Я случайно подслушала его разговор с отцом. Дядя сказал: "Нина - то как похотела на Задороню. "Странный бы все таки Задороню: в разговоре все время словечки какие-то иностранные вставлял, себя называл фрейр, а Нину - фрейя". "Фрей по немецки жених, фрейр - это уголовное, а кто же такой фрейр и фрейя". "Кто же он был, может мама?".

Тогда я поняла, почему мой отец, когда злился на меня, называл фреехой (я думала, что это что-то очень плохое).

После того, как я узнала, что Володя Н.М. не мой родной отец отношения у нас стали некрепкими. Я поняла, что он ненавидит моего отца, а я была для него воплощением напастей. И я конфликтовала с отцом из-за себя и отца.

В 14 лет меня забрала в свою семью тетя Катя, в поселок Тюльган Оренбургской области. Я училась в школе. Много раз расстраивала ее об отце, но она очень неохотно вспоминала о нем. Как-то она только сказала, что у меня редкие волосы как у отца. Я спросила: похотела ли я на него, она ответила: есть что-то. Когда я сказала, что хочу найти отца, она ответила: не ищи его, но наверное

уже нет в нем, ему и лет много, он старше твоего отца, болен туберкулезом, он не мог за кого себе выдавать, и не нужно ты ему раз он тебя сам не мучил. И что мало. Из-за него в больницу попал. Я ей сказала, но верь маме была здорова, когда ее в больницу забрали, меня Катя сказала, что я ничего не понимаю, что мама заболела тогда. Я у нее спросила, кричал здесь мой отец, ведь они расстались в 1952 г. У меня Катя вырвалось: "Твоя мать к нам до последнего бежала". Но свои дальнейшие рассказы отвечать не стала. Только сказала: "Не буди лихо, пока тихо".

Когда я жила уже в Москве, ко мне в гости как-то приехала моя двоюродная сестра, дочь младшего старшего брата, Юркина Людмила Александровна (девичья фамилия Рефренкина) и зашел разговор о моем отце, тогда вдруг говорит: "Нина, какой у тебя был замечательный отец, ведь я его знала". (Ей было 14 лет, а ее сестре Тамаре - 12.) "И как красиво он ухаживал за твоей мамой!" Что он выделялся среди всех элитный, воспитанный, галантный, умный, очень много знал, бывал в разных странах, много им рассказывал интересного, читал наизусть "Евгения Онегина" Пушкина. Они купили с Тамарой крейцершмидовские шпатель и возы с мамой в театр. Когда я сказала, что родственники мне другое рассказывали. Она мне ответила: "Не верь им. Во-первых они дикоры и невежды, а во-вторых

все они завидовали ему и твоей маме". Люда знала Неню, они с Тамарой ходили к ней в гости, она угощала их конфетами, называя их "конфет". Люда наконец мне сказала, что ее отец диакон, развел своих родителей, и что мой отец жил в Курьертау где-то до 1956 г.

Людьмило Александровна Юркина, кроме-
ваит в настоящее время в Башкирии, 450083,
г. Уфе, ул. Р. Зорге д. 37/3, кв. 84.

Ее сестра Тамара Александровна Крючко-
ва, девичья фамилия Федоскина, живет в
настоящее время также в Башкирии, г. Уфе,
ул. Айская, д. 60/1, кв. 3.

Летом 1977 г. я приехала в гости к маме
и отцу в г. Курьертау. В гости к нам пришла
сводная сестра отцу Валентина Маркова
и приехала меня к себе. Когда я пришла к
ней со своей дочерью она предупредила, что-
бы я не удивлялась, ей как кричит гость, брат
ее муж. Вскоре в квартиру вошел мужчина
лет 60-ти, очень бледный, чистый, аккуратный, в
голубой рубашке и светлых кожаных брюках. Руки
у него были тонкие, а сам слегка помятый, волос
на голове не было. У него были сероголубые, даже го-
лубые глаза. В этом человеке чувствовалась ка-
кая то строгость (как у священника) и в то
же время какая то чуть-ли не детская робость.
Взгляд был очень серьезный и глубокий. Валь

представило мне - это Нико, это ее дочь Лена. Он сразу же начал говорить, что он писатель, живет в глубинах России, что у него болезнь сосудов, поэтому он днем не уходит и не выходит, сейчас живет на Вашем садовом участке в дачной домишке. И сразу же стал рассказывать мне о моей жизни, где живу, работаю, где учился и т.д. Он интересовался даже, на мой взгляд, какие-то мелочи. Он рассказывал мне около двух часов, пока Ваша не сказала ему, что обед готов, (дверь была раскрыта и Ваша готовила еду). Он встал, у него было счастливое лицо, попрощался и ушел.

По дороге домой я думала, почему он сказал, что живет в домишке на садовом участке, домишек же крошечный, в нем только инвентарь находится. А потом я узнала, что у ее мужа братьев нет.

В 1999г., когда я у Васи спросила про этого человека, она мне ответила, что он кроме тогда и не разговаривает сестра и брат. Больше она о нем ничем не стала говорить.

Валентина Маркова в настоящее время живет по адресу: Ташикорганстан, Кугарчинский р-н, село Подгорное, ул. Комсомольская.

Зимой 1985г., в связи с тяжелой болезнью отца, за полгода до его смерти, я приехала в г. Кулебаку. И в разговоре отец мне сказал, что моя мама не простая женщина, что она много знает Бугакина, на что моя мама со вздохом ответила: "Хороший был человек Николай Александрович". Мама умерла 11.02.1998г.

В 1992г. на рождение правнучки приехали мама. И когда моя дочь приехала из роддома, и мы сидели за праздничным столом, мама сказала про правнучку: "Вот и баронетчик родился". Когда мы ото- шлись отки, мама мне сказала: "Никочка я ви- дела по телевизору, как в Америке несли портрет твоего отца", что мама сказала, что это сестра Нина невест в той стране, где жили Фрейя, и что, если я смогу, но должно найтись его сест- ру. Потом она сказала, что мама называла меня Бошня Фрейя.

Летом 1992г. я приехала в г. Меллунд и мама очень удивлена тем, Катя, которая недавно сказала мне: "Богородица как жиста сейчас похожа на своего отца, ты такая же красивая и чужая как он". Я так растрогалась, что даже не спросила, почему она так редко говорила мне о моем отце, к тому же я сказала, но неужд.

В 1994г. я с дочерью приехала в Уфу к двоюродной сестре Юриемой ЛА и она мне сказала, что видела фильм о Р. Валленберге и узнала его - это был мой отец Захарович Н.И.

Так как ни одной фотографии моего отца нет ни у моей мамы, ни у моих родственников (а фотографии у них много и Карамзинских и Кудрявских), позже, в силу

неизвестных мне причин, они возможно были изъезжены.

Но кроме моих родственников, Задорожного Николая Ивановича, виден старожилы 2. Куликова, которые еще живы, и я думаю, что их можно спросить.

Для установления истины я согласен на проведение экспертизы по предмету установления родства.

Я не могла изложить все факты в своем заявлении, но учитывая изложенные факты прошу провести расследование не являлся ли Задорожный Николай Иванович Раулем Валленбергом.

Заранее благодарю Гиню
Дмитрия

18.09.2002.

Гиню —

P.S. И еще одно, очень важная просьба: очень желательно, чтобы Ваше расследование было независимым. Ведь дело имеет политический аспект. А я бы не хотела бы осложнений ни для Российского правительства, ведь Россия и так в очень сложном положении, ни для Швеции. Это важно и для меня: я не хотела бы повторить судьбу своей мамы.

Harald Hamrin
2002-08-26 11:39

EC

To: Stefan Gullgren/FOREIGN/MINISTRY,
cc:
Subject: Brev i RW-ärendet

Stefan!

Efter samråd med Hans Magnusson har vi beslutat att lägga ärendet a.a.

Hälsningar

Harald Hamrin

Forwarded by Harald Hamrin/FOREIGN/MINISTRY on 2002-08-26 11:35

INK. UTRIKESDEP.		
D.Nr. 238/001		
08-26		
2002-08-03		
AVD.	2	Eu

To: Harald Hamrin/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK, Hans Magnusson/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK
cc: Stefan Gullgren/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK
Subject: Brev i RW-ärendet

Harald, Hans,

Via Schweiz' ambassad har vi fått ett (handskrivet) brev i RW-ärendet. Brevet är från en privatperson, Grigorij Ioffe. Jag skulle gärna vilja höra Er bedömning av hur det skall hanteras. Det som framför allt väcker tvivel är att Ioffe begär pengar, (att han avtjänar ett "mycket långt fängelsestraff"), samt att han inte med ett ord antyder varför han skulle sitta inne med information eller hur han kommit över denna.

Ioffe inleder brevet med att tala om att han 47 år och av judisk börd. Han säger sig ha hört att "Er stat (dvs Schweiz, enligt Ioffes uppfattning) är intresserad av Raoul Wallenbergs öde".

Han fortsätter: "Jag har en rad grunder för förmodanden om Wallenbergs sista vistelseort och begravningsställe eftersom jag har information om en rad fakta som inte kan betvivlas". Ioffe, som "är av judisk börd och känner till vad RW gjorde under kriget mot fascisterna för att rädda judar från förintelsen, är intresserad av att sanningen om hans sista vistelseort fastställs".

Idag, skriver Ioffe, "avtjänar jag ett mycket långt fängelsestraff och har därför inte möjlighet att själv inställa mig på ambassaden för att presentera den information jag förfogar över. Därför ber jag er sända er representant /till mig/ för att få informationen, eller ge mig adressen till Wallenbergs systerdotter, som är hustru till Kofi Annan, och intresserad av efterforskningarna efter Wallenberg såsom hans närmaste släkting".

"Eftersom jag för närvarande är en person som är i behov av pengar, hoppas jag på belöning för den information som jag ger, och vilken inte kommer att framkalla tvivel eftersom det finns bekräftelse i form av dokument på mina uppgifter", avslutar Ioffe det korta brevet.

Ioffe lämnar sin adress, som tydligen är ett fängelse, i Vologda län.

Jag lämnar nu ambassaden, men lägger tills vidare brevet och detta email ad acta i RW-dossiern för ev. vidare åtgärd. Tacksam därför reaktion skickas till Stefan Gullgren, som tillträder på ambassaden den 19 augusti.

Hälsningar

HATS Foyer
Amb. Moskva



SVERIGES AMBASSAD

TELEFAX

1 (8)

2002-08-27

Moskva

Fambs Stefan Gullgren
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Kopia internt på ambassaden till:
SH, PS, MH, CJ

INK. UTRIKESDEP.		
D.Nr.		
2002-08-28 ²⁷		
AVD	GF	Val
P	2	Eu ¹

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET, dnr 438

För:

EC

Kopia:

EP (Wahlbäck)

Refax:

amb Budapest

Tidningsartikel om Raoul Wallenberg

(1 bil.)

Den officiösa tidningen "Rossijskaja Gazeta" hade den 21 augusti en lång artikel om Raoul Wallenberg och hans öde. Artikeln har rubriken "Raouls hemlighet – Var den svenske diplomaten Wallenberg agent för den sovjetiska underrättelsetjänsten" och är signerad Fjodor Lukjanov, Budapest (rimligen rör det sig om den svensk- och Sverige-kunnige Fjodor Lukjanov som ambassaden har haft många kontrakter med under senare år, men som numera i första hand brukar skriva för tidningen "Vremja").

I artikeln, som bifogas i ambassadens översättning till svenska, ges en lång och ingående redovisning av upprakten till och omfattningen av Raoul Wallenbergs gärning i Budapest. De sedvanliga teorierna beträffande hans öde återges. På det hela taget är det en mycket genomarbetad översikt, bortsett från en och annan märklighet. T.ex. finns en hänvisning till "den sovjetiska agenten" Karl Gerhard....

Artikeln avslutas med några spekulationer om eventuella ytterligare uppgifter i arkiven och om dessa uppgifter möjligen skulle kunna kasta nytt ljus över Raoul Wallenbergs öde. Författaren hänvisar här till en uppgift som han själv hört nyligen från 'en person som är insatt i ärendet'. Lukjanov skriver så här: 'Enligt den här versionen ska Wallenberg i början ha arbetat för...den sovjetiska underrättelsetjänsten, som ska ha krockat upp honom i hans "vänsterorienterade ungdom".'

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a.a.

[Handwritten signature]

h

Sveriges Ambassad
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2002-08-27

För det sovjetiska agentnätet i Sverige före och under kriget var starkt. Om detta talade också en annan diplomat från Budapest – Vladimir Krjutjkon, som upplevde händelserna 1956 tillsammans med ambassadör Andropov, och som senare blev chef för KGB. Det sägs också att det någonstans finns dokument som vittnar om Wallenbergs kontakter med den sovjetiska underrättelstjänsten, men att de bär stämpeln "Toppbemykt. Arkiveras för all framtid."

HIRDMAN

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
Moskva
Christina Johannesson

ÖVERSÄTTNING
2002-08-26

Översättning från ryska

Artikel i Rossijskaja Gazeta den 21 augusti 2002

Raouls hemlighet

Var den svenske diplomaten Wallenberg agent för den sovjetiska underrättelsetjänsten?

Exklusivt för Rossijskaja Gazeta

Fjodor Lukjanov
Budapest

I augusti 2002 skulle denne man ha fyllt 90. Han hade mycket väl fortfarande kunnat finnas bland oss. Samtidigt har detta namn i ett halvt sekel omgärdats av en uppsjö av rykten och legender, och hans öde har blivit legendariskt efter att ha "dragit in" många starka personer i denna världen, som Roosevelt och Truman, Stalin, Chrusjtjov och Gorbatjov. Denne man hette Raoul Wallenberg, och sista gången han sågs i livet var i januari 1945 i Budapest...

En skyddsängel med ryggsäck

2 ukrainska frontens styrkor nådde den ungerska huvudstaden den 20 december 1944. Striderna om staden pågick fortfarande för fullt när en ung man dök upp på Röda korsets kontor på Benzur-gatan, inte långt från stadsparken. Denne man var Raoul Wallenberg, förstesekreterare vid det neutrala Sveriges ambassad.

"Den märklige svensken" förklarade för Röda korsets personal att ryssarna antagligen skulle befria just denna stadsdel först, och att han då snabbt skulle kunna kontakta den sovjetiska stridsledningen och befälhavare Malinovskij personligen för att överlämna viktig information till denne, bland annat om Budapests ghetto. Hans antaganden visade sig till största delen vara riktiga. Röda arméns frontstyrkor intog Benzur-gatan den 13 januari. Löjtnant Dmitrij Demtjinkov befriade Röda korsets byggnad med sina mannar och erbjöd genast Wallenberg beskydd och en plats där han var säker från beskjutningen.

Dagen därpå, den 14 januari, dök Raoul upp utanför beskickningen i ett sovjetiskt militärfordon, meddelade att han hade ordnat det riktigt bra för sig och att han var på väg till staden Debrecen, till Malinovskijs stab och den plats där den provisoriska ungerska regeringen hade inkvarterats. Ytterligare två dagar senare, den 17 januari, när de sovjetiska styrkorna hade befriat nästan hela Pest inklusive ghettoområdet, dök Wallenberg oväntat upp på den svenska ambassaden med ryggsäck på ryggen. Han förkunnade glatt att han hade lyckats rädda merparten av fångarna i ghattot och att han nu med gott samvete kunde bege sig till Debrecen. Sedan den dagen, 17 januari 1945, har varken släktingar eller kollegor sett den svenske diplomaten Wallenberg eller hans chaufför. Han bara försvann - för att sedermera dyka upp på Lubjankafängelset i Moskva ...

Hemligt uppdrag

Raoul Wallenberg kom till Budapest den 9 juli 1944, inte ens 32 år fyllda. Ungern var redan ockuperat av Hitler. Men Hitler litade inte ens på amiral Horthys "vänligt sinnade regim" och beslutade sig för att genomföra en förekommande attack. Natten till den 18 mars 1944 trängde elva tyska divisioner in på ungerskt territorium och kunde enligt planen "Margaret - 1" ockupera hela landet på tolv timmar. All makt i landet övergick i tyskarnas händer. Redan ett par dagar senare startade de fascistiska orgierna, med arresteringar, plundringar och deporteringar av ungerska judar till koncentrationsläger i Tyskland och Österrike (den judiska folkgruppen i Ungern var en av de största i Europa - 700 000 personer).

Wallenbergs ankomst till Budapest var kopplad till just dessa omständigheter. Idag känner vi till en hel del om hans arbete för att rädda de ungerska judarna. Det var dock först alldeles nyligen, efter att amerikanerna hävde sekretessen för sina arkiv, som vi fick reda på något om förhistorien till Wallenbergs hemliga uppdrag...

Allt började en dag i maj 1944 då två utlänningar av en slump stötte på varandra i en hiss i centrala Stockholm. Den ene av dem, en ungersk jude vid namn Kalman Lauer, var chef för ett mindre export- och importföretag. Den andre hette Eever Olsen, operativ officer vid den amerikanska underrättelsetjänsten, och arbetade under täckmantel på den amerikanska ambassaden som finansspecialist. Efter att ha fått veta att Lauer var född i Ungern bad Olsen honom att leta reda på "en stark svensk", som skulle vara beredd att resa till Budapest för att rädda ungerska judar. Lauer svarade genast genom att föreslå sin medarbetare Raoul Wallenberg, som redan vid ett flertal tillfällen varit i Budapest å arbetets vägnar...

Kort därefter träffades Olsen och Wallenberg i juni på kurorten Saltsjöbaden. De fick genast god kontakt. Den amerikanske officeren imponerades av att Wallenberg var ung och initiativrik, och att han var en övertygad antifascist samt positivt inställd till USA efter att ha studerat vid universitetet i Michigan.

Amerikanerna hade gjort sitt val. Arkiven vittnar om att Wallenbergs utnämning till uppdraget till Budapest diskuterades på allra högsta nivå, och att president Roosevelt själv godkände honom.

Resten var formaliteter. Washington gjorde en brådsnande framställning om att Wallenberg omedelbart skulle anställas vid det svenska utrikesdepartementet som ambassadssekreterare i Budapest. Svenskarna hade egna skäl till att gå med på detta mycket ovanliga förfarande. Stockholm gick Washington till mötes i förhoppning om att amerikanerna skulle lätta på sina krav om att svenskarna skulle upphöra med all handel med Tyskland under kriget. Wallenberg skulle arbeta i Budapest för medel från det amerikanska krigsflyktingrådet, inrättat på Roosevelts uppdrag i januari 1944, finansierat av judiska organisationer och tätt knutet till den amerikanska underrättelsetjänsten. Men allt detta kommer lite senare. Olsen rapporterade i telegram till Washington att Wallenberg hade så bråttom att sätta igång med sitt spännande uppdrag att han kastade sig iväg med bara en ryggsäck med en revolver i, utan att ha tagit med sig varken instruktioner eller pengar...

I envig med Eichmann

Tyvärr hade majoriteten av de ungerska judarna redan utrotats när Wallenberg kom till den ockuperade ungerska huvudstaden. SS-kommandon under Adolf Eichmann, av Hitler personligen kommenderad till Budapest för att lösa "den judiska frågan", rörde sig systematiskt från stad till stad, från by till by med assistans från 20 000 ungerska gendarmar. Till den 9 juli 1944 hade man fört ut 434 353 judar ur landet – alla utom de som befann sig i "arbetslägren" och bodde i huvudstadens ghetto, som var drygt 200 000 personer.

Inledningsvis var Wallenbergs uppgift ganska blygsam: han skulle försöka ordna utresa för 300-400 judar till Sverige eller Palestina. Men hur skulle det gå till? Landet var ockuperat, tyskarna var överallt. Men efter att ha satt sig in i frågan och umgåtts med diplomater från neutrala stater lyckades Wallenberg undan för undan hitta de lokala myndigheternas svaga sidor – rädsla och pengar. Wallenberg kunde till slut, rakt framför näsan på tyskarna, komma överens med ungrarna om att utfärda 1 500 "skyddspass" till invånarna i ghettot – informella "svenska pass" som han själv hade hittat på, och som gav innehavaren en chans att känna sig säker. Senare lyckades man utöka antalet skyddspass till 4 500, men i själva verket utfärdades tre gånger fler. Med tiden fick Wallenberg "räddningsmekanismen" att fungera, och lyckades göra rena underverk. Hela hus i ghettot förklarades vara "beskyddade" av den svenska kronan. Antalet människor som räddades till livet växte till flera tusen. Enligt beräkningar idag hade minst 20 000 invånarna i Budapest ghetto Wallenberg att tacka för sitt liv.

Naturligtvis började tyskarna få uppgifter om den svenske diplomatens verksamhet. I början av december rände en tysk lastbil som av en händelse in i Wallenbergs bil och förvandlade den till skrot. Som tur var satt inte Wallenberg i bilen, eftersom man hade hunnit varna honom.

Det berättas att denna incident föregicks av ett personligt möte mellan Wallenberg och Eichmann. Lars Gustafsson Berg, före detta attaché vid den svenska ambassaden i Budapest, har berättat om detta möte. Enligt honom bestämde sig Wallenberg en dag för att bjuda hem SS-chefen och hans ställföreträdare Krumi på middag för att få veta vem han hade att göra med. I början gick allt bra. Vin, tilltugg, trevligt samtal. Men när gästerna senare

flyttade över till salongen för att dricka kaffe bestämde sig Wallenberg, avsiktligt eller händelsevis, för att dra ifrån gardinerna i salongen, och man såg hur den mörka himlen vid horisonten lystes upp av det ryska artilleriet: Röda armén slutförde omringandet av Budapest. Enligt Gustafsson Berg var synen överväldigande. Raoul hade ursprungligen inte haft för avsikt att diskutera något särskilt ämne med Eichmann under detta möte, men började nu plötsligt tala om nazismen och att kriget snart skulle vara över, och förutspådde tyskarnas totala nederlag. Gustafsson Berg anser att Wallenberg på så sätt ville råda Eichmann att stoppa deporteringarna.

Enligt Berg visste SS-officerens missnöje inga gränser. Vem hade mage att kritisera Führern, och det i en stad som till råga på allt var ockuperad av tyskarna? I den intellektuella envigen var det dock helt klart Raoul som hade sanningen på sin sida.

- Ja, herr Wallenberg, ni har rätt, - tvingades Eichmann medge. - Jag har aldrig trott på nazismen som sådan, men den gav mig makt. Jag är medveten om att min nuvarande angenäma tillvaro snart tar slut. Jag kommer inte längre att få kvinnor och vin influgna från Paris, ryssarna lägger beslag på min hästar, hundar och lägenheter, och jag, en SS-officer, blir skjuten på fläcken. För mig finns ingen räddning. Men jag vill varna er, herr Wallenberg: jag kommer att ha tillräckligt mycket tid och kraft för att stoppa er. Och då kommer ert diplomatpass inte att hjälpa er. En diplomat för ett neutralt land kan också råka ut för en olycka...

Senare bekräftades SS-officerens dystra förutsägelser. Efter att ha flytt från Budapest i december 1944, gömde sig Eichmann under många år i Latinamerika, innan israeliska specialagenter hittade honom och förde honom till Israel, där dödsdomen hann ifatt honom. Wallenberg å sin sida väntade på att Budapest, ghetton, skulle befrias. Men anade han då att hans liv skulle ta en tragisk vändning bara några veckor senare?

Döden på Lubjanka

På Wallenbergs fängelsekort, upprättat på det sovjetiska NKGB:s inre fängelse och påträffat i de hemliga arkiven först 1991, finns ett datum - 19 januari 1945. Under rubriken "brottets art" är det tomt. Detta betyder att svensken arresterades redan dagen efter ankomsten till Malinovskijs högkvarter. Officerarna inom kontraspionaget Smersj tog itu med honom omedelbart.

Man kan förmoda att Wallenberg hade hamnat i det sovjetiska kontraspionagets blickfång långt innan han dök upp på Malinovskijs högkvarter i Drebecen.

Pavel Sudoplatov, en av de högsta cheferna för det sovjetiska kontraspionaget på den tiden, erkänner att Smersj i förväg riktat in sig på Wallenberg, som misstänktes för samarbete med de amerikanska, engelska och tyska underrättelsetjänsterna. I sina memoarer "Underrättelsetjänsten och Kreml" skriver Sudoplatov att "vår agent Kuzov" (en medarbetare vid den svenska ambassaden som kommit till Sverige som emigrant i den första vågen och som arbetat för Sovjetunionen sedan mitten av 1930-talet - *författarens anmärkning*) hjälpte till att bearbeta Wallenberg i Budapest. Kuzov hade till och med misstänkt att

Wallenberg hade kontakt med den tyska underrättelsetjänsten. Man påstod sig ha fixerat att Wallenberg vid ett flertal tillfällen hade träffat den tyske underrättelsechefen Schellenberg. Det här är en uppgift som man ännu inte kunnat styrka med några dokument, men det är ändå möjligt att amerikanerna under krigets sista månader försökte upprätta kontakt med den tyska ledningen för att få till stånd separata överläggningar. Hur det än var med det – i Moskva förstod man antagligen genast vad det var för en fågel som fastnat i nätet.

Den första tiden förnekade man inte ens från Kreml att Wallenberg befann sig i Moskva. På en förfrågan från den svenska sidan i februari 1945 meddelade Sovjetunionens ambassadör i Sverige Aleksandra Kollontaj diplomatens mor att hennes son befann sig i säkerhet, under sovjetiskt beskydd... Därefter lade dock Moskva locket på och började bemöta alla svenska förfrågningar med tystnad. Förgäves skrev Albert Einstein ett brev till Stalin och bad att den försvunne Wallenberg skulle eftersökas, förgäves sände det svenska UD note efter note (sammanlagt åtta stycken) till sina sovjetiska kollegor, som i sin tur skrev brev till NKGB. Inte heller den svenske ambassadören Söderbloms personliga möte med Stalin den 15 augusti 1946 gav något resultat. Svenskarna försökte till och med koppla in president Truman på fallet, men inte heller det ledde till något.

Hela tiden som den fruktlösa brevväxlingen och sökandena pågick utanför Lubjankafängelsets murar fortsatte förhören med den arresterade Wallenberg i det inre fängelset. Idag kan vi bara ana oss till vilken inriktning man valde i arbetet med den svenske samvetsfången på Lubjanka. För det första var "svensken från Budapest" med sina omfattande kontakter en mycket värdefull informationskälla. Om Wallenberg verkligen hade förhandlat i kulisserna med tyskarna på amerikanernas uppdrag gjorde det honom till ett viktigt vittne. För det andra insåg man på Smersj mycket snart att man genom Wallenberg kunde få kontakt med svenska banker och judiska finanskretsar i USA. Direkt efter kriget funderade Stalin allvarligt på att attrahera utländskt kapital till uppbyggnaden av den raserade sovjetiska ekonomin. I samma syfte fördes samtal om att inrätta en judisk republik på Krim...

Det ska sägas att man faktiskt hade erfarenhet av att arbeta med svenskarna på det här området. Mitt under brinnande krig 1942 lyckades Moskva med hjälp av den sovjetiske agenten och kände svenske skådespelaren Karl Gerhard få till stånd en viktig uppgörelse – Sovjetunionen fick högklassiskt svenskt stål till flygplansindustrin i utbyte mot platinum. Den bank som anlätades för uppgörelsen tillhörde familjen Wallenberg...

Kort sagt hade man stora planer för Wallenberg på Lubjanka, men av allt att döma vägrade den envise svensken låta sig värvas, och värdefull tid gick förlorad. I oktober 1946 undertecknades den sovjetisk-svenska kreditöverenskommelsen på för den tiden sagolikt goda villkor. Man får förmoda att den osäkra situationen med ärtlingen till den inflytelsesrika familjen som hamnat i Sovjetunionen gjorde sitt till... Amerikanerna var ursinniga, och Stalin gjorde inget för att dölja sin belåtenhet. Mot slutet av oktober 1946 avslutades Nürnbergprocessen. Wallenberg behövdes inte längre som vittne till

amerikanernas hemliga spel med tyskarna. Till sommaren 1947 hade "fallet Wallenberg" gått in i en återvändsgränd.

Efter allt som hänt skulle det ha varit detsamma som att avslöja sig totalt om stalinregimen låtit ett sådant viktigt vittne löpa. Därför är det idag tyvärr versionen om förgiftning som ter sig mest trolig. Det särskilda "X-laboratorium" som låg i närheten av Lubjanka hade vid den här tiden utarbetat en mycket effektiv metod för att göra sig av med misshagliga personer med hjälp gift. Kännetecknande för offren var att hjärtat stannade, eller infarkt. Just den diagnosen – infarkt – ställde chefen för den medicinska avdelningen på Lubjankas inre fängelse Smoltsov hos den 35-årige intagne Wallenberg. Enligt dokumenten hände detta på kvällen den 17 juli 1947. Betecknande är också att order gavs om att kremiera kroppen utan obduktion...

Därefter följde ytterligare tio år av ändlösa brevväxlingar och förfrågningar till olika instanser, innan den sovjetiska regeringen 1957 under Chrusjtjov i ett så kallat Gromykomemorandum officiellt erkände att den svenske fången dött på Lubjanka. Sökandet efter Wallenberg fortsatte dock ända till mitten av 1990-talet. Under Gorbatjov sökte akademiledamot Sacharov efter svensken i de sovjetiska lägren efter att den tyske kanslern Kohl bett honom. Ärendet utreddes återigen under överinseende av Bakatin. Utredningen bekräftade att Wallenberg dött i fängelset. Under president Putin mot slutet av 1990-talet fattade militära riksåklagarämbetet beslut om att rehabilitera Raoul Wallenberg och hans chaufför Langfelder, trots att ingen formellt sett dömt dem i domstol (man hade ju för övrigt inte heller haft något att döma dem för).

Det kan ju tyckas att man nu borde kunna sätta punkt i fallet Wallenberg efter så många år av sökande och undersökningar, nu när även amerikanerna äntligen hävt sekretessen för sina arkiv. Men man kan ju fråga sig om de har visat allt? För det finns ju ingenting i arkiven om Washingtons kontakter med den tyska ledningen via Wallenberg mitt under brinnande krig. Men här kommer ytterligare en version, den senaste i raden. Jag hörde den nyligen från en person som är insatt i ärendet, så att säga. Enligt den här versionen ska Wallenberg i början ha arbetat för... den sovjetiska underrättelsetjänsten, som ska ha kroat upp honom i hans "vänsterorienterade ungdom". För det sovjetiska agentnätet i Sverige för och under kriget var starkt. Om detta talade också en annan diplomat från Budapest – Vladimir Krjutjov, som upplevde händelserna 1956 tillsammans med ambassadör Andropov, och som senare blev chef för KGB. Det sägs också att det någonstans finns dokument som vittnar om Wallenbergs kontakter med den sovjetiska underrättelsetjänsten, men att de bär stämpeln "Topphemligt. Arkiveras för all framtid". Så det verkar som om det är för tidigt att sätta punkt i fallet Wallenberg...

UMK

2002-08-27

Dnr	Avd	Grupp	Mål
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Jag har med sorg erfarit att Din make Per Anger har gått bort. Jag beklagar innerligt den stora förlust som hans bortgång innebär och vill på detta sätt förmedla min och regeringens djupa medkänsla och deltagande i Din och Din familjs sorg.

Exp-28/8-02

Per Anger var en synnerligen uppskattad medarbetare inom utrikesförvaltningen, med en lång och mycket meriterande livsgärning fylld av viktiga uppdrag, utnämningar och poster.

Per Angers namn är för oss alla förknippat med Raoul Wallenberg och hans tid på legationen i Budapest, där de båda gjorde avgörande och oförglömliga insatser för att rädda judar från andra världskrigets förföljelse. Vi kommer också att minnas Per för hans oförtrutna arbete med att sprida kunskap om Raoul Wallenberg och för att bringa klarhet i Wallenbergs öde.


Per Angers viktiga insatser ledde, med rätta, till att han fick motta en rad hedersbetygelser, såsom hedersmedborgarskap i Israel och Illis Quorum medalj.

Vi kommer att minnas Per Anger som den framstående diplomaten han var, men även för hans livsinställning som gjorde att han ansåg det som självklart att hjälpa människor i nöd.

För mig kommer Per Anger alltid att framstå som en ledstjärna och bli ihågkommen för den gärning han utträttade i Budapest.

Mottag än en gång mitt djupa deltagande.

Med vänliga hälsningar,



Anna Lindh

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UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

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Ungerska pressklipp i samband med Raoul Wallenbergs 90-årsdag
1 bilaga

Bifogar de artiklar som dök upp i ungersk press i samband med högtidlighållandet av Raoul Wallenbergs 90-årsdag den 4 augusti.

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Népszabadság, 5 August 2002

Commemorating Raoul Wallenberg on the "Humane Day"

President Mádl sends letter appreciating the Swedish
diplomat's heroism

A whole day long series of events commonly named "A Humane Day" commemorated Raoul Wallenberg on his 90th birthday in Budapest. "The fate of the victims of dictatorial regimes cries to sky while the fate of their rescuers obliges all of us as a permanent example to examine ourselves and to pass on the spiritual legacy rooted in facts", wrote Ferenc Mádl in his letter read out to the audience. The President of the Republic stressed that Wallenberg was a hero who not only said a definite YES to the appeal of humanitarianism, but also found the means to assert this in a determined, even self-sacrificing way.

The series of events began by the wandering exhibition that has already been displayed in the capital and several other cities, opened by Mayor Gábor Demszky for only one day this time. The exhibition was organised at 11, Raoul Wallenberg street, in the same house where the Swedish diplomat used to stay. At the opening ceremony the Mayor said: Raoul Wallenberg saved the lives of several ten thousands of Budapest Jews during the Holocaust. The soviet army captured Wallenberg in 1945 and the diplomat died amidst still unknown circumstances.

According to Demszky we are faithful to the spirit of Wallenberg if we follow his example, if we fight the forces of fascism, anti-Semitism, inhumaneness and instigation of hatred. He emphasised that the people of Budapest haven't forgotten what Wallenberg had done for them, thus his memory is preserved in the capital by a street, a statue and a memorial park, too.

The Mayor equally said: "Pál Schmitt claims to be apolitical and independent." "If being free of politics means that we do not raise against those who proclaim fascist messages and their moderate companions, then my twelve years at the head of the city are indeed not free of politics, neither will the future be so", said the Mayor. He added: if independence means independence from humanist values then I am not and I will not be independent. Gábor Demszky stated: he is convinced that Raoul Wallenberg who would be 90 years old now,

can be worthily commemorated only with this type of warrior-like humanism.

As part of this series of events wreaths were laid at the memorial and the participants took a commemorating walk. A panel discussion entitled "Symbols, stigmata and ideologies" also took place, the historical drama "K.Z." recalling the world of concentration camps was presented, as well as a "happening" instalment of rows of shoes at the Pest side banks of the Danube, in memory of the victims. To conclude the series of events candle lights were kindled in the evening at each location of the commemorations.

The series of events were organised by the Holocaust Documentation Centre and Public Foundation, the Jad Vasém Friends' Society and the Raoul Wallenberg Association, with the support of the Education Ministry and the XIII district municipality.

Emlékezés Wallenbergre a humánus napján

Mádl Ferenc levélben méltatta a svéd diplomata hősiességét

HÍRÖSSZEFOGLALÓNK

A humánus napja elnevezéssel egész napos megemlékezésorozatot rendeztek Budapesten Raoul Wallenberg születésének 90. évfordulóján. – A diktatúrák áldozatainak sorsa az égbe kiált, megmenetők sorsa pedig örök példaként kötelez mindannyiunkat önvizsgálatra, a tettek-ből fakadó szellemi örökség továbbítására – írta a helyszínen felolvasott levélben Mádl Ferenc. A köztársasági elnök kiemelte: Raoul Wallenberg hős volt, aki nemcsak lélekben mondott igent a humanizmusra, hanem eszközöket is talált annak elszánt, önmagát sem kímélő érvényesítésére.

A megemlékezésorozat kezdeteként Demszky Gábor főpolgármester megnyitotta a fővárosban és több vidéki helyszínen már bemutatott Raoul Wallenberg-vándorkiállítást, amely ezúttal ezen az egyetlen napon volt megtekinthető. A tárlatot a svéd diplomata egykor lakóhelyén, a XIII. kerületi Wallenberg utca 11. számú házban rendezték be. A megnyitón a főpolgármester utalt arra: Raoul Wallenberg sok tízezer zsidó származású budapesti életét mentette meg a vérszomorkor idején. Wallenberget 1945-



Történelmi szomorújáték a Szent István parkban

FOTÓ: MTI - RÓZSAHEGYI TIBOR

ben a szovjet hadsereg elhurcolta, s a diplomata eddig ismeretlen körülmények között halt meg.

Demszky szerint Wallenberg szellemiségéhez akkor vagyunk hűek, ha követjük példáját, s szembezállunk a fasiszmus, az antiszemitizmus, az embertelenség, a gyűlöletkeltés erőivel. Hangsú-

lyozta, hogy a budapestiek nem feledkeztek meg arról, amit Wallenberg egykor értünk tett: a diplomata emlékét utca, dombornú, szobor és emlékpark is megőröki a fővárosban.

A főpolgármester kitért arra is: „Schmitt Pál azt mondja magáról, hogy ő politikamentes és független.” „Ha a politi-

kamentesség azt jelenti, hogy nem szállunk szembe a fasiszta üzenetet hirdetőkel és mérsékelt cinkostársakkal, akkor az én 12 esztendő városvezetésem valóban nem mentes a politiktól, és a jövőben sem lesz az” – mondta. Hozzátette: „ha a függetlenség a humanista értékektől való függetlenséget jelenti, akkor én nem vagyok független, és nem is leszek az”. Demszky Gábor kijelentette: meggyőződése, hogy csak az ilyen harcos humanizmussal emlékezhünk méltóképpen a 90. esztendeje született Raoul Wallenbergre.

A rendezvénysorozat keretében megkoszorúzták Raoul Wallenberg emlékművét és emléksétát tartottak, Jelművek, stigmák, ideológiák címmel beszélgetést rendeztek, bemutatták a koncentrációs táborok világát felidézö KZ című történelmi szomorújátékot, és a mártírok emlékére létrehozott cipősor-installációt a pesti rakparton. Az eseménysorozat zárásaként este emlékműcseseket gyűjtöttek a megemlékezések helyszínein.

Az eseménysorozat a Holokauszt Dokumentációs Központ és Emlékgyűjtemény Közalapítvány, a Jad Vasem Baráti Kör, a Raoul Wallenberg Egyesület az Oktatási Minisztérium és a XIII. kerületi önkormányzat támogatásával rendezte.

Népszavazás

05/08/2002



Népszava, 5 August 2002

Commemorating Raoul Wallenberg on the "Humane Day"

- MTI information

According to President Mádl the fate of the victims of dictatorial regimes cries to sky while the fate of their rescuers obliges all of us as a permanent example to examine ourselves and to pass on the spiritual legacy rooted in facts. The letter of the Head of State was read out on Sunday in Budapest at the series of events commonly named "A Humane Day" commemorating Raoul Wallenberg on his 90th birthday.

Wallenberg was a hero who not only said a definite YES to the appeal of humanitarianism, but also found the means to assert this in a determined, even self-sacrificing way

The series of events began by the wandering exhibition that has already been displayed in the capital and several other cities, opened by Mayor Gábor Demszky for only one day this time. Demszky highlighted: Raoul Wallenberg saved the lives of several ten thousands of Budapest Jews during the Holocaust. The soviet army captured Wallenberg in 1945 and the diplomat died amidst still unknown circumstances.

According to Gábor Demszky we are faithful to the spirit of Wallenberg if we follow his example , if we fight the forces of fascism, anti-Semitism, inhumane-ness and hatred.

As part of the series of events entitled "A Humane Day" wreaths were laid at the Raoul Wallenberg monument.

Népszava Napilap

2002. augusztus 5. hétfő

Wallenbergre emlékeztek a humánium napján

Mádl Ferenc köztársasági elnök szavai szerint a diktatúrák áldozatainak sorsa az égbe kiált, megmentőik sorsa pedig örök példaként kötelez mindannyiunkat önvizsgálatra, a tettekből fakadó szellemi örökség továbbítására. Az államfő erről szóló levelét az egykor zsidók tízezreit megmentő svéd diplomata, Raoul Wallenberg születésének 90. évfordulója alkalmából tartott, A humánium napja című megemlékezéssorozat keretében olvasták fel vasárnap Budapesten. Mádl Ferenc kiemelte:


Raoul Wallenberg hős volt, aki nemcsak lélekben mondott igent a humanizmusra, hanem eszközöket is talált annak elszánt, önmagát sem kímélő érvényesítésére.

A megemlékezéssorozat kezdeteként Demszky Gábor főpolgármester megnyitotta a fővárosban és több vidéki helyszínen már bemutatott Raoul Wallenberg-vándorkiállítást, amely ezúttal ezen az egyetlen napon volt megtekinthető. Demszky utalt arra: Raoul Wallenberg sok tízezer zsidó származású budapesti életét mentette meg a vészkorszak idején. Wallenberget 1945-ben a szovjet hadsereg elhurcolta, s a diplomata eddig ismeretlen körülmények között halt meg. Demszky Gábor szavai szerint Wallenberg szellemiségéhez akkor vagyunk hűek, ha követjük példáját, s szembeszállunk a fasizmus, az antiszemitizmus, az embertelenség, a gyűlöletkeltés erőivel.

A humánium napja elnevezésű rendezvénysorozat keretében megkoszorúzták Raoul Wallenberg emlékművét.

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Népszava

A humánus napja: megemlékezés Budapesten



A humánus napja címmel tegnap estig tartott az a megemlékezés-sorozat, amelyet Raoul Wallenberg születésének 90. évfordulójára rendeztek Budapesten. Demszky Gábor nyitotta meg a fővárosban és több vidéki helyszínen nemrégiben már bemutatott Wallenberg-vándorkiállítást. A főpolgármester szavai szerint Wallenberg szellemiségéhez akkor vagyunk hűek, ha követjük példáját. Az eseménysorozatot – civil kezdeményezésre – a Holokauszt Dokumentációs Központ, az Oktatási Minisztérium, a kerületi önkormányzat rendezte meg

Fotó: Pélyi Nóra

szagor Hídap p 7. 05/08/2002

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
PRAG

TELEFAX

Sid. 1 (2)

Ambr. Erik Lindfors

2002-09-02

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2002-09-03		
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UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET nr 163 ✓

Till: Lundvik, UD-EC X

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Wallenberg-ärendet - Antonin Krüger

Bifogar fax från vårt gk i Bratislava som berör
Krüger-spåret. Sauf avis contraire vidtar vi inga
åtgärder maa. informationen.

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From: Eva Gašperanová

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D.N.: 10/40		
2002-08-27		
AVD. P	GR. 2	Wallenberg

Date: 2002-8-27
Pages: 01
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Raoul Wallenberg

Dear Erik,

We were called by Mr. Ľudovít Nášík/Návšík, from Šamorín, Jasná 5, tel. 031/5623908.

He met a certain Anton Krüger in a hospital (geriatric ward in Podunajské Biskupice) and was with him for a longer time. Mr. Krüger says he met Raoul Wallenberg in Russia in a gulag. He was present there when he died.

Krüger did not dare to speak about that because he was much afraid of Dušan Slobodník who as he says was a „kápo“ – a collaborating prisoner – in the same gulag. (Slobodník is a former HZDS politician who died some 2 years ago). Krüger does not exactly remember where this gulag was, only that it was behind the Polar Circle and the prisoners worked in anthracite mines. He says that it is not correct to say that he died 1947 in Ljubljanka.

We remember here at the consulate this Mr. Krüger. He visited our consulate one or two times. I remember that our former colleague Gabriela Silešová spoke with him and wrote a report to the Embassy. It must have been sometimes around 1995. He was more or less a homeless person and it was difficult to communicate with him because he was mentally not quite OK, with unreliable memory.

Anyway, we felt obliged to inform you. If you think it is worth talking with him we could try to find out where he is. According to the latest information we have he is probably in an Old People's Home in Štupava, 15 km from Bratislava city centre.

With best regards,

Eva

Eva



SVERIGES AMBASSAD
TEL AVIV

TELEFAX Sid 1 (1)

2002-09-06

Andreas Ekengren

INKOM UD		
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Avt P	Gr 1	Mål Angers Per

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UD-EC (Hamrin) Dnr 155 ✓

a.a.
H.H.

Kondoleans med anledning av Per Angers bortgång
1 bilaga

Översänder härmed The Raoul Wallenberg Associations
kondoleans med anledning av Per Angers bortgång.

LIDÉN



SVERIGES AMBASSAD
OTTAWA

T E L E F A X

Sid 1 (1)

2002-09-10

Pontus Melander

INK. UTRIKESDEP.		
DNR		
2002 -09- 10		
Avd.	Gr	Mål
P	1	Angers Per

BREV SVAR
020917/cfw

Utrikesdepartementet, dnr 105 ✓
Till: AME
Kopia till: X

orig (P 2 Eu 1)
(AME)

9/9 020917.

Per Angers bortgång
(1 bil)

Bifogade kondoleansbrev med anledning av Per Angers bortgång från "Canadian Jewish Congress" har inkommit till ambassaden.

Tacksam departementet överlämnar brevet till Angers anhöriga enligt önskemål.

Melander

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377 Dalhousie Street
Ottawa, Ont. K1N 9N8
CANADA

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SVERIGES AMBASSAD
TEL AVIV

Anders Lidén

TELEFAX

Sid 1 (8)

2002-09-12

INK. UTRIKESDEP.		
D.Nr.		
2002-09-12		
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EC

EC/Hamrin / JvB

020924

Fax 45 t.

Amb. Tel Aviv

a.a.

UD-EC (Hamrin), Dnr 158 ✓

Efterlysning av Wallenberg

1 bil

Max Grunberg har som bekant arbetat sedan en tid med att utforma en affisch för efterlysning av Raoul Wallenberg. Han önskar nu hjälp med distributionen av affischen i fråga. I bifogade brev till mig ber han att jag skall efterhöra med er om UD på något sätt skulle kunna bidra med distributionen av affischen. Om inte UD i eget namn vill göra detta, kanske det finns någon NGO i Sverige som skulle kunna vara behjälplig.

Grunberg återkommer också till en annan idé som han länge drivit. Han vill att en prissumma skall utlysas för relevanta upplysningar om Wallenbergs öde. Jag tror tanken har diskuterats tidigare och avvisats från svenskt håll. Men egentligen kanske den inte är så dum. Självklart riskerar man att få en uppsjö av falsk information. Men om kriterierna för utbetalning av priset är entydigt klara, kanske denna väg trots allt är framkomlig.

LIDÉN

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UD
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D.N.
173
2002-09-09
R 18 RW

Raoul Wallenberg Honorary Citizen Committee

P.O. Box 38 Ra'anana, Israel 43100 ygrun@netvision.net.il

9 September 2002

H.E. Anders Liden,
Swedish Ambassador to Israel

Your Excellency,


Thank you for taking the time to meet with me.

May I kindly ask you to convey to Ambassador Hamrin the following ideas:

- Would the Swedish Foreign Ministry be able to assist in distributing the attached Missing In Action appeal?
- As per our discussion, it is important to review the possibility of granting a financial reward for new facts on the whereabouts of Mr. Wallenberg. To the best of my knowledge, the Swedish Justice Ministry has issued in the past financial rewards for information gleaned in order to solve crimes. Old people often feel the need to reveal a secret they have harbored for many years. Given the financial hardships in the former Soviet Union, one may now give over information about the fate of Mr. Wallenberg tempted by the financial incentive along with the psychological need to reveal the truth. Although I am aware of the fact that if a government issues a financial reward for information, frauds are likely to jump on the bandwagon as well, I nonetheless feel the benefits outweigh these potential problems.

Looking forward to hearing from you.

With kind regards,


Max Grunberg

3(4)

(NAMES IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER)

- cc. Mrs. Nane Annan, (niece of Raoul Wallenberg), United Nations
Prof. Guy von Dardel (brother of Raoul Wallenberg), Switzerland
Mrs. Nina Lagergren (sister of Raoul Wallenberg), Sweden

- cc. Ambassador Johanan Bein, Israel
Dr. Jean Kloos-Fishman, Chairperson, The Raoul Wallenberg Association,
Beer Sheva
Mrs. Talya Lador-Fresher, Advisor on World Jewish Affairs to President
Katsav
Rabbi Michael Melchior, Deputy Foreign Minister of Israel
Dr. Mordecai Paldiel, Director of the Righteous Among the Nations
Department, Yad Vashem
Ambassador Dr. Dov B. Schmorak, Israel
Mr. Avner Shalev, Chairman directorate of Yad Vashem
Mr. Yaron Sideman, Counselor, World Jewish Affairs Department,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem

4(4)

PUBLIC APPEAL **to individuals who may** **have factual information** **about the whereabouts of** **Raoul Wallenberg**

MISSING IN ACTION **Raoul Wallenberg**



Age Progressed Photo
(courtesy of National Center for Missing
and Exploited Children - Horace Headner
- USA)

DETAILS ABOUT RAOUL WALLENBERG:

Among the few rays of light during the Holocaust/Shoah, were the actions of the "Righteous Among the Nations", men and women who risked their lives to save the lives of Jews from the Nazis and their collaborators.

Raoul Wallenberg, a Swedish diplomat, was born in 1912 and risked his life to save thousands of Jewish people in Hungary during World War II.

Raoul Wallenberg was therefore officially recognized by "Yad Vashem" in Israel as one of these "Righteous Among the Nations". Raoul Wallenberg is an Honorary Citizen of Israel, United States and Canada.

He was detained in Hungary in January 1945 by the Soviet Army and imprisoned in the former Soviet Union.

Raoul Wallenberg's whereabouts since then is unknown.

GOAL:

To establish the truth about Raoul Wallenberg's fate.

Despite various official declarations and rumors about his fate, the civilized world at large and Jewish people in particular, are determined to research and find the whereabouts and fate of this great fighter for humanity.

A joint Swedish-Russian Working Group was formed in 1991 with the task of examining evidence from Russian archives and from people who may have knowledge about Raoul Wallenberg's detention in Soviet prisons and camps.

The conclusion of the official Swedish report, which was published in January 2001, is that there is still no conclusive evidence in regard to the whereabouts of Raoul Wallenberg.

It is hoped that the publication of this report will help stimulate further projects and/or discoveries, particularly in Russian archives. Also research in other countries' archives may generate information that needs to be followed up in the Russian Federation.

If you have any information as to the whereabouts of Raoul Wallenberg or are able to assist in the search, please contact:

Raoul Wallenberg Honorary Citizen Committee
P.O. Box 38, Ramatana 43100, ISRAEL
Tel.: +972-54-953039 Fax: +972-9-7749495 E-mail: offices@inter.net.il

All information will also be forwarded to the Wallenberg family and the research center at the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs



SVERIGES AMBASSAD

Sveriges Ambassad
London

2002-09-13

Harald Hamrin
UD-EC

256/001

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2002 -09- 20		
Avd.	Gr	Mål
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EC

Raoul Wallenberg

Från Susan Ellen Mesinai som tydligen ingick i den rysk-svenska arbetsgruppen om Raoul Wallenberg, har jag via Sir Sigmund Sternberg, mannen bakom de många Wallenbergstatyerna världen över, fått närslutna papper. Sternberg begär å hennes vägnar om pengar för hennes fortsatta arbete i saken. Jag anser det utsiktslöst att diskutera privata sponsorpengar för projektet. Men det är kanske idé att hon ansöker om pengar från någon annan stans, om projektet anses värdefullt, vilket jag inte kan avgöra.

Mats Bergquist

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
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ambassaden.london@foreign.ministry.se

Sir Sigmund Sternberg KCSG

Star House, 104 Grafton Road, London NW5 4BD
Tel: 020 7485 2538
Fax: 020 7485 4512
Email: Rachel@sternberg-foundation.co.uk

26 June 2002

H.E. Mr. Mats Berquist
Ambassador of Sweden
11 Montagu Place
London W1H 2AL



Susan Ellen Mesinai, director and senior research fellow of the ARK Project of Freedom Channel in the U.S.A., has received an offer from Yale University Press to prepare a book on Raoul Wallenberg's fate, based on her unique access to Soviet files, as well as studies in the American, British, Swedish, Polish and Hungarian archives. Her research is unfinished and she needs to supplement it by raising research funding.

may be


She is seeking funding from a number of sources, and I wondered if you could be helpful in suggesting one or more corporate donors who would consider covering her costs, which she estimates would be no more than \$6,000 for two months' work in the U.K., which includes London room & board, the costs of copying and an honorarium.

The book is based on a truly investigative, historical, scholarly and spiritual perspective (i.e., she documents the relationship between the democratic church leadership and Wallenberg's mission in Budapest, which has never been done previously).

I enclose relevant material which may be helpful to you.

With warmest best wishes,

Yours sincerely,



Sigmund Sternberg

Enclosure

SUSAN ELLEN MESINAI

Susan Ellen Mesinai graduated with high honors from Barnard College/General Studies of Columbia University's Department of Religion (1965) where she studied with Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr and Theodor Gaster, among others. Awarded a full fellowship to the University of Chicago Divinity School to study Comparative Religion with Mircea Eliade, she chose instead to pursue traditional faiths in their own settings. In this capacity she studied for four years with Tibetan Buddhist lamas even as she was instrumental in opening the way for His Holiness the Dalai Lama to finally gain access to the United States with the assistance of the National Council of Churches. She has worked in welfare rights for minorities, including Native Americans, and in 1984 was Program Designer for the Sinai Gathering, an international gathering of world spiritual leaders to pray together in the desert for peace in the Middle East.

Author of Shlomo's Stories, favorite Hassidic tales of Rabbi Shlomo Carlebach published in 1994, she has pursued courses toward her Masters in Jewish Philosophy at the Jewish Theological Seminary with distinction. A former Board member of the Temple of Understanding, an international interfaith organization founded by Juliet Hollister, Eleanor Roosevelt and J. Nehru, Ms. Mesinai has studied and pursued a number of spiritual paths ritually, as a human rights advocate, and an author out of a deep commitment to non-violence. Her life-long interest in the fate of Raoul Wallenberg, who saved tens of thousands of Jews from Nazi liquidation only to be taken captive into the Soviet Union, was born out of this same commitment.

Ms. Mesinai is co-founder and Director of the ARK Project of Freedom Channel (formerly of the Russian Relief Fund). Initiated just prior to the August 1991 transformations in the former Soviet Union, ARK is a grass roots human rights project inspired by Ms. Mesinai's years of research into the Wallenberg case as well as her 'live search' techniques for finding missing Americans and other foreign prisoners taken into the Soviet Gulag under the Communist regime. Aided by her co-founder, Freedom Channel President Mikhail Kazachkov, once a long term political prisoner and cellmate of Anatoly Scharansky, ARK made a public appeal to the Russian people for information on the fate of missing Americans in early 1992. As a result, ARK found, identified and reunited one live American (held anonymously for thirty years in a psychiatric prison hospital) with his family. Ms. Mesinai helped bring the Russian wife and son of another who died in captivity to safety, to be reunited with their American surviving next-of-kin. For four years, Ms. Mesinai worked to trace internationally the whereabouts of a third "American" prisoner, dual national, to make certain that he attained freedom and/or that his family knew of his fate.

Through these discoveries, among the few contemporary findings of civilians to date, ARK established that anonymous foreign prisoners were being held in psychiatric facilities and asylums throughout the former USSR, into the present day. ARK's commitment to finding the truth of these prisoners' fates has led to international press coverage: U.S. News & World Report on three different occasions, the New York Times, London Times, Boston Globe, Montreal Gazette, Dagens Nhyter, Expressen (Sweden),

Jewish Week, Aufbau, and Cosmopolitan; all major American television networks (NBC, CBS, ABC) German television, Channels 1 and 2 in Russia, Channels 1 and 4 in Sweden, Danish Television, Radio Netherlands, Radio Russia, the Independent Radio Foundation (Russia), as well as a number of Russian newspapers across the former USSR. Ms. Mesinai appeared on Good Morning America after the discovery of Victor Hamilton. Her work has been cited on Equal Justice and Sally Jesse Raphael. It has twice been presented to Congress and to the European Parliament. U.S. News & World Report's 21-page article on U. S. Cold War flyers shot down over the USSR, 'midwived' by Ms. Mesinai and subsequently produced on Prime Time, won the Overseas Press Club award for 1993. The journalists donated their award to the ARK Project.

From 1994 until its dissolution in January of 2001, Ms. Mesinai was an ad hoc member of the official Swedish-Russian Working Group into the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. From December 1997, Ms. Mesinai worked as a full time consultant to the Government of Sweden, in FSB (KGB), MVD and Military Archives in Moscow --as well as in archives in London and Washington -- in an effort to reconstruct Wallenberg's fate. The interim results of this thorough search -- which includes significant findings to track Wallenberg should he have disappeared, rather than died in July 1947 -- was released in Stockholm in a separate Independent Consultant Report in conjunction with the official results of both the Swedish and Russian Governments on January 12, 2001. These findings represent a summary of only part of the work conducted by Ms. Mesinai over the past four years -- the rest awaits data from both the Russian and Swedish governments in order to be more conclusive.

Since 1991, Ms. Mesinai has pressed for the declassification of documents relevant to Wallenberg's fate and mission in a number of nations. (See 'In the Name of Raoul,' published in Stockholm's Expressen, January 28, 2001 in conjunction with the First International Forum on Holocaust Research and Education.) In America, this effort has been made possible through the active support of United States Senator Carl Levin of Michigan whose urgings resulted in the declassification of important CIA documents in 1994 and subsequently. Further efforts have resulted in materials related to those with whom Wallenberg worked in various capacities in Hungary being released to the National Archives.

In support of her work on Wallenberg's connection to the Hungarian centrist resistance, Ms. Mesinai received a grant from the U. S. Holocaust Memorial Museum while the Simon Wiesenthal Center gave ARK a grant in support of its efforts to research the fate of Wallenberg in the former Soviet Union. Additional funding has been given through consultancies to NBC-News Moscow on the issue of prisoners of war, to the U. S. News & World Report's article "The Angel Was a Spy" of May 1996, as well as grant from the family of Raoul Wallenberg's half brother and other private individuals who support the search for Wallenberg as a 'prisoner of conscience.'

Ms. Mesinai is a published poet and artist who resides in New York City.

LIQUIDATSLA

The Question of Raoul Wallenberg's
Death or Disappearance in 1947

SUSAN ELLEN MESINAI
Director, ARK PROJECT of FREEDOM CHANNEL
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Copyright: Susan Mesinai, Library of Congress, December 6, 2000.



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Susan Mesinai would like to thank the following individuals for making this work possible: Dr. Guy von Dardel, Raoul Wallenberg's half-brother, who has been an insightful inspiration, invaluable guide, knowledgeable resource and support throughout.

The Foreign Ministry of the Government of Sweden, particularly Ambassadors Hans Magnusson who has fought hard for the advancement of this work on many an occasion, Jan Eliasson, Martin Hallqvist, Sven Hirdman, Lage Olson and Jan Lundvik; the staff of the Consulate General in New York as well as Mats Foyer, Stefan Gullgren, Anders Wallberg and Eva Tojzner-Gluckman of the Swedish Embassy in Moscow; archivist Daniel Backmann, Daniel Larssen and Fredrik Hörnberg.

The Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation, particularly Vyacheslav Tuchnin, Konstantin Kosachov, and Viktor Tatarintsev as heads of the Russian side of the Swedish-Russian Working Group; Colonels V. C. Vinogradov, A. Ziborov and Y.M. Razboyev of the FSB (former KGB), S. C. Nikishkin of the MVD and his archivists; V. Filippov of the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense; Director S. V. Mironenko, Deputy Director O. V. Marinin and archivist D. N. Nokhotovich of GARF (State Archive of the Russian Federation); T. G. Zanina, V. I. Korotzev and Natalya Samsonova of the State Military Archive (Ross Archiv); Dr. Tatiana Dmitreva and S.A. Karpov of the Serbsky Institute and Ministry of Health; E.V. Bilevich of the Archive for Foreign Policy; and Anatoly Prokopenko, retired chief archivist.

For related research I would also like to thank the following representatives of the American Government: Senator Carl Levin who spearheaded declassification in a number of U.S. government agencies, particularly the CIA and State Departments; Congressman Tom Lantos, his wife Annette, and Dr. Kay King; Norman Katz, Al Graham and Captain James Connell of Task Force Russia - DPMO - the Pentagon; John Taylor of the Military Archives of the National Archives in College Park Maryland, Maria Waller, and Michael Berenbaum, formerly Head of Research and Dr. Wesley Fisher of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum.

Special thanks go to the members of my team who worked with me in Russia: Svetlana Zavrazhova, Andrey Allahkverdov, Gennadi Kuzovkin of Memorial, Alya Oganova, and Kimberly O'Haver as well as Dr. Marvin W. Makinen who worked with me in the early phases of my project - who has been both a mentor and provider in facilitating this work; Ari Kaplan who opened new doors of research through the computer; and Susanne Berger who provided supporting information from her own research in the Swedish and American archives and in interviews with the eyewitnesses. Last but not least, my thanks to Mikhail Kazachkov, who co-founded the ARK Project with me and who is President of Freedom Channel and his wife, Theresa, former associate director Boris Yuzhin who did the first translation and analysis of the documents released by the Russians in 1991, Mark V. Oppenheimer Esq. of the Russian Relief Fund and Dr. Ed Beard, Executive Director of Freedom Channel. All of these men brought inspiration, courage, important connections and helped solve many of the practicalities to this independent work.

CONTRIBUTIONS

The funding for this particular research has been provided by the Foreign Ministry of the Government of Sweden who deserve special credit for sponsoring such a groundbreaking work. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the following private individuals and organizations for their financial contributions to the ARK Project of Freedom Channel, or by providing grants directly to me to carry out aspects of this work.

Dr. Guy von Dardel and Family
Thomas L. Bird & Family
Mr. and Mrs. Manuel Brömberg
Sylvia Elias & Family
Margaret Crosby Fitzgibbon
Rabbi Ronald Greenwald
Mr. & Mrs. Ari Kaplan
Elinor Kios
Mark Oppenheimer
Paula Perlis
Mr. and Mrs. Ruthven Ryan
Helen Soos & Family

Simon Wiesenthal Center
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
NBC News - Moscow
U.S. News & World Report - Consultancy
U.S. News & World Report Reporters who donated their
Overseas Press Club Award to the Ark Project
PBS - Madison Wisconsin

Russian Relief Fund
University of Chicago - Raoul Wallenberg Gift Fund
Freedom Channel
National Alliance of Families
Edgehill Church

Raoul Wallenberg Committee of Greater New York
Raoul Wallenberg Committee of Jamestown, New York
Raoul Wallenberg Committee of New Jersey
Raoul Wallenberg Committee of the United States.

All contributions received for this work have gone directly into program - primarily 'live search investigation' in Russia as well as archival research and translation fees in archives in America, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Hungary and other nations to gather together and reconstruct information pertinent to the Wallenberg case. Apart from the research performed in Russia under the Government of Sweden, the majority of the actual research has been done over the years on a volunteer basis.

SUMMARY

The attached is an interim discussion of the issues key to the fate of Swedish diplomat and Honorary United States citizen Raoul Wallenberg, primarily as determined by putting the findings related to the 1947 date 'under a microscope.' It is not the formal interim report which I submitted to the Governments of Sweden and of Russia, which is fully footnoted and remains classified to honor the rights of privacy of prisoners and their families, and of confidentiality. In those cases where this discussion offers essential findings to understand the alternative to the claims of the past fifty-five years, I have made an exception with the text for the sake of Raoul Wallenberg and the truth. Names – except for the most celebrated – in these portions have been sanitized. Because of the above constraints, footnotes appear only in the classified version.

This discussion was created out of an investigative work in progress which has been carried out over the past three years thanks to the Governments of Sweden and Russia combined with ten years of archival research and 'live search investigation' in Russia, the United States, Hungary, Britain and Sweden as director of the ARK Project of the Russian Relief Fund, and subsequently of Freedom Channel. It consists of new findings plus excerpts from two chapters of a seven chapter approach to the issue of Raoul Wallenberg's whereabouts and fate in the Soviet Gulag. These areas include: 1. Wallenberg's Mission, an exploration of the 'Why'; Questions related to 2. Investigation and Sentencing, which focuses on the issue of 1947 – from an investigative point of view being 'too soon'; 3. Death; 4. Camps; 5. Strict Isolation and the Numbering of Prisoners, the basis of 'Disappearance; 6. Medical Sightings and Forensics; and questions related to Wallenberg's status as an 7. Illegal captive and Prisoner of War. Most of the information in this interim discussion comes from Chapters 3 and 5.

To summarize my findings, for those who may not endeavor to labor through the intricacies of my argument, they are as follows:

1. The most likely scenario is that Raoul Wallenberg did not die in July 1947, but 'disappeared' – that is, his identity was changed as either a numbered prisoner or a prisoner under a different name although he remained in the system both for purposes of interrogation and to be available in case of a possible exchange. As this constitutes a dissent to the presentations of both the Swedish and Russian governments, I have gone to great lengths to phrase an argument that would explain this.
2. As death by execution – whether by shooting or lethal injection – would have required a decision of leadership, an order and a witnessed act must exist to confirm that it had been carried out. In short, if Wallenberg was killed in 1947 as described by the Russians, there should be a paper trail. The officials presenting

these claims are expecting the public to accept their claims without such documentation. It is up to the world to insist upon legitimate proof.

3. If Wallenberg had indeed died of a heart attack in 1947 as claimed, it would be unlike Abakumov not to have registered the death in all the appropriate places since his function was both security and administrative. He himself had co-authored the regulations overseeing the reporting of deaths of foreign prisoners in 1943. In cases where heart attack is induced by lethal injection, the purpose of such a procedure would be to generate one which did not appear to be an execution but could be registered in the system to provide satisfactory closure in the case of a known prisoner. Death by lethal injection would make an accounting possible as the death could be registered with OAGS or ZAGS, the civilian regional registry for deaths.
4. If the Smoltsov document is genuine, since it does not constitute a legitimate death act – its most likely purpose would be to include it in Wallenberg's file so that it would appear he had died. This would be a necessary step to prevent further questions regarding his absence before opening a new file as a numbered prisoner or under a pseudonym. If the document was contrived later – after the deaths of both Smoltsov and Abakumov, the fact that it does not meet any of the requisites for identifying the prisoner in question as Raoul Wallenberg would leave room for a Soviet policy reversal later on. The language of the Gromyko Memorandum of February 6, 1957 -- which the Smoltsov document 'supports' -- also leaves the door open for the entire claim that Wallenberg died of a heart attack in 1947 to be reversed. The most likely purpose of this would be, again, should it be necessary to bring Wallenberg 'back from the dead' in an exchange. We know that there were probes for such an exchange of Raoul Wallenberg for the Swedish Soviet spy Stig Wennerstrom in the mid-Sixties – so this is not simply a hypothetical situation.
5. The argument that Wallenberg disappeared rather than died in 1947 is multi-faceted, based first on the fact that his name – and that of his colleague Vilmos Langfelder – were cut out of registries or blotted. As there are only four blots on names of prisoners in the registry of possessions for Lubyanka for 1947 – one of whom was numbered but later returned to Rome – the fate of the other three may be the same. They too could have lived. That is, Wallenberg, Langfelder and Katona (whose relation to this case is not yet known) may also have been numbered and the blots correspond to the removal of traces of their names and also the transfer of their possessions to another registry for numbered or renamed prisoners only. This registry would have been in the hands of the very few.

6. In an examination of the only file said to exist on Numbered Prisoners among classified Prison Department records in GARF (combined with an ongoing analysis of the prisoner cards at Vladimir Prison where Wallenberg is most often sighted after July 1947, and of the personal prisoner files I have studied), I made calculations based on the system. This shows that there are only six numbers available for three missing men that match the time period of their disappearance. The Russians claim to have already identified three of those numbers, which means that we now have three numbers for three men – Wallenberg, Langfelder and Katona – dating between June 1947 and May 1948. These files must be identified as they are quite probably those of the three men we are seeking if they were sentenced during that period.
7. If Wallenberg, Langfelder and Katona were not numbered and/or sentenced but renamed, our task is more difficult. We do however have a few documents which state this is the case. We also have eyewitness reports of two individuals at Vladimir – one worker and one prisoner, with no knowledge of each other – who identified a photo of Wallenberg under the same pseudonym. The Russians however have not produced a card under that name and the same numbers which are missing in Item 6 above are missing from the Vladimir kartoteka.
8. Dr. Marvin W. Makinen and Ari Kaplan's study of the cell occupancy of Corpus II, Vladimir Prison, back to back with my own studies for 1947, would indicate the high probability that Wallenberg was sentenced for Counter-Revolutionary activities and sent to Vladimir in July 1947 where he remained until sometime in 1948, after which he would have returned to Moscow for further questioning. There are subsequent indications that he returned at a later date (1954/1955) after many of the primary witnesses whom he had known from Moscow prisons had been repatriated. It then appears that he remained in Vladimir Prison even through the Gromyko Memorandum of 1957 (suggesting his death in 1947) and beyond. I am presuming that Wallenberg was given a second sentence around 1957 – the standard 25 year term for espionage which would incorporate his previous sentence and take note of time already served. This would mean that his longer sentence would expire in 1970 or 1972, depending upon whether they count from 1945 with its initial detention, or from 1947. It is also probable that his original numbered prisoner status was changed – either it was dropped after some years or the authorities replaced it with a pseudonym.
9. The return of Wallenberg's possessions in 1989 is the strongest evidence pointing to his having lived into the Eighties – as a number of important eyewitness have affirmed. While these require verification, prison regulations regarding the valuables and currency not confiscated upon sentencing and their return to the prisoner upon his repatriation or to the next of kin within six months of the point of death make it necessary for the Russian side to explain why Wallenberg's

currency in various foreign denominations was still 'lying around' in 1989. If Wallenberg had died in 1947 – or at any time thereafter – these monies should have been immediately confiscated.

10. Throughout this discussion, I have shown indications that essential portions of Wallenberg's file still exist – which contradicts the Russian claim that it has been destroyed or is missing. The two pieces of actual evidence we have been given – the Smoltsov document and the return of Wallenberg's currency – point directly to the existence of a file in 1957, from which the doctor's note was taken, and in 1989 – from which receipts were consulted for the return of the currency or some sort of record to determine what remained in his financial debit/credit account. The return also of Wallenberg's passports and prisoner of war card in 1989 suggest that the latter was to be found in his personal prisoner file, the former in his Archival Investigative File.
11. There exists in the former Soviet Union a meticulous record-keeping system which would enable us, or the Russians themselves if they so choose, to track Raoul Wallenberg's paper trail through a variety of means. For example, upon the issuance of my original report in 2000 regarding the importance of the currency released in 1989, the Russians issued an unsolicited response stating that all financial records pertaining to the accounts for prisoners held at Vladimir from the years 1945 to the present 'had been destroyed.' This is intended, one would presume, to discourage further pursuit of a route that could firmly establish Wallenberg's presence in the Gulag. As a panic reflex, such a reply is understandable – but not credible. One does not destroy all financial records up to the present, particularly when such a conscious act is so contradictory to the cooperation promised – and often exhibited – under the Swedish-Russian Working Group into the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. It goes without saying that the appropriate destruction documents have not been forthcoming.

I. LIFE

When Raoul Wallenberg -- a Swedish diplomat struggling to save the remaining Jews in Hungary from Eichmann's "Final Solution" -- asked to be taken to the command post of the Soviet troops liberating Pest, he set his fate in motion. On December 31, 1944 Wallenberg's name had been included on a list of Swedish diplomats and businessmen to receive Soviet 'protection' because their government represented Soviet interests in Hungary. By January 17th, 1945, the 'protective custody' being offered to Wallenberg provided a cover for something more sinister. The humanitarian hero who had saved the lives of tens of thousands of Jews from Nazi 'liquidation' was about to become an illegal captive of the Soviet GULAG.

For two days after Wallenberg and his colleague Langfelder first made contact with the Soviet troops at the spa of the Varosliget Park, he was allowed to leave the command post in order to gather his papers, some currency and valuables and to put his humanitarian affairs in order. During that time orders were being cabled to and from Moscow through the headquarters of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. By the 17th of January, Wallenberg's arrest had been ordered by Deputy Defense Minister Nikolai Bulganin at the request of Victor Abakumov, head of Smersh ("Death to Spies."). When Wallenberg set forth that day, with the motorcycle convoy escorting his car to Debrecen to meet Marshall Malinowski, he seemed unaware of any danger from Soviet troops. He was too intent on making certain that his work not have been in vain. Only his parting words to Laszlo Peto, a long term friend -- said with humor -- seem both tragic and prophetic in retrospect: *"I don't know if I am going with them as their guest or their prisoner."*

The Soviet troops' orders were to round up the foreign diplomats -- those who had not fled with the Arrow Cross government to Szombathely -- and take them to safety. According to Wallenberg, the rest of the Swedish legation was to be found on the Buda side of the city. He made a point of naming the legation's various buildings and their 'safe houses.' While noting the various location, the Soviet officers kept coming back to the fact that Wallenberg refused to leave the front line, *to move to the rear, because he had 7,000 people in his charge in the Eastern or Pest side of the City.* Although Wallenberg felt he must go to Debrecen to assure his own safety from lawless Arrow Cross bandits now roaming the City, his primary concern remained the Jewish community whose welfare he had shepherded through one siege after another since July 1944. The Swedish government had, since October 1944, refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Arrow Cross government -- leaving Wallenberg the sole go-between as long as their officials remained in Budapest. In retaliation, the Arrow Cross representatives who assumed power after the official government retreated to Szombathely, would no longer accept Swedish neutrality as an extraterritorial shield for their Jewish protegees. They would enter the houses and pull them into the streets; they threatened to blow the buildings 'to Kingdom come' with all the Jews in them.

The Soviets had, for months, been in the Budapest region and yet they delayed its liberation -- some say to limit their number of casualties. In reality, however, this valuable time allowed their agents to infiltrate and assess the 'balance of power' among key personalities and groups in the City. For example, the military corps of the Horthy government resistance group, the MFM, was infiltrated by a NKVD Major and subsequently arrested by the Gestapo. Wallenberg's disappearance on January 17th would seem to reflect the tragic coming together of two 'mysteries.' In Wallenberg's case, there is the question of why he went to meet the Soviets with so much money and, it is rumored, gold and jewels, not to mention important documents and proof of atrocities. Whom or what group was he expecting to meet? Besides the location of the two ghettos and various safe houses, what information was he prepared to offer which might

have effected history? Was he a witness to something bigger and more important? On the Soviet side, there remain the concerns of Smersh ("Death to Spies") to properly identify their enemies and the various civilian – as well as military means – which existed to counteract their occupation of Hungary. Wallenberg's arrest order is a clear indication that, for reasons unknown, he was high on that list.

Even before Wallenberg's arrest was ordered, ciphergram order Number 2058 from General Kuprianov to Major General Afonin of the 30th CK of the 2nd Ukrainian Front dated January 14th shows that the Swedish diplomat was to be cut off from the world. *Any links between Raoul Wallenberg and the outside world to be banned.* Handwritten on the side of the cable, there is a notation: That Wallenberg had been found on the 13th on Benczur Street, that *he came himself* to the Soviet troops and that he had *refused to go to the rear*. Prior to this a number of pro-Allied prisoners of war, hiding out in Budapest, had gone of their initiative to meet the Soviet troops at a designated point, only to be arrested. Sir Reginald Barratt, a British warrant officer, who had repeatedly escaped German POW camps, 'disappeared' into the Soviet Union (fate unknown), as did Colonel Marion Steifer, a representative of the Polish Army. Dutch Lieutenant Garet van der Waals, who brought the Soviet troops anti-aircraft information, was arrested and taken to Moscow prisons where he died in 1948. Van der Waals, a 'British officer' was accompanied by Karl Schandl, a Hungarian whose family had banking and rescue ties with Wallenberg. Schandl, like the Jewish engineer and Wallenberg's friend, Vilmos Langfelder, shared the fate of the foreigner he accompanied. Other than records of his interrogations and some reports from eyewitnesses during the early phase, we do not know how Langfelder fared as the result of Raoul Wallenberg's arrest. Was he only a shadow to Wallenberg or, in the eyes of the Soviets, important in his own right? But the case against Schandl was so weak that, in the end, the Russians have stated that the charges against him were 'borrowed' from Van der Waals' file.

Another American dual national, Charles Clifford Braun, an engineer working in Hamburg during the War – and probable OSS figure -- also disappeared from Budapest. Braun, believed dead by the American military forces looking for him as early as May, re-emerged in Moscow prisons as a cellmate of the Slovak diplomat, Jan Spishek who was arrested and questioned by Smersh officers in Hungary at the same time as Wallenberg. Braun was later interrogated by Daniel Kopelyansky along with Wallenberg, Langfelder and Van der Waals on July 17, 1946 in Lefortovo Prison. He was sentenced in 1951 and died in or around the Verchne-Uralsk Prison in 1953, just prior to his release and/or rehabilitation. (A number of eyewitness reports of Wallenberg show him also being held in Verchne-Uralsk Prison and camps in that region during that same time period).

By January 22nd, Smersh in Hungary had issued reports regarding the locations of the various embassies in Budapest, the numbers of those arrested by nationality (Wallenberg was the only Swede), and the instruments – including radios, weapons and equipment for sabotage – confiscated at that time. By January 25, 1945 Wallenberg and Langfelder – whose exact whereabouts in Hungary or Rumania are unclear -- were on their way by train to Moscow. Their new escort maintained the illusion that the two men were 'protected guests' – giving them the freedom to disembark and dine at a restaurant in a depot station in Rumania. Upon arrival at the Kiev railway station in Moscow on February 6th, they were given a brief tour of the metro system and then brought to Lubyanka Prison on foot. Here Wallenberg and Langfelder were separated, unlike Van der Waals and Schandl, Spishek and Braun, or the Swiss diplomats Meyer and Feller who were sent by the Soviets from Budapest to Moscow in March 1945.

On January 17th, Smersh operational officers in Moscow had arranged the placement of Richter and Schlitter, Wallenberg's first cellmates, together in a cell in Lubyanka Prison. Schlitter's

name, for the sake of this operation, had been changed to 'Shauer' to facilitate his role as informant. While seemingly coincidental, details such as the timing – an indication that the authorities were preparing for an 'important prisoner' – highlight certain features of this case. The same can be said for the separation of Wallenberg and Langfelder. *Arriving prisoners are to be placed on order from head of prison with regard to directions from the investigative body..... Investigating bodies are to give instructions about isolating same case prisoners from each other.... On returning to prison after hearing during trial, prisoners for one case are isolated from other prisoners but not from each other....* In principle this would imply that, while Raoul Wallenberg and Vilmos Langfelder never shared a cell together between February 1945 and July 1947, they could have been sentenced together in 1947-48 or sat together at a later date – if they survived their respective 'death dates' of July 1947 and March 1948. Our evidence to date would show that – while they may have both been sent East – they went to different isolation prisons. Both seem to have been brought back to Vladimir Prison in the Fifties, but did not share a cell.

As Wallenberg's criminal file is missing, the charges against him are not known. However, according to a discussion between General Key as American representative and the Soviet heads of the Allied Control Commission in Debrecen in May 1945, it had been stated that the three neutral diplomats – the Swede Wallenberg and the Swiss Meyer and Feller – had been arrested by the Soviets on suspicion of Nazi collaboration. It should also be noted that in a March 8, 1945 broadcast of Radio Kossuth, Debrecen, fellow Swedish 'diplomat' and Red Cross director Waldemar Langlet was cited as the source for a story that Wallenberg had undoubtedly died in Hungary at the hands of the German Gestapo. This set the tone for the later conjectures of Swedish Minister Steffan Soderblum to Stalin in June 1946 that Wallenberg had been murdered by robbers or had a car accident in Hungary. This in turn seems to have inspired some of the language for the denial by Deputy Foreign Minister Andrej Vishinsky of August 18, 1947 that Raoul Wallenberg was unknown to Soviet authorities and not to be found among the prisoners of war being detained in the USSR.

And yet, again in May 1945, the Soviet ACC military official Levushkin made it clear to American officials that Wallenberg had not died in Hungary, but was in Soviet hands. Swedish officials also stated to Acting U. S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson at a meeting in Scandinavia in the Fall of 1945 that Wallenberg had been taken, with his documents, to the Soviet Union and that they feared he would never return. In other words, both in the beginning and at successive stages, there were two signals being given by the Soviets – to the public at large dissuasive disinformation stating Wallenberg to be dead – but in closed meetings on a controlled level a clear statement that he was in Soviet hands. For some this implies an invitation to assure Wallenberg's return through an exchange, as the British had initiated the return of the Swiss diplomats through the ACC in Hungary. The failure of those responsible for Wallenberg's mission to act immediately during the more fluid ACC period (which lasted until July 1947) cast still more suspicion on him. By the Fall of 1946, Wallenberg in Moscow prison was drafting a letter to Stalin. According to wall tapping exchanges with prisoners in neighboring cells, after this Wallenberg was called to interrogation and, to calm him down, told by the Commissar that he should wait until March 1947 when the fate of all prisoners of war would be the subject of a conference in Moscow.

In the Spring of 1947, there were not only international discussions regarding the return of prisoners of war, but reorganizational changes within the Security organs, following upon those already initiated in 1946. In April 1947 an order was sent from I. A. Serov establishing the rules governing the care of a category known as 'numbered prisoners' to the head of Ivanovo MGB prison. We shall assume that the same document was sent to nearby Vladimir Prison. If the Soviet authorities are to be believed, by then Wallenberg was no longer considered as a

straightforward case of prisoner of war. The last references produced by the Russian side of the Swedish-Russian Working Group are a blotted registry of possessions for Wallenberg's arrival in Lubyanka (recorded March 2, 1947) and his interrogation on March 11, 1947. Besides this, we have the Vishinsky memorandum to Molotov of May 14, 1947, referring to the 'liquidatsia' of either the man or the problem caused by Wallenberg's detention, and a registry entry for the Council of Ministers from Abakumov to Molotov, dated July 17, 1947 – Wallenberg's alleged death date. While we do not have the actual Memorandum 3044a – the coincidence of date has been cited by those who support the claim of Wallenberg's death in 1947. In fact, this document could have made any one of a number of recommendations or reported several outcomes, other than execution.

Were it not for those he saved combined with serious sightings from a number of eyewitnesses in Moscow and Vladimir prisons, and elsewhere, Raoul Wallenberg might have been forgotten as so many foreigners thought to have been taken to the Gulag, fate unknown. The Russian side of the Working Group over the past ten years has provided a number of documents to establish Wallenberg's presence in Moscow prisons. Because of the absence of the complete sequence of documents for 1947 – transports, searches, cell occupancy, cells for interrogation, prolongation of his investigation, statements of jurisdiction, his medical history and death act – the question of Wallenberg's fate remains open. Any effort to resolve it – in the absence of his personal and investigative files – must be achieved through a painstaking process of 'reconstruction.' In this regard, we have eyewitness reports from a variety of sources related to Wallenberg's mission, his presence in camps, the verified reports of his presence in Moscow prisons until early 1947 – and the unverified ones which begin almost immediately after his alleged death date of July 17, 1947 and continue into the Eighties. In order to launch a systematic investigation to cluster and verify these reports, it has been necessary to establish a context in which to evaluate them. This includes some understanding of the step by step processing of a prisoner within a special contingent undergoing interrogations in preparation for sentencing as well as clues provided by the prison regime.

A number of questions must be asked as one proceeds with this reconstruction. For example, how do the various sightings of Wallenberg alive, or speculative reports of his death, relate to the norm? How can we apply proper procedures for arrest and registration, regularity of interrogation, reporting of jurisdiction, sentencing – and particularly the decisions which arose with an approaching end of prison term – to determine the next juncture of Wallenberg's fate? If he was sentenced at a certain time – what is the probability of the charges against him? What was his length of term? Where might he have gone? How does his alleged death relate to the standard – or exceptional – reporting of any other foreign prisoner? How do the later reports in the Seventies and Eighties of Wallenberg's presence in places to the East, as well as in psychiatric facilities, correspond to the general procedures or patterns of movement for a prisoner whose lengthy sentence includes both prison and camp time? Is it possible that for medical or other reasons he was eventually taken out of the MGB/MVD system altogether? How can we track a prisoner whose term has expired and yet his status has been prolonged under the label 'Especially Dangerous State Criminal'?

The details of Wallenberg's initial 'arrest' in Budapest – particularly the isolation which put him beyond reach of those whom he'd saved – would indicate that in the eyes of Soviet leadership, he was already considered an 'important State criminal.' Factors involved in confirming the charges against such a criminal were presented in a compendium of practices laid forth by MGB and former Smersh chief, Abakumov to Stalin on July 17th, 1947, Wallenberg's alleged death date.

I report to you about the practice formed in the organs of the MGB of conducting investigation on the affairs of spies, saboteurs, terrorists and members of anti-Soviet underground (organizations). 1. Before the arrest of a criminal there are measures foreseen which provide for the suddenness of the ...arrest with the object of a) averting escape or suicide; b) prevention of an attempt to inform accomplices; c) staving off the destruction of evidential data. At the arrest of an important State criminal, when it is necessary to conceal the arrest from the surroundings or when it is impossible to simultaneously execute the arrest of his accomplices, in order not to give them an opportunity to slip away from responsibility or to destroy evidential data – a secret arrest is being executed in the street or in some other especially invented circumstances.

The manner in which Wallenberg was allowed to prepare for his journey to Debrecen, to gather his documents and, it is rumored, a great deal of currency and valuables – to give final instructions to his workers in a number of different offices or clinics under the seemingly casual eye of the NKVD – corresponds to this ruse. The question is why a neutral diplomat, such an invaluable humanitarian, should be of serious interest to the Soviet authorities. Was it simply as collateral for an international game, a pawn for an eventual exchange? Or were there grounds for real charges against him?

The Importance of Wallenberg's Lubyanka Registration Card

The fact that Wallenberg's registration card at Lubyanka Prison, dated February 6, 1945, acknowledges him as a 'prisoner of war', that he remained under the jurisdiction of Smersh and later, the 4th Department of the Third Main Directorate (Military Counter-Intelligence), raises some questions about possible military implication to his mission in Hungary. (It should be noted that of the eighty prisoner files I have studied, many of whom were also arrested by Smersh, it was not usual for Abakumov personally to request an arrest and/or that the prisoner be brought to Moscow. The only other cases I have seen were high-ranking German military or naval officers.) At the same time, one should bear in mind that wartime questions of a humanitarian nature – involving the saving and movements of refugees across national borders – had to be coordinated with the military strategies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in London and Washington, and with the various intelligence groups stationed in Caserta and Bari, Italy. While Moscow was informed through the British and American Missions in Moscow of some of these activities, the Soviets were not fully apprised of the Western Allies intentions in the Balkans. In fact, in their respective campaigns in Southeastern Europe and in the neutral capitals of Europe and Turkey, the Anglo-American Allies and the Soviets were already watching, and keeping secrets from, each other.

What was Wallenberg's mission? The only non-American working as a U.S. War Refugee Board representative, his task was not only to 'observe' in the passive sense of sitting at a desk and writing reports. Wallenberg made it a condition of his service that he be permitted to save lives. We also know from his detailed record-keeping regarding the property and next of kin of those under his care, and the Nansen Plan he was creating to assure the safe reconstruction of the Jewish community in Budapest, that his work had an economic component as well.

This both originated and carried over into his special relationship with the Managing Directorship of Tungsram, also known as United Incandescent or Orion Tungsram – a General Electric, ITT, ISEC and ASEA affiliate until the U.S. declaration of war against Germany in 1941 when the Western Allies were forced to withdraw from the multi-national cartel, leaving only Hungarian, German and Swedish ownership. Wallenberg openly formed his 'Humanitarian Sector' leadership out of the Managing Directorship of Tungsram, with such assistants as Hugo Wohl,

while ASEA -- a Wallenberg owned General Electric affiliate in Sweden -- negotiated the exchange of Leopold Aeschner, Tungsram's top director from Auschwitz. Aeschner arrived safely in Switzerland on January 18, 1945 -- the same day that Soviet troops liberated Auschwitz -- and one day after Wallenberg's disappearance at the hands of Smersh. (By Christmas 1944, the Wallenbergs had also arranged through Berlin for the release of the Norman Group, a number of ASEA affiliated executive arrested in Poland and held by the Gestapo. That fact that both Aeschner and the Norman Group were ransomed from the Germans under the threat of the advancing Soviet troops -- while Raoul Wallenberg was not -- is most tragic. The answer in this case presumably lies with the Wallenberg family private archives.)

Early questioning in Budapest shows that the Soviets were already concerned about the true nature of Wallenberg's diplomatic status. *Find out what kind of secretary he is.* For Wallenberg was not a career diplomat but a businessman who traveled in Germany and the occupied countries on a Kabinetpass prior to his humanitarian mission. Wallenberg's Passport Number 248 -- returned by the Soviets in 1989 -- is also a Kabinetpass, only with the word 'diplomat' inscribed in gold leaf. As clearly Wallenberg relied upon his diplomatic status for his safety, it is important to compare this form of passport with that of a career diplomat such as Per Anger. Could the Soviets see on sight that there was something different about his papers? Did they realize also that the date of Wallenberg's passport had been extended in his own writing, although Per Anger's signature is attached?

One of the most cryptic items in Wallenberg's intake interview, reflected on his Lubyanka registration card, is Item 7, Profession/Specialty, where it is written "diplomaticheskii nadsmotr." Translated literally this means "Diplomatic foreman" -- i.e., a diplomat who oversees other diplomats to assure the productive fulfillment of an established goal. Again we come to the distinction between a passive observer and one with a more active humanitarian role -- 'like a prosecutor or manager.' Does this correspond to Wallenberg's marching orders as representative of the U. S. War Refugee Board? The fact that this label describes the way in which Wallenberg actually conducted various aspects of his mission would indicate that this was central to its structure. For example, the heroic story refers to Wallenberg's threats to his adversaries that they would be tried and hanged -- if they persisted in their crimes against humanity. Was this personal bravado or, in fact, part of his function as a diplomaticheskii nadsmotr? From the testimonies of a few individuals who worked or claimed to have worked with Wallenberg, we know that he collected evidence of atrocities -- not only against the Jews but against Hungarians in Transylvania and -- as two witnesses have testified -- even related to Katyn. Some of these existed in photographic form. Those photographs are missing. Although there is no actual proof that he took them with him to meet the Soviets, it is presumed.

Wallenberg's efforts to re-establish justice were an essential part of his rescue and reconstruction mission. The atrocities he documented, the account books he kept could have been every bit as much a reason for his arrest as the rumor that he was an American agent. Iver Olsen -- Wallenberg's War Refugee Board contact in Stockholm -- denied that Wallenberg was ever part of the American OSS. In fact, the American government -- at least after the death of President Roosevelt in April 1945 -- seemed to know little about the man. A CIA document dated March 31, 1955 from the American Embassy in Stockholm to Horsey, Deputy Director at the Department of State, after a meeting with Swedish official Gunnar Jarring, summarizes Wallenberg's mission in Budapest as follows: *For your information, Wallenberg, who is a nephew of the influential banking Wallenbergs, was assigned by the Foreign Office to Budapest in 1944 to be in charge of their Foreign Interests Section, but, more particularly, to try to do something for the Jews who were suffering severely under the German occupation.* (Underlinings mine).

While this point has been debated and denied, it should be noted that the Foreign Interest Sector was the very division of the Swedish Legation in Budapest responsible for overseeing Soviet interests in Hungary against those of 'Fascist Germany.' If indeed Wallenberg was technically in charge of the Sector – any protection afforded German-owned property or industry in Hungary or of Hungarian national or Jewish valuables being removed from there to Germany/Austria in the wake of advancing Soviet troops would not be interpreted by Moscow as representing Soviet interests. Further to this, any evidence or knowledge which Wallenberg possessed related to atrocities in Eastern Europe and the Ukraine, 'aktions' most often attributed to General Serov (Ivanov) with the approval of Stalin—would have placed him in imminent danger. As Baroness Elizabeth Kemeny-Fuchs has commented, Wallenberg was 'naïve when it came to the Russians.'

German Police Attache Gustav Richter, Wallenberg's first cellmate in Moscow in February 1945, also commented that Wallenberg's official mandate was somehow coordinated with 'protection' or 'protective powers.' *In the course of our conversations, Herr Wallenberg told me that he had been sent to Budapest in an official capacity (amtlicher Eigenschaft) in order to carry out a protective mandate (Schutzmachtauftrag).*⁵ While on the surface this could refer to Wallenberg's diplomatic status for his humanitarian mission, we must dig deeper to determine the way in which it was licensed and structured in order to understand its true intention. Was it to save lives or to save interests? Wallenberg's efforts to save Jewish lives by making deals while, at the same time, keeping Hungarian economy and certain interests intact, may account for the conflict between protecting Jews and their property (a mandate of the Western Allies' "Safe Haven" program) and protecting Soviet interests in Hungary.

We see signs of this in that, after Wallenberg's arrest, Sector B of the Foreign Interests Sector of the Swedish Legation was forbidden by the military command to represent any foreign powers *All foreigners (i.e., all non-Russians and non-Hungarians, therefore really also Swedes) would be referred to the City commandant's Foreign Bureau which, as mentioned earlier, was headed by the former Swedish Embassy officer, Count Tolstoy.* Tolstoy, described by the head of Polish intelligence in Budapest as an 'anti-Semitic pro-Fascist agent of the NKVD', had kept diligent notes on both Raoul Wallenberg and the Wallenberg family's interests in Hungary, according to one archival expert. Tolstoy's file in the SVR (Foreign Intelligence archives) has not been shown to the Swedish side in spite of repeated requests.

While we have neither enough information about Wallenberg's mission nor any known analogy for the Soviet use of the term diplomatscheskiy nadsmotr to evaluate this matter further, we do know that whatever was recorded on Wallenberg's registration card was not done arbitrarily but corresponded to materials to be found in his archival investigative file. In this case, "Passport 248, Foreign Ministry of Sweden," is even written on Wallenberg's card just underneath the term diplomatscheskiy nadsmotr. Judging from the contents of the files we have seen, we may assume that this term was not introduced by Wallenberg himself during the intake interview. Had it been, it would have been inscribed – "By his own words." Furthermore, as will be discussed in Section II. DEATH, there are certain aspects to the incompleteness of the card which would indicate that it had not been retrieved from the kartoteka of Lubyanka Prison where it belonged, but from the back of his file – which we have been told is missing, or destroyed.

The question is whether Wallenberg's seemingly neutral mission had more sensitive political overtones as well. We can see from Wallenberg's calendar for Budapest – returned by the Soviets in 1989 – that he had a number of meetings with representatives of different political factions in Hungary. One of the first was with Dr. Geza Soos – diplomat of both the Cultural and Scandinavian Departments of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. By November 1944, Soos – a

pastor and jurist – had become the Secretary and head of the Magyar Függetlenségi Mozgalom (MFM) in the absence of Domokos Szent-Ivanyi who was in Moscow negotiating the Armistice. The OSS in Caserta in their search for Soos in November 1944 had both Per Anger and Wallenberg's names as those who would know where he was to be found. After the arrest of the military leadership of the MFM by the Gestapo, Soos – who had been in hiding – escaped to Italy with a separate peace proposal for the West. These papers, taken from him by Allied interrogators, are missing as well.

In addition to all the known political figures with whom Wallenberg had meetings, he also met on November 26 and December 3 1944 with members of the EXZ, a secret nationalist society whose members included Catholic and Protestant leadership, aristocracy and clergy working together toward a pro-democratic unity in Hungary. Among these was former Hungarian Prime Minister Count Istavan Bethlen, a leader of the Smallholders Party. Bethlen had hidden from the Germans since their occupation in March 1944; the Soviets kept him under 'house arrest.' To prevent Bethlen from becoming reinvolved in the political life of the country, particularly because of his pro-British orientation, Bethlen was also arrested by Smersh at the orders of Molotov and brought to Moscow where – by some reports – he was interrogated by Abakumov. He died on October 5, 1946 from *paralysis of the heart*. But Bethlen was old – Wallenberg only thirty-two at the time of his arrest. Espionage aside, Wallenberg's connections with a number of different networks made him a valuable source for the Soviets. His age gave him a good chance for survival – at least until he had been 'thoroughly debriefed' in the course of his investigation, which normally took six to seven years.

There is, on the other hand, another important aspect to Wallenberg's registration card that should be considered: the fact that he was registered at Lubyanka (Internal Prison Moscow) under his name. The Lubyanka Possessions Registry for 1945 also shows him entering and exiting from Internal Prison under his name. The importance of this can be seen in the disclaimer introduced in the Gromyko Memorandum of 1957. *The Soviet authorities thoroughly examine archives related to prisoners and their investigative files in order to find possible information about Wallenberg. But as a result of these measures, one cannot find any data that Wallenberg was in the Soviet Union. It became clear that no one who was debriefed knew anyone whose name is Wallenberg.* In short, those who might have known the name of Wallenberg are dead, no longer actively involved in the administration, or not about to reveal themselves. If Wallenberg did still exist as a prisoner of the Soviet Gulag, it could only be under a (number or) different name. This is the equivalent of being 'lost in the Gulag', only instead of this being a problem of a vast territory with no coordinated tracking system, we are referring to a highly centralized 'watch' system which can recall a prisoner to Moscow even from the Far East in a matter of days and which can oversee from afar a select group of prisoners whose identities have been erased.

The fact that Wallenberg, in February 1945, was lured to Moscow and introduced to the prison system under his real name should be compared to the treatment of the members of the Polish Government in Exile who had been invited to a meeting in Moscow in March of that year. Rounded up and arrested by Serov (Ivanov), the members of this group were immediately numbered – starting with Number 2 for Okulicki, as the leader of the Home Army (who died in December 1946 as the result of a hunger strike) or Deputy Premier Jan Stanislaw Jankowski, an important figure in Polish counter-intelligence, particularly after the death of Premier Sikorski at Gibraltar in 1943. Jankowski died just prior to the end of his term in March 1953. The rest of the numbered Poles, all of whom appeared in a public show trial in June 1945, were given less severe terms and repatriated.

The 'Polish arrested' were numbered solely for the period they were *under investigation*. They appeared for public trial under their names, after which they were known as '*the convicted Okulicki*,' etc. During the investigative period, their identities were hidden from prison personnel by their numbers, while they underwent intense interrogation under the jurisdiction of the Especially Important Matters Division. Another group that was numbered, as early as 1943, were the leaders of the Baltic nations arrested in the Penza, Kubishev or Tambov regions in 1941 (where, presumably, they too had been invited for their protection and safekeeping.) Until 1946 these families were held in Kirov Internal Prison, after which they were transferred to Ivanovo MGB – with a slight adjustment in numbers in keeping with what would appear to be a more centralized system controlled by Moscow Central. One member of this group – Prisoner Number 12 – was sent to Kazan Psychiatric Prison hospital to undergo treatment – again under his number, not his name. These prisoners were under the jurisdiction of the 2nd Main Directorate. They were held *under investigation* until 1952 when they were brought to Moscow to be sentenced. After sentencing, they received new numbers and were sent to Vladimir where – in late 1953 – like the other numbered prisoners known to us, they were allowed to resume use of their name. Except for those who died, the majority of these prisoners were repatriated to their respective homelands in 1954.

Wallenberg – and perhaps Langfelder's case – tend toward the opposite. For the first two years of their detention – although the Soviets would not openly admit to their respective governments that they had seized them – these men were permitted a number of different cellmates who knew them by their names. They were processed under their names. Their presence within the contingent of prisoners was established – both orally and written. We have seen documents indicating that by April 1947, a decision had been prepared – but not yet reported – regarding Wallenberg's fate. This decision could as easily have involved his 'disappearance' as his death. The evidence supporting this is that while Wallenberg and Langfelder's names have been either cut out or blotted out of different registries (the manual removal of their names), no attempt has been made to account for their deaths in the regular way (register their deaths but fake the cause of death).

In their cases then, they may have been tried in closed session by OSO (the Special Tribunal) in a trial they probably were not permitted to attend, so they never saw the evidence or knew the charges against them. After their sentencing, they would be sent out of Moscow as a Numbered Prisoner or under another name, while those in charge of their cases would retain their true identity (as noted on their original registration card) in an envelope at the back of their new file. Even if this identity was changed from place to place, this sequence of identities could be noted by holding their registration cards. This may explain why Langfelder's card is still missing and Wallenberg's – which was returned – makes no mention of his return to Lubyanka in March 1947, much less of his alleged death in July 1947. This establishes the time when the card was removed from the general *kartoteka* as being late February 1947, perhaps even the very day that Roedel was sent on ahead to Lubyanka and Wallenberg kept somewhere other than Cell 203 Lefortovo.

The documents the Russians have presented establish that Raoul Wallenberg was registered under his name from his initial registration in February 1945 through his transfer from Lefortovo Prison to Lubyanka on March 1, 1947 – at least until his interrogation by Kuzmishin on March 11, 1947. Therefore, if he 'died' or 'disappeared' some document should exist to inform those departments whose function it is to confirm a prisoner's status or whereabouts of what had happened. Even if Wallenberg's death/disappearance constituted 'exceptional' circumstances, the process of clearing and removing his paper trail would require some order – oral or written – warning the official trying to follow the normal procedures *not to inquire any further*.

Wallenberg's Investigative Process

Not knowing the charges against Wallenberg at the point of his initial arrest, it is difficult to predict his course. All that we know comes from documents provided by the Russian side of the Swedish-Russian Working Group since 1991. While it has been openly claimed that Wallenberg was accused by the Soviets of being an American spy, there are definite indications that he was also considered as a German collaborator, a British agent and a member of Swedish intelligence. The latter was rumored particularly in Glasnost when the Russians returned Wallenberg's possessions and stated they had made a *tragic mistake*. In trying to identify the nature of the 'mistake' it was mentioned by Russian experts that the Soviets were looking for a Swedish intelligence agent but may have arrested the wrong man.

According to the authorities and his cellmates, Wallenberg was interrogated rarely in the beginning (February – May 1945), although the eyewitnesses recollected more frequency than the documents turned over by the Russian side would confirm. We know of only five Wallenberg interrogations through the Russian side of the Working Group, ranging from February 8, 1945 to March 11, 1947, all under Smersh or its later incarnation, the 4th Department of the Third Main Directorate. As the Swiss diplomats Meyer and Feller were also interrogated rarely, we may see this as an example of neutral diplomats who are essentially being held as pawns in the international game.

Yet witnesses such as the Italian diplomat, Claudio di Mohr (who claimed Wallenberg was still alive in 1948) – judging from the sounds related to Wallenberg, and his cellmate Willi Roedl, emanating from an adjacent and/or audible cell in Lefortovo – stated that the two were taken out frequently at night for interrogation. One would expect a prisoner as knowledgeable and diversely connected as Wallenberg to have been a valuable source for the various Soviet foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence units as they sharpened their tools in preparation for the Cold War. A first step was always identification of personalities in other countries, for which Wallenberg's calendar and address books – returned in 1989 – served a useful purpose. In this regard, retired KGB officials Sergei A. Kondrashev stated that he served as interpreter for one interrogation in April 1947 in which Wallenberg answered questions related to names on a sheet – so calmly and openly that Kondrashev was convinced the man was innocent.

Of the known Wallenberg interrogations, there are two which stand out because they overlap with those of other figures potentially related to Wallenberg's fate. The first is Wallenberg's interrogation of April 28, 1945, coincidental with Burashnikov and Kopelyansky's joint interrogation of Count Istavan Bethlen and Rassypinski's of Deputy Premier Jan Stanislaw Jankowski. We do not know the subject of the Wallenberg interrogation (unless Kondrashev has confused the year), nor can Jankowski's be found, but the authorities have informed us that the Bethlen interrogation involved *biographical data, connection with the Senate and Foreign Affairs Committee of Hungary, politicians in the West and withdrawal from the War* – in other words, offers of separate peace. (Underlinings mine).

In late August and early September 1944, a number of Hungarian peace feelers went out toward the Western Allies – in Madrid, Istanbul and Bern. The most detailed came through discussions between 'the young Count Bethlen' and a British representative in Spain while Regent Horthy remained in closed council in Buda with 'the old Count Bethlen', the former Minister for Foreign Affairs de Kanya and former Prime Minister, Gyula Karolyi. While the proposals for action vacillated between *turning on the Germans and making it impossible for them to hold a line on*

the Danube 'to relying upon German aid to defend Hungary against a Russo-Rumanian invasion, one point remained firm: *Regent has ordered the deportation of Jews to cease and Hungarian Government alone* (as opposed to the occupying Germans) *will henceforth handle the question.* In this one respect at least, one can identify the task of Raoul Wallenberg. Wallenberg, who was to have returned to Stockholm at that time, actually remained in Budapest while members of the Hungarian 'Crown Council' deliberated how best to effect an armistice – to the Allies through the neutral legations in Budapest or through the commander-in-chief of the Red Army.

Deputy Premier of the Polish Government in London, Jankowski, operating in Eastern Europe under the code name 'Sobol', contributed to the rescue of Jews by providing Polish intelligence to the World Jewish Congress and the Joint Distribution Committee. On April 15, 1944, for example, he wrote:

From Teresienstadt in the Protectorate where the Czech Jews are concentrated, the Germans – under the guise of giving them jobs – moved 7,000 Jews to Auschwitz. Two weeks later they gassed them. Before they killed them (the Germans) took from them written letters to their cousins and friends with description of their good working conditions. This is a trap for the next groups...In Hungary there are presently 800,000 Jews. The Germans have started already their action to liquidate them...Here in Poland the action of tracking and liquidating the Jews is still on...

The leaders of Poland and Hungary both faced grave danger from two opposing totalitarian forces intent on occupying their countries and subduing their national spirit. In Hungary a firm stand on the Jewish question was presented as a positive reason for the Anglo-American forces to consider a separate peace in spite of their commitment to Stalin in 1943 of 'unconditional surrender.' As a Government in Exile, the Poles were involved in a different aspect of the Jewish question. While Hungary until the German occupation offered a safe haven to the Jews, Polish intelligence through Jankowski provided an important network for intelligence gathering for Polish, Allied and Jewish questions. The Catholic component of this network, through the Prince Primate families, assisted in the rescue of prisoners of war and, in some cases, Jews. Their network reached from Cracow to the Vatican. It was to Baron Apor, Hungarian Minister to the Vatican, that Geza Soos, a Reformed Church leader, jurist and Secretary of the Hungarian resistance movement MFM, carried the final Hungarian separate peace offer to the Allies – which was intercepted in Caserta/Bari. These papers also have disappeared.

How these networks cooperated in the rescue of Jews and prisoners of war and in the documenting of atrocities is the subject of a greater work. One should note, in terms of the interrogation in question on April 28, 1945 that none of these three men – Wallenberg, Bethlen or Jankowski – were ever repatriated to their homelands.

The second interrogation which shows an overlap of case-related individuals is that performed by Kopelyansky on July 17, 1946 – one year before Wallenberg's alleged death date. On that day, Kopelyansky interrogated Wallenberg, Langfelder, Van der Waals and Braun in Lefortovo Prison. In the cases of Wallenberg and Langfelder there is an actual overlap in time – indicating that the investigator went back and forth between their respective interrogation rooms. What question was he pursuing that he used this interesting procedure? (Or, was someone of an extremely high rank present but Kopelyansky signed for both.) While we have been told that Wallenberg and Langfelder's files are missing, we have requested protocols of interrogation for Van der Waals and Braun for that date to see if we can determine the line of inquiry. These too have not been forthcoming. Again we should note that all four of these men did not make it to

freedom. Wallenberg allegedly died in 1947, Langfelder in March 1948, Van der Waals of tuberculosis in August 1948, Braun of the same in Verchne Uralsk in 1953.

The Question of Sentencing in relation to 'Liquidation'

Both the Russian side of the Swedish-Russian Working Group, and Alexander Yakovlev of the Presidential Commission for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression under Stalin have stated that Raoul Wallenberg was never sentenced. This is an extremely important claim – first, it cannot be established as fact without referring to Wallenberg's investigative file and/or establishing the identity of every prisoner sentenced 1947 – 1952 by the Military Tribunal or OSO (Special Tribunal) – including numbered prisoners. Secondly, as both Russian inquiries are claiming Wallenberg died from execution – whether by lethal injection or shooting – this would also imply a sentence or decision. (Oggins, who was said to have been killed by lethal injection in 1947 had been sentenced long before – his term was about to expire. Gfrorener was sentenced by the Military Tribunal to death by shooting in February 1952 and was actually shot in April of that same year.)

What is being implied here by the current Russian execution claims is that Wallenberg's death was ordered while he was still *under investigation*. There is something wrong with this – especially since in 1947, judging from the other prisoners with whom Wallenberg sat or whose case was related, his investigative process was barely underway. Recruiting was not the only consideration of the Soviet investigating bodies – there was a tremendous amount of information to be gleaned from a 'talking man.'

Valeri Boldin, in an article in Top Secret, March 1999 stated that among the documents found in Stalin's safe immediately upon his death in March 1953 were stenographic transcripts of Wallenberg's interrogations as well as communications from Abakumov regarding a prisoner Mueller being held in a special site in the Urals. (The claim that Eichmann's boss, Heinrich 'Gestapo' Mueller, was held by the Soviets has been made both by Walter Schellenberg in 1948 and the KGB defector Deriabin in 1971.) The investigators told Abakumov that they received all the data they needed from Mueller – and wanted to know if the prisoner should be kept on or if the case should be closed for good, *so information on the person does not leak*. It should be noted that all the activity in the Spring of 1947 to resolve the problem of Wallenberg's known captivity followed a leak by two Soviet security men at a cocktail party in Moscow, where it was revealed to the Swedes that Wallenberg was in Moscow prisons and under the watch of top security officials. In this context, it is the 'leak' which must be resolved, not the execution of a man whose knowledge could prove useful in Cold War realpolitik.

General Yevgeni Pitovranov, head of the 2nd Main Directorate (Counter-Intelligence) at the time that Abakumov was in charge of the 3rd (Military Counter-Intelligence), stated to Swedish television in 1992: "*Stalin needed him (Wallenberg) in the big political game and would never have executed him.... His death was a mistake.*" And, indeed, 'a mistake' is the only possible explanation for what could have happened in 1947, if it happened then. First, none of the appropriate medical personnel who usually sign off on the death of prominent foreign prisoners are taking responsibility for what happened. This is left to A. L. Smoltsov of the Sanitary Unit of Lubyanka Prison. Smoltsov, according to Yakovlev, had already been dismissed for reasons of health on March 21 1947 and was not working on July 17/18, 1947 when his note describing the death of one *Walenberg* by heart attack was supposedly written. By 1957, when Smoltsov's note surfaced in support of the Gromyko Memorandum suggesting Wallenberg's death, the doctor was also deceased.

Secondly, one KGB expert has made the point that the reason the akt had to be witnessed was to establish that the death was not the result of violence or foul play. Item 8 of Abakumov's report to Stalin of July 17, 1947 on investigative procedures in dealing with a prisoner does not rule out such a possibility.

The MGB organs according to the CC VCP (B) (Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party) instructions of 10 January 1939 use measures of physical coercion toward spies convicted by investigation, saboteurs, terrorists and other active enemies of the Soviet people who impertinently refuse to give away their accomplices and do not testify: In the Center – with the sanction of MGB USSR. In the regions – with the sanctions of State Security Ministers of republics and of heads of (regional) Departments of MGB.

This paragraph is, however, particularly controversial to the Russian side of the Working Group who maintain that there were specific orders not to use torture and that this compilation – attributed to Abakumov -- may not in fact be a 'real' document. The files themselves would confirm that the investigators kept watch over their prisoners, as in the cases of Kitschman or Gerstenberg, sending them to the doctors for evaluation to see if they could withstand further interrogation.

Thirdly, if a decision was made to liquidate Wallenberg in the sense of 'execution', it would have required a sentence by Military Tribunal or a sequence of discussions within the circle of the highest level of Soviet leadership, followed by a decision and then an order, with a witnessed document to affirm that it had been carried out. No one is admitting responsibility for this either. They do however acknowledge – even volunteer the fact – that on May 26, 1947 rasstriel (death by shooting) was canceled and not resumed until January 12, 1950 in anticipation of the Leningrad trials, which ultimately became part of Abakumov's downfall. Reintroduced, the penalty was to apply to traitors to the country, spies and subversive diversionaries – and other groups of political offenders. On April 30, 1954, its use was extended to apply to cases of murder.

Much of the argument related to the recent speculations that Wallenberg was executed, either by shooting or lethal injection, relies on the absence of documentation to eliminate contradiction. (That is, without documentation – the truth can never be affirmed one way or another.) Conviction that stories of Wallenberg's execution are true are sparked by the 'common knowledge' that in Stalinist times quick, retaliatory executions were everyday. Former KGB official Ilya Dzhirkvelov repeatedly makes the point – both in relation to purges of Party leadership or assassinations as prepared by Liter L, the 'Liquidatsia' unit, under Sudoplatov – that these procedures were not done in a climate of *total lawlessness organized by the NKVD and Stalin personally but were carried out in strict accordance with laws that are still in force today.*

Dzhirkvelov also states that the only exception to the rule of a collective decision involving members of the Politburo with a particular connection to the KGB was *when Beria was in charge of Soviet intelligence and counter-intelligence: he had the right to approve such operations and to inform Stalin about them orally.* While the Soviets who prepared the Gromyko Memorandum of 1957 attributed such license-to-kill to Abakumov, Beria's role in defining the 'exception' should be considered further.

If Wallenberg Was Sentenced, When?

Had Wallenberg been sentenced rather than killed, my calculations would show that the earliest date this could have happened – given the procedures in question -- would have been June of 1947. In such a case, the charges against him would most likely have been 'Counter-Revolutionary Activities', i.e. involvement with nationalist, religious or international networks opposed to Soviet occupation or influence in Central and Eastern Europe. The preparations for this trial would coincide with his period of Wallenberg's isolation in Lubyanka/Lefortovo prisoners starting March 1, 1947 until a decision was made and his file sent to OSO. *Prisoners accused of Counter-Revolutionary crimes are to be isolated from other prisoners and from recidivists.* A sentence for Counter-Revolutionary crimes was generally lighter than that for espionage. Those in the group with whom Wallenberg had been initially placed were not given their 15-25 year sentences for espionage until 1951-52, after more than a hundred interrogations in several cases

Bearing in mind that prisoners associated with this case did on occasion receive more than one sentence, this initial sentencing in 1947 carrying a term of ten years or less would serve the positive function of removing Wallenberg from Moscow prisons. *When the sentence is passed or decision made by OSO (Secret Tribunal), the prisoner is to be moved from investigation cell to convicted cell and then sent away.... Convicted prisoners cannot stay in prison more than ten days after the Prosecutor's decision comes into force or the OSO decision is announced.* Under exceptional circumstances, *the prisoner can be detained for operational purposes for up to two months by a written order from the head of the UNKVD or his deputy, with indication of the purpose.* In 1947, this would have involved an order from Selivanovsky and/or Abakumov of the MGB. It should be noted that prisoners Shulgin, Volkov and Kutepov as well as Numbered Prisoner 15 – all sentenced by OSO on June 26, 1947 arrived in Vladimir Prison either on July 25th in the case of those named, or August 3rd in the case of Number 15. Eyewitnesses have reported that Wallenberg was first sent to Vladimir at the same time as Shulgin. This not only conforms to the above definition of an exception, but would reinforce the theory that Wallenberg might have been Number 14.

This brings us to the question of concealing a prisoner's identity by numbering him or her, or giving him or her a pseudonym. By studying the sequence of numbered prisoners sentenced by OSO at that time (the Spring/Summer 1947 until May of 1948) I was able to determine that there exist only six available numbers to account for the possible disappearance of three men – Raoul Wallenberg, Vilmos Langfelder and Sandor Katona who was brought with Langfelder to Lubyanka Prison on July 23, 1947 where Langfelder was questioned extensively, for over eleven hours. These numbers will be discussed further in III. DISAPPEARANCE but are being mentioned now to remind the reader that there existed a clear cut option to 'liquidation' as execution and an apparatus to implement it which was very much in place.

The Question of 'Liquidatsia'

We know now, through documents provided by the Russian side, that Wallenberg's presence in Moscow prisons under the MGB was known to representatives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry as early as 1946. We would expect Stalin, Molotov and Beria, (hence Vishinsky, Lozowski and Dekanozow as their deputies), to have been aware of Wallenberg's capture soon after his arrest. In a communique between Borashnikov of the 3rd Main Directorate and Chebotarev of the

Foreign Ministry regarding the case, it was stated to MID: *it would be desirable if Comrade Vishinsky gave a call to Comrade Abakumov on this issue.* This was followed by an oral communication between Fedotov, of MGB, and Rodionov of February 1947 informing him that Wallenberg was raspodejane, 'under the control of the MGB.' In a follow up report from Vietrov to Vishinsky dated April 2, 1947 we learn: *Comrade Fedotov promised to report to Molotov about the reasons for Wallenberg's detention and also to give the proposals on further measures on the issue. However, according to Fedotov's information this issue has not been reported yet but has been already prepared.* We therefore cannot assume that Vishinsky's denial of August 18, 1947, *"As a result of a careful investigation it has been established that Wallenberg is not in the Soviet Union and that he is unknown to us,"* was based on ignorance of the real facts of Raoul Wallenberg's status.

The question then is whether Vishinsky's response of August 18, 1947 was intended to conceal Wallenberg's alleged execution on July 17, 1947, or was rather a standard statement issued to foreign governments inquiring after prisoners of war to avoid endless diplomatic wrangling for their return. Similar language, for instance, has been seen in a reply by Vishinsky to the British regarding the warrant officer, Sir Reginald Barrett, also arrested in Hungary. It also was expressed by Novikov in relation to Nils Hilding Jorganson, a Managing Director of the von Oppeln Company, who disappeared on February 5th, 1945 near Dresden. *Inform you that the Swedish subject is not detected on the territory of the Soviet occupation zone.*

While the intention reflected in the Vishinsky memorandums of 1947 is always ambiguous, his catalytic role in shaping Wallenberg's fate seems clear. The most critical document, religiously evoked to establish the Soviets' intention to kill Wallenberg in 1947, is that of Vishinsky to Foreign Minister Molotov of May 14, 1947. Here Vishinsky notes that – in response to repeated inquiries from the Swedish government, he has requested clarification from Smersh ("Death to Spies") and later the Minister of State Security (both Abakumov) regarding the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. *Insofar as the case remains unresolved until the present moment – i.e., nothing is moving; no one cares to resolve it – I ask you to order Abakumov to present information on the subject of this affair and suggestions for its liquidatsia.* Molotov wrote on the same document to Abakumov: *Report to me.*

The controversy that exists among experts – both scholars and former KGB officials as well as the Russian representatives – is whether this word 'liquidatsia' refers to Raoul Wallenberg, the man, or the problem generated by his presence as a captive inside the Soviet Union. Is this a simple matter of 'reporting back' or a more sinister 'hint' to execute the man?

Interpreters in the West have, with great conviction, latched upon this word 'liquidatsia' to mean 'death', as indeed it would have meant if speaking of the Holocaust. However, it is very important – in the absence of Wallenberg's file – to place this language in a context. Take, for example, the parallel cases of PRISONER S and PRISONER C, two pro-Allied Hungarians arrested in the Budapest region, who were held in Lefortovo Prison for years without being interrogated. *We inform you that according to Abakumov's instructions, (PRISONER C) is to be kept in Internal Prison without the usual documentation until special instructions....*" (17 December 1946). Two years later, protesting violations of investigative procedure, Ionov, Chief of Lefortovo, wrote a succession of letters to the Chief of Section A, Major Burashnikov (October 1948), to the head of the Investigative Section for Especially Important Matters, Leonov (January 28, 1949); and the Chief of the 2nd Main Directorate, Pitovranov (December 30, 1949). Ionov was particularly explicit in his letter to Leonov when he stated that, in spite of repeated oral and written attempts to resolve the matter, it remained as before. *The indicated sections do not wish*

to acknowledge them as their prisoners. I request explanation and to take all measures to move the question ahead. (Underlinings mine).

In view of the parallel between Ionov's language '*to take all measures to move the question ahead*' and Vishinsky's to Molotov, *to present information on the subject of this affair and suggestions about its liquidatsia*' (meaning to report on it so that a decision could be made) it is important to pay close attention to the means taken to put an end to the problem in the cases of PRISONERS S and C. Ionov had written to a number of different offices in an attempt to determine who was responsible for these prisoners. While he applied to the division of Especially Important Matters and to the 2nd Main Directorate – both of whom prepared cases for sentencing – his reply came from Department A on the 10th of February 1950. *Not to give a report on the arrest of the arrested...PRISONER C (year of birth 1920) and PRISONER S (year of birth 1912) in Lefortovo Prison.*

However, on April 13, 1950, charges were finally placed against PRISONER S as an agent of British intelligence (PRISONER C was in fact a British officer). Both were sentenced on July 1, 1950 and sent to Vladimir Prison as numbered prisoners 24 and 26 respectively. Together with PRISONER P, a Hungarian officer with contacts – it is rumored -- with both the British and Soviet intelligence, these three form a series. They were sentenced together by OSO on July 1, 1950. Together they traveled to Vladimir where they were placed in Corpus II. All three were repatriated. Their cards appear in the kartoteka, along with that of another unknown Hungarian – Prisoner Number One – whose card bears the label 'American spy.'

PRISONER S and PRISONER C's cases were, in their way, a violation of the norm. And yet when Ionov sounded the alarm, the solution was not to kill the prisoners to remove the problem of an illegal or undocumented arrest. It was rather to come to a decision – i.e., arrest, sentence and send him out as a numbered prisoner – all within a matter of months. Their numbering does not reflect the system's desire to conceal a violation from itself – assuming that is even possible – but rather to resolve the problem by sending them into a facility that provided strict isolation, where their identities would be unknown. This was especially important because both men were valued by the British – PRISONER S because he had housed Special Operatives Executive personnel in Hungary and PRISONER C because he was a Lieutenant in the "British Army" in Hungary (an Army created by the British using Hungarian personnel). Their return had been repeatedly requested, as well as clarifications of their fates, by the Foreign Office. In other words, in their cases as in Wallenberg/Langfelder's, there is pressure to resolve the cases (come to a decision) from without, through diplomatic channels, and within (holding to prison administrative regulations).

This 'disappearance' format corresponds to information provided by one ex-KGB official asked to comment on the Vishinsky and Gromyko Memorandums. Without hesitation, he interpreted "liquidatsia" to refer to the removal of a problem, not the execution of a man. The procedures defined to move the issue ahead, to resolve it, were common knowledge to him. *The prisoner was numbered or given another name and sent either to the East – or some place where he would not be seen – while those who had been witnesses to his presence were rounded up and interrogated to determine what was known about him. Once this information could be summarized, they were placed in isolation for a time to intimidate them not to speak of the presence of the prisoner in Moscow prisons.* Which is what happened.

The Primary Witnesses

On July 22, 1947 Kartashov as head of the 4th Department, Third Main Directorate – and Kuzmishin, head of the Investigative Unit of OVD, interrogated a series of prisoners who had sat with either Wallenberg or Langfelder and then sent them into isolation. Those called in did not include two important witnesses – at least one of whom had sat with both Wallenberg and Langfelder. They did include Langfelder himself who was interrogated by both Kuzmishin and Kartashov. Without access to his file, we do not know if these interrogations included that of Willi Roedl who had been Raoul Wallenberg's cellmate in Moscow prisons from March of 1945 until the end of February 1947. In fact, with the exception of Roedl who died of a heart attack on October 15, 1947 en route to Camp 27/Krasnogorsk, and Langfelder whose death date is alleged as March 1948 – none of these witnesses died around that time. Those whose testimonies we have received were obviously repatriated to the West, as was Schauer, one of Wallenberg's original cellmates, who never came forward to testify. So the situation was not so severe that it required a radical remedy, namely an execution, to silence the witnesses. It required only operational circumspection.

In relation to this we have the testimony of the interrogator Solovyov before the Working Group in 1991, quoted by Ambassador Magnusson in his Report. According to Solovyov, sometime in 1947:

Section Chief Kulesjov made a list and a diagram which showed which prisoners had sat with Raoul Wallenberg. On the diagram was noted all information about cell numbers, etc. so that the paths of his cellmates in the future should not be crossed with other prisoners who did not know Raoul Wallenberg.

The result of this diagram was not simply to call the prisoners Richter, Schlittler, Krafft, Pelkonen, Huber, Kitschmann for questioning on July 22, 1947. After Hille was brought from Krasnogorsk and Loyda from Odessa Repatriation Camp in January 1948, the prisoners on this list (with the exception of Roedl who was dead) were paired for years, moving together even from prison to prison. Loyda was placed in a cell with the Swiss spy Hans Hoffstetter while Hille became the long term cellmate of Pelkonen. From then on, with very few interruptions, Richter sat with Kitschman, Schlitter with Huber, while Grossheim-Krisko, (the only other member of the Swedish Legation besides Wallenberg to be arrested and brought to Moscow) sat with Janos Sokets (Sokachs) the Hungarian Trade Attache in Sofia. Admiral Krafft – who does not appear to have been interrogated at that time although he sat with Langfelder – was placed in Moscow with Stahel and later with von Kleist. Krafft, Stahel and von Kleist Senior all died in Vladimir Prison before they could be repatriated.

The one exception to this system occurred with the move to Butyrka where Huber, for a few days starting March 8, 1951, was placed with Pelkonen and Hille, both Langfelder witnesses. From that point on, he appears to have been separated from Schlitter and indeed, upon sentencing, each was sent to a different prison to be placed in *strict isolation* – Huber to Vladimir, Schlitter to Alexandrovsk MGB in the Irkutsk region. While many of the others – like Grossheim-Krisko and Richter, both of whom were held because of their connection to an *especially important prisoner* – were also supposed to be isolated after their conviction, within a reasonable amount of time they were again sharing a cell with their old mates.

As noted by Hans Magnusson, one interesting side effect of this pairing phenomena is that none of these 'primary witnesses' ever came to the conclusion that either Wallenberg or Langfelder were being held in Vladimir. Their discussions and turmoil over the issue was contained within their group, in some cases to a dangerous point. But the testimonies that Wallenberg and Langfelder were to be seen in Vladimir came from witnesses from scattered networks, some of whom had been held in deep isolation in Corporates I, II and III of Vladimir Prison – in some instances without record of their cell changes for several years. (Two of the most interesting examples of these witnesses were the American, Wilfred Cumish, who informed one of his cellmates at Vladimir in December 1954 that he had sat with a Swede and also claims to have sat with Langfelder – successfully identifying both – and the Latvian Zigurds Kruminsch discussed at length in Dr. Marvin W. Makinen and Ari Kaplan's report). Others witnesses were among those brought back from the East – from isolateurs like Alexandrovsk Central or Verchne-Uralsk MGB or camps in the Vorkuta, Rochnoi or Ozerny regions. Their reports, standing alone, did not have the impact of the collective group of primary witnesses who sat with Wallenberg and Langfelder when they first arrived in Moscow prisons – i.e. when their presence was not being heavily concealed within the prison system.

Of all these primary witnesses, Schlitter and Huber fared the worst. Huber, who had been sentenced to ten years in 1945, was called back in the Spring of 1947 and in 1951 given a second sentence of 25 years for espionage. Schlitter, generally regarded as an informant, was given a fifteen year sentence, which did not take into account the ten years he already had served. Schlitter was placed in strict isolation in Alexandrovsk Central until he emerged in March 1954 to sit with Prince Konoye in their Cell 49. Huber was strictly isolated when sent to Vladimir or forced to share a cell with Numbered Prisoner 28, who was experiencing severe psychological trauma at the time, threatening to any cellmate. When Huber was finally brought out of isolation to share Cell II-17 Vladimir with Stahel, Hahn and Schmidt, he interpreted this to mean that the Wallenberg matter – had been *taken care of*. He was therefore very surprised to learn upon his release that it was still unresolved.

Huber attributed his extreme isolation in Vladimir – correctly or incorrectly – to having sat briefly with Langfelder in Lubyanka Prison in the Spring of 1945. Pelkonen and Loyda shared similar fears, understandably when prisoners were often not informed of the reasons for their arrest or the evidentiary basis of the charges against them. In Huber's case one might also question whether the severity of his punishment did not reflect confidences shared with Schlitter over a period of four years. In May of 1956, after the Swedish government had presented the testimonies of the returning eyewitnesses – Richter, Kitschman, Hille, Pelkonen, Supprian, Wallenstein, Rensinghoff, and von Hinkeldy (the last four communicated with Wallenberg and Roedl through wall tapping) – the Soviets specifically raised the question whether Schlitter had come forth to testify. They did this carefully – using his assumed name of Schauer and stating that he was presumably in a cell with Wallenberg (when in reality a call for his file would tell them that he had been in Cells 121-123 with Richter and Wallenberg, staying on even after Richter was moved to another cell.)

Why did the Soviets risk drawing attention to Schlitter/Schauer? As Richter had already testified as to Wallenberg's presence in Cells 121 and 123 from February 6 until March 18, 1945; Schlitter's testimony would add very little -- unless he had sat with Langfelder and/or with Wallenberg again, at a later date. In my Preliminary Report to the Russian side dated November 1998, I have already noted how Schlitter's cell changes in 1947 are consistently coincidental with significant dates in the Wallenberg case at that time. The question should be raised again whether Schlitter sat with Wallenberg in Internal Prison as early as March 1, 1947 or at any point until his

alleged death date – in which case he could have provided facts that would have brought us much closer to the truth. Alternatively, he could have sat with Wallenberg in Butyrka while Huber was sitting with Hille and Pelkonen in Cell 287 – or from any time until Schlitter was sentenced in 1951 and sent out. He also could have shared his isolation with Wallenberg – or Langfelder – in Alexandrovsk Central (1952-54), although as yet there have been no testimonies indicating that Wallenberg was held in that prison.

In spite of their severe isolation, both Schlitter and Huber were repatriated. While Huber testified to the Swedish government regarding Langfelder, he was very afraid of his testimony being handed over in his name. Schlitter died in 1960, Huber in 1957 – around the time of the Gromyko Memorandum when, for the first time, Wallenberg's presence in the Soviet Union was formally acknowledged by the Soviets. Using the Smoltsov document as supporting evidence, the Memorandum also implied that Wallenberg had died of a heart attack. In response to this, Gustav Richter – whose testimony had done much to reverse the Vishinsky position of August 1947 – wrote to the son-in-law of a fellow prisoner: *Now that the Russian note has been presented, the matter has become even more mysterious because the contradictions are obvious. How can a man have died in 1947 when three witnesses confirm they were together with him in one cell in 1950/1951?*

Richter's remark is but an introduction to the one hundred or more sightings that date after the 1947 alleged death date – including those kept classified over the past thirty years, at least until the day after this report was initially released – January 11, 2001.

I have refrained from releasing materials related to the other chapters (historical, investigative and sentencing, sightings of Wallenberg in prisons and camps outside of the Moscow and Vladimir regions, and the psychiatric/medical) because the data is incomplete. In certain cases, particularly where it involves travel to regional archives throughout the former Soviet Union, this has been set aside for the 'follow up' phase. In other cases, the research has been crippled by the failure of the Russian – and Swedish – sides to produce much needed information known to exist. These include files, registries, transport records, medical records on the Russian side and the sightings – in their complete form – still classified for the past thirty years on the Swedish side, without which one cannot possibly properly cross-reference and apply the evidence at hand.

It is my hope that those who carefully study these materials will find themselves more equipped to deal with the question of 'liquidatsia' – whether it means the death of an important man, or his disappearance as a means of resolving a problem. In so doing, I ask the readers to put aside their previous beliefs or convictions – as I have had to do – to examine the materials as they are. The tools I put before you are the building blocks of this work. I also ask the reader to bear in mind a few important questions in order to better analyze this case:

The first is: **Why 1947?** What is so special about that year which made – assuming the Soviet claim to be true – such an exception to the investigative procedures? Did he die 'accidentally'? Or was he involved in an initiative against the Soviet Union so threatening that he aroused violent opposition from the Soviet leaders of the time? If such is the case, we do not yet know what precipitated such an explosion or possible 'mistake.' Certainly the fact that the Swedish government was making periodic inquiries as to Wallenberg's fate – or that Wallenberg refused to be recruited on the first round – is insufficient reason to kill a man who was so useful to the international game.

Another aspect of this question: **If Wallenberg did not die in 1947, but disappeared only to die later, why did the Soviet authorities choose that particular time to place his alleged death?**

While the answer to the first may reflect Soviet hostility to interests abroad – the second seems directly related to the question of accountability within. In order to explain Wallenberg's death – some history had to be given, some scapegoat blamed – preferably prior to the 1949 signing by the Soviet Union of the articles of the Geneva Convention related to prisoners of war. One must objectively consider the possibility of his death at a later date, when Wallenberg's investigation was over, his refusal to be recruited seen as final. One cannot forget that by 1957, Wallenberg's presence in the Soviet Union was established by the repatriated prisoners so 'disappearance' was less of an option. The convergence of these events, combined with the completion of a possible ten year term for Counter-Revolutionary Activities, could create an 'urgent situation. The crisis would not only be a diplomatic one, but would arise from within the system with its demands that a decision be made whether to repatriate the prisoner, re-sentence him, send him into exile or execute him. If we take the analogy of Prince Konoye, it is at the 1956/57 date that one might logically fear an execution.

Here we must raise the question whether the Soviets had an agent, like Colonel Stig Wennerstrom, in place as early as 1947. If so, Stalin would not have killed Raoul Wallenberg. He would have needed him as collateral for an eventual exchange. Conversely, if Wallenberg lived into the late Fifties, there is no dispute about Wennerstrom's service as a Soviet agent by that time. Wallenberg's value in the event of Wennerstrom's capture would have weighed heavily in the balance when Khrushchev, Molotov and Serov – among others – decided his fate.

II. DEATH

Given the official claims of the 1957 Gromyko Memorandum suggesting Wallenberg died of a heart attack in July 1947 -- and the recent competing claims of execution by lethal injection or shooting -- one would expect the evidence produced in the year 2000 to offer conclusive proof of Wallenberg's death -- or at least argue the case 'beyond reasonable doubt.' It does not. In fact, where the essential issues of Wallenberg's death are concerned, the few pieces that have been added to the puzzle over the past ten years are riddled with the same ambiguity as before and are so contradictory as to leave one with nothing to grasp.

This is a direct function of the failure of the Soviets to substantiate their claims. The Gromyko Memorandum of February 6, 1957 is 'supported' only by the Smoltsov Document, a handwritten note to file which -- in terms of actual accounting of a death -- has no legal validity. The lethal injection claims put forth by Pavel A. Sudoplatov in his book, Special Tasks, has been strengthened by the analogy offered in the case of the American Communist Esau Oggins -- but upon closer examination, and particularly as a number of documents in the Oggins sequence are missing, the parallel falls apart. The 'execution by shooting' claim presented by KGB defector Gordievsky, retired KGB official Kondrashev and now Commissioner Yakovlev is contradicted by the fact that rasstriel was canceled in May of 1947 and not restored until the early Fifties. Since the alleged hint by Vishinsky to 'liquidate' Wallenberg came on May 14, 1947 there would be not enough time to make such an important decision and carry it out. In fact, this would be true in both cases -- whether by lethal injection, as in the case of Oggins, or shooting, as in the case of Gflorener in 1952 -- an execution did not happen overnight. Behind the scenes discussions were followed by formal recommendation to leadership (from Abakumov to Stalin in the case of Oggins, while Gflorener was formally sentenced by the Military Tribunal eight months after Abakumov himself was arrested). Deliberation was followed by a decision on the highest circle of government -- after which an actual execution order could be written on the

prison administrative level. In both forms of execution, the death act would be witnessed to establish that the order had been fulfilled.

No such documentation has been presented to substantiate the death claims regarding Wallenberg. This disregard for any of the convention forms of evidence to establish a death is part of the overall projection of Wallenberg's case – and death – as an 'exception.' We need to define what 'exception' means? Are the authorities hinting that the 'cause of death' was a 'mistake' – in which case is it one of 'mistaken identity' or of an 'accident,' a death that shouldn't have happened? Or does it refer to some internal conflict – the nature of which I would not dare to guess – in which Wallenberg proved an unfortunate pawn in a vicious battle between security chiefs? Or does it mean quite simply that those who believe he died are 'mistaken'?

Short of access to files that document other 'exceptions' – we are left with the barest sketch upon which to base our conclusions. There is no actual proof of death and no documentation to give further weight to the Soviet claim, other than the presumption that in those times killing was commonplace and no attempt was made to record acts which were blatantly criminal. This has a detrimental effect on our ability to properly evaluate the Smoltsov – the only document afforded us – which could conceivably have been one small part of a greater body of documents describing a death, but on its own cannot serve as proof of death for reasons which will be discussed below. This in turn brings us face to face with the deeper question of why the complete body of materials – multiply-witnessed medical history, autopsy and burial certificate – were not produced in the case of Raoul Wallenberg from the onset. For this would have resolved the question of his fate decades before, rather than allowing the ambiguities which have surrounded it to fester.

This question is all the more valid for 1947 as we know, through the partially documented case of Oggins, that Abakumov – the very man to whom Wallenberg's death was attributed – was perfectly capable of ordering a false medical history, autopsy and alteration of the actual date of death to conceal the true facts. Why would he then draw attention to Wallenberg's absence by failing to note it in ways that were in keeping with the normal procedures of the system? This is all the more problematic because in 1943 Abakumov co-authored the regulations for reporting the death of a foreign prisoner both to State Security and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As a good introduction to the watchfulness of the system, I quote this below. As will be noted later, none of the criteria for reporting the death of a prisoner mentioned are observed properly in the Smoltsov note.

Certain heads of prisons and camps have not informed the NKVD and KGB USSR about deaths of foreign citizens, convicted or under investigation, in which cases the above bodies cannot inform the Ministry for Foreign Affairs USSR who is to inform embassies and missions. (1) Heads of prisons, etc. are to telegraph the information about foreign prisoners to the 1st Special Department NKVD USSR; (2) Heads of 2nd Departments NKGB-UNKGB are to telegraph about deaths of foreign prisoners under investigation to the 2nd Department of NKGB-USSR; (3) The information is to include the name, birthdate, citizenship, arresting body, date of arrest, convicting body and sentence date, term of punishment, date and cause of death. The telegram is to be followed by a death act (sent through special communications) Signed by Deputy Narkom, Minister of State Security Abakumov and Deputy Narkom, Commissar of State Security, Kobulov.

There can be little-to-no doubt that Abakumov was fully aware of the administrative value of documenting a death in a timely manner. He also was in the ideal place to manipulate the system – whether to arrange for Wallenberg's disappearance or to provide a false medical history to

establish a death. It would appear that he had a specific responsibility for those foreign prisoners not under the Directorate of Prisoners of War and the Interned. For these three reasons alone, Abakumov would have been approached by Vishinsky and Molotov to recommend a procedure for the elimination of the problem caused by reports of Wallenberg's illegal detention. One need not jump to the conclusion that the purpose was to seek a recommendation for killing him.

Abakumov had the capacity to phrase the solution in terms of the norm – the procedures which he himself governed. He could have applied the same technique for documenting Wallenberg death on July 17, 1947 as he used for that of Oggins only a few days before. Apparently he did not. At least there is to date no evidence that such documents ever existed, as there should be since the reporting of a death was and is a significant act. We have only the mysterious reference in the Council of Ministers registry of Memorandum 3044a from Abakumov to Molotov dated July 17, 1947 which presumably clarified Wallenberg's fate. As Susanne Berger has noted, there is evidence in the Soviet files that this document was already missing from the Foreign Ministry/Council of Minister archives by 1952, as per an inquiry prepared by the executive Chief of the 5th European Department, June 5, 1952.

On the basis of the documents we have seen, there would seem to have been a secrecy surrounding the Wallenberg case even under Stalin. Such silence – or ignorance as shown in the Vishinsky Memorandum of 1947 – is hard to accept. Again we are faced with inuendoes as to the nature of the reply – whether 'liquidatsia' refers to the problem of an irregular arrest, resulting in further isolation and disappearance, or to the execution of the man. Either way, the secret which obscures everything else is: who was responsible for this act if Wallenberg died, or who had him under his jurisdiction, if he disappeared but lived under the MGB/KGB watch? Is this a collective guilt or are we dealing, as the Gromyko Memorandum would have us believe, with the strange deeds of one security chief and his deputies, acting without authorization?

This brings us again to General Yevgeni Pitovranov's cryptic observation to Swedish television in 1992: "*Stalin needed him (Wallenberg)...and would never have killed him.*" As the Komitet Informatsii, Committee on Information, was being formed by Stalin in 1947 to focus on political as well as military intelligence gathering, there can be no question that whoever was responsible for allowing Wallenberg's death under his watch would have been reprimanded for the loss of a 'talking man' valuable to the international game. And yet there is no mention of recriminations against Abakumov until 1957 and the Gromyko Memorandum when the death of Wallenberg for the first time falls under Abakumov's many crimes.

Projections Based on the Absence of Documentation

The absence of any form of valid 'death documentation' – whether the contents were fabricated or true – can only be counteracted by an open study of annual and decade registries for the various prisons, a comprehensive study of medical files as well as those of the regional civic authorities and prison department records for the registration of both executions and deaths. But the essential story is to be found in the prisoner's personal, investigative and operative files. While the operative files would have already been destroyed in any case, Wallenberg's personal and criminal files are reported destroyed or missing. However, the return of his identity papers and valuables in 1989, as well as the repeated claim by the authorities that Wallenberg was never sentenced, would imply access to at least some portion of his file. Serov, who oversaw much of

the destruction of files after the death of Stalin, reportedly destroyed part of Wallenberg's file – but not all.

Before examining the question of probable cause of death, if in fact death in 1947, we should first consider the possibilities for Wallenberg's fate as projected from the absence of documentation. This has proven a useful tool overall, as will be seen in III. DISAPPEARANCE, for placing any information that exists against a proper background. For, in search of a dead or disappeared man, relating that which is missing to the evidence at hand is a helpful tool in defining the problems that attend the case.

These possibilities are:

- 1) **there never was any such 'legitimate' (witnessed) body of materials pertaining to Wallenberg's death because he did not die in 1947 or even by the date of the Gromyko Memorandum in 1957.** In this regard then the Smoltsov document may have been contrived to support the illusion put forth by the Gromyko Memorandum that Wallenberg died in July 1947. The recent disclosure by Alexander Yakovlev, Chairman of the Presidential Commission on the Rehabilitation of the Victims of Crimes in the Stalin Era, that Smoltsov retired as head of Sanitary Services at Lubyanka on March 21, 1947 would support this view. The objective then would be to establish the illusion of his death in 1947 while using the name 'Walenberg', identity unclear, to forestall further discussions. The door would be left open, however, should Wallenberg's aliveness prove expedient, as in the case of an exchange. By this projection, Wallenberg lived not only past 1947 but beyond the period of the Wennerstrom-Wallenberg exchange described by Swedish Police chief Otto Danielsson. Such negotiations began in 1965 but, according to Susanne Berger, continued into the early Seventies;
- 2) **Wallenberg died and the evidence exists in his file which has not been produced because the material it contains contradicts some portion of the claim put forth in the Gromyko Memorandum suggesting that Wallenberg died in 1947 at the hands of Abakumov.** He could have died naturally – from prison attrition – in the early Fifties as certain eyewitnesses have reported. Or he could have been executed at a later date, most tragically in keeping with the Gromyko Memorandum. In support of this possibility we see that the documents offered by the Russian side in 1991 showed that in 1955/56 a number of scenarios were being prepared and considered to account for Wallenberg's fate in 1947. The very fact that they were considering these various versions of the truth rather than the one that eventually emerged with the Smoltsov document could indicate that they knew the truth but were looking for substitutes – unless these were real reports circulating at the time. Finally, Wallenberg could have died in 1947 but as the result of excessive brutality under interrogation and/or murder, criminal acts which are not the same as an ordered execution. It is of interest that neither the Soviet nor Russian governments have ever mentioned such a scenario, even though it might explain the lack of witnesses on the Smoltsov document and other irregularities.
- 3) **As the Soviet/Russian authorities have claimed, the file had been destroyed and the authorities preparing the Gromyko Memorandum of 1957 were ignorant of the real circumstances of Wallenberg's imprisonment – whether as disappearance or death.** Here we return to the example of the Vishinsky Memorandum of 1947, which the Gromyko Memorandum was to overturn. If Vishinsky was really ignorant of Wallenberg's presence in the USSR, then his memorandum of May 14, 1947 could only have referred to the 'liquidatsia' of the problem, not of the man. To elaborate on this, one must note the fact

that in 1954, Gromyko wrote to Serov as head of KGB inquiring "*When and under what circumstances Raoul Wallenberg died.*" Serov's only response was to refer to the reply of Ignatiev of 1952 which was essentially a repetition of the Vishinsky Memorandum of August 1947 denying that Raoul Wallenberg was to be found in the Soviet Union. From this it would seem that this denial was policy both within government and without. The circle that knew Raoul Wallenberg's fate was exceedingly small. Again, this does not establish that Wallenberg died in 1947. I have noted in section III. DISAPPEARANCE two instances where numbered prisoners 'slipped through the cracks' and were only dealt with because some situation forced the competent authorities to focus in that direction.

The Soviet claim that the Wallenberg file was destroyed – or is not to be found – is of course central to our problem. We need this evidence to establish whether or not Wallenberg died or disappeared in 1947 – and if he died at a later date, where, when and under what circumstances. Given the nature of the file, one should consider the possibility that the issue at stake is not simply that Raoul Wallenberg died while under investigation, i.e in 1947. Rather it is that he was sentenced and went on to serve one or more terms or a life 'beyond the limit' as an especially dangerous State criminal. The Russians – both in the Working Group and Presidential Commission for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression under Stalin – have insisted that Raoul Wallenberg was never convicted, at least under his name. And yet charges had to exist against him even before his initial capture in Budapest in January 1945 for Deputy Minister of Defense Bulganin to have issued an arrest order at the request of Abakumov. What we are not being allowed to see – either because his file was destroyed or would cause a controversy – are the details of the suspicion and proof, i.e the nature of Wallenberg's alleged criminal activity. This would tell us why Wallenberg was arrested and explain the context in which his death – in 1947 or at any later time – was ordered. It also might reveal circumstances that prevented his return, including a knowledge threatening to certain factions in the West who therefore nixed every opportunity for an exchange.

Examples of Cases of Other Foreign Prisoners

The Wallenberg case has been described as an 'exception.' We can neither evaluate that claim nor qualify in what form it may accurately be described as an 'exception' if we do not have a firm understanding of the 'norm' where the registration of the deaths of other foreign prisoners are concerned. How much of that 'status of exception' centers around the fact that Wallenberg was considered an important prisoner? How much of this status had to do simply with the fact that he was a foreign prisoner, as opposed to a Russian national? Until we understand this, death theories will abound – and not only in the case of Raoul Wallenberg.

Again we return to the question of the full and proper documentation of the death of a foreign prisoner. In the appendices of my official report – I included translated excerpts from the files of those prisoners on my list who did die as foreign prisoners in the Soviet Gulag during the period 1945 – 1957. These include medical histories, autopsies and burial records, plus notes I have made which indicate any irregularities regarding those particular deaths. These reports from the files must remain classified to guard the rights of privacy of the prisoners and their next of kin so cannot be included here. The following should be noted however:

a) On the cover of a number of these prominent files is the designation: "*To be kept forever.*" This includes files where there is some question about the real cause of death. So the act of destroying the file does not necessarily follow upon a 'strange death.' Until I am able to study those of others on my list, however, it is difficult to be more precise about what kind of detailing leads to concealment.

b) Among the foreign prisoners who did die in Moscow prisons during the 1945 – 1947 time period whose files I have seen, autopsies were provided by the team of Moscow Medical Forensic specialist Semenovskiy and Lt. Colonel of Butyrka Medical Services, Finayev with a third doctor occasionally in attendance as a witness. This can be seen in the cases of Van der Waals, Okulicki, Marek and Roedl. The first three all presumably died in Butyrka Prison Hospital.

c) The fact that a prisoner did not die in the hospital but in his cell or elsewhere is noted in the file and in the akt proclaiming a death.

d) The prisoner registration cards at Vladimir Prison almost always state with precision the full cause of death. In the case of Polish Deputy Premier, Jan Stanislaw Jankowski, the card says only "He died." This death was also not recorded in the office of the regional authorities under specific instruction from the Head of Prison.

e) Whether before or after sentencing, deaths were reported by the Head of Prison to Deputy Head, 1st Sector, Department A of MGB; with a copy to the head of the Prison Directorate MGB. In addition reports had to be made to 1st Special Department MVD and to the 2nd Department. In the case of a prisoner who died while *under investigation*, the head of prison would notify the investigator in charge of the case. This has been confirmed by a subsequent study of the regulations.

There existed, even in the Stalinist regime a form of checks and balances to limit abuse – all the more visible when dealing with the minutiae of reporting. In a system where every prisoner must be accounted for, a death does not go un-noticed. If unreported, this would have to be explained. A specific document would have to exist ordering those who made inquiry '*not to ask anymore,*' those who must arrange for the disposal of the body *not to 'bury in the general grounds as usual'*, and in certain cases – *not to report the death to the regional civic authorities*, i.e. those outside the MGB or MVD system itself.

ACCOUNTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Before proceeding with our discussion of the Smoltsov document, it is essential to introduce four general considerations against which one must weigh the claims of the Gromyko Memorandum of February 1957:

a) the thoroughness of Soviet accounting – the counting, grouping and categorization of prisoners as a way of 'keeping close watch' in a society that was both utilitarian and totalitarian. In relation to the utilitarian aspect of this issue, (to be developed more fully in my chapter on Investigation and Sentencing), it is becoming increasingly clear that from an investigative and political point of view, death for Raoul Wallenberg in July 1947 would have occurred 'too soon.' This is both a function of his good health at the time and of the security organs need to amass a great deal of information quickly about the thought processes, personalities and capabilities of those in a number of nations. As stated above, Wallenberg's

calendar alone would show the level of those with whom he had meetings in Budapest. In addition to this, there are his contacts in Sweden, Germany and the United States to be considered in terms of the political game.

Ruling out problems of health (applicable to older prisoners who died during the 1945 – 1947 time period such as Bethlen, Marek, and Roedl but not to Wallenberg born in 1912), one must examine more closely the fact that the intense interrogation processes of related prisoners like Gflorener, Gerstenberg, Bentivegni, Richter, Hatz were just warming up at that time. If there exists no real evidence of Wallenberg's death in 1947, it may be because it did not happen then. The testimonies of certain eyewitnesses would indicate that, after a hiatus of time, Wallenberg did undergo an intense period of interrogation in Moscow prisons 1948-49 and it would appear that he was formally charged during that period as well. In support of this, we return to General Yevgeni Pitovranov's comment in an interview with Swedish television in 1992: "*Stalin needed him(Wallenberg).. and would never have killed him. His death was a mistake.*"

In terms of the Soviet's ability to 'keep close watch', what is definitely missing from our joint research which, hopefully the Russian side can provide, are the documents which exist in the 1st Special Department, the 2nd Special Departments MGB and MVD as well as the secret archives of the Secretariat MVD related to Wallenberg. These agencies, whose function it was to keep track of prisoners, had to have corresponding information regarding the prisoner Wallenberg on some level. This includes documentation regarding his death, for the MGB/MVD required periodic reports on prisoners under investigation and --if for some reason these were suspended --there had to have been paper work ordering those lower on the chain of command "not to ask" any more. (It should be noted that these offices were consulted by the 'competent authorities' to confirm the testimonies of the primary witnesses handed over by the Swedish government in 1956. In our recent work, the Russian side has notified us of the discovery in GARF of a cover note for a report of 8 August 1956 by A. Sirotin as Head of the 1st Special Department MVD *concerning the return of materials on R. Wallenberg to be kept at the Archive of Special Importance of the Secretariat of the MVD/USSR*. While it has been stated that these materials actually refer to the witness Wallenstein, whose papers were being returned, until we can see the Wallenberg and Wallenstein materials on file in this Archive, this document would contradict the claims of the Gromyko Memorandum that a thorough search had been performed and nothing had been found.

In terms of evaluating Wallenberg's 'usefulness', it is important to ask again for the reports from MGB to MVD to be forwarded to higher instancas – presumably reports of interrogations passing from Abakumov via Beria to Stalin – for the 1945 – 1947 time period. That is – if indeed Wallenberg was killed or died of a 'heart attack' in 1947, this would have come about as the result of especially intensive interrogations and/or 'active measures' to get him to talk which backfired on his investigators. From the perspective of 'usefulness' – Wallenberg was too valuable a commodity to have sat for years – interrogated only five times – then executed.

Either we are missing a very intensive series of interrogations leading up to the July 17, 1947 alleged death date or the event of his execution occurred much later, not under the competency of men already dead when the Gromyko Memorandum was prepared and issued in 1956-57.

- b) the seriousness – and respect – attributed to and surrounding the act of death, so that if one were to die, and particularly a foreign prisoner of some prominence, not only is there a strictness of accounting but certain amenities were observed in the

documentation of the death. Never did I find, among the prisoner cases studied, an absence of documentation related to a death. Normally, death documentation covers at least ten percent of a large file, with the documents related to death placed near the front of the file, after the sentence and – in important or controversial cases – on the front page. Further medical information would then appear later in the file. In addition to this, the file would include records of special arrangements made to honor certain dead – burying a Jewish Communist in a Jewish cemetery; placing an important German general in the grave in full dress uniform; including photographs of his loved ones in the grave of a Japanese hero.

In my zeal to substantiate the Soviet claim that Wallenberg died in July 1947 by pressing for documentation of this sort, I soon realized that my questions in and of themselves were disturbing, if not challenging. I had trespassed both on their respect for the dead ('rest in peace') and the reticence which has shrouded those who may prove accountable ('live in peace'). This ethos which has emerged from the Communist regime effects – on a psychological level – our ability to get to the heart of the matter and resolve this case. In this regard, I want to thank the Russian side for providing more in-depth information regarding the place and date of Oggins' death in 1947;

c) **the issue of future accountability both internally – i.e. being named as person or group held solely responsible for an illegal act ordered in the present but blameworthy under a future regime; and externally, in terms of the smoothness and success of diplomatic relations, then and in the future.** This was important, even before the USSR signed on to the Geneva Convention in 1949. In this regard, it should be noted that the deaths of Marek, Bethlen, Okulicki, Akikusa, Roedl, Oggins, and Van der Waals – among others – were meticulously documented. Why should the Soviets do this for Hungary, Austria, Poland, Holland and Japan – but not for Sweden?

d) **Faith in the propaganda machine.** Until the research of the Swedish-Russian Working Group, the public did not have access to the prisoner files to realize the possible nature and extent of documentation, nor did they have access to those documents produced by the Russian side which point to the fact that the Smoltsov document was not the only scenario being considered for presentation. Those preparing the Gromyko Memorandum of 1957 could rely on the powerful impact of Gromyko's official statement combined with the sketch put forth in the Smoltsov Document to serve their purposes. The fact that forty-three years later our investigation is stronger and more demanding than ever reveals the strength of the public's disbelief of such claims.

The Question of Competency

The concept that Abakumov could 'hide' Wallenberg – or his 'death in 1947' – from his co-workers, starting with the heads of prisons like Mironov of Lubyanka and Ionov of Lefortovo is a 'myth.' These men were not without power in their own right. We can see instances where both Ionov and Mironov protested detention of certain prisoners without interrogation as an illegal act taking place under their physical jurisdiction. We also know that both Kartashov and Burashnikov ordered moves of prisoners related to Wallenberg's detention in Moscow prisons. We have established the names of some of Wallenberg's interrogators – Sverchuk, Kopelyansky and Kuzmishin – even if we don't know who his primary investigator might have been. As long as Wallenberg was still 'under investigation', these individuals would have had to be informed of the death of a Raoul Wallenberg in Moscow prisons.

That Smoltsov – head of Sanitary Services in Lubyanka Prison, a man whose signature appears on slips for increased rations or to determine a prisoner's fitness for labor -- could oversee the cremation of Wallenberg would over-ride Mironov's responsibility. If Wallenberg had not yet been sentenced but was still under investigation, Smoltsov's ordering of a cremation would also have ignored Mironov's responsibility to inform Kartashov as head of the 4th Department, 3rd Main Directorate or Wallenberg's main investigator. Since Kartashov was informed by Mironov orally and in writing of the death of Roedl, Wallenberg's long term cellmate, in October 1947 – there is no reason to think that either Mironov or Kartashov could have been left 'out of the loop' where the death of Wallenberg was concerned.

We also should not ignore the fact that Wallenberg's name does not appear in the (Emergency) Registry for Unusual Events in Lubyanka/Internal Prison for the period from July 1 to August 1, 1947 as shown to us by the Russian side. This does not rule out the possibility that his death may have happened somewhere else. For example, Roedl died in transport and therefore his death still fell under the jurisdiction of Internal Prison rather than that of Camp 27, even though he was not in Internal Prison at the time.

For the system to function efficiently, a death must be reported in a number of different directions. This is the strongest argument that exists toward 'digging deeper' especially when we have seen through the Russian response to our queries that indeed the information exists, if approached correctly. In the prisoner files where deaths occur, accounting of a death takes up a good percentage of the pages. Even if the prisoner's death is not registered in the local or regional registry of Civil Acts (CAGS/ZAGS/OAGS), it must be reported to the Prison Department in Moscow and to a number of other persons and divisions in the overall Gulag structure involved in the all important question of 'whereabouts' such as Special Department Numbers 1 and 2, MGB or MVD.

Out of context, the limited death documentation presented to us leaves the reader with little choice but to go in the direction that Wallenberg died as the result of a conspiracy between Abakumov and Smoltsov while the entire Prison and Investigative systems 'slept' or turned their backs. This does not conform to the reality of a very active and vigilant administrative structure, where those in high level position remained in power precisely because they knew the importance of generating a paper trail to protect themselves. (Even the Smoltsov Document, if genuine, may be just that.) This brings us to the alternative that there was no actual death at that time, but Abakumov ordered Smoltsov to prepare the note to be inserted in Wallenberg's file to 'close it out' in order to start up a new file under another name or as a numbered prisoner. This transfer of information from file to file could have occurred without involving the rest of the prison administration. The only place where it would seem to appear is in the blots in the Lubyanka 1947 possessions registry which show, in analogous cases, possessions being shifted over from a named to a numbered prisoner. However, some accounting would still have to have been made as to the 'whereabouts' or destination of the prisoner who was in the prison until that point. Where is that information?

More on Wallenberg's Lubyanka Registration Card

A prisoner whose presence is already known to the authorities – and the Russian side has helped established that this was the case with Raoul Wallenberg --- cannot just 'vanish in thin air.' There must be a paper trail. What is remarkable is that Langfelder's card is still 'missing', while

Wallenberg's has been produced. Comparing Wallenberg's card with that of his cellmate, Willi Roedl – who moved with Wallenberg from Internal Prison Cell 140 in May 1945 to Lefortovo and who would have traveled back to Lubyanka with him in late February 1947 had not Wallenberg been held back a day – it is remarkable that Wallenberg's card does not show, as Roedl's, that return in 1947. Roedl's card shows his death, gives his archival registration number indicating where his file is to be found – even though it is now 'missing.' Wallenberg's card indicates neither the crossing off (completion) of the Lefortovo portion of his detention (May 1945 – March 1947) nor his death. I can only conclude from this that either the authorities did not inform the clerks of the kartoteka that Wallenberg was in Lubyanka under his name or they had the card removed from the kartoteka and put in his file so that no further markings on it would be necessary.

To repeat: Wallenberg's card only shows his arrival in Lubyanka Prison and his departure for Lefortovo Prison with Roedl in 1945. It does not show his return on March 1, 1947 to Internal Prison – an event we know took place because it is documented in the file of Horst Kitschman who, with Otto Hatz, replaced Wallenberg and Roedl in Lefortovo Cell 203. It is established also through the Lefortovo outgoing transport registry and appears again in the alphabetical 1947 Lubyanka possessions registry, as forensically proven from an infra-red examination of the blot. This raises questions as to the nature and length of Wallenberg's stay in Internal Prison starting March 1, 1947. We have been led to believe that he stayed there until his death on July 17, 1947 and yet there is no proof of this other than his March 11, 1947 interrogation and the report of the interrogator Solyov that he delivered a sealed packet with papers pertaining to Wallenberg to the head of Department A. Why wasn't such a straightforward move documented on his registration card? Was this a matter of being brought to Internal Prison for only a few days interrogation, as we have seen in other files? Or had Wallenberg already become a numbered prisoner *under investigation*?

One proposed amendment to the draft of a proposed speech to be given by the USSR Ambassador to Sweden to Swedish Foreign Minister Uden in early 1956 would suggest that Wallenberg was predominantly in Lefortovo Prison, not Lubyanka. *"...examination of the archives of Counter-Intelligence established that Wallenberg was kept in Lefortovo Prison under personal order of Abakumov – under special conditions. The prison personnel around (him) did not know his name. In July 1947 he died in the prison hospital and his body was cremated."*

This document, if authentic, would imply that Wallenberg's death occurred either in the Lefortovo clinic or, if time allowed, at the Butyrka Medical Unit – as has also been suggested in the exchange between Molotov and Serov on this subject. As discussed above, this would predicate another set of medical signatures on the medical history and death act than that of Smoltsov. Without judging the Smoltsov document as true or false, one can see from the fact that it was the selected version to accompany the Gromyko Memorandum that the following decisions had been made:

- 1) not to describe Wallenberg as a numbered or anonymous prisoner, implying severe isolation;
- 2) not to place him in Lefortovo (for reasons to be established); and
- 3) not in a prison hospital where one might expect very accurate reporting of medical circumstances.

Wallenberg's So-Called Lefortovo File

In support of the version that Wallenberg remained predominantly in Lefortovo Prison in 1947, there is a testimony by Sergei Antonovich Stepanov, given to the Swedish Embassy in April 1992. Stepanov had worked for the KGB and later for both the Interior and Foreign Ministries. Between 1950 and 1953 he worked in the Archives of the First Main Directorate (Foreign Intelligence), 5th Department. As mentioned previously, this directorate – presently SVR – has not opened its archive on the Wallenberg case, although it has been reported by a retired archivist that the file of Count Michael Tolstoy-Kutuzow, reportedly an NKVD agent who spied on Wallenberg in Budapest, is kept there. In 1992, the archive of the First Main Directorate under Primakov was also the source for information related to the irregular deaths of Esau Oggins and Prince Fumitaka Konoye. (This disclosure followed upon the ARK Project's discovery of dual national Victor Hamilton in a psychiatric facility outside of Moscow, proving that indeed foreign prisoners were still being kept anonymously or under pseudonyms in prison psychiatric facilities and asylums.)

According to Stepanov, he had been requested by his chief, Kukin, to bring Wallenberg's file from the Archive in October or November of 1950. The file, Stepanov reports, carried the heading "*Swede Wallenberg*" which is customary, in that the cover of a foreign prisoner file often states his nationality and citizenship. At that time, Stepanov says, Wallenberg had been moved from Vladimir Prison to a small house in East Moscow where an attempt was being made to recruit him at the orders of Beria. After one or two weeks, Stepanov received the file back "*without any new notations...and any new documents having been added. The last note...the last entry...was a stamp which said 'K.M. niet – 'no compromising materials.'*"

In Stepanov's embellishment of the story, he added the following details which – while not always accurate – are of interest in terms of the question of a later death. The weaknesses in this part of the testimony may stem from the fact that Stepanov was speaking about things he had heard rather than his own direct experience. I have inserted commentary where appropriate.

Wallenberg was arrested in Vienna (actually Budapest) where he made a great effort to save human beings from the Nazis. After his arrest, he was taken to Lubyanka. According to official statements (the Gromyko Memorandum), he died as a result of an illness (heart attack) which he contracted or obtained in captivity long before the fall of 1950 (1947), but in reality he was fresh and healthy during that time. Wallenberg had first been taken to a hospital (Butyrka) and after that he had been taken away... (on the basis of which) it was reported that he was dead. After that he was taken to Vladimir.

Stepanov supports his statements by evoking his colleague Dzjerkvelov, author of the memoir Secret Servant. Dzjerkvelov had also worked in the archive at that time. In his memoir, Dzjerkvelov repeatedly makes the point that executions were not performed randomly, but according to laws existing until his defection in the Eighties. He emphasizes that the decision to execute – in the sense of 'liquidate' through assassination – was a high level collective one. According to Stepanov, Dzjerkvelov orally confirmed that this was Wallenberg's so-called "LEFORTOVO FILE". One archivist with whom I have worked for many years in the Russian classified materials commented that Wallenberg and Roedl's move to Lefortovo in May of 1945, like that of Hatz and Kitschman in February of 1947 (who replaced them in their cell) indicated a 'certain stage of development' in the investigative process of a 'special contingent.' He would elaborate no further.

Further to this, in my work I was introduced in a very few cases to what is known as an 'arrest file'. The examples were Van der Waals, Spishek, Meier and Feller – all Budapest arrestees. These files are smaller in size and of a different color than the files generated after the sentencing of the prisoners. The arrest file is for those who are not sentenced, as the authorities have claimed in the case of Wallenberg, but either died in captivity at an early phase (Van der Waals/1948), were repatriated/exchanged (Meier and Feller-late 1945 or early 1946), or returned to their homeland to stand trial (Spishek – February 1947). The normal file contains all the materials related to a prisoner's sentencing. It would also contain the various transport slips, search and medical slips and interrogations – both those under Smersh or the Third Main Directorate and those under the jurisdiction of the Especially Important Cases Unit or the Second Main Directorate, usually the final stage before actual sentencing. The normal file also contains records of their transport post-sentencing to whatever special camp or prison selected, documents reflective of their routine in that prison or camp and either their death, repatriation or exile documents. The 'arrest file' is limited to their being picked up and brought to Moscow, the various documents related to their intake and cell placement, any medical matters and their interrogations. There is usually a document attesting to the fact that they are being sent to Lefortovo as part of a 'special contingent' – often with a cellmate but sometimes alone.

Stepanov makes the point that the file he saw in the archives of the 5th Department of the First Main Directorate in 1950 included the Wallenberg 'Lefortovo File' – according to which Wallenberg 'should have died the 17th of July 1947 – plus other documents about Wallenberg. In those documents, however, Wallenberg figured under another name. If this is true, it would appear that Wallenberg was renamed either instead of, or after having been initially numbered. His arrest file was kept to document his 'death' if need be, in the greater file that included all the materials related to his further detention under another name – including their efforts to recruit him.

Stepanov also states, in the name of Dzjerkvelov, that the latter saw the file for Wallenberg one other time – in April or May of 1953, immediately after the death of Stalin but before the execution of Beria. This in fact corresponds to a time period when a number of files of prisoners such as Grossheim-Krisko and Richter, whose arrests were connected to that of an 'Especially Important Prisoner' were being reviewed for possible repatriation. Grossheim-Krisko who, like Wallenberg, had been an employee of the Swedish Legation in Budapest (in his case, definitely of the Foreign Interests Sector) was released rather unexpectedly on the grounds that his presence in the Soviet Union was 'no longer necessary.' In his testimony, Stepanov erroneously states that the Wallenberg file being studied in 1953 was at the order of Abakumov. This cannot be correct for a number of reasons – Abakumov was himself a numbered prisoner in Lubyanka at that time, having been arrested in 1951. Only a few months later Dzjerkvelov – according to his memoir – was in danger of being purged as he himself was known as a Beria man.

A CLOSER EXAMINATION OF THE SMOLTSOV DOCUMENT

The doctor's note accompany the Gromyko Memorandum is ostensibly a handwritten report to the former Minister of State Security of the USSR, Abakumov, from Chief of the Sanitary Services of Lubyanka Prison:

Reporting that the prisoner Walenberg who is known to you died suddenly in his cell, presumably as a result of infartka karda. Because of your personal instruction to watch

Walenberg, I ask your instruction whom should make an autopsy to determine the cause of death. July 17, 1947. /Signed/ Chief of Sanitorium Service, Smoltsov. (NOTATION: Reported personally to the Minister. Got the order to cremate the corpse without autopsy. July 17. Smoltsov.

While acknowledging that the Smoltsov document – if genuine – could refer to the death of Raoul Wallenberg in 1947, there are a number of flaws in this document which must be acknowledged before proceeding further.

- 1) It is not witnessed. A legal death report or act by Soviet law requires at least two, and usually three, signatures. According to one expert, the purpose of three witnesses was to establish that the person's death was not the result of a violent act. In that case, assuming the Smoltsov document to be valid, one must consider the possibility that Wallenberg's death was neither the result of a heart attack nor of a planned execution but of a 'trauma' caused by an attack on his bodily person. (See The Question of a Young Man's Death, following.)
- 2) The cause of death is '*presumed, not conclusive*' which is unprecedented among the files I have studied. As cause of death is a fundamental requirement of all reports on a death, uncertainty regarding the true cause should have made an autopsy – routine for a heart attack – an absolute necessity. (See below). *(61) The doctor or expert must have the medical history if the prisoner dies of a disease or act of discovery if he is murdered or committed suicide, but no other information....*
- 3) There is no medical act to our knowledge and no autopsy was performed. According to the regulations: *(60) an autopsy is made only by order from the investigating or supervising body, when head of prison or Prison Department has doubts about the causes of death stated in the medical act... The Medical Act is to be signed by Deputy Head of Prison and doctor, approved by head of prison after he examines the body in person, sees his personal file and checks the circumstances; (61).... The autopsy act is to be signed by the doctor and approved by the head of the prison. (65) Copies of the medical examination or autopsy act for the body of prisoner who was under investigation by the NKVD go to the investigating body, to the Prison Department and to the personal file.*
- 4) The Smoltsov document not only mis-spells the prisoner's family name as 'Walenberg' when the proper spelling of the name occurred on surrounding documents at that time, but he gives no first name or patronymic as required by the Soviet system – for all intents and purposes leaving the identity of the prisoner open to being a mistake. This is, of course, useful for later reversal of a claim that Raoul Wallenberg died in 1947 as proven by this particular document.
- 5) The document does not state the year of birth, a fact also required by the Soviet system to help identify one prisoner of same name from another. At the arrival of a prisoner in every prison, or after a search, or on medical slips, the prisoner himself must sign his name – family, first and patronymic, year of birth and give his signature. As the Swedish Final Report makes mention of one other prisoner with a similar name, Rudi Wallenberg, one cannot assume that Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish diplomat, was the only one to have such a surname in the Gulag records of the time.
- 6) The document does not denote the time (hour and minute) of death, thereby skipping over one of the most fundamental pieces of information in reporting a death. If the document is genuine, this could indicate that Smoltsov did not know – i.e. was not actually present. In that case, it could not have served as the act or report notifying Abakumov of Wallenberg's death but

only as a routine sharing of information for which one might expect similar slips to other officials – that is, Smoltsov could have been reporting on the basis of something he heard, since no attachment of any act is mentioned on the document.

7) The document does not state the citizenship and/or nationality of the deceased as required by Soviet reporting regulations. In the case of foreign prisoners, *the information is to include the name, birthdate, citizenship, arresting body, date of arrest, convicting body and sentence date, term of punishment, date and cause of death.*

8) The document implies that Smoltsov had the power to dispose of the body. (69) *Bodies of prisoners charged under Article 58 and those of internal and central prisons cannot be given to their families; (70) The body will be buried on order from head of prison, which fact will be recorded in the copy of the medical examination or autopsy act that goes into the file.*

9) The document implies that the body could be disposed of without reporting to the proper authorities: (62) *The Prison Administration is to report the death to the investigating or court body under whose jurisdiction the prisoner is, the Department for Acts of Civil Status (DACS) on the territory where he lived before the arrest on the Form given here (Supplement Number 2) or, when the address is unknown, the DACS of the republic or region to which the prison belongs.*

Page 59 or 159

There appears to be a page number of the upper right hand corner of the document, either '59' or '159' merged with the words 'Top Secret.' This suggests that the Smoltsov document was part of a file, presumably – if we were to follow the standard pattern of prisoner files – either Wallenberg's personal or investigative file. Such files were stitched unless a specific order was given 'not to stitch', meaning the authorities expected to have to add, remove or re-arrange documents in the future. Pages were numbered in pencil but could be re-numbered in different colors as they were re-arranged, combined with other files or cut down. Certain files had three different pagination systems on some pages.

If not a contrived 'special effect' on an inauthentic document, this page could have been taken from Raoul Wallenberg's personal or investigative files. Alternatively this could have been taken from Smoltsov's correspondence file either to Abakumov personally or to his deputies of the Especially Grave Matters Investigative Unit. This group relied upon Smoltsov to prescribe increased rations or evaluate their prisoners for labor fitness. Less likely, given the gravity of the matter at hand, is the possibility that this came from the correspondence files of the Sanitary Services unit within Internal Prison. (Yakovlev's disclosure since this writing that Smoltsov was not even working in Lubyanka during that time period makes this even more suspect).

A serious attempt should be made to determine from which file this document was found – including the fact that there existed another prisoner by the name of 'Walenberg.' A more controversial option is that Page 59/159 is a forgery based on a document, the original of which refers to another prisoner, but where the name 'Walenberg' has been substituted for the original, shorter name – without including the first name and patronymic because it is too long. Here too the page number acts as a 'special effect' to support the illusion that this was an authentic document.

"Because of Your Instruction Personally to Watch Wallenberg"

The implications of this statement in the Smoltsov document lends strength to the claim projected by the overall effect that there existed special circumstances which would explain the unusualness of Smoltsov being the attendant physician as opposed to the Head of Medical Services of Internal Prison, or Doctors Colonel Larin and Lt. Colonel Finayev of the Butyrka Medical Services who usually cared for the prisoners who were sick from all three Moscow prisons.

There is, however, an intermediate set of documents missing from here which would make this claim more logical – namely no evidence has been produced as yet to prove that Wallenberg had been shifted from the jurisdiction of the 4th Department of the 3rd Main Directorate to the Investigative Unit of the Especially Grave Matters/Especially Important Cases Division under Leonov. Colonel Vinogradov has stated that Wallenberg remained under the jurisdiction of the 4th Department until his death. Smoltsov's signature – in the files I have studied – appears only in relation to those under the jurisdiction of the the Especially Important Cases unit.

In view of this, I renew my request that the Russian side review its interrogation and other registries for proof that Wallenberg was shifted to the Especially Grave Matters Unit. All numbered prisoners *under investigation* held under their jurisdiction after the March 11, 1947 interrogation with Kuzmishin should be considered to determine if any of them could be Raoul Wallenberg – particularly Prisoner Number 7 *under investigation*. This is based on the assumption that, if Abakumov indeed had ultimate 'watch' over Wallenberg, it would have been either through the 4th Department of the 3rd Main Directorate or the Especially Grave Matters Unit.

The Question of 'Watch'

Normally this expression is used to imply 'care' or to 'prevent escape.' If a prisoner is under a guard or a doctor or a warden's 'watch' or the 'watch of the MGB organs' in an internat, he is their direct responsibility. Should anything happen to him, the one in charge of the watch would be accountable. Along these lines we can see, for example, the guard's watch when Polish General Leopold Okulicki went on a hunger strike in Lefortovo Prison in 1946. The guard reported at frequent intervals whether Okulick was in a reclining position, whether he slept or not, his smoking habits and so on. The implication was that if things got worse – should an emergency occur – it would be reported immediately in order to keep him alive and the situation under control. Indeed, a special surgeon from the Medical Services MGB was called in to perform surgery in an attempt to save the Polish leader's life during his final hunger strike. This operation was performed in Butyrka Prison Hospital, however – not on site.

The Emergency Registry for Unusual Events at Lubyanka Prison for the July 1 – August 1, 1947 time period, provided by the Russian side of the Working Group, does not make reference to the death of Raoul Wallenberg or any other prisoner. It does make reference to the attempted suicide of a female prisoner. I have asked to see this registry for the date of October 14/15, 1947 when Wallenberg's cell mate Willi Roedl died on his way to Krasnogorsk, but still under the jurisdiction of Internal Prison. This would confirm that we are studying the right journals to determine who died during that year under the 'watch' of the head of Lubyanka Prison.

In my study, the term 'watch' appeared in yet another context. Prominent foreign prisoners suffering from psychiatric problems or being sent into exile rather than being repatriated at the end of term were to be held in special facilities *under the watch of the MGB organs*. While this will be a subject for a later report, it has been acknowledged that the MGB, later KGB, had and

has a number of 'safe houses' where a prisoner of Wallenberg's calibre could be concealed. In this regard, there exist a number of valuable testimonies which have been ignored until now reporting Wallenberg's presence in a 'villa', 'small house, or closed ward of an MVD medical facilities on the outskirts of Moscow, or 'pension' or 'special site' for Poles and Balts who were never released.

"Presumably by Myocardial Infarct" – The Question of a Young Man's Death

At the request of Dr. Marvin W. Makinen, Dr. Harry A. Fozzard, a highly respected cardiologist at the University of Chicago, gave his assessment of myocardial infarct as the presumed cause of the death of Raoul Wallenberg, born 1912 – at the age of 35. In terms of Smoltsov's statement 'presumably by myocardial infarct,' Dr. Fozzard points out that myocardial infarct could not be determined on the basis of an external examination, only through autopsy

correlating a coronary occlusion with an infarcted area of heart muscle. The muscle changes are only present typically 24 hours after the onset. If the patient dies before 24 hours, even the post-mortem diagnosis was unreliable....In summary, a physician could suspect the diagnosis (only) if he were to be with the patient during the acute chest pain...

Short of having been with Wallenberg in his cell for a long period of time, Smoltsov should have had access to some medical documentation of previous complaints of angina or chest pain, in making his assessment as to the 'cause of death.' Again, we must call for the missing medical records.

While concluding that myocardial infarct is extremely unlikely in a young man of 35, based on the evidence as it exists to date Dr. Fozzard raised the question of trauma.

For example, soft tissue trauma or bone fractures have a close association with pulmonary emboli, which can result in sudden death especially if the individual is restrained or dehydrated. Head trauma resulting in intracranial bleeding can lead to cardiac arrhythmia and sudden death.

This raises the question: if Wallenberg died in 1947 – was it really the result of a planned execution or rather from a trauma induced by heavy beating or a blow to the head? In reference to this, on July 17, 1947 – Wallenberg's alleged death date – Abakumov not only communicated with Molotov about the Swede. He also reported to Stalin regarding the practices of arresting, handling and maintaining a prisoner *under investigation*. The original of this document, which exists as a copy among the papers of General Dmitri Volkogonov in the Library of Congress, has yet to be found in the Presidential or other archives so its veracity is in question. However, one of the more controversial aspects of this document – which Colonel Vinogradov describes as a 'compendium of instructions' – is the reference to torture in order to extract essential information from a prisoner under investigation. According to Colonel Vinogradov such practices were explicitly forbidden.

Dr. Fozzard also makes the point that the chances of a young man of 35 – who has no history of heart disease in his immediate family – would have been one in a million. According to Friedberg's text, only 5% of myocardial infarcts occurred before the age of 45. *Stress, dehydration and recent surgery can promote a hypercoagulable state that would increase the*

likelihood of myocardial infarction, but only in individuals with severe pre-existing arteriosclerosis.

Here too another analogy comes into question – the case of Prince Fumitake Konoye who, like Oggins, was reportedly executed to prevent his repatriation. Konoye's death took place in October 1956, only a few months before the Gromyko Memorandum was issued. He was 41 at the time, only three years younger than Wallenberg. His death records state the cause of death as *'hypertensive disease and generalized arterio-sclerosis resulting in a large area of broken blood vessels in the fourth ventricle of the brain....Nephrosclerosis with hemorrhagic nephritis and pyelitis contributed to the death.* There has been some question as to whether this is a false medical history. Konoye died when the question of his repatriation to Japan had become a pressing issue. While there had previously been definite indications that he was to be repatriated – rights of correspondence and the fact that he was to be transferred to a repatriation camp in Harbin – Konoye was recalled from the East. In his last communication he wrote to his wife that while he'd had high hopes of seeing her again, he sensed that a negative decision had been made in his case.

If Wallenberg survived in 1947, the 1955-56 period appears the more 'dangerous' for Wallenberg – logically speaking. By then, all investigative purposes would have been served, the question of his recruitability firmly determined. This is all the more critical because, by then, his presence in the Soviet Union could no longer be denied thanks to the testimony of the repatriated eyewitnesses. A report of the nature of the Gromyko Memorandum was necessary to countermand the obviously false claims of the Vishinsky Memorandum of 1947. (It is also possible, as I have noted in my report on Strict Isolation and the Numbering of Prisoners, that other internal pressures existed to make a decision regarding Wallenberg's future at that time – namely that in early 1957, Wallenberg's possible ten year term for Counter-Revolutionary activities dating from 1947 was about to come to an end. This would have made the decision whether to repatriate or exile him all the more necessary. Execution was the third, most extreme alternative at that time.

EXECUTION BY SHOOTING

With the exception of Franz Rudolph Gflorener, executed by shooting in April 1952, most of those sentenced to capital punishment had their sentences commuted to fifteen years of ITL or hard labor. For this reason it was recommended by experts that I actually see Gflorener's execution act which was not in his personal file – only the sentence itself, without proof that it had been carried out. In the end I was shown this proof of his execution – which includes a list of others who were executed at that time – as well as documents related to the disposal of the body. This is another instance of Russian cooperation which has proven helpful to properly understanding the steps leading up to an execution. The problem remains however that – if Gflorener's file is a true example-- the proof of such a death would be found only in Wallenberg's investigative file (reportedly missing) or in other classified records where executions are listed including time and place of execution, the names of those placed before the firing squad, disposal of bodies and so on.

Where the death date of July 1947 is concerned, however, we have another discrepancy. While a number of retired Soviet KGB officials have reported that Wallenberg was killed in July 1947 by shooting, rasstriel was cancelled in May of 1947 and did not resume until 1950. Even after it was reinstated, it was mentioned in passing to the prisoners more as a threat, to emphasize the gravity of their 'war crimes.' That is, even though rasstriel had been re-instated, the sentence would read

in effect: "Were it not for the fact that rasstriel has been canceled, you would have been executed." A twenty-five year sentence for espionage was considered the next most severe punishment. Prisoners from Perm and other maximum security prisons released in the late Eighties and early Nineties have made reference to aging, nameless 'Nazi war criminals' still being held in isolator prisons to the East.

In short, among the important or controversial cases I have studied – Gflorener is the only one to have actually been shot. Why? Is it because he refused to be recruited? Or did the fact that he had already been proven a triple agent make him too unreliable in the eyes of the Soviets? The reason Gflorener's fate is particularly important to our research is Gflorener's role as the head of Abwehrstelle Budapest in Jewish rescue and his cooperative relationship with the Joint, pre-dating Wallenberg's mission. In fact, Gflorener's arrest by the Gestapo in May of 1944 and his detention in Vienna until the end of the War meant – from an Allied/Joint perspective – that someone was desperately needed in Budapest to carry on his protective functions. Wallenberg interrogator Kopelyansky has inferred that there exists an important parallel between the case of Gflorener and that of the Swedish diplomat. The question must be explored whether the accusations against Wallenberg as a Nazi collaborator relate solely to his trade dealings with the Nazis in order to save lives, or if he took on some of the information-gathering oversight which had been Gflorener's function for the Abwehr as for the Allies.

While the authorities of Domskoi Crematory wrote a document in 1991 stating that there is no evidence of Raoul Wallenberg being buried or cremated there, the experts on the Russian side have informed me that those executed were disposed of without recording their names at Domskoi. One would expect, however, a list within the Prison Administration itself to coincide with a list of executions because – as was pointed out to me by the Russians themselves – unless one sees a full sequence of documents to the end, there is no guarantee of what happened. Again, it is up to the Russian side to substantiate their claim.

Nobel-Laureate Andrej Sakharov, in the English edition of his Memoirs, has provided further information regarding the documentation of rasstriel which he learned from a KGB officer who dealt with such files in the Thirties and Forties: *NKVD and KGB investigative files are stamped 'To be preserved forever.' In rare instances specific pages may be removed on instructions from the top leadership, but a file is never completely destroyed...In every case, the first page of a file was retained. If a person had been executed, an affidavit that the death sentence had been carried out was included, with a record of the serial number of the pistol used.*

EXECUTIONS MADE TO APPEAR DEATH BY DISEASE

The lengths to which the authorities could go to account for a death, even if death was induced, may best be seen in the case of the American citizen, Esau Oggins. In Memorandum 2733A of May, 1947 Abakumov had recommended to Stalin that Oggins --whose term had expired and therefore a decision was necessary regarding his fate -- be 'executed'. This was necessary to prevent Oggins from returning to the United States where, as a Communist, his testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee would turn world opinion and that of 'fellow travelers' against the USSR. To facilitate this, however, it would be necessary to provide a false medical history and autopsy as to the 'cause of death.' Abakumov recommended that Oggins be executed, the date of his actual death be altered to occur just prior to the end of his term

(presumably so there would be no question of illegalities in the form of prolonged detention), and that his death be attributed to '*aggravated tuberculosis of the spine.*'

In relation to Oggins, Abakumov writes: "*In the archives of the Noril'sk camp, we will reflect the course of Oggins' illness, medical and other help given him. Oggins' death will be registered officially as a result of illness by an autopsy document and a burial certificate.*" Abakumov's memorandum to Stalin, censored in part, as well as Oggins' death certificate have been given over to us through the U.S. /Russia POW/MIA Task Force. We still have no copy of the false medical history or autopsy to see how and to what degree Abakumov's recommendation was acted upon or modified by Stalin and other leaders involved in the final resolution of Oggins' fate.

The Oggins case has been presented to the Wallenberg investigators as analogous to that of Raoul Wallenberg who allegedly died during the same time period. Here two there are a number of comparative details that should be noted:

- 1) Abakumov's response regarding Wallenberg, Memorandum 3044A – contents unknown – was addressed to Molotov of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His recommendation for the execution of Oggins was addressed directly to Stalin. Susanne Berger has pointed out that, by the year 1952, this Memorandum regarding Wallenberg was already missing from the Council of Ministers/Foreign Ministry files. This, like the blots in the registries discussed in the DISAPPEARANCE section to follow, could have been part of a systematic effort to remove traces of his presence among the regular archives.
- 2) In May of 1947, when Abakumov wrote this recommendation to Stalin to execute Oggins and fake his medical history and autopsy, rasstriel – death by shooting – had just been or was about to be canceled in a matter of days. Abakumov's recommendation was not to be acted upon over night. Assuming the order to cancel rasstriel to have been strictly observed, 'execution' of Oggins would have been through injection, liquidation by poisoning, or other forms of biochemical manipulation. In this regard, the text of the Smoltsov document could describe a doctor's watch after having given an injection to make certain that it fulfilled its intended purpose. The statement that the prisoner 'Walenberg' died 'presumably as a result of infarcta carta' could be read as a recommendation for the language to use in stating 'cause of death' on the actual death certificate. We are however still haunted by the question why, having gone this far, they did not document the matter entirely in 1947, particularly given the precedent of Oggins whose actual death occurred in July – only a few days before Wallenberg's alleged death date.
- 3) While the Russian side has not stated how exactly Oggins was killed, they have not only disclosed the information that he was 'executed' but, in answer to my letters of November 3, 1999 and January 10, 2000 – that he died on July 5, 1947 in Penza where he was buried in the Jewish cemetery. Oggins was not in Lubyanka Prison in Moscow at the time of his execution. The close timing of Vishinsky's memorandum to Molotov, calling for the 'liquidatsia' of the problem of Wallenberg's detention and Abakumov's letter to Stalin recommending that Oggins be executed (May, 1947) back to back with the fact that Oggins died on July 5, 1947 and Wallenberg allegedly on July 17, 1947 is a compelling argument. I have considered the possibility that for the sake of secrecy both died in the same manner in the same place. Results of independent field work related to this question are not yet forthcoming.

WHY THE LACK OF SUBSTANTIATION: 1957 AND BEYOND

Why A Fake Medical History Could Not be Contrived in 1957

In 1956, when the Gromyko Memorandum was being prepared, the Smoltsov document was either genuinely uncovered or contrived. As I have repeatedly emphasized in this chapter and elsewhere, if an authentic document, there should be more to give us the complete picture of Wallenberg's medical history, murder or suicide. If inauthentic, why stop with this one piece of paper that has no legal validity as a death certificate? Why not fake the entire body of documents and silence the whole matter, as Abakumov suggested in the case of Oggins in 1947?

There are two possible answers to this. One is that the goal was not to declare Wallenberg dead but to create a document sufficiently ambiguous that its implications could be easily reversed at a later time. All the flaws in the Smoltsov Document work toward this end, one which presumably would be employed if the Government of Sweden agreed to enter into an exchange. As we know that the Soviets had at least one spy in place in Sweden in 1957 – Stig Wennerstrom – the inconclusiveness of the Gromyko Memorandum leaves the door open to an exchange while correcting the impression that Wallenberg was not to be found in the Soviet Union.

We should add to this that, if Stepanov's testimony is correct, initially this document may have been generated by Smoltsov at the request of Abakumov to be placed in Wallenberg's 'Lefortovo file' for deception purposes – establishing his "death" even as his identity was being changed. Afterwards, at the time the Gromyko Memorandum was being shaped, it may have been decided that it was a useful tool to convince the outside world as well. The misspelling of Wallenberg's name is, of course, suspect.

The second possibility is that the policy makers of the times might have considered providing a full, but contrived, body of evidence to establish that Wallenberg was dead – but they could not because of the mechanics of their own legal and accounting system. In short, by 1956/1957, the 'books were closed' on a death in 1947. It would be too late to introduce the 'proper' documentation into all the registries and files of all the appropriate offices.

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs directive to Soviet Ambassador to Hungary, Uri V. Andropov of September 17, 1957, the Soviets claimed that Langfelder died on March 2, 1948. This directive also states: *Unfortunately we couldn't discover any reason to think that all materials regarding Langfelder as well as all materials about Wallenberg were not destroyed by the former leadership of State Security in the USSR. But the list of the prisoners in Lubyanka was found and there is the name of Langfelder with a remark: 'Died on March 2, 1948.'*

Our request to see this list, made in my first Preliminary Report of November 1998, should be continually repeated. In fact, we should ask for the right to see these 'prisoner lists' for the period 1945-48 to see if, on a regular basis, these notations were made of the death of prisoners – as for example in the cases of Marek, Bethlen, Van der Waals, Okulicki and Roedl. Does Langfelder's name really appear as stated? Did this list apply only to prisoners who died in Lubyanka? Are there comparable lists for other prisons? Does the name Wallenberg appear on this list of prisoners in Lubyanka – as it should since we know he was there through the 1947 Lubyanka Possessions Registry? What notation is next to his name, if any? Was his name blotted out?

We should also point out the fact that Vilmos Langfelder's Lubyanka prison registration card is missing. How is it possible that Langfelder's name appears on the list of prisoners for Lubyanka

prison with the notation that he died on March 2, 1948 – while his card has disappeared from the kartoteka? In a system as meticulous as this, there should be correspondence between the two notations. Langfelder's card should note his date of death and also give the archival number for his records, at least as known in 1948. Wallenberg's registration card, on the other hand, does not state that Wallenberg died on July 17, 1947 or at any time. These contradictions are compelling and should be analysed to a greater depth.

Finally we should repeat our request to study the annual listing of prisoners who died throughout the Moscow prison complex during the period 1945 – 1948, to acquaint ourselves more fully with the system and to see if there is any indication whatever of the death of Raoul Wallenberg, even as a nameless or numbered prisoner. If we are to take the fact that Wallenberg's currency was returned to his next of kin in October 1989 – when the regulation is that it is to be given over within six months of death or confiscated by the State – then we should also be studying these records during this time period also. This is a goal of my follow-up work.

The Decade Listing

Of more importance, in terms of accounting and 'protecting the books,' we now know from prison administration regulations that there also existed a 'decade listing.' To introduce Raoul Wallenberg as dead in 1947 after the fact – i.e. when the books for the Forties have been long closed by 1957 and especially if the decade registry is in chronological and/or alphabetical order – could not be done without alerting a number of different competent authorities. This may explain why we are left with the Smoltsov document – a handwritten note to file that can claim no legal value and therefore does not constitute an illegal act.

CONCLUSIONS REGARDING AN EARLY DEATH

1. My first conclusion is best expressed by Lucien Goaze, an officer of the French Deuxieme Bureau stationed in Budapest both during and after the War and a prisoner at Vladimir, in his analysis of the Gromyko Memorandum to Wallenberg's mother, Maj von Dardel.

Finally it seems impossible to me that the Soviet Government could justify lack of precision (in Wallenberg's case) from an objective point of view as well as the lack of proper care leading to death – simply by reference to the great number of prisoners kept in the camps and by the cruelty of an Abakumov. Raoul Wallenberg, Swedish diplomat, was too important a character in and of himself, and also in their game – I mean the Soviets' intentions and calculations – for him not to have been monitored very precisely in his movements in the USSR and in the evolution of his health.

While this will be developed more fully later with the completion of my study on Investigation and the Sentencing of Prisoners, I agree with Goaze's assessment of the Soviet prison system. In terms of 'the evolution of his health,' in the files studied I discerned two phases for prisoners:

- (1) those *under investigation* where a clear effort was made to sustain figures of importance so that they can survive their strenuous interrogations; and
- (2) those *already sentenced* who survived their terms but – one might argue – were still considered a threat to or enemy of the State. A number of these important prisoners seemed to have died just prior to their time of release. With their aging, this was of

course more problematic to assess. But Wallenberg was young at the point of his arrest and, as noted by Dr. Frozzard's analysis of the Smoltsov document, for him to die of a heart attack would have most likely resulted from a sharp blow to the head during interrogation. This may have been what General Pitovranov meant when he said that Wallenberg's death was a 'mistake.'

2. There are a number of death dates which should be considered in determining the fate of Raoul Wallenberg, not just one. The significance of the 1947 death date is primarily supported by the fact that Soviet officials have given it credence – first through the Gromyko Memorandum and then through subsequent oral reports, especially in the past decade, which would indicate Wallenberg died in 1947 but as a result of execution rather than natural causes. Apart from the Gromyko Memorandum/Smoltsov presentation and these oral testimonies, there is no documentation to support Wallenberg's death at that time – which is odd considering that a number of other important cases of foreign prisoners' deaths are well documented, even though the cause of death may have been a fabricated one.

The second 'danger' period of 1952-53 is drawn from a number of eyewitness reports which state either that Wallenberg was very sick during that time and in the hospital (in various parts of the country) or that he was very sick and died at that time. These reports have to be studied with more care and in conjunction with the Medical investigation. Therefore they will be dealt with in a later chapter. The most analogous deaths at that time, however, were those of Jan Stanislaw Jankowski and Prisoner Number Eleven whose causes of death were not stated on their prisoner registration cards at Vladimir Prison, nor were they reported to the regional authorities at the order of the head of Prison. These two prisoners were buried together in the same grave.

The third 'danger point' is that of the 1955-56 period when a new response to Swedish inquiries as to the fate of Wallenberg were being prepared, reversing the Vishinsky Memorandum of 1947. While these are not as readily documented, it has been claimed by Soviet experts and ex-KGB officials that the Khrushchev period was marked by as many atrocities as that of Stalin. Wallenberg's case is closely analogous to that of Prince Fumitaka Konoye, more so than to that of Oggins because at the time Oggins died – Wallenberg's presence in Soviet prisons was not sufficiently proven. This was only established through the testimonies of the repatriated primary witnesses returning from 1953 and following. Had Wallenberg survived until this time, the question of whether to repatriate or execute him would have been much more urgent than in 1947. Further study of the Konoye case in the Archives of Foreign Policy would be useful in analyzing this analogy more precisely.

The fourth possible date of death which has been completely overlooked, but for which there is evidence, is that which relates to the return of Wallenberg's possessions (money and valuables) to his next of kin in 1989. This death scenario most appropriately conforms to the standard prison regulations for the disposal of belongings and valuables following a prisoner's death. In any case, as I have noted, for these valuables and money to still be available in 1989 when his real death should have occurred in 1947 is completely in opposition to standard practice of confiscation within a set period of time after the date of death, or in instances where the real ownership of such valuables could not be established. If Wallenberg died in 1947, 1952/53, or in 1956 these monies should have been confiscated by the State decades before. As the valuables and currency follow a prisoner after his sentencing from prison to camp, hospital to asylum to be used in his credit/debit account; the availability of these objects in 1989 under normal conditions would establish that Wallenberg lived until that time. The Russian side must explain – if they can – this 'exception.'

3. The reason for the absence of documentation is, in and of itself, grounds for projecting what really happened in the policy makers attempts to shape a view, while skirting contradictions in the details given or avoiding unwanted accountability.
4. At the same time, the Russians repeated statement that Raoul Wallenberg was never sentenced combined with the return of Wallenberg's identity papers and other personal documents, including his valuables and currencies, would indicate that some portion of his file still existed in 1989.
5. The existence of not only annual death registrations but decade listings should either verify Wallenberg's death in 1947 or explain why a full set of legal documents related to his death could not be introduced ten years after the fact.
6. Separate from this, I have noted the different offices within the Prison Administration which, at one point or another, would have to be informed of the death of a known prisoner – which Wallenberg was. Their records have never been made available to us. This is part of the Soviet failure to substantiate their own claim and should be rectified.
7. While the Russians showed courage in producing Abakumov's recommendation to execute Oggins and alter his medical records, this inevitably opens a 'can of worms'. One can no longer look at the medical records and autopsies of a death – especially if it involves a reasonably young man – and be sure that they describe the real circumstances of the death. This is further compounded by our awareness that the preparation of the 'falsified circumstances' was a high level committee decision. This may be seen even in the analogy of Oggins. The form of falsified death which Abakumov recommended to Stalin does not completely correspond to the formula which appeared on his death certificate, showing that it was changed while under consideration.

A number of different voices participated in the preparation of this fairly "exceptional" action involving a foreign prisoner. Until we can study Oggins' file, we cannot know, step by step, the procedures that brought this unusual solution into force and compare it with the evidence we have in the Wallenberg case. We do not know, for example, Molotov or Vishinsky's involvement in the planning process – if any. Until we have articulated this process, we cannot make use of the information to determine if Raoul Wallenberg may have also died in this manner in 1947 or beyond.

As for death by shooting, the Russians would have to provide us with analogous cases of foreign prisoners shot in July 1947 or thereabouts. Here too we must examine the procedures to determine competency and accountability, then check relevant files to determine if there are indications of another death under their jurisdiction which could be that of Raoul Wallenberg's. Until this is done, it should be understood by the public at large that both stories of execution – by lethal injection or by rasstriel in 1947 – are without foundation.

On the other hand, I have already identified for the Swedish and Russian governments the only numbered prisoner numbers which could correspond to Raoul Wallenberg, Vilmos Langfelder and Sandor Katona during the 1947-early 1948 time period as models for the DISAPPEARED. Until the anonymous persons carrying those numbers are properly identified, both those

sentenced and those *under investigation*, the option that this could have been Wallenberg's fate at that time is quite probable.

III. DISAPPEARANCE

One of the most powerful tools that existed in the Soviet system to isolate prisoners '*under investigation*' and to limit awareness of their identity even after *sentencing* was that of '*numbering*'. Thus the name, and other pertinent data about a prisoner, could be concealed not only from fellow prisoners but from everyone who guarded him or her -- except for those on the highest level. While this system existed even in Czarist times, it proved particularly useful to the Soviet prison authorities in the handling of nationalist leaders and others arrested during World War II. In keeping with MGB/MVD organizational changes which took place in the Spring of 1947 regarding the categorization of prisoners and their placement, the system governing the '*contingent*' of numbered prisoners would seem to have become even more centralized as well.

Thus, on April 19, 1947 Central in Moscow sent the Directorate MGB for Ivanovo Region regulations for keeping the newly arrived contingent of Baltic numbered prisoners:

General Rules: Head of Internal Prison, his deputies on duty and guards are responsible for: a) keeping secret the very fact that numbered prisoners are kept in the Internal Prison; b) keeping secret their names, last names, background, etc.; c) prevention of their attempts to escape, contacts with the outside world and with each other; and d) making sure that the numbered prisoners obey the regulations for their regime. None of the personnel is to know about the numbered prisoners, except the head of the Internal Prison. The guards are not allowed to speak to numbered prisoners, by any means. No conversations about them are allowed in the presence of the guards, personnel or workers of the MGB Directorate. When necessary, in official conversation, the guards are to use the prisoners' numbers or the numbers of their cells. Only the following guards are to guard the numbered prisoners....

We may presume that similar instructions went to the heads of MGB Directorates in other regions which housed isolateur or maximum security prisons, particularly the nearby Vladimir Oblast where political prisoners and prominent figures were often kept in Prison Number 2. This doesn't exclude the possibility that other numbered prisoners were also kept under '*special conditions*' in more minor or less known prisons -- or special sites -- throughout the former USSR. This is particularly pertinent to Wallenberg who was described by one former Soviet official as well as one informant/Vladimir prisoner as having been kept, particularly after psychiatric difficulties set in, in a villa with two or three other prisoners.

Through the files of the numbered prisoners we have been allowed to see, we now know that their personal files --rather than traveling with the prisoner from place to place as is the norm -- would be opened and maintained only by the warden or deputy head of the facility where the prisoner was held at that time. The complete personal file -- including identifying documents, orders and decisions, his investigative processing, or details of his stay in other special prisons or camps -- was kept in the Prison Department in Moscow, so that the very few knew not only the identity of the prisoner but the pattern of his movements. In some cases the prisoners were informed of their numbers -- in others they were not.

Registration cards, corpus and cell cards – rather than being included in the various prison kartotekas -- were all returned to the head of the Prison Department/Directorate of 'Central.' All information regarding these prisoners was passed in 'sealed packets'. As noted in Ambassador Magnusson's Final Report, sometime in 1947 the interpreter Solovyov was asked to carry a such a packet from Section Chief Kuleshov (under Kartashov) to the Archive Chief MGB Gertsovsky:

On the package was written 'Package with materials concerned the arrested Number 7, can only be opened with permission of MGB leadership.' Package included certain pages and personal documents (although not the personal file) which concerned Raoul Wallenberg.

The Russian authorities have acknowledged that this is a clear indication that Raoul Wallenberg was temporarily a numbered prisoner while *under investigation* in Moscow prisons. We can be assured that Wallenberg was at that time still alive, not yet sentenced insofar as he is described as *the arrested* rather than the *convicted* or the *deceased*. As we have seen from other prisoners who were numbered while *under investigation* in Moscow prisons and then *sentenced* under a number, the sentenced number was different. For example, *convicted* Prisoner Number 15 was called the *arrested Number 30* while *under investigation*. Our findings would show that if Raoul Wallenberg 'disappeared' in 1947 rather than being executed, he was most likely sentenced by OSO in June of 1947 as Prisoner Number 14 and sent to Vladimir Prison soon thereafter.

The warden of the prison, where numbered prisoners were concerned, had to turn to his overseer in the Prison Department MGB or Prison Directorate for instruction on every detail related to the prisoner's care-- which did not prevent the nachalnik from expressing his personal opinion regarding orders to his superior. In turn, the Prison Directorate under Colonel Kuznetsov -- who personally signed most of the special orders regarding Numbered Prisoners -- would consult the Investigative Unit of the 1st Main Directorate MVD -- at least by 1953.

The mental stress on individual prisoners whose contact with the outside world had been severely cut was very great. Psychiatric breakdowns are well documented. Being placed in the punishment cell (kartser) did not deter *convicted* Prisoner Number 15 at Vladimir from painting his number and cell number on his valenki or boots, so that vigilant prisoners watching from the window as he took his walk could be made aware of his existence. Or, Hungarian Prisoner C might shout his name and number at the top of his lungs from his cell, demanding that his Embassy or previous contacts in Allied intelligence be notified.

Such behavior created problems for those guarding them. Personnel who came in contact with a prisoner determined to reveal his identity would have to report this incident in such a way as to make clear that he had not '*heard or understood*' the name -- for such knowledge was strictly forbidden. After Stalin's death, Kuznetsov as head of the Prison Directorate pressured those to whom he reported to re-evaluate their practices of imposing serious periods of isolation on an unstable single prisoner, such as Hungarian Prisoner C. On the other hand, a numbered or seriously isolated prisoner who was so intimidated that he did not dare to defy the system by drawing attention to himself might sit forever and indeed get lost.

This was further complicated by the fact that those numbered, renamed or in strict isolation were denied the right to write protests to their detention, their sentence or specific conditions in their regime. Hungarian Prisoner C writes about this in his appeal to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, not forwarded because of its anti-Soviet content: *I was absent from my trial in 1950 in Moscow. Since then I have been demanding re-examination of my case, but my appeals were*

blocked by the local authorities and the medical personnel pronounced me mad. And so my petitions were not valid.

If 1947 appeared to be a year for centralization, 1953 – after the death of Stalin – seemed to indicate the beginnings of reform – and, for some, re-numbering. As early as April, amnesty was proposed for Vladimir long term Prisoner Number 3, (born 1896) – sentenced on November 30, 1946. On July 13, 1953 Deputy Head of the Prison Department, Prison Directorate MVD – wrote to I.A. Serov as Deputy Head MVD suggesting that PRISONER Number 3 might even be '*released without exile.*' This was a favor as many of the older numbered or heavily isolated prisoners, upon release, were sent into internats (asylums) in remote regions. It is important to note Serov's decision-making role at critical points in the fate of some of these numbered prisoners.

By September 1953, the names of many of the numbered prisoners had been restored. As their numbers were released, fresh prisoners from Moscow or others in isolation prisons to the East could be renumbered (their number reduced) before being brought to Vladimir. By 1954, those on the '*strictly isolated*' list, including at least one reported Wallenberg witness, were already being brought back to Vladimir from Verchne-Uralsk and Alexandrovsk Central. By 1955, others came from Irkutsk. Both our calculations and eyewitness reports would suggest that Raoul Wallenberg was also brought to Vladimir during this time period, although there is indication that he may have been there previously, as early as 1947. (See Vladimir Corpus II study of Dr. Marvin W. Makinen and Ari Kaplan).

The isolated fate of a 'numbered prisoner' was shared equally by leaders of the Baltic nations arrested in 1941; members of the Polish Government in Exile invited to Moscow in March of 1945 until their show trial in June of that year; Stalin's in-laws such as Anna Sergeyevna and Eugenia Alexandra Allilueva sentenced in 1948; Boris Menshagin – the chief witness to the truth of the Katyn Forest Massacre and an unknown Ukrainian national leader – among others.

It is not difficult to understand the goal in concealing prisoners as prominent or controversial as those mentioned above. The same could be said of the case of numbered prisoners like former Ministers of State Security, Abakumov and Yezhov – arrested in what can only be described as a reshifting of power. Few guards would refrain from bragging about the important prisoner under their watch, some might even be sympathetic. The precautions expressed in the April 1947 instructions were to the point. Though rare – there was at least one instance of escape as the result of a numbered prisoner successfully bribing a guard. Beyond this, one must bear in mind that zealous nationalist networks were constantly seeking information about their leaders and rewarded well those who informed or made communication possible between them.

It is less easy to follow the reasoning behind the imprisonment of such numbered prisoners as the Armenian Jesuit priest, PRISONER AA (Vladimir Prisoner Number 15); Wolfgang Johann Meiners (Vladimir Prisoner Number 27) about whom we know little as his file was never requested; or the convicted Mexican Communist Vadillo (Vladimir Prisoner Number 28) who sat for some time in Vladimir Prison with the Langfelder witness Ernst Huber. Huber, while not numbered, was under *strict regime* at Vladimir. According to Huber own testimony, he sat alone in heavy isolation from his arrival May 27, 1951 until October 26, 1952. Then Vadillo – who had psychiatric problems – was brought into his cell. Because of his strict isolation status, however, Huber was not allowed to write letters to protest his cellmate's threatening behavior until the 15 of February 1954. Prisoner AA who arrived in Vladimir in 1947 was not allowed to write a letter regarding his missing possessions until 1953.

This gives some indication of the interaction of closely related but different forms of isolation. The fact that a numbered prisoner and a prisoner in '*strict regime*' were allowed to share a cell together establishes that it would also be possible for Raoul Wallenberg to have sat with others on the isolation list for a certain corpus. In Vladimir, the prison where much of our research has been concentrated, there is clear evidence of isolated prisoners whose cards do not give any cell history for them for at least five years. We also have cases -- like Herbert von Richthofen, former German Ambassador to Bulgaria urgently called back from Alexandrovsk Central MGB to be forwarded to Vladimir Prison -- who seems to have vanished into oblivion.

Calculating the Possible Number for Wallenberg & Others in 1947 (Excerpted)

It should be acknowledged that there could be -- at one and the same time -- two persons bearing the same number "15" -- one '*under investigation*' in Moscow prisons -- and another convicted on June 28, 1947 and sent away from Moscow as of his sentencing.

Of these two systems -- '*under investigation*' and '*sentenced*', the convicted numbered prisoner series is by far the clearest to follow. The numbers are sequential, referenced to the date their verdicts were handed down by OSO. At the same time, we can also see that -- in terms of those brought to Vladimir -- re-numbering began at the end of February 1952. In short we have a limited number of sentenced numbered prisoners with a very specific gap of numbers for which there is no identification.

NAME OF PRISONER	NUMBER	DATE SENTENCED
PRISONER AA	Number 14	June 28, 1947
	Number 15	
	Number 16	
	Number 17	
	Number 18	
	Number 19	
	Number 20	
Stalin Relative	Number 21	May 29, 1948
Stalin Relative	Number 22	May 29, 1948
Stalin Relative	Number 23	May 29, 1948
Hungarian Prisoner C	Number 24	July 1, 1950
Hungarian Prisoner P	Number 25	July 1, 1950
Hungarian Prisoner S	Number 26	July 1, 1950
German Prisoner M	Number 27	August 14, 1950
Vadillo, Martinez	Number 28	March 3, 1951
Menshagin, Boris G.	Number 29	September 12, 1951
Stulchinskis, Alexandras	Number 30	February 27, 1952
Shilingas, Statis	Number 31	February 27, 1952
Gonkunas, Jozis	Number 32	February 27, 1952

Alternatively, if the numbers of the Baltic prisoners '*under investigation*' were included in the sequence as part of centralizing the system, then we have Prisoner One -- Hungarian 'American spy' arrested in 1940, sentencing date unknown. Prisoner Two -- unknown in all details. Prisoner Three, Georgian, sentenced and already at Vladimir, with Merkis and the

others sitting in Ivanovo MGB or Kazan Psychiatric facility part of the chain. In this case, the only numbers which are unaccounted for in 1947 remain 14, 19 and 20.

By April 1952, the Baltic leader numbered prisoners '*under investigation*' in Ivanovo MGB began to be sentenced by OSO in Moscow. The new numbers they received as Prisoners were reduced in a number of occasions.

Merkis, Anton	Number 1	April 16, 1952
Merkis, N.	Number 2	April 16, 1952
NUMBER 3 ALREADY IN VLADIMIR PRISON		
Merkis, H.	Number 4	April 16, 1952
Urbshis, I.K.	Number 5	April 16, 1952
Urbshis, M.	Number 6	April 16, 1952
Munters, V.N.	Number 7	April 16, 1952
Munters, N.	Number 8	April 16, 1952
Balodis,	Number 9	
Balodis, E.	Number 10	
Laidoner, I.	Number 11	May 20, 1952
Laidoner, M.	Number 12	Already Sentenced

Prisoner Number 13 was dead, so that number may have become available at that time. So again the numbers for sentenced prisoners allows for the numbers 14 and above.

"AA": Prisoner Number 15

On the 29th of July 1947 a transport order number 16/1-65535 was prepared by Department A to send PRISONER AA to Vladimir Prison as sentenced Prisoner Number 15. PRISONER AA, an Armenian national Jesuit priest, had been a chaplain in the Italian Army and had served also as a medic on the Soviet front. He was arrested in 1942 as a military officer with the rank of Lieutenant and held in camps as a prisoner of war. Upon arrival in Moscow prisons in December 1945, he was still listed as a prisoner of war but placed under the jurisdiction of the 1st Directorate NKGB USSR per order Head Department 9.

Throughout his interrogations under the 1st Directorate, PRISONER AA was called up under his name. On the 2nd of May 1946, jurisdiction shifted to the Investigative Department for Especially Important Matters (OBD). His arrest was undocumented as late as October 11, 1946. By December of 1946, PRISONER AA was known as 'Prisoner Number 30,' whether at Lubyanka or Lefortovo. PRISONER AA was at that time '*under investigation*' but on June 28, 1947 he was sentenced according to Articles 58.4 and 58.11 of the Criminal Codes of the RSFSR to ten years in prison for 'Counter-Revolutionary' activities— at which point he became convicted Prisoner Number 15. In a letter to his sisters which appears in his file (meaning it was never mailed), PRISONER AA explains the charges against him as follows: "*.....membership in a counter-revolutionary organization – that is, for the fact that in 1937 when I entered the Jesuit order in Rome, I became a member of that religious organization – which they consider counter-revolutionary.*" However, prior to his military service and work in Rome, PRISONER AA --a scholar of classical and modern languages --served as Assistant to the Bishop of Lwow and also served in Teheran – two locations that later became important intelligence-gathering sites.

The Blotting of Names in the Alphabetical Possessions Registry

Our argument that Wallenberg, Langfelder and the unknown Hungarian – Sandor Katona – are candidates for these missing numbers is strengthened by the fact that PRISONER AA was sentenced by OSO on June 28, 1947 and sent to Vladimir on August 3rd as Prisoner Number 15. For PRISONER AA shared one aspect of Wallenberg and Langfelder's fates – his possessions had also been blotted out of the 1947 Lubyanka Alphabetical Possessions Registry. Until now, the fact that the names of Wallenberg, Langfelder and Katona were blotted out has been taken to mean that all three had died. However, there are four blots in the possessions registry, not three, and the authorities on both the Russian and Swedish sides have puzzled over the possible connection between these three prisoners from Hungary and PRISONER AA. One might ask, for example, were they all – like PRISONER AA – taken for 'British spies'? Did they all have connections with international religious organizations – whether Catholic or Zionist? Were they involved in the same underground rescue network?

The fact that Wallenberg arrived in Lubyanka on March 1, 1947, his possessions registered but seemingly never transferred elsewhere, has been used to imply that Wallenberg died. The blotted line for Wallenberg is compared with the case of his long term cellmate, Roedl, whose possessions were withdrawn when he was transferred to Camp 27. This is a fallacious argument because – while AA's name is also blotted out of the possessions registry – he did not die in captivity. Rather he was released on the 7th of February 1954 to the Italian authorities and returned to Rome. It is also critical that forensics be done on the Wallenberg blot for 1947 to establish whether he brought his rucksack with him as in the transfer from Budapest to Lubyanka and Lubyanka to Lefortovo in 1945. If instead he brought only 'personal documents', this would give us a better idea of his intended length of stay.

Perhaps then the blotting of these particular names in the registry has nothing to do with death. Instead, it may indicate the transfer of important information regarding possessions to a different registry with more limited access. We are assuming a registry which dealt exclusively with the possessions of numbered prisoners and was under the control of a separate division, department, directorate or even individual. Such a registry would be necessary to properly assist in every aspect of a numbered prisoner's daily maintenance – which includes the receiving of possessions upon request from storage or making use of moneys in their account to buy food through authorities at the prison kiosk.

The second point to be made is that these possessions of the numbered prisoner were not confiscated. They were still available to him. Examination of PRISONER AA's file shows that PRISONER AA wrote from Vladimir Prison more than once for the return of his '*precious possessions*' taken from him at successive points during his transfer to Moscow between 1943 and 1944. This particular letter was written in October 1953 – just after he had been given permission to resume the use of his name:

"Comrade Citizen Head. According to your oral order of the 14th October 1953, I inform you of the following: On the 29th of July 1943 in Internal Prison (Kazan) they took from me for storage – military rucksack with precious possessions under receipt Number 1146¹ and 67 rubles of money (don't remember number of the receipt). During several transfers from prison to prison¹ they took from me money receipt on 19 June 1944 in Butyrka Prison and receipt for possessions on the 8th December 1946 in Internal Prison, having merely said: 'Your money will be given back afterwards ... Precious possessions cannot be given personally. They are forwarded to the destination.'

With this everything was over and there is no money or precious things. I spoke about this in due time with the heads of Internal Prison and Lefortovo prisons. I wrote about this to the Center from Vladimir on the 11 October 1947 and on the 23 February 1951 according to the advice of the respective heads of prison. To this date I have not seen any result. With respect. [PRISONER AA].

P.S. Small list of precious possessions: Pocket watch with chain; alarm clock in leather case; Medallion – gold; Chain – gold; wedding ring of gold; cigarette case of silver; small vase of white metal; Waterman pen with gold tip.....

This same list of possessions appears in PRISONER AA's file, Page 118/123, with the handwritten note: *To be filed. Receipts for possessions and money rewritten for Number 15. 8 March 1949.* The items, listed below, are clearly those of a soldier/chaplain. While unable to retrieve possessions of ritual value, PRISONER AA's possessions were still being guarded for him, although an ideological threat to the Communist system. They eventually could be made available to him, depending upon the discretion of those who watched over him.

Copy of Receipt for Possessions – To be filed.

1. *Small case with church 'utensils.'*
 2. *Bag for possessions – used.*
 3. *Bag, canvas – 1.*
 4. *Leather boots – used – one pair.*
 5. *Church clothes – black wool – used – 1 set.*
 6. *Lighter – copper*
 7. *Saucepan, metallic – 1.*
 8. *Uniform, overcoat in green – used. 1 item.*
 9. *(Illegible) – green. 1.*
 10. *Gray blanket – used (1).*
 11. *Metallic flask – 1.*
 12. *Fountain pen – 1.*
 13. *Spectacles with case – 1.*
 14. *Copper chain and cross – 1.*
- Belongings received by (ILLEGIBLE)*
SIGNED: Prisoner Number 15.

By 25 April 1952, AA had access to at least one of the possessions on this list: *To Mr. Citizen Nachalnik. II-24. I ask for your permission to make a bridge on my own account and to exchange the wide belt for lumbago which was prescribed for me by doctors five years ago, because the old one is getting shabby and sags in parts. Also for the receipt from storage – my aluminum saucepan. Also for the demonstration of my possessions received in parcels...as you so friendly promised me. (Underlining is mine).*

The fact that these possessions were saved for the numbered prisoners, to be made available to them at a later date, can be established also in the case of the three Hungarian Numbered Prisoners. When the three Hungarians arrived in Vladimir in 1950 to be put in 'isolation cells in strict isolation', Zhuravlov wrote to Yevsenin of the Prison Department: *Prisoners 25 and 26 had, among their possessions, copies of receipts Number 258 and 36 with their surnames and first names. They are not notified of their numbers. Give your instruction whether they should be notified. For your information – the other numbered prisoners here know their own numbers.*

When Hungarian Prisoner C was sent to Butyrka Prison Hospital by special convoy as if 'for especially dangerous State criminal' in June of 1953, he took with him an array of possessions which he had brought with him from Budapest. These are listed under Receipt for Number 24. Presumably these personal possessions followed him to Leningrad Special Prison Hospital, back to Vladimir and then to Kazan. Prisoner C was the 'last remaining Hungarian citizen' to be repatriated from Kazan Prison Hospital. After he returned to Budapest, a letter was sent from the Prison Department on the 10th of December 1958 to the Head of Registration, Archival Department KGB:

In reference to [Hungarian Prisoner C], sentenced July 1, 1950 by OSO....When in Internal Prison MGB, [Prisoner C] was given Receipt Number 258/4 of 4 June 1946 for his watch, foreign money (13,000 Hungarian pengoes and 200 U.S. dollars) and Receipt Number 122/ of 7 II 50 for ten foreign coins and six foreign bank notes; plus Receipt Number 453/le of April 12, 1950 for personal documents and papers. By decision of the Military Collegium ...he was repatriated on the 14 of June 1957 and has requested the return of his valuables, money and personal papers. We are sending copies of his receipts and requesting that you resolve (reshitvopros) (the question of) the return of his valuables – or compensation for them – also of returning his personal papers. For your information, [former Prisoner C] lives in Hungary....Enclosed three receipts. Signed OFFICIAL V.

The return of Raoul Wallenberg's personal documents, his cigarette case and moneys in October of 1989 should be evaluated in light of the above. As we already know from the file of German Prisoner HM, personal identification papers were kept for the prisoner in his Archival Investigation File, not his personal file. German Prisoner HM's valuables, removed at his arrest, had already been turned over to the State Treasury because they were confiscated when he was sentenced. But German Prisoner HM was not a numbered prisoner. In the case of Hungarian Prisoner C all three categories of significant possessions – his personal papers, valuables and moneys – were under the control of the Registration Archival Department KGB.

Ramifications of Wallenberg's Returned Possessions

The fact that the authorities expected Hungarian Prisoner C's valuables to be retrieved raises very important questions regarding Wallenberg's possessions. In October 1989, when Raoul Wallenberg's next of kin – Dr. Guy von Dardel and his sister, Nina Lagergren – were invited to Moscow by the Russian Government to bring closure to the 'tragic mistake' of Wallenberg's arrest, the following items were handed over to them.

Wallenberg's passport Number 248

Wallenberg's car registration

Wallenberg's address book and calendar for 1944

Cigarette case – gold (1)

Money in the following currencies:

1,000 U. S dollars (issued in 1934)

500 Swiss francs

30 Swedish crowns

153,443 Hungarian pengoes

25,750 in Bulgarian currency

At that time, the next of kin were also handed a document to sign as a receipt for these possessions. As this document contained a clause acknowledging that Wallenberg was dead, they were not prepared to sign.

If Wallenberg died in 1947 when suggested, would not his valuables have already been turned over to the State? If sentenced without number, would they not have been confiscated? Why were they still around in 1989, waiting to be turned over to Wallenberg's next of kin? Is the currency handed over the exact same bills that had been in Wallenberg's hands, or does this represent a compensation? If compensation, where is the receipt from which the correct amounts were calculated? It could only be found in one of his files or on file in the Financial Department MGB in which Mironov, head of Moscow Internal Prison, would appear to have kept a direct hand – overseeing the transfer of monies and parcels to prisoners formerly under the OBD.

While we do not have the original receipts and therefore cannot verify that these are all of Wallenberg's valuables and possessions, we can begin to study the ramifications of the return of these few simple belongings in terms of normal Prison regulations. Gennadi Kuzovkin's study of the declassified Prison Directorate Archives of GARF for this project teaches us that: a) such valuables were taken from the prisoner within 48 hours of arrest; b) they followed him from prison to prison, until such time the court decided they were to be confiscated, or he died or escaped; c) during the investigative period, the investigative body kept the prisoner's precious metals and savings account records until the sentencing; d) currency turned over to the UNKVD Financial Department was put in a sealed parcel or envelope with a cover letter indicating name of the arrested, description of valuables by number and weight, the number and date of the receipt. Form Number 2 was placed in the Investigation File. This sealed parcel was reviewed at least four times a year by at least two persons to establish that the contents of the parcel matched those on the receipts. This confirmation was inscribed in a ledger with annual accounts. Any money or valuables kept for periods beyond the confiscated term (meaning, I presume, periods where one would expect them to have been confiscated) were checked for potentially collectible sums and valuables.

When the prisoner was sentenced, both his case file and his valuables were sent to court on the basis of the decision made by the investigating bodies. After the sentencing and the court's ruling whether the valuables were to be confiscated or returned, the 1st Special Department would inform the Financial body responsible for storing money and valuables. *All confiscations made without the corresponding sentence (were) considered illegal.* (NOTE: This would reinforce the Russian position that Raoul Wallenberg was never sentenced, but the possibilities must be analyzed thoroughly, not on the surface.)

If the Court ruled to return the possessions, a sentenced prisoner received his precious metals back within three months – otherwise it was turned over to the State bank. An owner had to receive his money within three months – otherwise it was turned over to the State Budget. The convicted prisoner's valuables were sent to his destination. When the valuables arrived at the prison a report was sent to the Financial Department of the Prison within three days, a second copy was to be sent back to the sender within one day, with confirmation that the moneys were to be transferred to the prison's address. The sender was to transfer the moneys within two days by post as 'valuable parcels.'

When the owner (was) unknown, money and valuables (went) to the State Budget using the same procedure as for confiscation – only with specific indication that in this case the owner is unknown. A special investigation was required – with interrogations etc. to try to re-establish the identity of the owner – prior to the decision to hand it over to the State.

The money of those who died in camps went to the State budget if not claimed by the heirs. Among the Prisoners of War and Interned, there existed a Special card index of the Special Information Bureau MVD ordered by Serov. Valuables in parcels were listed indicating owner, year of birth, rank, citizenship, when and where left one detention site for the next, the number of receipt and so on.

Finally:

If the prisoner dies in prison, his possessions are returned to the family – as a rule – if they can confirm the right.

If the possessions are not claimed within six months, the valuables go to the State budget – his other belongings are destroyed and an act is made.

Signed: OFFICIAL V, Captain of State Security
Head, Revision Department GTU NKVD USSR

To conclude, if Raoul Wallenberg had indeed died in 1947 and there existed somewhere an act or registration of this fact, these valuables and possessions could not have been returned in 1989 as they would already have been turned over to the State. Nor is it possible to claim that the owner of these valuables and possessions were unknown to those competent authorities who watched over them and periodically re-confirmed that they had not been diminished, or that confiscation had not been ordered, or – one would presume – that the prisoner had not died or escaped. Wallenberg's identification papers, valuables and currency had to have followed him to the end – meaning they would be available if the need arose, either from him or some internal decision. The most logical explanation then is that Raoul Wallenberg died earlier in 1989 and that the authorities, holding to proper procedure, were offering these valuables to the next of kin and requesting – as is proper – that they acknowledge with the receipt that their half-brother was dead. I would further emphasize the importance of the fact that the various forms of foreign currency are presumably intact. *Foreign citizens having visas for going abroad receive (back) foreign currency within limits established by legislation, at their request.* In short, this money – as passport, car registration and cigarette case – were sitting around for the day when Raoul Wallenberg would have gone home – either because he was repatriated with his end of term or, more likely, through an exchange.

Blots and the Numbering of Certain Prisoners

If we were try to co-ordinate a search for the route taken by Wallenberg's possessions in keeping with his disappearance, it would be most helpful to know which Number was his. The same applies to Langfelder and/or Katona. In this regard, it is very helpful that the unidentified numbers 14, 16-20 form a series around Prisoner Number 15. These blots in the alphabetical possessions registry dispels the argument of 'coincidence' in favor of a coherent organized processing of a group of foreign prisoners. We can therefore explore further the hypothesis that Raoul Wallenberg – rather than dying in July 1947 – may have 'disappeared' as Prisoner Number 14 or Number 16, depending on whether or not he was 'sentenced' and shipped out prior to Prisoner AA or after him. There are arguments for both.

Other possibilities are: 1) that Wallenberg, Langfelder and Katona are *sentenced* Prisoners Number 16, 17 and 18; 2) that Wallenberg is *sentenced* Prisoner Number 16 while

Langfelder/Katona who arrived in Lubyanka together on July 22/23, 1947 as *sentenced* prisoners could be any of the two adjacent numbers in the series – that is, Prisoners 17 and 18; 18 and 19; or 19 and 20. If, however, we are speaking of prisoners still '*under investigation*' – and if there is a centralized count – then the only possibilities are 14, 19 and 20 in the Spring and Summer of 1947 for Wallenberg, Langfelder and/or Katona. (NOTE: The Russian side's recently identified prisoners 16, 17 and 18 at MGB Prison in response to this report. If these numbers are from Lubyanka they most likely reflect prisoners *under investigation* (and we believe this to be the case because one of these prisoners was held at Vladimir post-sentencing, under his name). If, however, these reflect *sentenced* numbered prisoners, then we have only three possible numbers for three possible men: 14, 19 and 20, for Wallenberg and Langfelder/Katona respectively.)

We have established that corresponding openings exist showing the arrival of a prisoner or prisoners undergoing isolation at Vladimir Prison in the Spring and Summer of 1947. Dr. Marvin Makinen and Ari Kaplan's computer analysis of the cell occupancy of Corpus II, where most of these prisoners were isolated at Vladimir, shows a sequence of unoccupied (unaccounted for) cells. These are: 1) April 11, 1947 to July 23, 1947 – Cell II-25; July 24, 1947 - to June 1, 1948 – Cell II-2. After early June 1948, according to their analysis, there are no other long term unoccupied cells to add to the sequence. This could suggest two different isolated prisoners whose cards have been removed from the *kartoteka* – one arriving in April 1947, the other on July 23rd or 24th, at a point coincidental with the rounding up and interrogating of many of the primary Wallenberg/Langfelder witnesses. Or it could suggest one prisoner who arrived in April and was transferred to Cell II-2 on July 23, 1947. A third cell, II-3, became vacant from July 28, 1947 until May 2, 1948.

In all three cases – the April or July 1947 arrivals – the period of unaccounted for isolation ends in the Spring of 1948 (early May or the beginning of June 1948). This is also of interest to us because we are currently documenting a number of eyewitness reports showing Wallenberg in Moscow prisons from the winter of 1948/49 extending into 1949. In this regard, Grossheim-Krisko, also known as Heinrich Tomsen, who worked at Sector B of the Swedish Legation in Budapest has stated in an original testimony that he is 'convinced' that Wallenberg was among a group of 100-110 prisoners who were transferred from Lefortovo Prison to Butyrka in March of 1950. De Latri has also reported that when he complained to a Soviet official in Butyrka in the early Fifties about the severity of his treatment, he was told: '*What are you complaining about? We have a Swede here who is much worse off than you.*'

We have repeatedly requested to study the Butyrka incoming registry for the time period March 30/31 to April 5, 1950 when almost all the prisoners under the 4th Department Third Main Directorate were passed to the jurisdiction of the Second Main Directorate. In spite of the absolute meticulousness of Butyrka's record keeping – outranking either that of Internal Prison or Lefortovo – we have been told that such registries no longer exist because they were 'destroyed' along with the *kartoteka* soon after the death of Stalin. Examining this registry, or reconstructing the list of those who crossed to Butyrka in March/April 1950, is critical to understanding whether or not Wallenberg was still under investigation by the 4th Department Third Main Directorate – as opposed to OBD. For with the exception of those prisoners sentenced soon after their arrival – up until 1948 – the original corps group of prisoners of war were sent to Butyrka for further pre-sentencing investigation under the 2nd Main Directorate in 1950, and convicted mostly in 1951 and 1952.

Because of the importance of this registry, we are requesting the actual destruction documents be given to us. Such documents were presented by the administration of Vladimir Prison for their incoming registry for a number of years in the Fifties and Sixties, but not including the important years of 1947 and 1957 – the existence of which they could 'neither confirm nor deny.'

Temporarily' Misplaced

While there are many missing pieces of information in this study – one of the most important is the question of control. In the limited information shown to us, we have seen nothing that would indicate that Raoul Wallenberg was under the OBD, 2nd or 1st Main Directorates. And yet those who support the rumor of his death by execution very often point toward the sinister OBD – as if this unit was synonymous with the danger of execution. OBD is the very unit that had jurisdiction over Prisoner AA, Okulicki, Pannwitz, Gottlieb, Pataridze, Shulgin, Goldstein and Hungarian Prisoner Number One. While not everyone under their control died, this was the more notorious division. When stories are told of Abakumov being arrested with his deputies – or that the deputies made every effort to destroy the files – the raconteurs are referring to Leonov, head of the OGB and his colleagues.

The relevance of who had control of Raoul Wallenberg in the summer of 1947 may be understood through a document which emerged from a file of the Prison Directorate NKVD/MVD USSR. In this document, Colonel K writes to the Head of Investigative Unit of the 1st Main Directorate requesting that certain prisoners be permitted to resume the use of their names:

According to the data of the 1st Special Department of MVD of the USSR – some time ago in keeping with the Order of the Investigative Unit of the 1st Main Directorate MVD of the USSR – the below-mentioned convicts, kept in Vladimir Prison, were to be kept under numbers, as follows:

- 1) Prisoner Number 15 – [PRISONER AA] also known assentenced by OSO MGB 28 VI 47 to 10 years of prison,*
- 2) Prisoner Number 24 – [PRISONER C] – Hungarian subject- former officer of English Army, sentenced OSO MGB on the 1st July 1950 to 25 years prison;*
- 3) Prisoner Number 25 – [PRISONER P] former officer of the Hungarian imperialist army – sentenced by OSO MGB, 1st July 1950 – 15 years.*
- 4) Prisoner Number 26 – [PRISONER S] – former auditor and lawyer of Budapest – sentenced by OSO MGB 1 July 1950 to 25 years;*
- 5) Prisoner Number 27 – [PRISONER M] – former soldier of the German Fascist Army, sentenced OSO MGB on the 14th of August 1950 to 25 years;*
- 6) Prisoner Number 28 – [PRISONER V] – Without any special occupations. Sentenced OSO MGB 3 March 1951 to 20 years in prison.*

In connection with the fact that – keeping convicts as numbered prisoners for a long period of time causes certain inconveniences -- I ask you to inform me whether the need

to keep the above-mentioned prisoners under numbers has not expired. Besides that, an order was given regarding some of the above-mentioned prisoners – particularly Number 24 – to keep them in prison in solitary 'order' (in total isolation). Solitary detention for such long periods of time negatively effects the psyche of prisoners and leads to psychiatric disorders.In connection with the above-mentioned, the Prison Directorate of MVD of the USSR thinks it reasonable not to impose solitary detention on prisoners with long terms of imprisonment. I ask you to inform me of your opinion on this subject.

At the same time, I ask you to inform me of your agreement to send Prisoner Number 24 to Kazan Prison Psychiatric Hospital MVD USSR for treatment. Signed: M. K., Head, Prison Directorate. 26 August 1953.

The reply to Colonel K's letter from S, Deputy Head of the 1st Main Directorate MVD, on the 4th of September 1953 is surprising, to say the least:

To K. RE 34/2/2637 of 26 August 1953.

1. Not against the cancellation of solitary detention for convicts [PRISONER C, PRISONER P, PRISONER S, PRISONER M, PRISONER V] and their detention henceforth will be under their real names – with other prisoners also sentenced for long terms of imprisonment. Doing this, establish such an order that the number of prisoners who know about the detention of the above-mentioned prisoners in Vladimir should be as small as possible.....

3. [PRISONER AA] kept under guard in Vladimir Prison is unknown to us. (Bolding and underlinings mine.)

It should be remembered that the Hungarian prisoners C and S had been originally under Abakumov but, in response to Prison Warden Ionov's protests to their lengthy detentions without moving the case forward – which took place in 1949 – they were turned over to the 2nd Main Directorate, under Pitovranov, for sentencing in 1950. Their numbering presumably began with their sentencing, at a point when they were no longer under Abakumov's control. Prisoner AA was numbered while *under investigation* in 1946, at that time under the jurisdiction of the Especially Important Matters Division – i.e., Leonov, et al, deputies of Abakumov.. He was sentenced by OSO in June of 1947 and brought to Vladimir on August 3, 1947.

The statement that Number 15 'being guarded at Vladimir is unknown to us' would imply a splintering of responsibility and/or deeper levels of secrecy even on the higher levels at the 'Center.' What we must now consider is whether PRISONER AA had – temporarily at least – 'fallen through a crack' generated by the arrest of Abakumov and his deputies in July 1951, the death of Stalin in March 1953 and/or the arrest of Beria and his deputies in June of that year.

While we still do not know the specific charges against Wallenberg, Langfelder and Katona – if they were all numbered at the same time they may well have had the same control. Thus if Prisoner Number 15 was unknown to the Investigative Unit of the 1st Main Directorate MVD on September 4, 1953, there could have been a 'black out' on this entire series between, say, July 1951 – when Abakumov and his deputies heading the Investigative Unit of Especially Grave Matters were arrested – and August 1953.

Ignorance of the existence of a particular Numbered Prisoner in one section of the Center would not prevent his continuing under the appointed prison's regime. Again, it is of utmost importance whether or not the isolated, numbered or long term prisoner had the right to appeal and, psychologically, whether he made use of that power – writing appeals, demanding to communicate with the nachalnik, or simply acting up in a negative way that required a decision from Central.

Even then, we have the possibility of a 'disappearance within a disappearance', of a temporary crack in the system. September 23, 1953 Begun, Head of Vladimir Prison, replied to the Deputy Head of the Prison Directorate MVD in regard to the second point in OFFICIAL S's letter:

I inform that among numbered prisoners as well as the other contingent of prisoners kept in prison there is no [PRISONER C]. We ask you to give an order to check this and inform me of the results.

Handwritten across this document is the comment: *'To Comrade K. He is now in Butyrka and is subject to being sent to Kazan. 28 IX 53.'* PRISONER C had been transported from Vladimir to Butyrka no earlier than June of the same year. Handwritten in the margin of this already handwritten memo, someone has inscribed *'Butyrka, Mil.....nowhere!'*

In the case of PRISONER AA we see that in early 1953 -- when he was unknown to the 1st Main Directorate MVD -- he was drawing attention to his warders at Vladimir by refusing to clean latrines. But this was a matter that could be decided upon locally. At the same time, money was being forwarded to Begun on Number 15's behalf by Mironov, still head of Internal Prison MGB, who oversaw the passing of parcels or transfers of money from abroad even after sentenced prisoners went under the MVD. These funds came from Italy, as did subsequent parcels. Here we have an instance where those abroad knew of PRISONER AA's incarceration under his name, while some of those overseeing his detention as a numbered prisoner or named did not know of him.

Unresolved Fate and End of Term

There is one further point to be made in the PRISONER AA analogy which can lend valuable new insight into the circumstances surrounding the Gromyko Memorandum of February 1957 which is the basis for the 1947 alleged death claim.

Like Shulgin, Volkov, and Kutepov, PRISONER AA was sentenced on June 28, 1947 for Counter-Revolutionary activities according to Articles 54.8 and 54.11. The three Russians received a term of twenty five years, but PRISONER AA's term was for only ten. This term did not begin from December 19, 1942 when he was first captured in the Verchne-Kovsky Region as a prisoner of war, nor from January 15, 1945 when he first arrived in Moscow. Rather it begins February 11, 1947.

I can find no documents in PRISONER AA's file to serve as a reference point for this date. Therefore I can only comment that on the 13th of February 1947, his Order for Prevention and coupon were issued. ¹ and with it an order from Department A *'Not to give any reports on the prisoner of Lefortovo --[PRISONER AA]'* This order was followed to such a degree that the coupon remains in the file intact. Ionov has written: *'C' 'Leave it as it is.'* It should be remembered that at the end of February, 1947 both Wallenberg and Roedl were ordered to be transferred from Lefortovo to Lubyanka, Prison but in the end Roedl went alone. Wallenberg

was held back until March 1, 1947. We consider the possibility that similar steps were being prepared for him to be processed along the lines of PRISONER AA. In short, this marks the point where he was separated from Roedl for the reason that he was to be numbered and sentenced by the Especially Important Matters Unit, while Roedl was to continue under the 4th Department 3rd Main Directorate.

If Wallenberg was to have been sentenced around the same time as PRISONER AA and if similar exceptions applied to him, then his term of ten years would have also been counted from that same point – whatever it might have been in his case. This means that his ten year term would have expired in February/March 1957 or thereabouts – the date of the Gromyko Memorandum upon which the Soviets have based their official claim that Wallenberg was dead. To my view, the fact that a decision would be required as to how to dispose of the prisoner (whether to repatriate, exile or execute him) generated a much more urgent pressure on the Security systems from within than that resulting from diplomatic pressures from abroad. It is therefore at this time that one might expect a great deal of attention to have been focused on the proper response to the Swedish government, in the reversal of the Vishinsky Memorandum of 1947 which had denied that Wallenberg was to be found on the territory of the Soviet Union. And, in fact, we know this to have been the case.

The third point of concern – where the same decisions would have had to be made – would have fallen in the period 1970-1972, presuming a sentence of 25 years for espionage to Raoul Wallenberg, starting either in 1945 or 1947. This approximates the end of sightings of Raoul Wallenberg at Vladimir Prison. As by then, efforts to discuss an exchange of Wallenberg for Wennerstrom had been dismissed by the Swedish government who had also closed the case for a period of fifteen years, repatriation through an exchange was no longer an active option. Nor was execution, in the sense of ongoing pressure from the Swedish government to release Wallenberg, necessary. This left exile or ongoing detention, essentially without term, or the final option that – in view of medical or psychiatric problems – Wallenberg would have been formally removed from the MVD system, but would still fall under KGB watch. If the sightings from the Eighties are to be believed, this most corresponds to the scenario one can expect. In this context, death in 1989 – at the point when Wallenberg's possessions were returned to his next of kin – is no longer out of the question.

CONCLUSIONS

As my essential findings regarding this aspect of my research into the fate of Raoul Wallenberg are presented in my SUMMARY, I will conclude with this note: In our previous hypotheses regarding Wallenberg's destiny, we have considered the case through the prism of the Cold War. Usually, for me as an American, this meant seeing Soviet interests as a mirror reflection of my own nation's attitude toward the USSR, with a dark force separating and obscuring us both. In this context, Raoul Wallenberg became an icon of the ideals of freedom and human rights thrown, like the Biblical Joseph, into the pit. As indeed he was.

However, to determine Wallenberg's whereabouts and fate, it is necessary to let go of that icon of perfection – and of the worst case scenario – and start again with an open mind, moving forward step by step through the realities of Eastern Europe at the end of World War II, the realities of the Soviet arrest and investigative process, of the GULAG experience particularly for a foreign prisoner, and of a death there. We do not know enough of the Soviet interests and security concerns in Hungary – or in Scandinavia – to be certain why Wallenberg was seized in January 1945. Until we do, we are all the more handicapped in our predictions regarding 1947 – forced to work in the manner which I have done, with the only tools afforded us. These are the decades of eyewitness reports and the documents handed over to us by the Russian side of the Working Group since 1989 which contain direct reference to Wallenberg, studied against selected prisoner files and certain archival registries and records. Our analysis using data basing has contributed a great deal to our ability to pinpoint with more precision Wallenberg's presence at given times.

Working in the Russian archives I learned that, to proceed objectively, it is very important to proceed from 'without' and 'within' – with an emphasis on the latter. Raoul Wallenberg's case has been described by the Russians as an 'exception', but – until this research – we had no other analogies or real details to even understand the norm. In my work, I have attempted to define this exception by breaking down Wallenberg's movements as we know them into different junctures which forced a decision. On the basis of this, I have projected his fate, using the reality of the norm as a measuring tool against which to evaluate the various eyewitness reports, official or prisoner. At each juncture, I continue to penetrate further – to grasp the procedures as well as over-riding interests and concerns – which lent 'urgency' or 'importance' to the decision of what to do with him for the next phase. Policy was of course an important part of that original determination – but not all.

There are a number of such 'defining moments': 1) That which transformed Wallenberg's 'protective custody' into long term detention as opposed to a 'safe conduct' to Sweden; 2) that which placed him as long term cellmate with Willi Roedl, of the German Embassy in Bucharest; 3) that which separated him from Roedl in early 1947; 4) that which defined Abakumov's recommendation for disposing of the problem caused by Wallenberg's illegal detention – whether because it had been leaked to the international community or because nothing was 'moving' in his case; 5) if he lived and was sent away as a numbered prisoner – that which defined any subsequent periods of interrogation or attempts to recruit him for which he was brought back to Moscow; 6) that which determined his sentence – the charges and term; and 7) that which determined whether or not to repatriate him or send him into exile when his term came to an end. These are, in their way, as pressing realities as diplomatic appeals for clarification of his fate.

It is particularly tragic that a meeting of 'without' (international pressure) and 'within' (Soviet policy and administrative concerns) never fully occurred to resolve the matter. Raoul Wallenberg

saved lives through real negotiation. For all the rhetoric, no deal was ever concluded for an exchange, which would indeed imply that those Wallenberg relied upon for his freedom did not care about him. Still the Soviets had their own obligations. It is very important to determine whether or not the Soviets had a Swedish spy in place by 1947 as this would have directly influenced Wallenberg's chances for survival from 'within.' This is not a far fetched notion. The fact is that one or more such spies existed by the time of Beria's death, that Colonel Stig Wennerstrom was tried and sentenced for this very crime in 1964 and that Wallenberg's name was mentioned for a possible exchange in 1966. This is then both a serious – and sinister – factor which cannot be left out of the equation.

In the year 2002 we are at a very important crossroads in the Raoul Wallenberg investigation. The old Cold War fears – seemingly – are no longer relevant. A new openness exists which, however, manages to awaken the same fears of 'rocking the boat.' I, for one, have had the honor of experiencing Russian cooperation to an unprecedented degree. But it is not enough if we stop short of the truth. What I have shared with you in this discussion constitutes – if nothing else – proof that the relevant information exists and that a reconstruction of Wallenberg's fate can be done. All the Russians have to do is give us access to the relevant registries and files – and here we speak of the most basic kinds of data related to movements of prisoners, their rations or medical care, whose file appeared in Court that day, financial records which will show whether or not a prisoner under whatever number or name has been drawing upon the currencies approximately equivalent to those acknowledged by the Soviets in 1989 as being Raoul Wallenberg's. The examination of death registries in particular times and places is also an essential step.

The fact that this access is not consistent – that exactly at those junctures where we could arrive at a clear-cut yes/no answer a registry is being denied – tells me that the answer may be 'Yes, Raoul Wallenberg was alive then.' And that is a very important consideration to those who have affirmed their deepest commitment to resolving this search. The test then is whether or not the world will prevail upon the Russians to take this final and most courageous step. Having advanced as far as I did with the support of the Swedish and Russian governments, I have no doubt that the answers are within reach. Do we want to know?

Terror of whatever nightmare lay behind the Iron Curtain may have inhibited the government of Sweden – and the nations who benefited from Wallenberg's mission – from pressing as they should for his release when there was strong reason to think he was alive. This is an invalid excuse. Remember -- the primary witnesses' testimonies to the Swedes did bring about a reversal over Soviet position in the Fifties – the admission that Wallenberg had been in the Soviet Union. The amnesty that brought about these prisoners' release and the negotiations that followed took place during one of the most severe times in the Cold War. So nothing is impossible.

The Russians took the unprecedented step of exposing certain portions of their GULAG records to us so that we could initiate a search. But if those in the West with the power to act on Wallenberg's behalf do not insist that we move on to the final resolution of this case, then indeed this work will only become an interesting collector's item of Gulag history and its real intention – to help Raoul Wallenberg and his family – will remain unfulfilled.

I am asking those who read this to let go of their fascination with the mystery that caused Raoul Wallenberg – rescuer of 100,000 Jews -- great suffering and collectively affirm our responsibility in this matter. The truth must be known and shared. To allow a man's existence to be erased – whether he lives on or not -- is indeed to 'liquidate' him and separate him from the world he loves.

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
DISTRICT DIRECTOR
31 HOPKINS PLAZA
BALTIMORE, MD 21201

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Date: AUG 02 1993

FREEDOM CHANNEL INC
C/O MIKHAIL KAZACHKOV
~~870 MARK V OPPENHEIMER~~
~~100 GRAND STREET~~
~~WATERBURY, CT 06702~~

30 Stone Avenue
Somerville MA 02143
U.S.A.

Employer Identification Number:
52-1809101
Case Number:
523159024
Contact Person:
MRS K FENTON
Contact Telephone Number:
(410) 962-9431
Accounting Period Ending:
December 31
Foundation Status Classification:
509(a)(1)
Advance Ruling Period Begins:
November 4, 1992
Advance Ruling Period Ends:
December 31, 1996
Addendum Applies:
Yes

Dear Applicant:

Based on information you supplied, and assuming your operations will be as stated in your application for recognition of exemption, we have determined you are exempt from federal income tax under section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code as an organization described in section 501(c)(3).

Because you are a newly created organization, we are not now making a final determination of your foundation status under section 509(a) of the Code. However, we have determined that you can reasonably expect to be a publicly supported organization described in sections 509(a)(1) and 170(b)(1)(A)(vi).

Accordingly, during an advance ruling period you will be treated as a publicly supported organization, and not as a private foundation. This advance ruling period begins and ends on the dates shown above.

Within 90 days after the end of your advance ruling period, you must send us the information needed to determine whether you have met the requirements of the applicable support test during the advance ruling period. If you establish that you have been a publicly supported organization, we will classify you as a section 509(a)(1) or 509(a)(2) organization as long as you continue to meet the requirements of the applicable support test. If you do not meet the public support requirements during the advance ruling period, we will classify you as a private foundation for future periods. Also, if we classify you as a private foundation, we will treat you as a private foundation from your beginning date for purposes of section 507(d) and 4940.

Grantors and contributors may rely on our determination that you are not a private foundation until 90 days after the end of your advance ruling period. If you send us the required information within the 90 days, grantors and contributors may continue to rely on the advance determination until we make a final determination of your foundation status.

If we publish a notice in the Internal Revenue Bulletin stating that we

Letter 1045 (BO/CG)

FREEDOM CHANNEL INC

will no longer treat you as a publicly supported organization; grantors and contributors may not rely on this determination after the date we publish the notice. In addition, if you lose your status as a publicly supported organization; and a grantor or contributor was responsible for, or was aware of, the act or failure to act, that resulted in your loss of such status; that person may not rely on this determination from the date of the act or failure to act. Also, if a grantor or contributor learned that we had given notice that you would be removed from classification as a publicly supported organization; then that person may not rely on this determination as of the date he or she acquired such knowledge.

If you change your sources of support, your purposes, character, or method of operation; please let us know so we can consider the effect of the change on your exempt status and foundation status. If you amend your organizational document or bylaws, please send us a copy of the amended document or bylaws. Also, let us know all changes in your name or address.

As of January 1, 1984, you are liable for social securities taxes under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act on amounts of \$100 or more you pay to each of your employees during a calendar year. You are not liable for the tax imposed under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA).

Organizations that are not private foundations are not subject to the private foundation excise taxes under Chapter 42 of the Internal Revenue Code. However, you are not automatically exempt from other federal excise taxes. If you have any questions about excise, employment, or other federal taxes, please let us know.

Donors may deduct contributions to you as provided in section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code. Bequests, legacies, devises, transfers, or gifts to you or for your use are deductible for Federal estate and gift tax purposes if they meet the applicable provisions of sections 2055, 2106, and 2522 of the Code.

Donors may deduct contributions to you only to the extent that their contributions are gifts, with no consideration received. Ticket purchases and similar payments in conjunction with fundraising events may not necessarily qualify as deductible contributions, depending on the circumstances. Revenue Ruling 67-246, published in Cumulative Bulletin 1967-2, on page 104, gives guidelines regarding when taxpayers may deduct payments for admission to, or other participation in, fundraising activities for charity.

You are not required to file Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax, if your gross receipts each year are normally \$25,000 or less. If you receive a Form 990 package in the mail, simply attach the label provided; check the box in the heading to indicate that your annual gross receipts are normally \$25,000 or less; and sign the return.

If you are required to file a return you must file it by the 15th day of the fifth month after the end of your annual accounting period. We charge a penalty of \$10 a day when a return is filed late, unless there is reasonable

Letter 1045 (DO/CO)

FREEDOM CHANNEL INC

cause for the delay. However, the maximum penalty we charge cannot exceed \$5,000 or 5 percent of your gross receipts for the year, whichever is less. We may also charge this penalty if a return is not complete. So, please be sure your return is complete before you file it.

You are not required to file federal income tax returns unless you are subject to the tax on unrelated business income under section 511 of the Code. If you are subject to this tax, you must file an income tax return on Form 990-T, Exempt Organization Business Income Tax Return. In this letter we are not determining whether any of your present or proposed activities are unrelated trade or business as defined in section 513 of the Code.

You need an employer identification number even if you have no employees. If an employer identification number was not entered on your application, we will assign a number to you and advise you of it. Please use that number on all returns you file and in all correspondence with the Internal Revenue Service.

If we said in the heading of this letter that an addendum applies, the addendum enclosed is an integral part of this letter.

Because this letter could help us resolve any questions about your exempt status and foundation status, you should keep it in your permanent records.

We have sent a copy of this letter to your representative as indicated in your power of attorney.

If you have any questions, please contact the person whose name and telephone number are shown in the heading of this letter.

Sincerely yours,



District Director

Enclosure(s):
Addendum
Form 972-C

Freedom Channel, Inc.

30 Stone Avenue, Somerville, MA 02143
(617) 623-3452 (voice); (630)-839-0800 (fax)
mkazach@gist.net
www.freedomchannel.org

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES

Freedom Channel, an American 501 c (3) corporation, headquartered in Somerville, Massachusetts and with offices in Moscow, Russia, was established in 1992 by Russians and Americans joined in the belief that post-Soviet Russia could become a free, open, democratic and market oriented society. In recent years Freedom Channel's work has been supported by The Eurasia Foundation, The National Endowment for Democracy, and The World Bank, among other sponsors. Freedom Channel has been affiliated with such academic institutions as the Human Rights Program of the Harvard Law School, the Edward R. Murrow Center of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, and the Office of the Chancellor, State University of New York system.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russians have faced profound challenges as they attempt to build a modern, developed democracy. The issue is not simply one of fair elections or free market reforms. The very concepts, which underpin free societies, are often absent, stripped away by decades of Soviet rule. The concepts are so easy to state: in a democracy, power and authority flow from the people; in a free market, the consumer decides. Russians grasp these concepts intellectually. Accustomed to totalitarian hierarchy, however, and all-too-often still subject to Soviet-style official institutions and thinking, Russians cannot always easily or safely experience them in their daily lives.

Early Efforts in Television

Freedom Channel's earliest efforts grew from the assumption that television, with its unique capacity to reach, inform and *move* millions, could serve as a crucial resource to help Russians better understand and better enjoy free market and democratic values.

Established concurrently with Freedom Channel and by the same original group of founders, the independent Russian television production house, PERSONA, from 1992 to 1994 produced and aired over two dozen programs aimed at helping millions of Russians better understand free market and democratic values. To secure airtime for PERSONA programs, Freedom Channel negotiated a contract with Russian National Television (Channel 2), contributed stipends and underwrote the costs of shooting and editing. More than once, Freedom Channel's efforts allowed PERSONA to resist *apparatchiks* who wished to impose their own editorial direction. As a result of over two years of institution building, PERSONA became, and remains, fully independent and viable.

A selection of PERSONA/Freedom Channel programs broadcast nationwide in Russia includes the following:

- * PRAYER FOR THE MOTHERLAND, broadcast September 17, 1992, consisted of a series of interviews with leaders of communist and nationalist party blocs. Little commentary was made by PERSONA during the course of the program; the leaders simply answered PERSONA's questions. After the program's broadcast, these leaders suffered an erosion of influence and support and several of their movements eventually disbanded.

- * MOSCOW CALLING, a program on the independence of the media, was broadcast on June 7, 1993. Fearing political backlash, Russian National Television chose not to broadcast the program in Moscow though it did reach much of the rest of the country. After protest from Freedom Channel and wide media coverage, the network rebroadcast the program nationwide, on August 5, 1993, and this time included Moscow.

- * SARATOV SUFFERINGS, broadcast on September 15, 1993 on Russian National Television, dealt with the plight of Russian "Germans," and addressed the complexities of democratizing a society with a stagnant, but still formidable, KGB. It included an extensive expose by ex-KGB Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Kichikhin.

- * "NADEZHDA" (Hope) aired on December 11, 1993, the eve of the Russian parliamentary elections. Filmed at the Nadezhda studios, a radio station "of the women, by the women and for the women", the program explored the issue of women in Russian politics, and featured several leading Russian politicians – all women – running for parliament.

- * ONLY HE WHO IS WALKING WILL COVER THE ROAD: PROBLEMS IN RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY was a four part series broadcast throughout the month of May 1994. A joint production with the US Information Agency, this mini-series explored the striking nature of American mobility, comparing and contrasting it to Russia's tradition of settlement. PERSONA followed American families in Pennsylvania and Texas as they struggled to cope with the consequences of moving. It also examined the lives of Russians who migrated to work in the coalmines of the Arctic Vorkuta region.

- * YOUR MONEY – OR YOUR LIFE consisted of two, hour-long programs on the dangers of high inflation. Produced with the help of the World Bank, *Your Money – Or Your Life*, filmed in Ukraine, Russia, Brazil and the U.S., aired the weekend of October 29 and 30th, 1994.

In the run-up to the December 1993 Russian parliamentary elections and Constitutional Referendum, Freedom Channel also initiated the production of three non-partisan, televised public awareness, "get-out-the-vote" announcements. Beyond urging Russians to vote, the goal was to begin to foster a "culture" of non-partisan political advertisement in Russia.

Produced by PERSONA, these pieces aired on Russian National Television. Freedom Channel oversaw their design, secured airtime, and brought American professional consultants to Russia for assistance. Subsequent to the elections, the Soros Foundation, Moscow, recognized the results as the most outstanding example of electronic media during the 1993 election period and awarded the authors the "Prize for Parliamentary Journalism".

Finally, Freedom Channel supported Dr. Alexander Radov, founder of the independent production company NOTA BENE, in the production of two, hour-long political debates prior to the 1993 Russian elections. Freedom Channel consulted in their design and production, and secured funding. Russian National Television also broadcast the programs nationwide.

From "Television" to "Telecommunications Policy"

With PERSONA established as a viable, independent entity, Freedom Channel began, in 1994, to move in new directions. Initially, these new directions grew naturally out of the television experience.

* Political Tracking Polls: Freedom Channel supported the Public Opinion Foundation (POF), a leading Russian polling organization, in its efforts to track election trends in the weeks prior to the 1993 Russian elections, and to distribute the results to the Russian press and the 13 political parties active in that election. Freedom Channel brought American polling professionals to Moscow to advise POF, and, together with POF and the official Russian Central Elections Committee, conducted a briefing for members of the press and the parties explaining the value and uses of polling data.

* Symposium on Television and Politics. In June 1994, Freedom Channel designed and conducted a symposium analyzing the relationship of television to politics, using the December 1993 elections as a point of reference. Russian broadcasters, journalists, politicians, political operatives and social analysts sat together for two days of round table discussions and examined such issues as the need for broadcast of Russian parliamentary sessions, the challenges of achieving journalistic objectivity, and more. Westerners in attendance included: Lawrence Grossman, former head of PBS and NBC News; Charles Lichenstein, former US deputy ambassador to the UN and a former public broadcasting official; Peter Foges, producer of *Adam Smith's Money World*; and Russell Neuman, director of the Edward R. Murrow Center of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

* Consulting to the Russian State Duma Radio and Television Service. Approached by Duma leaders during the first symposium on Television and Politics, Freedom Channel began in the summer of 1994 to serve as a resource to the Russian parliament's Radio and Television Service. Under funding received from The Eurasia Foundation, this effort led to the first establishment of procedures and mechanisms for broadcasting the sessions of the Russian parliament.

* Second Symposium on Television and Politics. This event, which took place in October 1995 and was fully devoted to the issue of parliamentary television, was supported by The Eurasia Foundation. Freedom Channel prepared a Briefing Book, which outlined the British, Canadian and American experience with parliamentary television. Translated into Russian, the Briefing Book became the centerpiece of the second symposium. Among Western participants were ambassador Charles Lichenstein, Nicholas Ketchum of the Canadian Radio-Television & Telecommunications Commission, Kristina Bracciale, Producer/Director of "Gavel To Gavel" (the production entity which covers and broadcasts proceedings of the Massachusetts State Legislature), Odd Engstrom, former deputy prime minister of Sweden, and others.

* Advising Russian Elites on National Policy in Telecommunications and Informatics. In 1997-98 FREEDOM CHANNEL developed and executed with the support of the WORLD BANK managed *infoDEV* ("Information for Development") program a major project designed to bring best case international experience in telecommunications and informatics policy to the attention of relevant Russian government officials and other stakeholders. The overall goal of the project was to open-up, inform, and influence the national telecommunications debate in Russia in order to promote stated *infoDEV* goals of transparency, free and open competition, and maximum access.

That WORLD BANK/*infoDEV* project, "Toward an Open, Informed Telecommunications Policy Debate in Russia," has involved setting up a project WWW page with mirror servers in the U.S. and Russia, bringing Russian officials (including members of the Duma) to this country for workshops and taking Western experts to Russia, commissioning and publishing research and analysis, and conducting direct, face to face education/lobbying. The *infoDEV* project's last "deliverable" (apart from its Final Report) was a workshop/conference in Moscow, in conjunction with a major international exhibition – EXPOCOM: Communications '98 – held May 12-16, 1998, at the Moscow ExpoCenter.

Immediately prior to the conference *InformCourier/Telecommunications*, a Russian trade bi-monthly, devoted its April issue to the discussion of alternative approaches to national telecommunications policy developed by FREEDOM CHANNEL. Papers prepared for the workshop were pre-referenced; additional materials on the most relevant technologies were also featured. That issue was shipped to subscribers with a bundled invitation to attend the workshop/ conference. The conference enjoyed extensive coverage in the Russian media.

Present Activities

FREEDOM CHANNEL recently completed, under the support of National Endowment for Democracy, a human rights/legal reform project heavily relying on its expertise in Internet and information technologies.

Working with such Russian human and civil rights groups as Moscow Helsinki Group, Human Rights Information Network of Russia (headquartered in Nizhny Taghil), the Human Rights Information Center in Ekaterinburg, the Ekaterinburg "Memorial" Society, the Tomsk Human Rights Research Center, and the "Training for Human Rights Activists in the Provinces" group FREEDOM CHANNEL established a permanent electronic data base (CD ROM based as well as available at <http://www.iis.ru/pravo>) to be utilized specifically for legal intervention and defense against human and civil rights violations throughout the Russian provinces.

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ON MY MIND | A. M. Rosenthal

Man in the Window

WASHINGTON
How long? I asked this man a few minutes after we met. He knew exactly what I meant.

"Fifteen years minus twenty days," he said. "Six years in solitary confinement. Seven years on hunger strikes."

"Dogs," I said, and again he knew what I meant. He laughed — at the K.G.B., the Communist system, the Kremlin — everything that had kept him in Soviet political prisons 15 years minus 20 days and freed him only two months ago.

I had waited more than two years to meet this slight, wiry man and he astonished me.

"You seem so merry," I said. He laughed again and said yes, he was, in prison and out of prison. Maybe that was one of the reasons that he had grown stronger every day, he said.

We had never met, but we knew each other. In a prison camp in the Soviet Urals, our lives had touched.

In December 1988, Soviet authorities permitted me to visit Perm 35, the notorious camp where thousands of political prisoners had been locked up, some for decades. Most had been released but some were still there.

Human rights workers suggested I try to see this man, Mikhail Kazachkov. He was a physicist 30 years old

I never saw Mikhail Kazachkov. After my visit I heard he had been moved to an even tougher prison, at Chistopol. Soviet authorities did not reply to The Times's protests.

And now here he was in the U.S. under the auspices of the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews. When we talked at the Hay-Adams Hotel, we had been connected to each other for two years and two months, minus three days.

He told me he had been sentenced to Chistopol because he had decided to follow up my visit with a demand for the establishment of a human rights monitoring group.

"In the prison?" I asked.

"Of course, in the prison," he said.

When that did not sit well with the warden, he filed papers for the establishment of a Perm 35 union: the First Union of Mandatory Labor Workers. Straight to Chistopol.

Mr. Kazachkov is not an admirer of Mikhail Gorbachev, no. Glasnost took five years to get around to freeing him for seeking consular help in emigrating, a crime now regarded as a right. He sees him as no lover of democracy but as a man who tried to expand his rule, and failed.

Mr. Kazachkov intends to return to the Soviet Union in May, to keep fighting. He plans to go on Soviet TV for a small pro-democracy group called "Open Christianity." Mr. Kazachkov, whose mother is Jewish, was moved by the Gospels when he managed to get hold of a Bible in prison. He says he still has some "homework" to do about the relative merits of Christianity and Judaism.

One thing he is sure of — that warden in Perm 35 kept prisoners on starvation diets longer than was "legal" under prison rules. So when he goes back to the Soviet Union, he intends to sue the hell out of that man.

It's difficult to write about political prisoners without the emotionalism with which I am richly endowed; I won't try. The political prisoners of the Soviet Union fought for Soviet freedom with their years and lives — millions of lives. They, not the new chief of the prison system, should have received the Nobel Prize.

But ever since we met at the hotel, I think mostly of Mr. Kazachkov's tone of eager merriment when he speaks of the battles fought and the battles ahead against the wardens of the world.

I always assumed that when God spoke it was in a deep, stentorian voice, very somber. Now I have a strange thought — when God talks to a prisoner whom He wishes to strengthen, could the voice be not heavy at all, but light, almost what you might call merry? □

Out of the gulag and still fighting.

when he was arrested in Leningrad in 1975, accused of high treason for contacting an American consular official as part of his open attempt to emigrate. He was sentenced to 15½ years. Later he was sentenced to an additional 3½ years, on "strict regimen" — near-starvation diet, isolation, a couple of letters a year. The accusation was "hooliganism" — agitating for prisoners' rights, bringing charges against the wardens.

At Perm 35 I was told that he and other prisoners also on my list of militants were in the hospital ward, suddenly ill, and simply could not be seen. Walking through a prison yard, surrounded by officers, I heard a window flung open. Somebody shouted "We want to see you." The window was slammed down.

The warden, a side of beef with epaulets, did not look up.

"Kazachkov," he said.

THE HARRY AND JEANETTE WEINBERG FOUNDATION, INC.

June 7, 2002

Ms. Susan Ellen Mesinai
Director, ARK Project of Freedom Channel
30 Stone Avenue
Somerville, MA 02143

Re: Wallenberg Project
Grant Number: B03-097

Dear Ms. Mesinai:

We have received various information from you, including your letter dated May 7, 2002, requesting funding to complete the 'live search investigation' into Raoul Wallenberg's fate.

Based upon the aforementioned information, The Harry And Jeanette Weinberg Foundation, Incorporated ("Foundation") is prepared to participate in your fundraising campaign in accordance with the following terms and conditions:

- A. Foundation shall provide a challenge grant to Freedom Channel, Inc. ("Grantee") in an amount not to exceed Fifteen Thousand Dollars (\$15,000.00) in total, equal to a \$1.00 Foundation grant for each \$3.00 of pledges received from others in support of the fundraising campaign between May 1, 2002 and May 31, 2003 ("Valid Pledges").
- B. Grantee shall use all funds provided by this challenge grant to support the 'live search investigation' into Raoul Wallenberg's fate and conduct other international archival research related to the Wallenberg case.
- C. Foundation funds shall be released to Grantee as follows:
 - 1. Foundation shall advance to Grantee the amount of Five Thousand Dollars (\$5,000.00) as an accelerated grant installment payment within thirty days following receipt by Foundation of a signed copy of this Letter Agreement.
 - 2. A second and final grant installment payment, in an amount not to exceed Ten Thousand Dollars (\$10,000.00), shall be equal to whatever amount is necessary to raise the cumulative total of such payments to the maximum eligible grant.




- D. Final grant installment payment would be made within thirty days following receipt by Foundation of a grant payment request containing a certification by an authorized representative of Grantee that cumulative funds representing payments of Valid Pledges, as above, have been collected in amounts sufficient to justify the cumulative total of accelerated grant installment payment and the requested grant installment payment by Foundation, based upon the prescribed ratio of a \$1.00 Foundation payment for each \$3.00 of such collections from others.
- E. As part of grant payment request, Grantee shall forward to Foundation a cumulative list in columnar form, by name, date and amount, of Valid Pledges received (pledges under \$2,500.00 may be reported in total on a single line), payments received against such pledges to date and balances outstanding thereon.
- F. Grantee shall, at least annually for the next two years, furnish a report to Foundation providing the following information for the preceding fiscal year:
1. A descriptive summary of the Wallenberg research program, including but not limited to activities undertaken and results obtained, other sources of funding, if any (by name of source of funds and total dollar amount provided by each such source), overall program cost, etc.; and
 2. Copies of any publications and/or media reports relating to the Wallenberg research program.

If the above fully and accurately describes the understanding and agreement by and between Freedom Channel, Inc. and The Harry And Jeanette Weinberg Foundation, Incorporated, please have an authorized officer of Freedom Channel, Inc. so signify by signing the statement below and returning the signed copy to this office. Please note any and all exceptions.

Sincerely,

The Harry And Jeanette Weinberg
Foundation, Incorporated



Bernard Siegel
President

Freedom Channel, Inc.

30 Stone Avenue, Somerville, MA 02143
(617) 823-3452 (voice); 630-839-0800 (fax)
www.freedomchannel.org
edmund.beard@umb.edu

8 July 2002

Bernard Siegel, President
The Harry and Jeanette Weinberg Foundation, Inc.

Re: Wallenberg Project
Grant Number: B03-097

Dear Mr. Siegel,

FREEDOM CHANNEL is delighted to accept the \$15,000 challenge grant to support the live search investigation into Raoul Wallenberg's fate and conduct other international archival research related to the Wallenberg case. We acknowledge and accept all conditions and procedures included in your award letter of June 7, 2002. Attached please find a signed copy of the Award Agreement. Thank you for your generous support.

Sincerely,

Dr. Edmund Beard
Executive Director

ONLY ONE TRUTH
Susan Ellen Mesinai

Moscow, February 2000: Stuck in traffic in the narrow side streets behind the Grand Marriott Hotel, my driver – a prize-winning professor of mathematics – wiped away the steam on his side window, looking for a ‘way out.’ He was face to face with a pole, embedded in a high embankment of snow, bearing the international graphics of a “ONE WAY” street sign. Thwarted, he sighed: “*You know, this term – one way – it is the same for traffic as for a very important theorem in mathematics.*” “*What theorem is that?*” I asked distractedly, worried about being late for a meeting with the Ministry of Health. “*The one that postulates that for every problem there is definitely a solution – but only one.*” Sergei Nikolayevich then realized I wasn’t grasping the full value of this momentous truth: *In other words, Susan, if you have more than one solution – you have NOTHING!*”

This principle is obviously applicable to determining the fate of Honorary U. S. citizen, Raoul Wallenberg: A man cannot be both dead and alive at the same time. Nor for that matter can he have died more than once, with competing causes of death. And finally the same prisoner cannot be in two places at once – especially if we are speaking of sweeping distances or sightings which show Wallenberg simultaneously in a Moscow prison or remote special camp. Who are the witnesses meeting when they say they have encountered a prisoner named Raoul – or a Swede – or a long term heavily isolated anonymous prisoner known simply by his ‘Number?’ Which one is the ‘real Raoul?’ These are the questions the independent researchers address in their investigation. For as long as these contradictions are allowed to co-exist, we will indeed have ‘Nothing.’

The achievement of the recent independent investigations in Russia is that – while we still have insufficient data to reach that “one solution” – we have, through Russian cooperation, narrowed the gap and found reliable new ways to trace a prisoner as important and as invisible as Raoul Wallenberg. All of this was made possible by unprecedented cooperation between the authorities and independent researchers under the special auspices of the Swedish-Russian Working Group. My part was full time research over a three year period into Prisoner Files and Prison Department records related to Numbered and Isolated Prisoners. Dr. Marvin W. Makinen of the University of Chicago, a former prisoner of Vladimir, with computer expert Ari Kaplan, did a ‘virtual reality’ study of the prison’s Corpus II or hospital facility where Wallenberg has been most frequently sighted since his alleged death in 1947. Susanne Berger has specialized in the Swedish archives – and more recently – in clarifying the number of missing Swedes in the Gulag who could be mistaken for Wallenberg. We all owe our ability to conduct this research to Dr. Guy von Dardel, Raoul Wallenberg’s half brother and a nuclear physicist, who brought us into the Working Group.

To understand the focus generated by our work, one must first understand the investigation as it was before we began our on-site research in 1997: Until our systematic investigation, any speculation, posing as truth, was possible because of the absence of objective data to qualify the ‘report’ or present a counterclaim. We had either

Address to the U.S. Congressional
Human Rights Caucus, International
Relations Committee, Foreign Ambassadors.
American - Finnish Committee Feb. 13, 2002

to 'take the Soviets' word for it' – or not. During this time, Wallenberg's fate was being determined by a kind of 'unconscious consensus'. The man or woman on the street might sense just how long a young hero in good physical condition could survive the Gulag experience. That he was dead had become for the majority of those who knew his name a kind of 'common knowledge.' This is not, from a human rights perspective, proper accounting of a death. And yet it was allowed to function as such.

As for the Soviets, when they issued the Gromyko Memorandum of 1957, they offered no legitimate documentation to support their claim that Wallenberg died in Lubyanka Prison in 1947 – not by international principles of accounting for a death, nor by their own security regulations. This too was permitted to function 'as if.' With all its obvious imperfections, the existence of the Gromyko Memorandum had a tremendously negative impact on the impetus to free Wallenberg from illegal captivity. For in the dynamic that ensued – any eyewitness who came forth to report having seen Wallenberg alive after July 17, 1947 stood alone against the Soviets' official claim – which was perhaps their underlying intention.

Unfortunately this distortion had its mirror image in the West. Those who interviewed the returning witnesses were too often cynical about their motives or so confused by conflicting reports that they did little more than write them down and file them away! After their Soviet interrogators, even the most competent witness would come away depressed. For when it came down to the danger of 'causing World War Three for just one man', political and intelligence considerations always won out over the hero who had been left behind. Who could withstand such isolation or rejection from a world that was supposed to represent 'freedom'?

What is tragic is that no further attempts were made to cluster the eyewitness reports and present them as evidence – after the initial success in 1955/56. For the reversal of the Vishinsky Memorandum of 1947 (which claimed that Wallenberg was not to be found on Soviet territory) in favor of the Gromyko came about precisely because returning prisoners of war who sat with Wallenberg and his colleague, Vilmos Langfelder, confirmed each other's accounts. This occurred during one of the most critical phases of the Cold War. Still the Swedish government submitted these testimonies and the Soviets realized that the evidence was of such strength – they would have to amend their position. Which they did by presenting a prisoner named 'Walenberg' as dead – but leaving themselves enough loopholes in the text that they could reverse their position again, in the event of an exchange.

That the Gromyko Memorandum was flawed was immediately evident to the returning prisoners, experts in the Soviets' ways. Gustav Richter, Wallenberg's first cellmate whose testimony was influential in the reversal that led to the Gromyko Memorandum, wrote in 1957 to a former prisoner's next of kin: *Now that the Russian note has been presented, the matter has become even more mysterious because the contradictions are obvious. How can a man have died in 1947 when three witnesses confirm they were together with him in one cell in 1950/51?* Richter refers to only one such clustering, the corresponding testimony for which is nowhere in the Swedish files. But this is by no

means the last. Prisoners returning at successive stages have reported seeing Wallenberg in the same approximate time and place. They speak of seeing or sharing a cell with him in Lubyanka and Lefortovo, still being questioned in 1948 and early 1949; in transit depots in 1949, in Verchne-Uralsk isolation prison (1952-53); in Vladimir (1947, then 1954-1970) where for a brief time Langfelder was seen also; and in psychiatric facilities from 1960 on.

While some are at odds with each other, most cluster into specific regions under the same jurisdiction during corresponding periods of time. **It does not take a computer to see this – a surface reading will do, provided that one has access to all the sightings in order to analyze them in a comprehensive and systematic way. Unfortunately this was not possible because a large number of sightings were classified until recently – 1993 when the CIA released their Wallenberg documents and 2001 when the materials of the last thirty years, including a number of detailed important reports from the Eighties, were finally declassified in Sweden. So that none of us, including myself as a full time investigator, realized the strength of the body of evidence that exists until now. And yet it was always there and could have been prepared decades before when the chances that Wallenberg was still alive were much stronger as well.**

Why wasn't it taken more seriously? What lies behind this seeming 'battle fatigue' that the evidence which existed for decades wasn't consistently developed and worked on Wallenberg's behalf, for his release, over the years? Why now, 56 years after Wallenberg's disappearance when he is most likely dead, are we beginning to conduct a normal investigation? Is this simply a matter of the fall of the Iron Curtain and 'communist regime' to elicit first phases of Russian cooperation? Or is there something that we in the West have been missing all along – which has kept us from really looking? These are questions of conscience that, as I resume my efforts to reconstruct Wallenberg's paper trail in Russia starting next month, I hope that you in Washington will strongly address.

NOW for the findings of the independent investigation. Even before my driver introduced his theorem, the word '*Nothing*' has haunted the independent Wallenberg investigation since our research began. "*They will look – and find nothing*" was the official forecast in response to the unique access granted Dr. Makinen and myself to finally conduct on-site investigations in 1997. '*Finding nothing*' (meaning nothing that would contradict the Gromyko Memorandum) seemed a foregone conclusion, one which has existed, in certain influential quarters, since Wallenberg's disappearance in 1945.

Since we were the first to proceed systematically, armed with the eyewitness reports and documents provided by the Russians, the prediction that we would find nothing could not be based on the failure of anyone having tried before us and failed. What this prophesy did reflect in the year 1991 were two things: 1) presumed security knowledge about the real fate of Raoul Wallenberg to which neither the family nor the public might ever be privileged – and 2) emphasis on the handicap we really did face – namely that all essential documents related to Wallenberg's presence in the Gulag after his alleged death, had been removed to a safe place, but not – by our calculations – destroyed.

Our challenge was to turn the curse of 'finding nothing' into a blessing. This we did by gathering enough data and organizing it in such a way that we were able to work the 'empty spaces' which marked the absence of information related to an 'exceptional prisoner' against the certainty of normal prison procedures. This work with the 'blank spaces' -- that is finding and identifying the places where information has been removed as a way of tracking Raoul Wallenberg -- has brought investigation into the fate of the Disappeared to a new, scientific level.

Here are some of our interim findings:

First, in relation to the question of whether Wallenberg died or disappeared in 1947, where 'disappearance' implies a special procedure to remove his identity and replace it either with a number or pseudonym: I have identified the number or numbers which would have been used to conceal Raoul Wallenberg, his driver Langfelder or another Hungarian associated with them -- were they to have been sentenced by Special Tribunal (without trial) and sent away from Moscow in 1947 -- 1948, the alternative to their 'execution.' The Swedish Government has recently pressed again for the identification of those numbers to determine if indeed this constitutes the beginning of Wallenberg's 'disappearance trail.' Active vocal support from both the American government and Jewish community on this issue could make a difference, as we have essentially three missing numbers for three missing men.

Secondly, in a high tech computerized study of Vladimir's Corpus II, Dr. Makinen and Ari Kaplan were able to confirm that a number of the eyewitness reports of a prisoner identified through photographs and forensic sketches as Wallenberg correspond in time to unoccupied cells holding an anonymous prisoner. These matchings took place in 1957 around the time of the Gromyko Memorandum, in May of 1960, and in late 1969, just prior what would have been the completion of a 25 year term for espionage. Here too we are calling for your support in demanding that the identity of the prisoners who sat in Cell X on date Y to Z be given so that we may determine which of these men were or were not Raoul Wallenberg. **(I would like to emphasize that, in both the first and second sets of identifications, these questions can be answered through basic registries, corpus lists, prisoner files and special Prison Department records to give us a clear yes/no answer.)**

Thirdly, there is the question of why Wallenberg's currencies and valuables, returned to the family in 1989, had not already been confiscated by the State if Wallenberg had really died in 1947. Was the Soviets' invitation to the family to come to Moscow in October 1989 the authorities discreet way of fulfilling their obligation to turn over valuables and currency of an important prisoner to next of kin within six months of death, to avoid their automatically reverting to the State Treasury? **Given the reports that exist in our CIA records of Wallenberg alive in special facilities in the Moscow Region in the early Eighties, the possibility that Wallenberg lived as late as 1989 is well worth investigating.** This requires access not only to regional death registries but to certain prisoner financial records -- the debit/credit account which follows

a prisoner until their release from captivity or death. The Russians have claimed that all such records for the Vladimir Region have been destroyed from 1945 to the Present.

These are but partial findings to show that, yes, the problem can be solved, bringing us to the one truth that corresponds to Wallenberg's fate. Without doubt, this fully depends on Russian cooperation and the sharing of data, but it also depends on the resolve of those in the West to stand by the evidence – as if it were the man. We are dealing here with what I call a “silent atrocity.” As long as there's no body, there can be no final judgment – which is to say, no ‘conviction’ and no time to mourn. This could, in fact, explain the perpetuating of Wallenberg's ambiguous fate – and our own passivity when it comes to the ‘Disappeared.’

But what about the space in between – the years Wallenberg, and we, have lost in a wilderness of not knowing enough to make the correct decision in order to act?

We all know the saying: *He who saves one human life, it is as if he saved the whole world.* Wallenberg saved 100,000. We have yet to save, or even help him to the degree that we are able or that he deserves. My sense – as one who has been for many years at the front – is that this is not a task for one worker, one witness, one investigator, one official or even one government to take on alone. Its value lies in acting as ONE, and in this I include the Russians. The task is a necessary and important one. For by resolving the fate of Raoul Wallenberg, we not only help him but open the gates for establishing the fate of tens of thousands of others – military or civilian – who have vanished, and not only in the Soviet Gulag.

February 13, 2002

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TIMES 2 SPECIAL

Energy Plan

Wallenberg 'was still alive in the 1980s'

From Giles Whittell
in Moscow

ONE of the bravest heroes of the Second World War may have been alive in a psychiatric hospital in Moscow until well into the 1980s, nearly 40 years after his arrest by Stalin's secret police.

Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish diplomat who as a young man saved tens of thousands of Hungarian Jews from Nazi concentration camps, was originally said to have died in 1947. However, a ten-year investigation into his fate, published in Stockholm yesterday, reports that newly declassified CIA reports state that he was seen in and near Moscow in both 1981 and 1983.

Wallenberg was last seen by Western eyes in March 1945, when he was arrested by Soviet agents arriving in Budapest with the Red Army. Successive Soviet governments clung to the story that he died of a heart attack in the KGB's Lubyanka prison two years later. However, dozens of eyewitness accounts and other material presented yesterday provide compelling evidence that he survived most of the Cold War and could even be alive today.

"As long as there is no unequivocal evidence of what happened to Raoul Wallenberg, and this is still the case, it cannot be said that he is dead," said Goran Persson, the Swedish Prime Minister, as two lengthy reports, one Swedish and one Russian, were released.

In a separate development, Mikhail Gorbachev, the former Soviet leader, refused, citing to confirm or deny a tele-



Wallenberg saved tens of thousands from the Nazis

which Helmut Kohl, the then German Chancellor, challenged him to produce Wallenberg alive. Herr Kohl urged his Soviet counterpart to "let that old man go". According to Per Anger, a former Swedish diplomat who was listening on an extension and also believes Wallenberg may still be alive, he received no reply.

Mr Gorbachev said yesterday: "I had thousands of meetings about Wallenberg. He was a great man, but I'm convinced he died in 1947." Asked if he had information on Wallenberg that he had refused to divulge to Herr Kohl, Mr Gorbachev replied: "I don't know. I don't remember that conversation." He declined to answer further questions.

Mr Anger, who is retired, worked alongside Wallenberg in the cauldron of Nazi-occupied Budapest and has spent much of his life since campaigning for Soviet and Russian authorities to reveal the truth about his friend. Last

personal offer from Stalin to swap Wallenberg for several Soviet refugees, and yesterday Mr Anger denounced the Swedish Government for siding him to maintain its claim to neutrality.

Wallenberg was catapulted into global politics as a result of an American initiative approved by President Roosevelt in 1944 to try to save Hungary's Jews, but also to learn more about anti-Nazi resistance groups in Budapest.

He arrived in the Hungarian capital in July of that year, aged 31. By then Jews were being rounded up and sent by freight trains to Auschwitz at up to 12,000 a day. Armed with courage and charisma, and money funnelled to him by the precursor to the CIA, he bribed, cajoled and bullied SS officers into releasing at least 20,000, and possibly up to 100,000, Jews into his care.

There is little doubt that he also found time to file intelligence dispatches to Washington on the state of the approaching Soviet army. However, a key finding of yesterday's reports is that he was almost certainly arrested not as a spy but as part of a scheme devised by Stalin to collect high-profile foreign prisoners for possible future exchanges.

The Kremlin produced no official word on his fate until a 1957 memorandum stating he had died of natural causes in the Lubyanka ten years earlier. An invitation to his family to visit Moscow to reclaim his personal effects in 1989 has fuelled suspicion that he may have lived at least until then. Soviet policy was such effects only



Survivor tells of the saint who saved her

By Laura Peek

SUZANNE KRAUS owes her life to Raoul Wallenberg, whom she calls a saint.

Now a British citizen and great grandmother living in Finchley, North London, Mrs Kraus, 66, was ten years old when German soldiers dragged her family from their comfortable home in the Hungarian town of Papa, on the Austrian border.

Having just escaped a train to Auschwitz, the family were confined to a Budapest ghetto. Her parents were beginning to despair when her father and a cousin heard of a Swedish diplomat who people said dedicated his life to saving people from the Nazis. They contacted him and he secretly arranged Red Cross papers to help them escape.

"We were saved by those papers," says Mrs Kraus. "Wallenberg must have risked his life meeting with the Gestapo to arrange such papers."

Mrs Kraus fled the ghetto with her mother on a chilly morning in January 1945.

"I remember my mother whispered to me to talk to no one as we left. We went to a house protected by Wallenberg. Although Budapest was German-occupied they were not allowed to touch this house.

My childhood was full of fear," said Mrs Kraus, "because we never knew what would happen next. I have that fear with me to this day."

The family stayed safely at the house until Budapest was liberated. After the war, they travelled to Britain, where the young Suzanne married her British husband and became a primary school teacher.

All her life she has dreamt of thanking the man who made her two children, nine grandchildren and one great-granddaughter possible. To ensure that his memory never died she gave a six-hour account of her experiences to Steven Spielberg's Shoah Foundation, which records the testimonies of Holocaust survivors.

"It seems unfair that while he saved so many people, no one could save him," she said. "At a time when it seemed impossible that people could be saved he stood out and rescued us. It was tremendous."

"Many people helped to rescue Jewish people but they did it for money. He wanted nothing in return and that is the greatness of Wallenberg."

"He could have had a very comfortable life in Sweden and a good future but he sacrificed all this for saving lives. He was a saint."



Suzanne Kraus, aged 12, foreground, with her sister.

SPECIAL REPORT

The angel was a spy

New evidence: Sweden's Raoul Wallenberg was a U.S. espionage asset

For five decades, mystery has blanketed key parts of the remarkable story of Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish diplomat who saved at least 20,000 Hungarian Jews from the Nazis. U.S. intelligence kept mum lest it confirm the Soviet charge that he had been an American spy. The silence was purposeful: There were strong hopes that he was alive in the gulag but stronger fears that any hint of his ties to U.S. intelligence would stoke Soviet anger.

But a six-month investigation—involving examination of thousands of recently declassified files, some of which the Central Intelligence Agency just released to *U.S. News* under the Freedom of Information Act, and scores of interviews with American, Russian and European sources—shows conclusively that Wallenberg was a valued U.S. intelligence asset. His appointment was approved by President Franklin Roosevelt, and his mission was not only to save Jews but to provide U.S. spymasters with access to anti-Nazi resistance forces trying to break up Budapest's alliance with Berlin. For the Office of Strategic Services—precursor to the CIA—Wallenberg was probably the only reliable man in wartime Budapest.

Confirmation. One of the newly released CIA documents is a 1990 memo in which William Henhoeffter, curator of the CIA's Historical Intelligence Collection, declares that revelations of Wallenberg's intelligence connections "are essentially correct." CIA historian Kevin Ruffner agrees: "On the basis of the files cited in your article, it is a reasonable conclusion that Raoul Wallenberg was of benefit to American intelligence." Donald Jameson, a former senior CIA official, calls this statement "a virtual admission that Wallenberg was used by us. It is a minimum statement the CIA can make and still be plausible."

Aware of Wallenberg's ties to U.S. intelligence, the Soviets spirited him

American operatives helped get Wallenberg his job as second secretary at the Swedish legation in Budapest. He saved anywhere from 20,000 to 100,000 Hungarian Jews during World War II.



out of Budapest in January 1945. Russians today say he was either shot or poisoned in 1947. However, *U.S. News* has tracked down several new credible eyewitnesses who say they saw Wallenberg after the "official" 1947 death date. One of his close colleagues, retired Swedish Ambassador Per Anger,

is convinced that he was alive as late as 1989 and may be alive today.

THE APPROACH

The Wallenberg saga, as told by biographer Kati Marton, began with a casual elevator chat between two strangers working in the same downtown Stock-

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holm building: Kalman Lauer, owner of an export-import firm, and Iver Olsen, an OSS operative whose overt job at the U.S. Embassy was finances. Once Olsen found out that Lauer was a Hungarian Jew, he asked for help in finding a Swede "with good nerves" to go to Budapest to save Jews. Lauer suggested his employee, Raoul Wallenberg.

The job interview took place soon after, on a warm night in June 1944 at the resort of Saltsjobaden. Wallenberg was on furlough from Sweden's National Guard—arranged by Olsen. By the end of the meal, Olsen knew he had his man: strong willed, eager to make his mark in the world, an anti-Nazi with American ties thanks to his architecture degree from the University of Michigan. It did not matter that he came from a family, dubbed Sweden's Rockefellers, whose companies supplied Germany's war machine with materials such as steel and ball bearings.

The files record that one OSS official expressed worry that his "personal history" would render Wallenberg a "doubtful" ally. But Olsen prevailed. At Washington's behest, Sweden assigned Wallenberg to its Budapest legation. Supposedly neutral in the war, the Swedes agreed to the unusual arrangement to relieve U.S. pressure to stop trading with Germany. Influential Hungarians were also apparently involved in Wal-

lenberg's placement. One 1954 memo from a CIA informant (the name inked out by declassifiers) notes that a Hungarian in Stockholm, Kalman Geiger, "assisted informant in inserting Roul [sic] Wallenberg into Hungary during WW II as an agent of OSS."

The 31-year-old Wallenberg was so eager to get started that he "left in a hell of a hurry with no instructions and no funds." Olsen cabled Washington. At the Hungarian border, he saw boxcars crowded with Jews bound for what the Germans called "labor camps." The U.S. government had known of the death camps since 1942, and Allied intelligence knew that the liquidation of Hungarian Jewry, Europe's last large Jewish community, had begun two months earlier, with freight trains carrying 12,000 peo-



□ To the manner born (upper right), Wallenberg became attached to America while a student at the University of Michigan (top left, bottom right). He received a B.A. in architecture.



ple a day to Auschwitz.

Wallenberg arrived in Budapest on July 9 with a revolver in his knapsack. In a few months, he became a local legend, spending covertly supplied American funds and using Swedish diplomatic tools to save Jews. He issued "certificates of protection" with the emblem of the Swedish crown. He moved his charges into buildings he bought or rented and flew the Swedish flag over them for protection. In October, he joined other neutral diplomats such as Switzerland's to persuade the new, rabidly Nazi Hungarian regime to set up an "international ghetto" for 33,000 Jews, 7,000 of them with papers known as "Wallenberg passports." Jokingly, people called him the city's No. 1 landlord.

At first, he worried that if he granted too many protective papers, they would become meaningless. But he soon began issuing them with abandon as Hungarian Nazis combed the city where more than 300,000 Jews lived, many with false identity papers or hidden by gentiles.

He granted far more passes than the Hungarian government had agreed to. He ignored their protests about forgeries. Matching the Nazis' energy in killing Jews, Wallenberg would go daily to the ghetto and to collection points such as brickyards and train stations. "When he dealt with the Nazis, Raoul was another person," says Anger. "That soft-spoken man became aggressive, brutal." He bullied Nazi officers, claiming he had a list of Swedish-protected Jews who had to be released to his custody. He'd shout out common Jewish names and quick-witted Jews in the crowd would figure out his ruse and line up behind him to be led to safety.

BROADER MISSION

Hungarian and German officials warned Wallenberg to stop. On orders from Lt. Col. Adolf Eichmann, the SS arranged an "accident" that totaled his Studebaker. Wallenberg was not in it. During a dinner with the Swede, Eichmann vowed to try again. Wallenberg just smiled and became more emboldened. According to one report, Wallenberg even "round-ed up weapons for the small band of

SPECIAL REPORT

Jewish resistance fighters in Budapest."

While browbeating some Nazis, Wallenberg bribed others, using funds from the U.S. War Refugee Board (WRB), which the newly declassified files show had an intimate connection with U.S. spy operations. According to a senior CIA official, the choice of Wallenberg combined OSS Chief William Donovan's two articles of faith about intelligence: Businessmen make the best operatives, and refugees are the best sources of informa-

Hungarian documentation shows that Wallenberg used flattery as well as intimidation to get German and Hungarian officials to protect the ghettos and release Jews picked up by Nazi thugs. In the last days of the city's siege, he had a Hungarian Nazi assigned to police headquarters tell an SS general to call off a massacre of 70,000 Jews in the central ghetto. He sought out many influential Hungarians, including members of the resistance, who were not involved in

Wallenberg met with key Hungarian officials, resistance leaders and German officers. He also issued 20,000 special passports (lower right) placing Jews under Swedish protection.



tion. OSS cabled its Stockholm station that Hungary would be the first of many joint ventures by the two agencies.

Olsen himself worked for both the OSS and the WRB. "Olsen went to Stockholm to crunch numbers for OSS," says Meredith Hindley, an American University graduate student specializing in the WRB and the OSS. "In charge of currency operations, he realized that buying currency from refugees helped him pick up intelligence. He accepted the WRB job and made good use of it for OSS."

Beyond his efforts to save Jews, Wallenberg seems to have had a broader OSS mandate to collect field intelligence. Thomas Veres, the photographer he hired, recalled in an interview with *U.S. News* that during Budapest's siege, with shells flying from all directions, Wallenberg drove to Castle Hill to observe Russian gun positions on nearby hills, and asked Veres to take pictures of them.

saving Jews. His objective seemed to reflect OSS Chief Donovan's directive that spies seek out locals unsympathetic to Nazis. The goal: to immobilize 18 German divisions in the Balkans.

Key resource. The need for OSS officers to penetrate Hungary is a recurrent theme in just-disclosed OSS files; one expert called it one of the war's toughest intelligence problems. OSS official history notes the failure of three missions. "OSS did not have an active penetration team in Hungary at war's end," recalls James McCargar, an intelligence specialist at the U.S. Embassy in Budapest in 1946. Under such circumstances, Wallenberg was a key resource for the OSS. He could exchange coded messages via Stockholm, use the diplomatic pouch—sent as often as every second day—and work with resistance leaders.

One message was from the SI—for Secret Intelligence—section of the OSS in Bari, Italy, to its headquarters on

Nov. 7, 1944. The communication indicated that Wallenberg was working with Hungarian resistance leaders right before a planned uprising against the Hungarian Nazi regime. The leader of a second resistance group, Geza Soos, was trying to broker a separate peace with Allied officials. The spy cable notes that Soos, who slept in a differ-

ent bedroom almost every night, "may be contacted only" via the Swedish legation and that Wallenberg "will know if he is not in Budapest." Soos sent messages to Stockholm, which shared them with Olsen, who apparently forwarded them to Washington. A traitor betrayed the group planning the uprising,


and Soos's effort also fell apart once the Germans arrested Hungary's head of state, Miklos Horthy.

Over the years, U.S. officials have maintained that Wallenberg worked for the WRB, not the OSS—and thus was not a spy. Nevertheless, the name Wallenberg appears on the roster of those who "worked for OSS in one capacity or another," as

one archivist explains. It is a two-volume computer printout of some 2,000 names, kept in the National Archives. Another archivist cautions that being listed

"does not absolutely mean that the person worked for the OSS," though "the great majority" were OSS officers, agents and assets. "The printout is the closest thing we have to an OSS roster."

Asserts one former OSS officer: "Wallenberg was not on the OSS payroll." He spent WRB money but did not take a U.S. salary, "thus technically, he was not an OSS agent." But OSS clearly was instrumental in placing him where he was and received assistance from him in a variety of intelligence areas in his quest to both save Jews and fight Nazis. Whether he was an espionage "agent" by today's definition—contractually engaged and remunerated—mattered little at the time. "OSS people and others who fought that war on the intelligence front would have laughed at our efforts now to distinguish between an agent who got paid and someone who helped us out, inspired by his beliefs," says ex-CIA official Jameson. After reviewing the de-





**Confronting Hungarian gendarmes at the Jozsef-
varos train station, Wallenberg (circle) bullied,
bribed and cajoled them to accept Swedish protection
for Jews otherwise bound for Nazi death camps.**

classified files. Jameson says he has no doubt that the Swede was "an important American intelligence asset, rare in that part of the world at that time."

THE CAPTURE

"The Soviets doubtless knew Olsen's OSS affiliation," says McCargar, a Russia specialist. "They must have known of his meetings with Wallenberg." That made Wallenberg a marked man.

As the Red Army marched into Budapest, Wallenberg insisted that he be taken to headquarters. After spending the night there, he went to collect papers to take to a meeting with the Soviet high command. The following day he drove to the international ghetto, escorted by three Soviet soldiers on a motorcycle equipped with a sidecar. He saw a few of his protégés, still wearing yellow stars, venturing outside. He ran into Laszlo Peto—a childhood friend from a Swiss summer camp—and told him he planned to go to Debrecen, the regional Soviet headquarters, to ask for food and medicine for the ghetto, and would return in a week.

"He was supremely confident," remembers Peto, reached at his home in Brazil. "He quipped about not being sure if he was the Russians' guest or prisoner. But that was a joke. He could have escaped easily." Nothing is known about what happened in Debrecen—or if he ever got there. By late January, he was

in Moscow's Lubyanka prison.

Testimony by Nazi prisoners offers what little certainty exists in the next chapter of the Wallenberg saga. Wallenberg's cellmate Gustav Richter told Swedish officials the Swede had traveled for five days by train from Hungary to Moscow, writing notes the Soviets later confiscated and may have used for the espionage case against him. The seizure of the papers upset Wallenberg. In a 1993 interview with University of Chicago Prof. Marvin Makinen, Richter said that Wallenberg told him the notes were for a novel about espionage. Why would he act so recklessly, creating evidence against himself? Makinen, a consultant to the official Swedish-Russian commission focusing on Wallenberg, believes the purpose was to record information, perhaps by using code in the text.

GULAG WITNESSES

After July 1947—the date the Russians claim he died—the official documentary trail goes cold. Eyewitness and secondhand reports, however, have placed Wallenberg in the Soviet Union decades after that date. The location repeatedly cited: Vladimir prison, 120 miles northeast of Moscow.

From German POWs jailed there

and repatriated in the early 1950s came word of prisoner Wallenberg. Neither prison records nor personnel files confirm his presence. Recently, however, U.S.

News tracked down a new and highly credible witness who has identified one prisoner as Wallenberg. She is a cleaning woman named Varvara Larina, who has worked at the prison since 1945.

The now 72-year-old woman was shown photographs of five men the same age as Wallenberg at the time of his internment, and when asked to point out anyone she recalled, she placed her finger firmly on the face of the Swede. She remembers him not by name but by cell number—49—where he was held in isolation. He is locked in her memory as a chronic complainer. "He was tall, had dark hair, was growing bald," she said in a two-hour interview with U.S. News that was striking for the consistency of her story, though she was unclear about dates. "He was always scolding. Always unhappy." Larina recalls leaving his soup on the cell-door ledge. The prisoner with the brooding eyes would declare the soup too cold and demand to see the guard, or a high prison official.

Kicking up a storm and asking to see supervisors is an effective gambit for prisoners, notes Makinen, himself in

SPECIAL REPORT

Vladimir from 1961 to 1963. While there, Makinen heard of a Swedish inmate called "Vandenberg." Makinen interviewed Larina two years ago and found her so convincing that he urged Russian officials to contact her. To date, her testimony has not been officially recorded.

Another post-1947 sighting confirmed by *U.S. News* was in the Siberian camp of Bratsk. After his repatriation to Poland, one inmate, Boguslaw Baj, read a newspaper report about Russian declarations of Wallenberg's death in 1947 and recognized the name and face. Baj died recently, but his testimony is preserved in a documentary film by Lechoslaw Czolnowski. Baj recalls befriending a Swede who said his name was Wallenberg and that he had been arrested in Budapest. "We talked pretty often," Baj says. "We even wanted to take him into our Polish brigade, where he would have felt better than among the Russians, who laughed at him because he spoke no Russian." But the camp commander refused.

Baj's friend Jozef Kowalski recalls first meeting Wallenberg at a Polish Wigilya—Christmas Eve service—held clandestinely at the camp. A Polish priest said a prayer, and the assembled sang carols. During a 1950 rail transfer of prisoners, Kowalski says, Wallenberg sat near him, but was taken off the transport before its final destination. Kowalski, Baj and a third Home Army veteran, Jerzy Cichocki, have all separately picked out Wallenberg from an array of photographs.

SOVIET RESPONSE

The Soviets never commented on specific sightings, nor did they ever openly discuss the premise that Wallenberg lived on. Col. Vladimir Vinogradov, chief archivist for the Russian Security Service—the renamed KGB—asserts that the sightings have been analyzed "very thoroughly. If one were to take them seriously, Wallenberg was kept in practically every camp in the Soviet Union. It is absurd."

A joint Russian-Swedish commission on Wallenberg, created in 1991, received some



500 pages of documents, mostly chaff. Such basic records as his interrogation protocols are missing. Crucially, there is no death certificate and no report attesting to his cremation. A prison registry logging deaths, suicides and discipline violations does not mention Wallenberg on the alleged date of his death, though it lists a suicide attempt by a female prisoner. Another official log says no one by the name of

Jozef Kowalski (above), a former Polish prisoner in the Soviet Union, and Varvara Larina (below), a prison cleaning woman, place Wallenberg in the gulag after 1947, when the Soviets said he died.



Wallenberg was cremated at that time. Vinogradov told *U.S. News* that the lack of primary source material is probably due to a desperate attempt to destroy documents and escape blame after Stalin ordered the 1951 arrest of Viktor Abakumov, his minister for state security and the official most closely linked to Wallenberg's imprisonment.

Experts familiar with Soviet archives dispute this claim. "All the statements of the security service that they don't possess any information are certainly untrue," asserts Anatoly Prokopenko, the former head of Russia's central archives. Noting the Soviet mania for producing documents and sending copies to other institutions, Anger dismisses with a thunderous "Never!" the possibility that the Wallenberg file was destroyed.

After the failed August 1991 coup that precipitated the Soviet Union's end,

President Boris Yeltsin created a special Russian commission to study the Wallenberg case and dispatched its members to secret KGB archives outside Moscow. "Everything was in perfect order," recalls a team member. But the probe was short-lived, and soon even government researchers had to abandon leads. One

commission member says he saw the file on Mikhail Tolstoy-Kutuzov, the Russian in Budapest suspected of being the Soviet agent who first fingered Wallenberg. That file should explain the arrest, he says, but he never had a chance to read it. Guy von Dardel, Wallenberg's half brother, asked to see the file, but the KGB has told *U.S. News* it no longer exists.

One Swedish diplomat familiar with the case says that out of the hundred some witnesses interviewed by his government, up to 15 remain "believable." Particularly striking is the testimony of the late Nana Svartz, a prominent Swedish psychiatrist, who was given information about Wallenberg—alive but mentally ill—in the 1960s. During a Moscow conference, Alexander Myasnikov, a Soviet cardiologist, told Svartz the Swedish diplomat was in a mental hospital outside Moscow and in poor health. But when Sweden sent the Soviets a query, Myasnikov denied his state-



COURTESY SWEDISH AIR FORCE

E Gulag survivor Natalia Schinkarenko claims the musician circled above is Wallenberg in 1953. A computer-aged picture (below) shows how he would look now compared with his wartime image.

ment, contending misunderstanding. Susan Mesina, whose New York-based organization Ark searches for foreign prisoners in the gulag, says the report on Wallenberg's mental breakdown is credible. Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko had just announced the 1947 death date in a 1957 memo to Sweden, and Wallenberg may have thought his country and family had stopped looking for him. "If Raoul was told he'd been declared dead, he would have been terrified about his future," she says. "Thank God the family stuck by him and demanded proof."

In 1989, on the eve of a visit by Wallenberg's kin, the Soviets surprised them by handing over his personal effects, including passport, money, a daybook and a permit to carry a pistol—but not the notes for his novel or his personal papers. The belongings had suddenly been discovered, the Soviets claimed, when a worker happened upon a plain envelope in a storage room. The chain of events was so unconvincing that von Dardel demanded a probe of his half brother's fate.

Ambassador Anger told *U.S. News* that he urged Chancellor Helmut Kohl to intervene in 1989. Holding an extension phone, Anger listened as Kohl called Mikhail Gorbachev and pleaded "let that old man go." The Russian had no answer, says Anger, who then went to Moscow to appeal

personally to the Soviet leader: "He showed no interest" and "implied that he had no control over the KGB."

Wallenberg's tragedy was that the governments that should have rescued him had reasons not to come clean. Worried about undermining its claim of neutrality, Sweden would not concede that it let U.S. intelligence use one of its diplomats. A senior CIA official recalls "some talk" in the late 1950s and early 1960s that the United States should initiate a swap. But the idea was dropped because of fear that an offer would vindicate Moscow in its charge that he was a U.S. agent. The Soviets scoffed at the U.S. denial.

One declassified document is a 1981 article in a CIA publication in which a CIA officer criticized agency silence in the Wallenberg affair. The author,

whose name is inked out, mentions that in 1979 the State Department accepted "partial responsibility for Wallenberg's fate by admitting in a so-called 'non-paper' presented to the Soviet chargé in Washington that the U.S. had provided funds for the program to save Hungarian Jews." But State failed to reveal, the CIA officer noted, that Wallenberg's contact in Stockholm, Olsen, worked for the OSS.

In 1990, senior CIA official Henhoeffler warned the director that in the years to come, the CIA would be taken to task because the OSS connection gave the Soviets a pretext for imprisoning Wallenberg. Nevertheless, he con-

cluded. "It should be deeply satisfying to every American intelligence officer that not only American funds but, at least indirectly, American intelligence expertise helped to save some Jews from the Holocaust."

EPILOGUE: TRADING TRUTHS

Washington may one day declassify files that will reveal whether Wallenberg volunteered for assignments in addition to the rescue mission or whether the OSS pressed him into service on other fronts. Similarly, the Russians may eventually divulge the reasons for keeping him hidden in prison: Did they hope to ransom him to the West? Or was their delay bureaucratic bungling?

Whatever the reasons for both sides' intransigence, they have vanished now, and a deal could be struck to get at the truth: America could acknowledge all that he did on behalf of U.S. intelligence and the Russians could make known his fate. Such a trade-off would not be justice, but it would end the mystery surrounding a rare, soul-soothing Holocaust legend.

BY CHARLES FENYVESI AND VICTORIA POPE
IN RUSSIA, POLAND, HUNGARY AND SWEDEN



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MONDAY, JUNE 29, 1992

SHORTS STORIES

Monday: Sunny, mid-80s

Tuesday: Partly sunny, 85-90

High tide: 10:53 a.m., 11:08 p.m.

Full report: Page 44

Action on missing

Conn. group seeks US captives in Soviet lands

By Judith Gaines
GLOBE STAFF

WATERBURY, Conn. — They are looking for the abandoned: American civilians and military personnel believed to have been held captive for 30, 40, perhaps even 60 years inside the former Soviet Union.

They say at least 49 men and one woman — captured during World War II, the Korean War and the Cold War — may still be living in a network of secret camps, isolated prison

cells and heavily guarded psychiatric units. These Americans are "the forgotten ones, and they don't have much time left," said Susan Mesnal, director of the Ark Project, the Waterbury-based group trying to find the missing and bring them home.

Officially organized in March, the Ark Project already has some notable successes. In May it discovered Victor Norris Hamilton, a 75-year-old American who has been held in Russian psychiatric clinics since 1962. The group is currently negotiating Hamilton's release with family members, doctors

ARK, Page 7

Information on missing often incomplete

Among the alleged sightings and other reports of missing Americans currently being investigated by the Ark Project are the following. In many cases, information is sketchy.

Rasoul Wallenberg, an honorary US citizen and Swedish diplomat, was kidnapped in Hungary by Soviet agents in January 1946. The Soviet government claims he died of a heart attack in 1947, but a Soviet doctor told a Swedish colleague he treated him in 1961. Eyewitness sightings into the 1980s place him in prisons in Moscow and various labor camps and psychiatric hospitals.

L.L. (J.G.) Robert Reynolds was navigator of a Navy plane shot down in April 1950, over the Baltic Sea. Reports from former prisoners stated that as many as eight crew members survived the crash and were held in camps and collective farms in the Far Eastern region of the Soviet Union. After an article by Mikhail Kazachkov and Susan Mesnal appeared in the weekly Russian magazine Express Chronicle, Ark received a report that Reynolds had been held prisoner in a psychiatric hospital in 1957.

A US military attache from a prominent Midwestern family, who cannot be named until details of the sighting are verified, was arrested in 1948 while attempting to deliver documents to Joseph Stalin. The informant said he rode with the prisoner for 12 hours in a prison van traveling from Moscow to gulag camps in Siberia in 1954, conversed with the prisoner in English and has provided Ark with drawings of him.

John Malteev, a POW from World War II raised in Philadelphia, was seen in 1957 in a psychiatric hospital in Leningrad. He reportedly claimed to be an American, but no one would believe him. He was later sighted in a labor camp by a dissident prisoner.

William George Robertson, a German released from the gulag reported that he met Robertson at a prison camp at Kiev-Darnizza in 1955. He described Robertson as a man "who wore glasses, who was talented at drawing, whose home was New Orleans and whose father was a lawyer." He said Robertson complained that no one would believe he was an American.

Rudolph Hamburger, an American who went to work in the Soviet Union as an architect and disappeared in 1947. He is said to have been taken to a special unnamed camp for Americans. A campmate provided Ark with drawings of Hamburger.

An electronic communications officer, who was flying in a military reconnaissance and shot down in July 1953 over the Sea of Japan. His photo was identified by a Japanese repatriate who had cleaning duty with him in a Soviet labor camp in 1955. His family just learned of this sighting through the Ark project.

Mrs. Oakland. This woman, an English teacher, aged 40-50, was described as being short, with long hair, living in a communal flat in Sverdlovsk, in the northern Urals, in 1948-49. Her son had been imprisoned for espionage, and she told the informant she was exhausted and scared and expected to be arrested. She subsequently did not make contact with the US Embassy.

JUDITH GAINES

Conn. group seeks Americans held captive in former USSR

■ ARK
Continued from Page 1

and Russian and US authorities.

According to Mesina, the group also has verified the 1983 death in captivity of a New England man, a civilian prisoner, who was held for 28 years in Soviet prison camps on espionage charges and pressured, unsuccessfully, to accept Soviet citizenship.

"Unfortunately, the prisoner has died, but his family is freed," said Mesina, referring to the anxiety and the anguish that not knowing breeds.

On Friday, Malcolm Toon, the American head of a US-Russian commission investigating the fate of American prisoners of war, said an intense, weeklong search of alleged camps in the Ural Mountains has revealed no evidence that any American POWs are still alive in the former Soviet Union.

In reply, Mesina said, "A KGB-guided tour of the archives is not satisfactory evidence for such a claim, and Toon's trip to the Urals was announced in advance, giving camp officials time to remove any tell-tale signs." In any case, she added, a thorough search will take years.

Meanwhile, reports of prisoners or former prisoners continue to surface. Yesterday in Moscow, the Russian cochairman of the Joint US-Russian commission said that four Americans were held at a Soviet psychiatric hospital in 1983, Reuters reported. Gen. Dmitri Volkogonov said in a television interview that there were no clues yet on the identity of those held in the hospital.

Ark is an acronym; the A in its name comes from the Alliance of Families, a national POW-MIA support group; R is for Rood Wallenberg, a Swedish diplomat who disappeared in 1945; and K comes from Mikhail Kazachkov, a Soviet dissident and one of Ark's founders.

Supported largely by private donations and a shoe-string operation called the Russian Relief Fund, also in Waterbury, the Ark Project is a nonprofit organization with a two-person staff; its headquarters are a renovated 19th-century carriage house that once served as a public restroom in Waterbury.

Its tactics for achieving its mission are even more unusual.

To locate the missing Americans,



SUSAN MESINA... "They don't have much time left"

cofounder Kazachkov and associate director Boris Yuzhin - who both suffered long incarcerations in the gulag system until Russian President Boris Yeltsin ordered their release in the last two years - are appealing directly to the Russian people for help.

Kazachkov, a prominent Soviet dissident, and Yuzhin, a former KGB official, have appeared on Russian evening news telecasts and on a Russian television news magazine called "Top Secret," asking for tips about where the Americans may be.

According to Kazachkov, who was interviewed at his home in Cambridge, and Mesina, the approximately 80 responses to these appeals, as well as information obtained from family members, former political prisoners, Russian dissidents, volunteer investigators and recently declassified archival documents in Russia and the United States, helped them piece together the trails that led to Hamilton and the New England man whose story they say cannot yet be disclosed.

Hamilton was a naturalized American citizen, born in the British-mandate territory of Palestine, who had worked for the US National Security Administration deciphering Arabic codes and diplomatic messages intercepted by the agency. He

was dismissed for medical reasons in 1959 and defected in 1962 to the Soviet Union, where he was diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic and committed to Soviet psychiatric hospitals. According to his doctors, the KGB attempted for 20 years to extract sensitive intelligence information from him.

Following a tip from an anonymous caller who had treated him in one of those hospitals, Ark tracked Hamilton to Psychiatric Prison No. 5, in Troitskoye, about 40 miles south of Moscow.

Mesina, who visited him there May 21 and again June 4, described him as "a little man, wearing a cap and a smock, intelligent, very cultured, but very tense, mistrusting and suspicious, with darting eyes" - apparently in good health physically but mentally ill.

"I wanted to talk about his life, and he wanted to tell me his theories of the universe, such as who would be bombed and destroyed, coming apocalypses, that kind of thing," Mesina said.

Hamilton had been living in a dark dormitory room shared with five other men. A table near his cot was piled high with the journals he has penned since the KGB locked him in 30 years ago.

Male that Mesina was allowed to read, Hamilton was tortured by Soviet agents and was denied requests for repatriation to the United States. In 1972, when he learned that President Nixon was visiting the Soviet Union, he briefly escaped, hoping Nixon would help him return to the United States. But Mesina said the KGB "found him praying in a church" and recaptured him.

For a while, Hamilton had a radio and kept a lively political commentary in his journals. But his contact with the outside world stopped sometime in the mid-1980s, Mesina said, and his journals became "inward, inward, gone."

When told that his wife and daughter, now living in Union City, N.J., still love him and want him to come home, "he had an expression like a kind of rapture," Mesina recalled, "and then he snapped shut. He said his wife was dead, I should stop talking nonsense, why was I trying to hurt him with this information."

Russian doctors have expressed mixed views about whether Hamilton should be released, and Ark currently is arranging for his family to

visit him in Russia.

As these negotiations continue, Ark also is investigating about 50 other cases, although many of these Americans are presumed by now to be dead.

Ark says some of these Americans came under Red Army control after it liberated Allied prisoners of war held in Nazi camps in World War II. According to Ark, some were taken prisoner in Korea by Communist forces and subsequently transferred to the Soviet Union. Some were crewmen in surveillance planes shot down over Soviet territory during the 1950s.

Still others were civilians charged with espionage, defectors or people who just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. Mesina says that often they were seized by Soviet officials because they were thought to have some information or skill - expertise in electronics or aeronautics, for instance - deemed useful to the system.

Similar reports were confirmed by a May 1991 staff report for the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, citing declassified Pentagon documents and other sources.

Such charges are also being investigated by the joint US-Russian commission and the Senate Select Committee on POW-MIA affairs, headed by Sen. John Kerry of Massachusetts.

Yeltsin himself has said that 12 Americans were shot down over Soviet territory in the 1950s and kept in Soviet prisons and psychiatric clinics. He also has said that the Soviets interned about 23,000 US citizens at various times, although he said most of them were repatriated, released, escaped or died in captivity. According to Yeltsin, the fate of the 12 airmen is still being investigated by Russian authorities.

Whatever has become of the missing Americans, said Kazachkov, "even if they're 85 years old, even if they have only a week to live, this still must be looked into, until there is no hope. And some Russians must be instrumental in getting the truth out."

"Even if the Americans are not alive, their remains must be found and buried with honor," he continued. "They're entitled to it. They have fought the longest war in history."



United States
of America

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 102nd CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

THE 11TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE RAOUL WALLENBERG HONORARY CITIZENSHIP LEGISLATION - WE MUST CONTINUE THE EFFORT TO FIND WALLENBERG

HON. TOM LANTOS
of California

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, October 5, 1992

Mr. Speaker, today marks the 11th anniversary of the signing by President Reagan of legislation making the Swedish Holocaust hero, Raoul Wallenberg, an honorary citizen of the United States. It is important that we mark that anniversary by remembering this great man, through whose courageous and selfless efforts as many as 100,000 Hungarians were saved from Nazi extermination camps during 1944.

As my colleagues know, Mr. Speaker, Raoul Wallenberg gave up the security, comfort and luxury of his home in Stockholm to go to Budapest in the midst of the war. There he risked his own life to save the lives of tens of thousands of people he did not know from the horror, brutality, and death that awaited them in Nazi extermination camps.

As my colleagues also know, Raoul Wallenberg disappeared into the Soviet Gulag on January 17, 1945, and he has not been seen outside the prison system since that time. It was our hope eleven years ago that by giving Wallenberg honorary United States citizenship, we might increase our ability to press the Soviet Union to release this great man. As we mark the anniversary of the adoption of our legislation, unfortunately, we must admit that we have not succeeded in that effort.

At the same time, however, we have succeeded in our effort to make known the incredible accomplishments of Raoul Wallenberg. Eleven years ago, when we began the effort to confer honorary American citizenship on Wallenberg, he was virtually unknown. Since that time, his name and honored deeds are known around the world. His selfless actions are remembered – and will be remembered – by men and women everywhere. And in this regard, Mr. Speaker, I want to pay tribute to my wife, Annette, who led the effort to make the deeds of Wallenberg known. Her indefatigable energy and enthusiasm has been a major reason for the success that has been accomplished.

As we mark this 11th anniversary of the Wallenberg honorary citizenship legislation, I want to renew my commitment to continue the effort to press officials of the Russian government and officials of the former Soviet Union to provide information about Raoul Wallenberg. There is reason to believe that he may still be alive in the remnants of the Soviet Gulag that still dot the countryside of the republics that were formerly part of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Speaker, this is not simply unfounded hope on my part, but it reflects the reality of what has been happening with prisoners who

are being found in the former Soviet Union. Let me cite examples.

In mid-September, just a few weeks ago, an 82-year-old Polish citizen died in the Psychiatric Prison Hospital in Raizan, 300 kilometers Southeast of Moscow. This Polish prisoner, Mr. Strajnski, was the last of some 100 Polish citizens brought to Raizan from Bailostock and committed to this hospital in January of 1941. He survived 51 years of incarceration, without any contact with family or his Embassy—even during several years of *Glasnost*.

On May 21, the Independent Psychiatric Association of Russia and a human rights and humanitarian group known as the ARK Project of the Russian Relief Fund based in Waterbury, Connecticut, found an American defector in Special Hospital Number 5, 50 kilometers from Moscow. The defector, Victor Hamilton, had languished in this hospital for over 20 years. He had been held in the psychiatric prison hospital system since 1962 – nameless, known only as the letter "K". Susan Mesinai, Director of the ARK Project, was able to establish Hamilton's identity by reviewing his personal journals over the past 30 years, at the doctor's request. She was, in turn, able to locate Hamilton's family in the United States and by introducing them to the

American Psychiatric Association lay the foundation for Hamilton's return.

This past April, Victor Demesco and his mother, Helena, arrived in the United States as refugees. Victor is the son of Michael Demesco of Columbia, Connecticut. Michael was a civilian prisoner of war held from 1941 to 1945 in a Nazi labor camp in Berlin. Afterwards, he was taken into the Soviet Gulag, and released in 1947 when he married a Ukrainian woman from Kursk whom he had befriended in a Nazi POW camp. Michael Demesco and his wife were both sent to labor camps in 1949 after a letter Michael wrote to his mother in America describing the horrors of the Gulag was intercepted by the KGB. He was repeatedly sighted in labor camps - his presence was reported to the State Department by the American representative of the Wallenberg Commission and a prisoner of the Gulag also spoke to him through slats in the fence of a labor camp. Demesco's family in the United States learned that he was in a Soviet prison and they came here to Washington to press for his release. As a result, Demesco did receive from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow papers to complete for his return. He filled these out and mailed them, but presumably they also were intercepted by the KGB.

In 1971, Demesco was approached by a Soviet official regarding his "immigration" to America. He was told that he would have to leave his family behind, that he would be sent to an intermediate point and from there sent to the United States. His family did not want him to go, but Demesco - who had never been allowed to work and was repeatedly punished for his refusal to accept Soviet citizenship - was willing to take the chance.

In 1971, while his son was away in the Army, Michael Demesco disappeared from Kursk. His wife and son pressed for years for news of his fate. In 1987, Helena Demesco was finally informed that her husband had died in 1983. At approximately the same time, Victor, who had courageously been concluding his own investigations into his father's fate, was shot three times in the back and remains a paraplegic to this day. The ARK Project and other investigations have established that Michael Demesco was held from 1971 until his death in 1983 in an asylum for the mentally ill, retarded, elderly and indigent near Kursk. The doctor who treated him and was with him five minutes before he died

never knew that he had a family.

The accounts of these three men - Strajnski, Hamilton and Demesco - should drive home the message that elderly foreign prisoners could be languishing in the Russian psychiatric prison hospital system to this day. Archivists of the Central Clinic in Moscow, through whom most "special prisoners" were committed to the system, have informed ARK Project directors that there were approximately 15,000 such special cases directly overseen by the KGB. These records are a precious resource which should be opened to the investigative efforts of human rights activists - including those of us seeking to find information about Raoul Wallenberg - to assure that those who remain within the prison system do not die anonymously.

The Wallenberg case is the quintessential case of the foreign prisoner of war held for decades against his will in the Gulag. I urge my colleagues to join me in pressing for a full and complete investigation of the Soviet prison system to identify Raoul Wallenberg - and other Americans and other foreigners - who may have been forgotten in such institutions. These men must not be abandoned or die anonymously, having spent half a century under such appalling conditions.

In the name of Raoul
January 28, 2000

LAG 28 JANUARI 2000

Kontor: Christel Persson Telefon: 08-738 30 00 Fax: 08-619 04 50

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Susan Ellen Mesinai söker sanningen om en rättfärdig man

Öppna arkiven nu!

Raoul Wallenbergs namn har ekat och prisats, denna vecka i Stockholm. Denne unge svensks vilja att sätta sin egen säkerhet på spel för att andra människor skulle få leva har blivit en universell besvärjelse, för att avvärja makttrömmarna ur det förflutna.

Men det är hög tid att ställa en viktig fråga om just hjälten Wallenberg: Hur kan en enda individs öde – ett helt ämnades hjälte, försvunnen sedan 55 år – fortfarande vara ett hot mot den nationella säkerheten, i så många länder?

Under sitt uppdrag i Ungern 1944, som svensk legationsskreterare, räddade Wallenberg mellan 20 000 och 100 000 människor, judar och ur andra minoriteter, undan nazisternas krigsmaskin. Dessa människor stod inför en säker död, men Wallenbergs räddningsaktion återgav dem tron på ett liv och en framtid. En godhetens kraft som speglas i de ord som judar använder om "de rättfärdiga" bland icke-judar, de som ställde sig

■ Nyckelord i mysteriet Raoul Wallenberg är det sovjetiska "liquidatsia", menar amerikanskan Susan Ellen Mesinai.

■ Betyder det död/likvidering, eller "bara" undanstuvande i väntan på bättre bruk?

■ Mesinai forskar sedan tio år i Wallenbergs öde, just nu på heltid i Moskva.

Hon vill rekonstruera pappersspåren efter svensken, som är en – frånvarande – huvudperson under veckans internationella konferens om Förintelsen.

drag vida överskred den enkla uppgiften att räkna och skriva rapporter? Om Wallenberg samlade bevis mot förövarna av folkmord – nazityska eller sovjetiska – så var han redan en "märkt man". Vilka andra uppgifter kan ha varit hans?

Handlar det alltså om en man som "visste för mycket"? Vars försvinnande skulle skett obemärkt, om inte de som räddats av hans humanitära glöd så högt sjunger hans lov?

Vi måste fråga

Varför kan inte ryssarna avslöja hela sanningen nu? Vilka skäl kan de ha att hålla Wallenbergs verkliga öde hemligt? Dessa frågor har upprepats, efter perestrojkan. Genom hela det kalla kriget var intresset koncentrerat till Sovjet: vad de hade, vad de visste. Nu måste vi vidga diskussionen, till det fortsatta hemlighetsmakeriet i väst.

För skälen till att Wallenbergs aldrig släpptes måste ha ett samband med skälen till varför vissa aspekter fortfarande är hemligstämplade i alla de länder som fallet berör.



IN THE NAME OF RAOUL
Reflections on the Wallenberg 'Mystery'

Susan Ellen Mesinai

At the January 25 –28 'Stockholm International Forum on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research' – attended by the leaders of twenty nations --the name of Raoul Wallenberg was inevitably evoked. For the young Swede's willingness to risk his own security that another people might live has become a universal talisman to ward off the nightmares of the past.

The name Raoul, meaning 'friend and shepherd of God' or the 'one who sees God' (in history) well describes Wallenberg's mission to Hungary in 1944 in which he saved between 20,000 and 100,000 Jews, and other minorities, from the Nazi war machine. For those facing certain death, Wallenberg's rescue efforts restored faith in the Oneness which universally guarantees 'life and the future'.. This power of goodness can best be understood by the traditional phrase evoked by Jews honoring the 'Righteous Gentiles' who stood between them and the forces of evil: *He Who Saves One Human Life, It is as if he saved the whole world.*

The tragic irony is that while, symbolically, Raoul Wallenberg became a legend, personally he assumed the very fate of those he could not save – that of illegal captive and possible homicide. On January 17, 1945 – one day before the liberation of Auschwitz – Sweden's hero disappeared from Budapest with a Soviet military escort, only to be arrested by Smersh and sent to Moscow prisons. Now, despite eyewitness reports of Wallenberg held in special prisons, camps or psychiatric facilities in the Soviet Union – dating into the Eighties – his fate remains a 'mystery.' The very man who carried a book in which he meticulously recorded the names of those in his care, their property and next of kin so that all could be restored to them after the War was allowed to slip away into oblivion. If dead, deprived the dignity of being buried with his family. And if 'disappeared' by many feared to be 'buried alive', that is held under a pseudonym or known only as a 'numbered prisoner.'

In short, while Wallenberg could save his tens of thousands, we as a civilization have been unable to save him. There are reasons for this: the Cold War --which is over. And in the immediate thaw efforts are indeed underway to verify the eyewitness sightings in order to reconstruct Wallenberg's paper trail. But this long overdue investigation must constantly contend -- not only with the secrets of the past -- but the universal tendency to lament what the Russians have acknowledged as a 'tragic mistake'. To mourn rather than respond wholeheartedly and together at the very time when the last final steps needed to resolve this case could be taken. Why?

The fact that we have neither rescued Wallenberg nor gained sufficient evidence to be confident of his fate is proof that despite decades of valuable Holocaust research and education, we are not yet cured. Still so overwhelmed by the numbers who vanished or

died that we become paralyzed when confronted with the needs of the very man whose name is synonymous with defending minorities against atrocities and restoring their dignity to them. Eichmann – tattooing numbers into the flesh of his captives – knew only too well the Jewish taboo against counting persons. Money may be counted, but not those born in God's image. The SS occult reversal of the spiritual order – key to oppression on every other level – was intended to eradicate the roots of the Jewish people and, by extension, Western law.

The ambiguity surrounding Wallenberg's fate has been further obscured by the life/death question of whether he died of a heart attack as the Soviet official position has remained since the Gromyko Memorandum of February 1957. Much of the present day debate centers around the use of the term 'liquidatsia' in a document released by the Russians in 1991. Experts are divided whether this memorandum from Deputy Foreign Minister and former Prosecutor Vishinsky to Abakumov of the Ministry of State Security calls for 'the elimination' of the man, Wallenberg, or of the problems generated by his arrest. A subsequent memorandum from Abakumov to Molotov, believed to define the course selected for Wallenberg's fate, is registered July 17, 1947 – Wallenberg's alleged death date. But the actual contents of that document are yet to be revealed.

Those influenced by the tragedy of the Holocaust, where the term 'liquidatsia' is synonymous with death, may be unaware that for the Soviet security organs of the time 'liquidatsia of the problem' had a very practical application. Rather than killing a prisoner who might prove useful in other ways – one would deny his presence as a captive in the Soviet Union, then back up the claim by concealing his identity, placing him in an isolation prison and/or 'far away' place to the East. Those who could testify to the prisoner's presence would be rounded up and intimidated not to speak. Which is what happened – Wallenberg's cellmates and those of his colleague, Vilmos Langfelder, were interrogated on July 22, 1947 and placed in isolation. The denial of Wallenberg's presence in the USSR came only a few weeks later.

In other words, even as the Russians must substantiate their death claim (which lacks the legitimacy offered by an authorized medical history and death certificate), their cooperation is imperative in documenting the only alternative to his fate – the 'disappearance trail' – to determine if indeed Raoul Wallenberg was forced to travel there.

The difficulty in the Wallenberg case, however, does not stem solely from the psychological barriers caused by the Holocaust trauma of numbers, of expecting the worst. For those like myself who have worked closely on this case, the question persists: Why has the ambiguity of Wallenberg's fate been allowed to fester, inhibiting his chances for an exchange? Why was there never a committed effort on the part of leadership to 'rescue the rescuer', to return kindness in kind? Is it because those who could make a difference were so convinced that Wallenberg was dead? Or because it is much easier to deal with a silent martyr than the nightmare unleashed by the return of a 'talking man'?

A man described as an Allied 'observer', whose nation not only had trade relations with Germany but represented Soviet interests in Hungary, was taken into protective custody by Soviet troops and arrested. His parting words to an old friend were 'I do not know if I go with them as a guest or prisoner.' What perceptions lay behind this bravado? What kind of hero are we talking about here? An idealistic young man, untrained, who was finally given his chance to do something for the war effort? Or a proven silent warrior empowered to preserve and establish order in Hungary, whose unorthodox diplomatic powers far exceeded the simple task of counting numbers and writing reports?

If Wallenberg was collecting evidence against the perpetrators of genocide – Nazi or Soviet – he was already a 'marked man.' What other tasks could have been his? In other words, are we dealing with a man who 'knew too much', whose disappearance might have gone completely unattended were it not for the praise of those who benefited from his humanitarian zeal?

Since perestroika, the question is frequently asked: "Why wouldn't the Russians reveal the full truth now? What reason could they have for keeping his fate a secret?" Throughout the Cold War all focus was on the Soviets – what they had, what they knew. Now we must incorporate into this perspective the ongoing secrecy in the West. For Wallenberg's lack of freedom must correlate with the reasons why certain aspects of this case are still classified in all the principle nations involved. I speak not only of the former Soviets who claim that Wallenberg's file is destroyed, when it would be necessary to dismantle their entire apparatus to eliminate traces of 'this one man'.....But of the Americans who, for reasons of 'national security and foreign policy', still retain a portion of their files on Wallenberg, when the majority of their remaining World War II documents were declassified in 1995 by Presidential order. Of the British whose extensive classification period (and a fire that destroyed 85% of their S.O.E. materials) are well fortified again questions whether Wallenberg or Langfelder had any connection to British intelligence....Of the Jews whose networks in Central and Eastern Europe, leading to Palestine, engaged in a number of negotiations not only to rescue their people, but to arm and finance a new State....Of the Germans who must know what deals, betrayals or disinformation took place in and around the Eastern Front, particularly in the later stages of the War....Of the Swedes who keep classified all their sightings of Wallenberg over the past thirty years....

We must ask the leaders of all these nations, and those who assembled in Stockholm last week, **How and why the fate of One Man, One Individual, Our Century's Hero—who disappeared 55 years ago – could possibly constitute a matter of national security, and to so many nations? Who or what are they protecting, and how has this curtailed Wallenberg's chances for freedom – and a life? Until these questions are answered, waves of eyewitnesses could step forth with testimonies regarding the legendary hero's fate, only to be muffled by quick classification or aspersions against their credibility. This is too reminiscent of Auschwitz where the truth of the camps, though long reported, was not believed or the courage and desire was lacking to take a stand.**

Ironically, when a decision was finally made to act, Raoul Wallenberg was the chosen champion – the one man sent to make a difference through a dangerous, impossible mission.

Is this how we treat our Holocaust heroes, our most righteous men?

Susan Ellen Mesinai is co-founder and director of the ARK Project of Freedom Channel which since 1992 has been dedicated to 'live search' investigation into the fate of foreign prisoners who disappeared into the Soviet Gulag. As an independent human rights effort, ARK has been instrumental in reuniting two families. In addition, Ms. Mesinai has researched the Wallenberg case for ten years in archives of various nations, with grants from the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, U.S. News & World Report, NBC and the Simon Wiesenthal Center, among others. She has, step by step, pressed for declassification of the American archives in conjunction with Senator Carl Levin (MI). Ms. Mesinai is presently a full time consultant to the Swedish-Russian Working Group into the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg, working primarily in Moscow to verify eyewitness reports and study other prisoner files in an effort to reconstruct Raoul Wallenberg's paper trail.

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

Susan Ellen Mesinai

On December 22nd, for the third time in the past several weeks, Alexander Yakovlev -- Chairman of the Russian Presidential Commission for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression under Stalin -- aired his conviction that Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg had '*undoubtedly*' been shot in Moscow's Lubyanka Prison in July 1947. His statement of December 6 -- in answer to Dr. Guy von Dardel, Wallenberg's half-brother's request that Yakovlev either present proof or refrain from painful speculations -- added the dramatic detail that Wallenberg had died in a 'salvo of gunshots' without producing any documentation to verify even the date. This is no small omission in that rasstriel, or death by shooting, had been canceled in the USSR as of May 26, 1947 and did not resume until January 12, 1950. That Yakovlev strengthened his story by citing as his source former KGB Chief, Vladimir Kryuchkov, only reinforces one's fears of possible 'disinformation.'

Yakovlev's third disclosure came hand in hand with the release of Wallenberg's rehabilitation document by the Procurator General Vladimir Ustinov. Journalists have rightfully noted that this document skirts not only the cause of death but the where. It also offers no statement as to the exact time period Wallenberg and his colleague Langfelder were held in the Soviet Union. Upon questioning, the Swedish Foreign Office responded that they find '*nothing unusual*' about the absence of particulars necessary to keep track of a foreign prisoner's whereabouts in the Gulag or for the legitimate registration of his death. The Swedish government may have its reasons for letting this pass. But anyone versed in the Soviet/Russian meticulous administrative and legal regulations, particularly those of the security organizations (MGB and MVD), should recognize the warning signs of yet another postponement of the truth.

Over the past four months, the public has been the target of two 'spins' -- one initially emanating from the Swedish side of the Working Group in the name of the Russians, the other from Yakovlev in the name of 'rehabilitation.' The macabre competition between two or more opposing 'causes of death' can only arise where there is an absence of proper documentation related to an execution. (Note also their mutual certainty as to the 'when,' while other significant details remain in question.) The repeated broadcasting campaign by officials on both sides is also unique -- but necessary to foster the public's acceptance of a 'murder' which in reality may have been something more severe -- a life in long term isolation.

Rather than pursue this alternative for Wallenberg's fate in July 1947 -- a reality which research in the Soviet system, prisoner and official testimonies fully support -- the authorities chose death, not disappearance. To explain the absence of documentation, they say they have searched and come up with 'nothing' to challenge their shadowy suggestions of a 'smoking gun.' This is not true -- as Dr. von Dardel and the independent experts have protested more than once over the past several months. The challenge does exist in the form of findings generated over the past three years by independent experts at the request of the Swedish government -- a process of reconstruction which has been

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interrupted in favor of unsubstantiated death claims. What is equally true, as even materials in the public domain can help establish, is that Wallenberg's file and other materials needed to conclude this work must still exist – at least in its most important aspects. In the words of one expert whom I consulted regarding an incoming prison registry which would give a clear yes/no answer as to Wallenberg alive in March/April 1950: *It is not that the files don't exist, but that there has been as yet no order to release them. This would require a more progressive atmosphere than has existed until now.*

What the public is being asked to accept then is not the final resolution of Wallenberg's fate, nor even an objective study in progress, but the views of divergent forces marching according to their 'convictions.' The sufferings of Raoul Wallenberg have – since 1945 – taken a back seat to the political climates such convictions were geared to promote. This has been done so artfully that the various death scenarios have become now 'common knowledge' in the arenas they rule. While these 'convictions' freely make use of the media for their ends, none have attempted to meet the international standards for proper accounting of a death by providing the essential facts: who, how, where, when, under the jurisdiction of whom – all witnessed. By failing to provide evidence for the most basic questions, the authorities have failed to establish Raoul Wallenberg's death in 1947 'beyond reasonable doubt.'

The contradictions in their claims are obvious. In the words of Nina Lagergren, Wallenberg's half-sister: *'You can only die once.'* And yet her brother Raoul – savior of tens of thousands from genocide during the War – has died, so far, five times that I can count. The first, announced on Radio Kossuth in Soviet-occupied Hungary, March 8, 1945, proclaimed Wallenberg dead at the hands of the Nazis. *All signs indicate that the Gestapo agents murdered him.* This set the tone for further tales that Wallenberg died in Hungary. The legend offered by Swedish Minister Steffan Soderblum to Stalin in 1946 that Wallenberg may have fallen victim to robbers or an automobile accident in the Budapest region was reworked by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrej Vishinsky in his Memorandum of August 18, 1947. Wallenberg's alleged death in Hungary shrouded the fact that the neutral diplomat had been, since February 1945, held by the NKVD/MGB in Moscow prisons.

In reality, key East/West authorities already knew the truth. As early as May 1945, Soviet military official Levushkin of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary told the Americans and British inquiring after Wallenberg's fate that he had not been killed by the Germans or Arrow Cross but was in Soviet hands. Swedish officials informed American Secretary of State Dean Acheson in the Fall of 1945 that Wallenberg had been seized with his documents and taken into the USSR from which, they feared, he would never return. The Russian side of the Swedish-Russian Working Group has established through documents released in 1991 that Wallenberg's presence in Moscow prisons was known to high ranking military, security and foreign ministry officials long before Vishinsky claimed to the Swedish Government on August 18, 1947: *As a result of a careful investigation it has been established that Wallenberg is not in the Soviet Union and that he is unknown to us."*

Wallenberg's second death was his 'presumed' heart attack in Lubyanka Prison on July 17, 1947. The only result to emerge from yet another *complete and thorough* investigation by the 'competent authorities' in 1955/56 was Dr. Smoltsov's handwritten note to file released with the Gromyko Memorandum of 1957, referring to the death of a prisoner 'Walenberg'. This document does not serve as a legitimate death 'act' for a host of reasons, starting with the fact that it fails to meet any of the criteria for identifying the prisoner in question as Raoul Wallenberg. While the Russian side of the Working Group has established through a forensic test that the Smoltsov document is not a forgery, Yakovlev's recent disclosure that Smoltsov was dismissed from his duties as head of the Sanitary Unit since March 21, 1947 and therefore was not on duty July 17/18, 1947 – if true – puts both the authenticity of the report and/or the date in jeopardy. One should add that in 1989, prior to Wallenberg's next of kin's first visit to Moscow, Yakovlev informed Nobel Prize Laureate Andrej Sakharov that Wallenberg died as described in the Gromyko Memorandum. How long has he known the 'truth' behind his present crusade and why were the new facts not communicated earlier to the Swedish-Russian Working Group whose mandate it has been to attend to this important matter?

The third and fourth versions of Wallenberg's death, spiraling around the 1947 death date and emerging particularly since Glasnost, have involved execution – either death by shooting or death by poison. Until the existence of the Working Group, these stories could not be checked. From the files I have studied it is clear that death by shooting came after an investigative process of many years and required a 'conviction' (sentencing) by the Military Tribunal or a decision by the highest circles of government. A highly classified paper trail, formed from those who recommended a course of action or deliberated the prisoner's fate on the highest level, the administrative body that issued the order, witnessed acts establishing the date of execution and those killed with the prisoner as well as information regarding the disposal of the body should then exist. According to Andrej Sakharov in his Memoirs: *If a person had been executed, an affidavit that the death sentence had been carried out was included, with a record of the serial number of the pistol used... Complete files of cases involving foreign citizens almost certainly were preserved, just to be on the safe side.*

Death by lethal injection had the advantage that it not only induced a quiet death but could be documented by making use of the language and procedures following a natural one. If then Wallenberg had died of poison, one would expect a faked medical history and witnessed death certificate stating 'heart attack' or 'tuberculosis'. This solution was introduced in May 1947 by Abakumov in the case of American Communist Esau Oggins who could not be sent home at the end of his term because of what he would testify about the ideal Communist State. These seemingly natural deaths would not only be recorded in the file and prison records, but the death would be registered with the civil regional authorities. The nation in question would be informed. Bodies were buried in a designated plot, where widows of foreign prisoners could come to visit. Such practices – with an eye to eventual accounting – were being observed even before the USSR signed onto the Geneva Convention in 1949. Nothing of this sort happened in Wallenberg's case, even though following through on such procedures would have brought 'legitimate' closure to the question of his death decades ago.

The fact that the Russians have produced neither the annual nor decade registries of death to verify their claims in either the case of Wallenberg or his colleague Vilmos Langfelder raises the question whether these men died at that time. Besides the various eyewitness reports showing them alive after 1947/1948, a careful study of NKVD/MGB investigation of the prisoners grouped with these men would indicate that 1947 was 'too soon' for foreign or counter-intelligence to have derived full information or for them to have learned too much about *certain areas of interest of the KGB* (quote: Yakovlev) to prohibit their return through an exchange. The number of Raoul Wallenberg interrogations by July 1947, at least those of which we have been informed by the Russians, can be counted on one hand. Perhaps we would do better to listen to General Yevgeni Pitovranov – former head of the 2nd Main Directorate MGB, which usually submitted the cases for sentencing of those formerly under Abakumov's jurisdiction. Pitovranov, who died only in the last few years, stated in an interview on Swedish television in 1992: *Joseph Stalin needed him (Wallenberg) in the big political game...and would never have executed him. His death was a mistake.* Are we talking 'mistake' - manslaughter, an unintentional death during interrogation in 1947? Or mistake in terms of an erroneous belief – the fact that it did not happen then?

This brings us to the fifth possible death date. In October 1989, Raoul Wallenberg's next of kin were invited to Moscow where certain of his possessions were returned to them – a passport, car registration, address and calendar books for his mission in Budapest, a gold cigarette or powder case and notes in various forms of foreign currency. The return of these objects constitutes the most compelling proof of Wallenberg's death at a date later than that promoted by either the Swedish or Russian sides. For if a prisoner is sentenced without confiscation, such valuables and money follow him from prison to camp to psychiatric facility, throughout the Gulag system, until his release or death. Had Wallenberg died in 1947, 1957, or beyond -- these same valuables and moneys should have already been confiscated by the State -- unless turned over to the next of kin within six months.

Until the Russians can satisfactorily explain why these possessions, valuables and moneys were 'lying around' in 1989, as if to be handed back to Wallenberg as he was about to return, the only logical explanation is that Wallenberg died around that time and the invitation for the family to visit Moscow was so that they could correctly dispose of his papers and moneys. The Russians should also explain how they can claim to have no file for Raoul Wallenberg when to retrieve his passport, one would have had to turn to his Archival Investigative file or whatever special file exists to identify Wallenberg as a prisoner who died under another name. As for the currency, to establish the correct amount someone would have had to consult his receipt for the original amount seized upon his arrest or financial records of his debit/credit account.

Again important details are being withheld, while those who care about Wallenberg's welfare and fate are subjected to yet another unsubstantiated report of his death in 1947. Why? One might argue that, for reasons unspecified as yet, death in Forty-Seven constitutes a 'tragic mistake' while anything beyond that time is a serious act for which someone in the present must account.

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RAOUL WALLENBERG CASE Live Search Investigation

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SOMEBODY'S SWEDE

Susan Ellen Mesinai

In May 1992, the ARK Project discovered Victor Hamilton, an American-Palestinian and former NSA cipher, in a psychiatric prison hospital 60 kilometers south of Moscow where he had been held for 20 years under a pseudonym. A doctor had telephoned ARK anonymously, in answer to a radio appeal, to state that she had treated the patient in a closed ward in Moscow in 1962, although he 'wasn't really sick'. The man we traced, however, had become very paranoid as a result of years of confinement, isolation and KGB interrogation. Hamilton still considered himself well informed, as he once had been. (A successful escape to Moscow at the time of a Nixon's State visit had cost him his radio and international news privileges.) Now he lived in a vacuum, with no idea that the Iron Curtain had fallen or that, theoretically, he was free to "just walk away." Any suggestion of his rights he considered a trick on my part – although the KGB had shown little interest in him for years. The pension he received for services rendered, generous under previous regimes, was barely enough to keep him supplied with pencils and notebooks for the journals, which provided his daily activity. It was by studying these, at the doctors' request, that I was able to establish who he really was.

Tracking down Hamilton took only a few months. Identifying him took only three days. An important issue for me was his future. After my first session with him, I talked with a woman doctor who had been one of his regular caretakers. "Thirty years is a long time," I said. "Perhaps it would destroy him to go back into the world now." As if the question had long been on her mind, the doctor answered without hesitation. "He should go home. He has a family somewhere in America. Find them!" And I did.

Hamilton's detention immediately became world news, the next of kin's only recourse to assure that the proper steps be taken by his government to bring him home. To offset ARK's humble achievement – a former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow publicly declared to POW/MIA families in Washington that the Embassy had known Hamilton was there all the time. As he was considered a defector, nothing had been done to inform the family or check up on him. The POW/MIA family members, many of whom had lost air men in Cold War shoot downs, answered: "How many other American "defectors" do you know about in the former Soviet Union – and how soon can we see them?" Russian journalists with contacts in SVR, the Soviet Foreign Intelligence directorate, spiced the media with the espionage favors Hamilton had done for his hosts. Human rights activists who had fought for years against psychiatric abuse, some now holding seats in the newly formed Yeltsin government, threw up their hands. "If there's one foreign prisoner being held in hospitals under a number, a letter or a pseudonym, then there's thousands!" they exclaimed.

A week after the discovery of Hamilton, Valentina, another health care professional, crossed Russia by train to discuss her meetings with a man she had treated in a closed village in the Magadan Region of the Far East in the early Seventies. She described this man as a well-educated Swede, probably an official, who had been arrested toward the end of World War II for supporting "Fascist Germany." After the Wallenberg case became known in the USSR, she wrote several times to Radio Liberty to report her experience. The letter that fell into my hands in 1990, written in the mid-Eighties, was neither her first nor last. "I will keep writing until I get an answer", she protested valiantly. It wasn't until the miraculous changes in the Soviet Union, seven years later, that Valentina's account could safely be heard.

Valentina told her story – simply, with no embellishment. The man, she said, had "a commanding presence, like an aparatchik." She looked up to him. He was very cultured, had

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books and listened to good classical music, and so was very popular among the young. He came to her clinic both to get medical slips that would let him off from work and for more stimulating conversation. Eventually he disappeared and, when she asked about him, was told that he had tried to escape and was dead (a response often used to insure that those who care inquire no further). My assessment that this wasn't Wallenberg was confirmed when I showed her Raoul's photograph. She said immediately: "No –that's not him. This man was blond....Still we must do something! He must be somebody's Swede!!"

Over the years, there have been several such reports of Swedes, believed to be Raoul Wallenberg. One, describing a Swede held in a psychiatric facility in the Barnaul Region, also during the Seventies, came only in January 2001. **Thrown onto the great stockpile of unused evidence, no action has been taken to identify the prisoners, track them down and – if alive – bring them home.** Nor had these sightings been systematically inter-related with those similar in time and place in an effort to group them as a way of building up a body of evidence. This process I began, with Susanne Berger's collaboration, only several months ago. That such groupings were not consistently pursued is tragic. In 1957, when the Swedish Government submitted to the Soviets a group of notarized testimonies of Wallenberg witnesses at the height of the Cold War, they were able to elicit an admission that the Swedish diplomat had been held captive in Moscow prisons. Once successful, they should have kept up their campaign – in spite of the Soviet unsubstantiated claim of 1957 that Wallenberg had died ten years before. For the widespread publication of Wallenberg's alleged death in the Gromyko Memorandum had immediately elicited contradictory evidence from returning prisoners who knew this not to be true – and who trusted the Swedish government to respond to their experience of the facts. Other than a one time submission related to the sightings at Vladimir in 1959 and two reports in the late Eighties, the Government's treatment of the witness reports for close to thirty years became the discrediting of such witnesses, one by one, rather than building up the entire body of evidence and researching it to see if confirmation could be found from other sources.

As a result, until the Working Group was established in the Nineties, this evidence went nowhere. At that time, the Swedes handed over four portfolios of eyewitness reports to the Russians. But the independent investigators, whose job it was to begin verifying these reports, were handicapped by the lack of the sightings of the past thirty years, which were classified until January 12, 2001, the day after the Group disbanded. Still, my recent study of the reports that were available to us, drawn from a number of sources, confirms not only that the challenge to the Gromyko claim existed but to a disturbing degree. While this is a work in process, we have already 38 sightings of Wallenberg in Moscow prisons from 1947 to 1953; 24 sightings in the Komi Region (Spring 1947 to 1954); 18 sightings in the Far East (1947-1954); nine sightings of Wallenberg in Vladimir Prison (1952-55) and thirteen between 1960 and 1970; plus four sightings of Wallenberg in Moscow 1960-62 of particular interest in connection with the testimony of Dr. Nana Svartz. That these groupings clash with each other, particularly during the 1947 – 1954 period, can be explained by Susanne Berger's pursuit of the question of other Swedes missing in the Gulag, some of whom could be confused with Wallenberg.

For example, in Vladimir Prison, an isolation prison several hours from Moscow, there were reports of three Swedes. Witness Ludwig Hunoldt, a German prisoner, met one named "Eriksson" in Corpus II, Cell 57 in 1950. Eriksson was then suffering from a gall bladder operation and was not expected to live long. According to Hunoldt, Eriksson had been sentenced in 1948 or 1949 with the two other Swedes and sent to Vladimir. In fact, the three Swedes seem to have been processed together all along as a "same case." At least four different witnesses encountered what would appear to be the same three – traveling as a group – in quarantine in Camp 27 Krasnogorsk, before they were sent to Moscow for investigation. Still others, besides

Hunoldt, confirmed their presence in Vladimir's Corpus III. So these Swedes are not "ghosts" nor an invention of a witness' imagination. So far, the Swedish Government has not been able to identify these men. Therefore, the burden of proof rests on the independent investigators to establish that Eriksson (who had a wife in Uppsala and was very indignant that a neutral citizen could be held in captivity for so long) is really a Swede.

It should be noted that Vladimir Prison has no record of the presence of Eriksson or the other two Swedes in their kartoteka – but this is not surprising. If Raoul Wallenberg or his colleague Vilmos Langfelder were brought to Vladimir in 1954, as has been repeatedly reported, their cards would also be missing because they are "exceptional prisoners" whose presence was being concealed. My work has established that the prisoners are numbered sequentially, so if a card is removed – or never filed in the routine way – this number without card will flag such an anonymous or unacknowledged prisoner. Furthermore, documentation in the anonymous prisoner files confirm that the various registration cards of a convicted numbered prisoner would not be filed in the usual kartoteka but kept in a Special Department of the Prison Directorate in Moscow, yet another resource for search. Finally, Dr. Marvin Makinen and Ari Kaplan's computer study of Corpus II, a project of the Working Group, has shown that cell II-57 was "unoccupied" for more than a year after Hunoldt sat there with Eriksson, an indication that it housed a strictly isolated prisoner, in this case one in need of ongoing medical treatment.

What is surprising is that the UD does not have any record of these missing men, who are described as having an affiliation with the Red Cross and to have been arrested in the Balkans. The UD may claim that the witness is confusing another Scandinavian, a Balt, or a Swiss for a Swede – which is possible, but less likely when the prisoner personally identifies himself to a witness as a Swede. The fact that the existence of some of these missing Swedes had gone unacknowledged has had an adverse effect on the search for Wallenberg and vice versa. By not knowing that there were other Swedes with a similar profile lost in the Gulag, reports of Wallenberg could be discredited as 'not being Wallenberg' – i.e., a blond – without further action being taken on behalf of "Somebody's Swede." On the other hand, the fact that reports about Wallenberg or a Swede showed him in all four corners of the USSR at approximately the same time, had the effect of canceling each other out. Had there been an accurate list of missing Swedes from the beginning – to which the various sightings could be related – there would have been grounds for a more forceful initiative to the Russians and a more effective investigation under the Working Group, one which would have potentially resulted in the return of yet more Swedes.

That the significance of such testimonies has been overlooked and that the UD in its efforts may not have been operating from a complete list of missing Swedes raises doubt as to Swedish government's real objective, from the beginning. This in turn brings us to the issue of whether or not there existed wartime networks of intelligence-gathering Swedes, captured by the Soviets, whose activities would have threatened the sanctity of Swedish neutrality. If records pertaining to such networks were either never in the normal Swedish files or removed to a more classified zone in the name of national security, new generations of government officials wouldn't have a clue where to look or who to ask for. In short, damage control of information at home at a critical early stage would seriously impair the Swedes' chances of ever being returned. Their only other hope remains for someone finally to pay attention to the eyewitness reports and act upon them – as we are trying to do now.

Like Valentina, I feel duty-bound to help "Somebody's Swede," however many there may be. If official record keeping leaves something to be desired, then I am turning to the public in hopes that families will come forth to provide a profile of these missing Swedes. Nor should

not having an actual name on a list prevent a Swedish official from making a concentrated effort to check out a sighting of a "Swede," such as Valentina's story or the report from Barnaul just last year. I had never heard of Victor Hamilton when I arrived at Special Hospital Number 5; I knew only that there was supposed to be an American. As long as the prisoner's presence in a facility can be established, the tools exist to build a trail—and if they don't, we can create them! As Hamilton's case will show, prisoners in psychiatric facilities or asylums do not move frequently. Those who have no next of kin to claim them may sit for decades in psychiatric facilities or asylums, under their Russian pseudonym – too intimidated to say who they really are – with no hope of seeing their homeland again.

More eyewitnesses have come forth in the case of Wallenberg, than any other disappeared hero. Some, we will assume, speak of other missing Swedes. **The opportunity exists to resolve not only one case but many. This is not only the most effective, but the only moral way to proceed.** It's time for Sweden to connect the dots in order to bring real closure to its wartime missing – including its Cold War heroes. As always this is a matter of making proper and maximum use of the evidence at hand and of taking a strong stand. Not to act now, without delay – when the evidence is finally being compiled and analyzed in its entirety – would be reprehensible, especially given the new degree of Russian cooperation. Not only family, but members of the military and intelligence community with knowledge of such Swedes should come forward to help identify these men – including those who had been secretly returned so that finally one can do a full accounting. The UD, on the other hand, for lack of time and personnel trained in the proper preparation of the evidence which has been in their hands for 57 years, should turn it over to a judicial agency whose expertise this is – leaving the diplomats free to negotiate on behalf of its citizens with resolve.

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The Truth about Wallenberg

Amy Knight

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Report on the Activities of the Russian-Swedish Working Group for Determining the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg (1991-2000)
Moscow: Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 37 pp.

Reports by the Independent Consultants to the Swedish-Russian Working Group on the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg, January 12, 2001:


**Liquidation:
The Question of Raoul Wallenberg's Death or Disappearance in 1947**
by Susan Ellen Mesina, 48 pp.

Cell Occupancy Analysis of Korpus 2 of the Vladimir Prison: An Examination of the Consistency of Eyewitness Sightings of Raoul Wallenberg with Prisoner Registration Cards from the Prison Kartoteka
by Marvin W. Makinen and Ari D. Kaplan, 63 pp.

Swedish Aspects of the Raoul Wallenberg Case
by Susanne Berger, 63 pp.

1.

On January 13, 1945, the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, accompanied only by his chauffeur, left his legation in Budapest for a meeting with officers of the advancing Soviet army, which was then in the process of "liberating" the city from the pro-Nazi



Nonetheless, the reports of the working group, issued separately by the Swedes and the Russians in January 2001 along with three additional reports by the group's independent consultants, significantly improve our understanding of the Wallenberg affair. Ten years of painstaking archival research and interviews in Russia, Sweden, and numerous other countries uncovered many new details about the Stalinist prison regime, the political machinations of Soviet leaders (not only among themselves but also with respect to Sweden), and the arbitrary way in which they disposed of the lives of innocent people.

What is also revealed in these reports is that the Wallenberg case goes well beyond the individual tragedy of a young man whose heroism saved the lives of thousands of Jews. Wallenberg, who belonged to one of Sweden's most prominent financial families, was a pawn in a larger political game played out by the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, by Sweden as the tensions of the postwar era increased. Indeed, this is a game that has continued for more than a half-century, with the Soviets (and later the Russians) stonewalling efforts to find out the truth about Wallenberg and Swedish authorities, for one reason or another, not pressing as hard as they might.

2.

The working group's ten-year investigation, and the five reports that resulted from it, go a long way toward explaining Russian motives for arresting Wallenberg and keeping him in

diplomat from a neutral country, was after the coup attempt in Moscow, and

purpose in seeking out the Soviets was to ensure the protection of Jews and their property in Budapest, and to make security arrangements for members of his legation. Wallenberg was not a career diplomat. He was a businessman with experience in Hungary who had, on the initiative of American officials, been appointed to work in Budapest as an employee of the War Refugee Board (WRB), an agency established by President Franklin Roosevelt for the purpose of rescuing Jews from the Nazis. To assist Wallenberg, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided him with a diplomatic passport and the rank of legation secretary at the Swedish legation. From July 9, 1944, the date of his arrival in Budapest, to the following December, Wallenberg saved thousands of Hungarian Jews from deportation to death camps, both by issuing them "protective passports" (documents which gave the holder the protection of the Swedish legation) and in some cases by negotiating directly with the Nazis for their freedom in exchange for money.

But for all his sophistication in dealing with the Nazis, the thirty-two-year-old Wallenberg was, according to one of his colleagues at the legation, "naive when it came to the Russians." Whether he met with Soviet officers remains unknown. It is now clear, however, from recently released reports that Wallenberg, despite being a

promptly taken into custody by the Soviet army and that three days later, on January 16, the Soviet deputy minister of defense, Nikolai Bulganin, sent a coded telegram to the commander of the Second Ukrainian Front, Marshal Malinovsky, ordering Wallenberg's arrest by the notorious military counter-intelligence branch known as SMERSH, a Russian acronym for "Smert' shpi-onam," meaning "Death to Spies."

Why the Soviets arrested Wallenberg and took him off to Moscow, together with his chauffeur, Vilmos Langfelder, has remained unclear for the past fifty-six years. An even deeper mystery is what happened to Wallenberg after he arrived in the Soviet Union. Despite the persistent efforts of Wallenberg's family, historians, journalists, politicians, and a host of prominent international figures, Wallenberg's fate has never been clarified. Indeed, perhaps the greatest puzzle of all is why, after all these years, the Wallenberg case is still unresolved.

The most far-reaching and thorough investigation into the Wallenberg affair was conducted, and recently concluded, by the Joint Swedish-Russian Working Group on Raoul Wallenberg, whose members included officials from the Swedish and Russian foreign ministries, representatives from the Swedish and Russian security agencies, and also Wallenberg's half-brother, Guy von Dardel. Their investigation began in September 1991, just a month

the Swedish members were hopeful that, under the new Russian policy of openness, long-suppressed information about Wallenberg would finally be released.¹ Unfortunately, although the Russians have provided significant new materials relating to Wallenberg, their archival policy has become increasingly restrictive, and some key collections that were accessible in 1991 were later closed.² Moreover, the authors of the published reports did not have direct access to several important archives, including those of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service and the counterintelligence service, as well as the archives of the Swedish intelligence service. Until the materials in these archives can be consulted, all conclusions about Wallenberg's fate must remain preliminary. A further problem is that Russian authorities claim Wallenberg's prison file — clearly a crucial piece of evidence — is missing.

¹Von Dardel took the initiative in organizing the effort to work with the Russians in determining Wallenberg's fate when he and his sister, Nina Lagergren, visited Moscow in 1989.

²For example, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the agency responsible for prisons and labor camps, allowed partial access, in the early Nineties, to special collections that contained high-level correspondence and reports about foreign prisoners, but now these collections are completely closed.

prison at least until July 1947, the last date for which there is proof that he was alive. Although there is no record of formal charges against Wallenberg, it is almost certain that the Soviets arrested him because they believed he was a spy, for either the Allies, the Germans, or both. The WRB, for which Wallenberg worked in Budapest, co-operated closely with the US Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the precursor to the CIA. In fact, Iver Olsen, who helped to organize Wallenberg's mission and communicated regularly with him in Budapest, was the representative for both the WRB and the OSS in Stockholm. The Soviets were well aware of the OSS-WRB connection and of Wallenberg's relations with Olsen, and so, as evidence cited in the reports suggests, the Soviets suspected that Wallenberg was, at least in some capacity, an OSS operative.³

According to the Swedish report, however, there is evidence that Wallenberg's work on behalf of the WRB was purely humanitarian, and that any suspicion on the part of the Soviets to the contrary was incorrect:

An internal CIA document from 1955 indicates that when asked

"The Swedish report, for example, mentions that a Soviet deputy foreign minister in an 'emotional outburst' told the Swedish ambassador in Moscow in 1979 that 'Raoul Wallenberg had been spying for the USA and that the Americans privately admitted this.'"

whether he had ever had operational contact with Raoul Wallenberg or used him operationally, Olsen repeatedly and categorically denied having done so. His contacts with Raoul Wallenberg had been only in his capacity as WRB representative. "Olsen was extremely emphatic on this point." ... None of the WRB dealings with Raoul Wallenberg reveals any direct links to intelligence work. ... It cannot be ruled out that some OSS agents also perceived Raoul Wallenberg as an agent. On the other hand, the CIA has not found material anywhere that indicates that Raoul Wallenberg was aware of Olsen's links with the OSS ...

Wallenberg's many contacts in Budapest (evident in his appointment calendar, which was confiscated upon his arrest and returned by the Russians to Guy von Dardel in 1989) may also have aroused doubts on the Soviet side about the neutrality of his mission. According to the reports of Susanne Berger and Susan Mesina, outside experts who served as independent consultants to the working group, several people who helped Wallenberg in his rescue work were involved in the Hungarian resistance movement and in other projects sponsored by Allied intelligence. Thus, for example, Wallenberg had contacts with the underground nationalist society, EXZ, made up of church leaders and aristocrats working toward an independent democratic leadership of Hungary.

Then there was Wallenberg's close contact, for the purpose of negotiating for the lives of Jews, with Nazi leaders in Budapest, including Adolf Eichmann. Wallenberg himself received funds from the leading Jewish resistance organization, known as JOINT, whose representatives routinely made deals with Nazi officials to save Jews from the death camps. The Soviets were highly suspicious of JOINT, which they later claimed was part of a

behind-
for
did from
must have
reason—presumably because Wallenberg was believed to be a spy. In view of the highly centralized structure of the Stalinist system and the fact that Stalin was a micromanager when it came to cases of important political prisoners, it is doubtful that either Deputy Defense Minister Bulganin or Viktor Abakumov, the chief of SMERSH, would have ordered Wallenberg's arrest without Stalin's explicit approval.

3.

Upon their arrival in Moscow on February 6, 1945, three weeks after their capture in Budapest, Wallenberg and his driver were imprisoned in separate cells in the NKVD's notorious

nesses was that Waller was rare questioned. If the Sov prison re-
ords are accurate, then it is puzzling why the Soviets, in dealing with such a well-known prisoner, with extensive connections in the political and intelligence circles of the Western allies, would not have wanted to question him further. A look at what went on at the official level between Sweden and Russia on the Wallenberg matter, documented largely by materials from the Russian and Swedish Foreign Ministry archives, may provide some clues.

Initially, the Soviets acknowledged that they had Wallenberg in their custody. In a memo of January 16, 1945, USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Dekanozov informed the Swedish legation in Moscow that Wallenberg was under the "protection" of Soviet troops in Budapest. The Russian ambassador to Sweden, Alexandra Kol-



Raoul Wallenberg during the early 1940s

tes. According to the Russian report The interview, most likely, caused Stalin some bewilderment, and possibly even irritation—not one major issue was raised. It emphasized the ambiguity of the [Swedish] approach to the Wallenberg affair: from one side [of the Swedish government], a request for an investigation, from the other—a "personal opinion" type of comment that the diplomat had most likely died in Budapest.

As the Russian report notes, the Soviet side did not consider it possible for a diplomat to have a "personal opinion" on matters of state and therefore, would have assumed that Soederblom's views represented those of the Swedish government. And so the Soviets might have concluded that the Swedish government, despite requesting an investigation, apparently wanted the Wallenberg case closed.

Why would Stalin have been irritated? Perhaps, as both the Russian and Swedish reports suggest, the Soviets wanted to use Wallenberg as a bargaining chip, apparently as part of an exchange agreement for Soviet citizens in Sweden whom the Kremlin wanted back. This might explain the mixed signals they sent about Wallenberg from the very beginning. Publicly they spread the false information that Wallenberg was dead, while through other channels they apparently wanted the Swedes to know that Wallenberg was in their custody.

The reports, including those from the Russian side, document several meetings between Soviet and Swedish diplomats during 1946 at which the Soviets hinted about an exchange for Wallenberg. This is confirmed in a 1986 statement by Swedish Ambassador to Moscow Rune Nystroem, cited by Susanne Berger:

That Raoul Wallenberg could have been exchanged for persons

Lubianka prison. On Wallenberg's mother, Maj von Dardel, in February 1945 that her

...they later claimed was part of a "global Zionist plot." Also, according to the Russian report, some of the "protective passports" issued by Wallenberg to Hungarian Jews fell into the hands of the Nazis, who were then able to escape arrest when the Soviets occupied Hungary. The Russian report gives no evidence for this claim. According to a SMERSH assessment from February 1945, cited in the Swedish report:

Instead of protecting the interests of the Soviet Union and Hungary, the Swedish Embassy and Swedish Red Cross are giving protection to the enemies of the Soviet Union and Hungarian people and providing them with refuge and sanctuary.

Presumably "enemies" referred to both members of the Hungarian underground who opposed Soviet occupation and Nazis who allegedly obtained Swedish passports.

Although SMERSH was arresting large numbers of people at random

Further release of US intelligence documents could affect these conclusions. Although some OSS and CIA documentation on the subject was released recently, a number of important files, including records of OSS communication between Budapest and Stockholm, remain classified.

"prisoner of war," and it was noted that he was arrested on January 19. Prison records release that the working group of Russian authorities show that Wallenberg's first interrogation took place on February 8—"a typical night session lasting three and a half hours," in the words of the Swedish report. According to these records, Wallenberg was not questioned again until the end of April, a month before he was transferred to Lefortovo prison in Moscow, together with a cellmate, Willy Roedel, a German diplomat. Although Wallenberg remained in Lefortovo throughout 1946, he was, so the prison records state, interrogated only twice during his incarceration there. After he was transferred back to Lubyanka, in early March 1947, the records show only one further interrogation, on March 11, 1947.

Some of Wallenberg's fellow inmates (several of whom were German prisoners of war interviewed after being repatriated by the Soviets in the early 1950s), as well as former prison staff and security officials questioned by the working group, suggest that Wallenberg was well treated physically despite the fact that he consistently refused to cooperate with his interrogators. According to these witnesses, there could have been a few additional, unrecorded interrogations, but the general impression of the wit-

son was in Soviet custody, although she did not say where. However, after all the other members of the Swedish legation had returned to Sweden in April 1945, and the Swedish Foreign Ministry began to press the Soviets for answers, the Soviets claimed they had no knowledge of Wallenberg's whereabouts.

Amazingly, the Swedish envoy to Moscow, Staffan Soederblom, who had initially urged the Soviets for information about Wallenberg, went along with their story, suggesting on more than one occasion in 1945 that Wallenberg had probably been killed in Hungary either in a car accident or during fighting as the Soviets took over Budapest. Although these theories were circulating in Budapest and on Soviet-controlled Hungarian radio, it is puzzling that Soederblom would have given them credence, in view of the communications of both Dekanozov and Kollontai about Wallenberg being in Soviet hands.

The Swedish report suggests that Soederblom, who was forced to retire because of mental illness six years later, had lost his ability to make sound judgments. This is borne out by the fact that Soederblom simply repeated his views about Wallenberg in a meeting with Stalin in June 1946—a meeting for which Stalin had set aside an hour but which lasted only five min-

in Sweden was a question that came up, or at least was suggested by the Soviets, at a very early stage in the [Wallenberg] case. On the Swedish side, however, it appears that the suggestion was either not understood or it was felt that it was not possible to agree to an exchange.⁵

If an exchange was indeed the Soviet intention, then it would explain why, as Russian security officials have told the working group, Wallenberg was never formally charged with any crime and no official investigation, which would have entailed intensive interrogations, was carried out. He was viewed, at least up until the end of 1946, more as a hostage than as a political criminal awaiting trial.

It is not clear why the Swedish government did not pursue the Wallenberg case more forcefully; Swedish officials may have been concerned about the fate of Swedish businesses located

When the Swedes inquired about Wallenberg, the Soviets would often respond by asking them about the repatriation of a seaman named Grigorovskiy, said to have been an NKVD agent, who had defected to Sweden, and a young Russian woman named Lida Makarova whose parents were living in the Soviet Union and demanding her return, although she wished to remain in Sweden.

in Hungary and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, which were in danger of being confiscated if Sweden did not quickly establish "normal" political and economic relations with the East Bloc. Whatever the explanation, the Swedes could not ignore the Wallenberg issue after German and other prisoners of war returning from the Soviet Union in the early 1950s testified that Wallenberg had been in both Lubianka and Lefortovo prisons between 1945 and 1947.

When the Swedes again began pressing the Soviets for answers about Wallenberg, the post-Stalin government, headed by Nikita Khrushchev, apparently decided that some sort of a response was called for. In February 1957, after protracted discussions within the Soviet leadership about how to handle the Wallenberg matter (discussions that are well documented in the working group's reports), Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko handed over a memorandum to the Swedish government stating that, after a thorough search of the prison archives, a single document had been discovered. The document, a copy of which was attached to the memorandum, was a handwritten report by the Lubianka prison doctor, A. L. Smoltsov, addressed to then Minister of State Security Viktor Abakumov. Smoltsov stated that Wallenberg had died in his cell of a "sudden myocardial infarction" on July 17, 1947.

A notation on the report (presumably added by Smoltsov later) stated that on instructions from Abakumov, Smoltsov had ordered the body to be cremated. According to this now well-known Gromyko memorandum, no further documentation about Wallenberg could be found, and, because Smoltsov had died in 1953, there would be no opportunity to question him. Gromyko also claimed that Abakumov, who had been executed in 1954, had given the Soviet Foreign Ministry false information about Wal-

particular interesting report from a Swedish physician named Nanna Svartz, who reported a conversation in German with a Soviet doctor, Alexander Miasnikov, during a 1961 medical conference in Moscow. According to Dr. Svartz, Dr. Miasnikov told her that he had recently seen Wallenberg in a Moscow mental hospital. Although Dr. Miasnikov later denied that he had said this, claiming that a misunderstanding had occurred because of his poor grasp of German, Dr. Svartz remained convinced that her version was accurate.

Despite all these reports, the Soviets (and later the Russians) doggedly insisted that the Gromyko memorandum was the definitive account of Wallenberg's death until late 1992, when the working group's investigation was well underway. At that time, new evidence relating to the memorandum and the significance of July 17, 1947, as a key date in the Wallenberg case was released by the Russian side. Among the new documents were messages between Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky and Soviet state security officials showing that the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs was well aware of Wallenberg's imprisonment in Moscow as early as 1946. By the spring of 1947 Vyshinsky, still faced with inquiries from the Swedish government, was looking for a way to resolve the case. On May 14, 1947, he wrote to his boss, Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, saying that he had requested clarification from the state security organs regarding the fate of Wallenberg and that "insofar as the Wallenberg case remains unresolved until the present moment I ask you to order Abakumov to present information on the subject of this affair and suggestions for its liquidation." It should be noted that in Russian "its" (*ego*) could also mean "his," so it is unclear whether Vyshinsky was referring to the case's liquidation or to the liquidation of Wallenberg. On the same

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lenberg, thus implying, disingenuously, that his ministry had not known about Wallenberg being a prisoner.

Not surprisingly, the Swedes were not convinced that this was the whole story, particularly since Wallenberg was only thirty-four years old at that time and had no history of heart trouble. The case was kept alive in Sweden by continued reports over the years about Wallenberg's presence in prisons and labor camps at various places in the Soviet Union well after 1947. The reports came from former prisoners of war who eventually were repatriated to Central and Eastern Europe, as well as from some former Soviet prisoners.

These witnesses recalled either meeting someone they thought was Wallenberg or hearing about Wallenberg from other prisoners. At least seven witnesses, for example, mention Wallenberg's presence in Moscow prisons after 1947; three former prisoners reported seeing someone who appeared to be Wallenberg at prisoner transit points in the late 1940s; two witnesses say they saw Wallenberg at the Kazan Special Psychiatric Hospital in the early 1950s; and there are at least seven reports about Wallenberg having been seen or heard of in Vladimir prison, located 250 kilometers east of Moscow, after 1947.

document Molotov ordered Abakumov to "report to me."

According to other documents provided to the working group, Vyshinsky wrote to Abakumov on July 7, 1947, with suggestions for how they could persuade the Swedes that Wallenberg had died in Budapest in 1945. From this it would appear that the Soviets were not planning to release him. Most ominously of all, a notation on a letter Vyshinsky wrote to Abakumov two weeks later shows that Abakumov wrote a letter to Molotov on July 17 (the same date that appeared on the Smolotov report of Wallenberg's death) and that the subject was Wallenberg. This letter, which could contain the key to the case, is said by Russian archivists to be missing.

All of the participants in the working group concur on the significance of July 1947. As the Swedish report put it, "There can only be full agreement on the fact that important decisions were taken about him at that time, or, alternatively, that something serious happened." The Russian report goes further, arguing that "all the circumstantial evidence confirms that Raoul Wallenberg died, or most likely was killed, on July 17, 1947." Among this evidence is the Vyshinsky-Molotov document, which, in the Russian view,

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
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shows that the Soviets intended to kill Wallenberg in 1947, and that the Smoltsov report was a cover for some more sinister cause of Wallenberg's death.⁶ According to prison documents released to the working group, a few days after July 17 several of the prisoners who had direct contact with Wallenberg were called in for lengthy interrogations about him and then placed in solitary confinement. This lends further credence to the view that he had just been killed. After July 1947 there are no further records of Wallenberg's presence in any of the prison registers. His name vanishes without a trace. As for Roedel, the prisoner with whom Wallenberg spent the most time in the same cell, and Langfelder, the driver when he was arrested, the archival evidence suggests that they died within months.

According to Wallenberg's fellow prisoners who were released and repatriated in the early 1950s, he consistently refused to cooperate with his interrogators. Thus by mid-1947 the Soviets might have given up on him as a source of information and decided to execute him. And if, as is likely, it was Stalin who decided Wallenberg's fate, Stalin's intense anti-Semitism may have also been a factor. Wallenberg was a savior of Jews, and Stalin was by this time embarking on his plans to launch a widespread campaign against Jews in the Soviet Union.⁷

4.

Still, the authors of the Swedish report and, more vehemently, those of the three independent reports remain unconvinced that Wallenberg died in July 1947, and they have strong arguments on their side. First of all, there is the ambiguity surrounding the term "liquidation," used by Vyshinsky in his May 17 letter, and the fact that it

if Wallenberg had refused to cooperate, it would have been early to give up on him without more extensive interrogations. Furthermore, if a decision had been made to execute Wallenberg, he would have been "convicted" of a crime and there would have been some record of the execution being carried out.⁸ As for the possibility that Wallenberg died because of some sort of accident or from mistreatment, his importance as a prisoner and reports from other inmates that he was treated relatively well, at least physically, make this improbable, although it cannot be ruled out.⁹

In addition to the numerous reports I have mentioned that Wallenberg was alive after July 1947, in 1993 members of the working group interviewed a former hospital orderly at Vladimir prison, Varvara Larina, who recalled a prisoner kept in isolation there from the mid-1950s to the 1960s. Larina's description from memory resembled Wallenberg, and when shown a number of photographs she chose the one of him. The fact that several of Wallenberg's cellmates in Lefortovo and Lubianka were later transferred to Vladimir prison after being sentenced, and then were identified only by a number and kept in solitary confinement, led Guy von Dardel to organize a research effort there in 1991. This was followed up later by University of Chicago professors Marvin Makinen (himself a former prisoner at Vladimir) and Ari Kaplan, who conducted an extensive computerized analysis of prison registration cards for the years 1947 through 1972, concentrating on the specific section of Vladimir prison where Wallenberg was reported to have been held (korpus 2).

Makinen and Kaplan found that a number of witnesses who claimed that Wallenberg was present in korpus 2 had, in fact, also been imprisoned in

berg's name does not appear in the prison registry. Makinen and Kaplan believe that the eyewitness reports of Wallenberg's presence "provide compelling reasons to doubt the credibility of the Gromyko memorandum about the alleged death of Raoul Wallenberg in 1947 and strongly suggest that he lived incarcerated in the Soviet Union at least into the 1960s and possibly 1970s and further."


Central to the problem of determining Wallenberg's fate is that, as I have mentioned, his file (*delo* in Russian) is said by Russian authorities to be missing, although some documents have turned up that appear to have been part of that file, such as Smoltsov's report concerning Wallenberg's supposed death in July 1947 from heart failure. Significantly, when von Dardel was in Moscow in 1989, the Russians produced out of the blue a plastic bag full of Wallenberg's personal belongings. They claimed that the bag was discovered inadvertently in the basement of Lubianka, but this is unlikely, in view of the strict procedures for dealing with prisoners' possessions. While it is possible that certain records were deliberately destroyed, it is implausible that any evidence relating to an inmate as important as Wallenberg would just disappear, or end up misplaced in a basement.

As Susan Mesina points out in her report,

A prisoner whose presence is already known to the authorities — and the Russian side has established that this was the case — cannot just "vanish into thin air." There must be a paper trail.

Mesina herself has made a painstaking effort to reconstruct what happened to Wallenberg by starting to

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could refer either to the man or to the case. If the intention was to dispose of the case, rather than the man, Wallenberg could have become a "security prisoner," identified by a number but with no recorded name. According to prison files studied by the working group, certain categories of prisoners were numbered, and their identity kept secret.

Those who question the Russian version also regard it as surprising that Wallenberg would be killed before his case was fully investigated and he was sentenced. If the official records are accurate, Wallenberg was interrogated only five times before July 17, 1947, and was never sentenced. Even

Alexander Yakovlev, chairman of the Russian Presidential Commission for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression Under Stalin, claimed in December 2000 that Dr. Smoltsov had been relieved of his duties at Lubyanka Prison in March 1947. If Yakovlev is right, it would mean that the Smoltsov report was in fact a forgery.

Stalin's vendetta against Soviet Jews began in January 1948, with the murder (arranged by Soviet security chief Abakumov) of Solomon Mikhoels, a leading Jewish cultural figure. The campaign culminated in 1952, with the arrest of several leading Jewish physicians on charges of plotting to poison Stalin and other leaders. See Louis Rapoport, *Stalin's War Against the Jews: The Doctor's Plot and the Soviet Solution* (Free Press, 1990).

corpus 2 at the time they saw him, and they identified seemingly empty cells where an isolated prisoner might have been secretly held. Although Wall-

It is significant that in May 1947 Stalin ordered the elimination of the death penalty from criminal law. Death by shooting was not reinstated until 1950, when Stalin revived its use for political crimes. See Peter Solomon Jr., *Soviet Criminal Justice Under Stalin* (Cambridge University Press, 1996). Even after 1950, prisoners, including those charged with espionage, were executed only very rarely.

A copy of a ten-page report from Abakumov to Stalin, dated July 17, 1947, the day that Wallenberg is alleged to have died, and available in the papers of historian Dmitry Volkogonov at the Library of Congress, raises other, disturbing questions. The report, which does not mention Wallenberg or any other prisoners, outlines procedures for dealing with political cases, one of which is the use of torture during interrogations as a means of obtaining confessions, and adds that, since some of the investigators were inexperienced, mistakes had been made. Abakumov could have been suggesting that someone had decided it was time to torture Wallenberg into confessing and had gone too far (which would explain why the interrogation was not registered). On the other hand, the report could simply have been related to broad policy decisions, including perhaps the transfer of prisoners such as Wallenberg to the status of special prisoner.

gether the evidence that is available, including the sightings of Wallenberg, and analyzing them against the backdrop of what we know about the Soviet prison regime. Both Mesinaï and Susanne Berger are convinced that the Russians are still withholding crucial evidence in the case, particularly since several archives have remained closed to researchers—notably, as I have said, those of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service and the counterintelligence service, which might be expected to have important material on Wallenberg.

Perhaps, then, as Susanne Berger says, the greatest myth of all is that the truth about Wallenberg cannot be discovered. The answers may well exist, but if so the Russians are not willing to provide them, even after fifty-six years, with the principal participants in the Wallenberg affair long since dead. Once the first cover-up began, it seems to have set the stage for a cover-up that has been carried out by subsequent Soviet officials and is almost impossible to reverse. But, as is stressed in all the reports, except those from the Russian side, it would be a mistake to give up and close the case on Wallenberg. In the words of Mesinaï: "If one places one's ear to the ground, one will understand as I have—that there is too much insistence, and has been over time, that there is 'nothing to be found,' and that this case is now 'history'—when in fact the real investigation has barely begun." □

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Efterlysning av Wallenberg

Fax 158 A 2002-09-12

Vi ställer oss i princip inte negativa till Max Grundbergs tanke på en affisch för efterlysning av Raoul Wallenberg. Men eftersom personer som skulle kunna ha upplysningar att lämna om Wallenberg knappast i första hand kan tänkas finnas i Sverige, utan snarare i länder såsom f.d. Sovjetunionen, Israel etc, har vi svårt att se att UD eller svenska NGO's är den rätta samarbetspartnern för Grunberg. Tänkbara NGO's i Israel torde Grunberg bäst själv känna till. I Moskva finns en organisation vid namn "Memorial", som Grunberg säkert känner till och som växte fram i slutet av 1980-talet i syfte att sprida kännedom om och samla in fakta om Gulag. Dessutom finns i Moskva "Soros Foundation - Russia", vars ordförande Ekaterina Genieva engagerat sig i Raoul Wallenbergs öde. Hennes adress är 8 Ozerkovskaya naberezhnaya, Moscow 113184 och hennes e-mail egenieva@osi.ru. Skulle affischidén realiseras är vi beredda att bidra med en mindre summa.

Tanken på en prissumma för relevanta upplysningar om Wallenbergs öde ställer vi oss mera skeptiska till. Men självfallet motsätter vi oss inte om Grunberg vill driva idén utan UD:s direkta medverkan.

Cabinet

Postadress
103 39 Stockholm
Besöksadress
Fredsgatan 6

Telefon
08 - 405 10 00
Fax
08 - 723 11 76

E-post: ud.registrator@foreign.ministry.se
X.400: S=UD; O=Foreign; P=Ministry; A=SIL; C=SE
Telex
105 90 MINFOR S

exp. 020925/
= 10.15 / fv



REGERINGSKANSLIET

ARKIVEX.

267/001
P 2 Eu

2002-09-24

(EC)

Utrikesdepartementet

Mats Bergquist
Ambassaden London

Enheten för Central- och Östeuropa (EC)
Ambassadör Harald Hamrin
Telefon 08-405 33 43
E-post: harald.hamrin@foreign.ministry.se

Raoul Wallenberg

Broder,

Tack för Dina rader om Susan Mesinai och Sir Sigmund Sternberg. Mesinai är väl känd av oss. Hon bidrog med en rapport till den svensk-ryska arbetsgruppens arbete. Hon har även senare fått bidrag från UD för visst forskningsarbete om Raoul Wallenberg. Det är dock vår uppfattning att om hon nu vill söka privata sponsorpengar, så är detta något hon får sköta på egen hand. UD och ambassaden kan endast, om hon (eller Sternberg) så önskar, intyga att hon tidigare fått forskningsbidrag av UD.

Jag vill också passa på tillfället att informera Dig om följande. Regeringen har för innevarande år anslagit 750 000 SEK för projektbidrag till oberoende forskning om Raoul Wallenberg. Vi hoppas på liknande anslag för kommande år. I samband med detta har (genom en förordning som trädde i kraft 1 april i år) en referensgrupp bestående av tre svenska och en norsk historiker/statsvetare tillsatts med uppgift att bistå UD och UD-EC vid bedömningen av projektansökningar (ordförande: Krister Wahlbäck). Av årets anslag går lejonparten till två projekt.

Dels har vi låtit en utomstående historiker/arkivarie från FRA gå igenom Wallenbergmaterialet och ge sina synpunkter på vilken typ av forskning kring Wallenberg som bör prioriteras. Hans drygt 100-sidiga rapport håller nu på att kondenseras till ett kortare papper att användas i samband med framtida utlysningar av forskningsanslaget.

Dels har vi inlett arbetet på en databas i vilken uppgifter från samtliga av oss kända sovjetiska dokument om Wallenberg liksom från samtliga

Postadress
103 39 Stockholm
Besöksadress
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08 - 405 10 00
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E-post: ud.registrator@foreign.ministry.se
X.400: S=UD; O=Foreign; P=Ministry; A=SIL; C=SE
Telex
105 90 MINFOR S

fria kunn
exp. 020924
JVB

2002-09-24

vittnesmål om Wallenberg kommer att matas in. Databasen blir därmed förhoppningsvis ett nyttigt instrument för framtida forskning i fallet.

Resterande del av årets anslag kommer att utlysas snarast.

Die Lippine
Harald

Harald Hamrin



SVERIGES AMBASSAD
OTTAWA

T E L E F A X

Sid 1 (6)

2002-09-25

P 2

INK. UTRIKESDEP.		
DNR		
2002-09-27 25		
Avd. P	Gr 2	Mål EU7

AME

2002-09-26
HALLDIN, AME
Kopia till:
Narén, SB

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET, DNR 115 ✓
Till: UD-AME (Jörgen Halldin)
Kopia till: Harald Hamrin, UD-EC

B R Å D S K A N D E

Raoul Wallenberg
(2 bil)

Jag har inbjudits och accepterat vara en av talarna vid firandet av Raoul Wallenbergs 90-årsdag söndagen den 6 oktober i Montreal organiserat av "The Raoul Wallenberg International Movement for Humanity" med Vera Parnes som ordförande. Bl.a. Wallenbergs bror Guy von Dardel kommer att delta.

Som framgår av bifogade korrespondens förväntas jag bl.a. kommentera Dr. Parnes brev nyligen till Statsminister Persson med förslag att Sverige

- 1) liksom Kanada tar beslut om en Raoul Wallenbergdag;
- 2) inför en Raoul Wallenberg-lektion i svenska skolor.

Inför evenemanget tacksam era synpunkter och vägledning.

ALVIN

Postadress
377 Dalhousie Street
Ottawa, Ont. K1N 9N8
CANADA

Telefon
+1 (613) 241 8553
E-mail: sweden@bellnet.ca

Telefax
+1 (613) 241 2277
Web site: http://www.swedishembassy.ca

The Raoul Wallenberg International Movement for Humanity

4845, Bourret Avenue # 34
Montreal, Quebec
Canada H3W 1L2

Tel. & Fax: (514) 343-0137
E-mail: wallenberg@vidcotron.ca

INVITATION

The Raoul Wallenberg International Movement for Humanity (RWIMH)
and The Canadian Friends of Raoul Wallenberg (CFRW)
cordially invite you to a special meeting devoted to

THE NINETIETH ANNIVERSARY OF RAOUL WALLENBERG'S BIRTH *and* THE INAUGURATION OF RAOUL WALLENBERG SQUARE

*THIS EVENT WILL TAKE PLACE ON
SUNDAY, OCTOBER 6, 2002 AT 2:00 P.M.*

*Place de la Cathedrale, 600 de Maisonneuve Blvd. West
Montreal, Quebec, Canada*

Conference Participants

Right Reverend Andrew Hutchison	Anglican Archbishop of Montreal
His Excellency Lennert Alvin	Ambassador of Sweden to Canada
The Honourable Sylvain Simard	Minister of State for Education and Youth of Quebec
The Honourable Gérald Tremblay	Mayor of Montreal
Mr. Shlomo Avital	Consul General of Israel
Professor Guy von Dardel	Honorary Chairman, RWIMH (Brother of Raoul Wallenberg)
Mr. Joseph Sherman	Poet Author of the book <i>Shaping the Flame: Imagining Wallenberg</i>
Mr. Pavel Feldman	Violinist Member of the Montreal Symphonic Orchestra and the McGill Chamber Orchestra
Ms. Isa Milman	Conference Chair
Dr. Vera Parnes	President, RWIMH

Refreshments will be served

Admission is free

This Event is Open to the Public

RSVP before September 16, 2002

TEL: (514) 340-4711 (4517)

FAX: (514) 340-4463

E-mail: benjamin.smith@polymtl.ca

Subject: Wallenberg information
From: Benjamin Smith <benjamin.smith@polymtl.ca>
Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2002 10:31:18 -0400
To: sweden@bellnet.ca

Dear Mrs. Haugli,

Thank you for the CV of Ambassador Alvin. Please find attached a file containing an invitation to our ceremonies on the 6th of October. My sincerest apologies that you hadn't received it sooner.

Dr. Vera Parnes, President of our organisation will contact you concerning the speech by Ambassador Alvin.

Sincerely,

Benjamin Smith, Organizing chairman

The Raoul Wallenberg International Movement for Humanity

4845, Bourret Avenue # 34, Montreal (Quebec) Canada H3W 1L2

Tel & Fax: (514) 343-0137 Dr. Vera Parnes E-mail: Wallenberg@videotron.ca

His Excellency

Lennert Alvin

The Ambassador of Sweden

Fax: (514) 241 2277

September 15, 2002

Your Excellency,

Our conference on October 6, 2002 is devoted to a heroic Swede, Raoul Wallenberg. It is aimed at promoting further knowledge about his achievements and his personal recognition. Raoul Wallenberg's heroic deeds have even greater significance today, when we are in the war against terrorism and in need of heroes of humanity, who have saved lives, as Wallenberg did. We use the example of Raoul Wallenberg in our program for Canadian schools, as Raoul Wallenberg is an excellent role model for our youth.

Raoul Wallenberg is also Canada's first honorary citizen, and "Raoul Wallenberg Day" is Canada's unprecedented national day dedicated to the memory of an individual. With these honours in mind, I approached the Prime Minister of Sweden with two suggestions: (1) to declare a Raoul Wallenberg Day in Sweden, and (2) to incorporate a Raoul Wallenberg Lesson into the curricula of Swedish schools.

I recently sent an additional letter to the Right Honourable Prime Minister with the same suggestions, and I am looking forward to his reply.

If you ask me what we would like to hear from you, I can answer: I would be thankful if you could give us positive responses to these suggestions, because they are aimed at reminding the world of a legendary Swedish rescuer so that the spirit of humanity that he represented can live on.

We all are awaiting your speech - it will be a voice from the country that gave mankind such a hero. Whatever you will tell us will be received with gratitude.

Sincerely yours,



Dr. Vera Parnes

President

RWIMH

The Raoul Wallenberg International Movement for Humanity**4845, Bourret Avenue # 34, Montreal (Quebec) Canada H3W 1L2****Tel. & Fax: (514) 343-0137 Dr. Vera Parnes E-mail: Wallenberg@videotron.ca****His Excellency****Lennart Alvin****Ambassador of Sweden****Fax:1(613) 241 2277****September 15, 2002****Your Excellency,**

I was glad to learn about the victory of the Right Honourable Prime Minister Goran Persson. Please give him my congratulations and best regards.

He did a lot for the Holocaust studies, and he is sensitive to the heroic activities of Raoul Wallenberg.

I have just found one of his letters, which can be interesting for you.

I can imagine that he was busy with the election and, therefore, my recent letter has not been answered yet.

Sincerely,



Dr. Vera Parnes

President

The Raoul Wallenberg International Movement For Humanity



PRIME MINISTER

Stockholm, 4 July 2001

Dr. Vera Parnes
President
The Raoul Wallenberg International Movement
for Humanity
4845, Bourret Avenue #34
Montreal (Quebec)
Canada H3W 1L2

Dear Dr. Parnes,

Thank you for your letter with comments on the Swedish report on Raoul Wallenberg and a suggestion that a Raoul Wallenberg Recognition Day be proclaimed in Sweden.

An important aspect of the report is its clear message that the public presentation of the findings of the Swedish-Russian Working Group should not be regarded as the final word on Raoul Wallenberg's fate. Since still no definite light has been shed on what happened to Raoul Wallenberg the Swedish Government intends to continue the investigations, with the support of the Russian Government, and with particular emphasis on the open questions listed in the report.

The information programme about the Holocaust called "Living History", initiated by the Government a few years ago, has set in motion a wide-ranging public debate in Sweden about the lessons of the past. The moral example set by Raoul Wallenberg has been an important element in this lively exchange of views. The question of how we should honour his memory is often brought up in this context, and I very much appreciate your contribution to the discussion. Whatever the outcome, let me assure you that we shall not forget the achievements of our heroic compatriot.

Yours sincerely,

Göran Persson

TOTAL P.06

2002-09-09

SP 2002/8542

The Raoul Wallenberg International Movement for Humanity

4845 Bourret Avenue # 34, Montreal (Quebec) Canada H3W 1L2

Tel. & Fax: (514) 343-0137 Dr. Vera Parnes

E-mail: Wallenberg@videotron.ca

Per Anger

Delivered from 88
Hill Ave
(Haldon)
020926

20/5/1

The Right Honourable Goran Persson
Prime Minister of Sweden
SE -103 33 Stockholm
Sweden

August 30, 2002


The Right Honourable Prime Minister;

On behalf of the Raoul Wallenberg International Movement for Humanity, I should like to ask you to use the opportunity of our Conference in Montreal on October 6, 2002 devoted to Raoul Wallenberg to send us several words about him and his colleague and friend, Ambassador Per Anger. These words would be read at the conference and then published in the *Raoul Wallenberg Bulletin*.

It was our privilege to have a special conference devoted to the 85th anniversary of Per Anger's birth several years ago and to send him our congratulations.

Hoping to hear from you, I remain

Sincerely yours,




Dr. Vera Parnes
President

FAX F. UOM

PONTUS MELANDER

OTTAWA 020926 / ef




Harald Hamrin
2002-09-26 11:13

To: Jörgen Halldin/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK
cc:
Subject: Re: Wallenberg

ar/JH

Forwarded by Harald Hamrin/FOREIGN/MINISTRY on 2002-09-26 11:07



Harald Hamrin
2002-09-26 10:43

To: Pontus Melander@RKCCMAIL
cc:

Subject: Re: Wallenberg 

Pontus,

Jag kommer strax separat att till dig forwarda ett PM jag skrev i våras i samband med att Per Anger av statsministern tilldelades Illis Quorum. Där finns hans CV och litet omdömen om honom hämtade ur en bok om PA.

I samma PM finns ett avsnitt om stöd till forskning kring RW (avsnittet om flaggan kan du bortse från). Vi räknar med minst samma belopp kommande år. Därutöver erinrar jag om den svenska rapporten från den svensk-ryska arbetsgruppen, publicerad i januari 2001. Där listas ett antal obesvarade frågor kring RW. Slutsatsen blir i den svenska rapporten att RW-dossierna inte kan stängas (vilket ryssarna i sin separata rapport gör). Vid möten Persson-Putin och Hans Dahlgren-Avdejev (vice um) i fjol våras resp höstas togs RW upp från svensk sida och den ryska sidan svarade att man även fortsättningsvis är beredd att samarbeta med Sverige i sökandet efter sanningen om RW.

Frågorna i faxet återkommer väl Jörgen Halldin till. Min spontana reaktion är att vi i Sverige mig veterligt inte har denna typ av dagar och att en RW-lektion i skolorna inte är något regeringen kan bestämma om, utan snarare ligger på Skolverket.

Hälsningar

Harald

From: Pontus Melander@RKCCMAIL on 2002-09-25 22:14

From: Pontus Melander@RKCCMAIL on 2002-09-25 22:14

To: Harald Hamrin/FOREIGN/MINISTRY, Jörgen Halldin/FOREIGN/MINISTRY
cc:
Subject: Wallenberg

Harald,

Antar att Du sett faxet från Lennart Alvin där två frågor om hur Wallenberg skall behandlas ställes. jag skulle vilja komplettera frågelistan till Dig med:


- Har Du möjligtvis någon språkregel/gammatlgt tal vad gäller svenska

efterforskningar kring RW och vad vi avser göra i framtiden?

- Har du möjligtvis något om Per Anger som ju även varit ambassadör här i Kanada?

mvh

Pontus Melander



Jörgen Halldin
2002-09-26 15:23

as/SH
/54851

To: Pontus Melander@RKccmail
cc: Harald Hamrin/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK, Stefan Noreén/PRIMEMINISTER/MINISTRY@RK, Mikael Sundesten/PRIMEMINISTER/MINISTRY@RK, Lennart Alvin@RKccmail
Subject: RW-dag i Montreal 6 oktober

Pontus,


Med ref till ert fax dnr 115 av igår:

Jag har varit i kontakt med SB, vars brevenhet fått in det brev till statsministern av Vera Parnes som hon refererar till i sitt brev till Lennart Alvin 2002-09-15. SB förbereder nu svar på brevet. När det väl är klart ser vi till att ni får kopia. Lennarts kommentarer vid framträdandet den 6 oktober bör då bygga på de resonemang som ges i SB:s svar. Vi återkommer således.

Vad gäller de frågor du tog upp per mail så såg jag att du fått svar av Harald Hamrin.

Hör av dig om något är oklart!

Mvh
Jörgen



Jörgen Halldin
2002-09-27 13:30

20/SH

To: Pontus Melander@RKccmail
cc: Lennart Alvin@RKccmail, Stefan Noreén/PRIMEMINISTER/MINISTRY@RK, Mikael Sundesten/PRIMEMINISTER/MINISTRY@RK, Harald Hamrin/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK
Subject: RW-tal i Montreal 6 oktober

Pontus,

Efter samtal med SB: SB kommer inte att besvara Vera Parnes brev av den 30 augusti (som vi faxade er en kopia på igår) innan Lennart går upp i talarstolen i Montreal. Som synes handlade det brevet egentligen snarast också om Per Anger, och tog inte upp frågan om en särskild RW-dag i Sverige och RW-lektioner i svenska skolor.

Vad gäller Lennarts tal menar SB att ni bör kunna saxa en del ur det tal statsministern höll när han mottog Raoul Wallenberg "Hero of our time award" vid Waldorf Astoria i New York den 4 december 2001. Det talet finns på RK:s hemsida (gå in på SB:s delav hemsidan och klicka på "tal GP" under rubriken "politik").

Vad gäller frågan om en särskild RW-dag i Sverige och RW-lektioner i svenska skolor bör ni följa den linje Harald föreslog igår: vi har generellt inte denna typ av dagar i Sverige, och en RW-lektion i skolorna är knappast något regeringen kan bestämma om. Däremot kan ju framhållas att många svenska skolor ändå uppmärksammar Wallenbergs gärning i stor utsträckning, liksom att han uppmärksammas nationellt i olika sammanhang. Det kan också vara lämpligt att nämna något om Levande Historia-projektet, som nu får en egen myndighet, och något om Raoul Wallenberg-monumentet i Stockholm.

Om ni behöver mer underlag för att säga något om Per Anger, utöver vad ni redan fått av Harald Hamrin, så kan vi också leta upp vad utrikesministern sagt i kondoleans till Angers familj (begravningen äger rum idag fredag), säg till isåfall! Jag noterade f ö att Parnes skrivit en dödsruna över Per Anger som publicerades i gårdagens SvD, den kan ju vara av intresse för er.

Hoppas att ovanstående, tillsammans med vad Harald tidigare skickat er, är tillfyllest. Hör av er annars!

Mvh
Jörgen



REGERINGSKANSLIET

2002-09-25

Utredningen om

Den svenska utrikesledningens agerande
i fallet Raoul Wallenberg (UD 2001:03)

Sekreterare

Johan Matz

Adress: UD-EC, 103 39 Stockholm

Telefon 08-405 31 73

E-post: johan.matz@foreign.ministry.se



INK. UTRIKESDEP.		
D.Nr. 268/005		
2002-09-26		
AVD. P	GR. 2	MÅL. EU

Angående material ur brittiska arkiv

På Söderbloms telegram av den 17 januari 1945, var han förmedlar Dekanozovs note av den 16 januari 1945 till UD, finns följande blyertsanteckning: "North britt. besk. underrättad om innehållet".

Vem är North? Varför underrättar UD North om att Wallenberg har påträffats och ställts under de sovjetiska truppernas beskydd?

Utredningen har den 22 september begärt uppgifter rörande North ur SÄPO:s arkiv.

Undertecknad har den 25 september talat med ambassadör Jan Lundvik rörande North. Lundvik hade inte kännedom om North men rekommenderade att utredningen, med bistånd från Utrikesdepartementet, borde rikta en förfrågan till brittiska myndigheter rörande uppgifter om North.

Utredningen anhåller härmed om Utrikesdepartementets stöd i samband med förfrågan vid brittiska myndigheter rörande North och dennes verksamhet i Stockholm.

Johan Matz

Sekreterare UD 2001:03

EC/Hammar/Job
0930
RISO 020930
t. amb. London
a a

mb

**Utrikesdepartementet**

Enheten för Central- och Öst

Ambassadör Harald Hamrin

Telefon 08-405 33 43

E-post: harald.hamrin@foreign.ministry.se

Ambassaden London,

exp 020930/c

Instruktion rörande fallet Raoul Wallenberg

Utrikesdepartementet har från utredningen om "Den svenska utrikesledningens agerande i fallet Raoul Wallenberg" mottagit en förfrågan enligt följande.

På svenske Moskvaenvoyén Staffan Söderbloms telegram av den 17 januari 1945, vari han förmedlar Dekanozovs besked att Wallenberg påträffats och ställts under de sovjetiska truppernas besked, finns följande blyertsanteckning: "North britt.besk. underrättad om innehållet".

Vem var North? Varför underrättar UD North om att Wallenberg har påträffats och ställts under de sovjetiska truppernas beskydd?

Ambassaden instrueras att hos berörda brittiska myndigheter inhämta information som kan kasta ljus över de antydda frågeställningarna.

Till ambassadens ledning kan dessutom följande sägas.

North tjänstgjorde som attaché vid brittiska ambassaden i Stockholm under tiden oktober 1940 till december 1945. Under en del av denna tid tjänstgjorde han vid ambassadens Press Reading Bureau. Det finns anledning förmoda att North också kan ha haft vissa underrättelseuppgifter.

Under åren 1942-september 1945 tjänstgjorde även Vilmos Böhm vid ambassadens Press Reading Bureau. Böhm, som var ungrare, hade 1918 varit medlem i den ungerska regeringen. Efter avslutad tjänstgöring vid brittiska ambassaden blev Böhm Ungerns förste envoyé i Stockholm

2002-09-30

efter kriget. Det är känt att Böhm deltog i förarbetena vid utformandet av Wallenbergs uppdrag i Budapest. Böhm förmedlade också vissa uppgifter från Wallenberg till brittiska ambassaden. Relationen North-Böhm vore därför också intressant att få belyst.

Cabinet

Raoul Wallenberg

THE LUIS ORTEGA INTERNATIONAL
LOIF
FOUNDATION

NON-PROFIT CORPORATION FOUNDED IN 1981.
WASHINGTON • MADRID • MOSCOW • PARIS • ROME • NEW YORK

JAN LUNDVIK

Ambassador. Ministry for Foreign Affairs

D.Nr. 291/003		
2002 11-11		
10-21		
AVD P	GR. 2	MAL Eu

Roma, 18/10/2002

Your Excellence Mr. Ambassador,

Thank you for your letter. The Washington headquarters received 2 letters from the Embassy as well. To go on with the cooperation, the Foundation sent the vital document to His Excellence Prime Minister of Sweden last December.

Unfortunately, the Foundation offer was misinterpreted to a considerable extent, which disappointed a certain part of our scientists. However, the new takes time to be perceived; the Super-technologies can boast of obvious achievements, so there is no reason for any pessimism.

The Foundation is satisfied with your willingness to cooperate. The Foundation has presented the concept and is prepared to come up with the information on our research methods.

You are absolutely right, the computer research has limited capabilities. However, the Foundation never offered any computer research to the Swedish Party. Perhaps you did not receive the sheets enclosed to the letter, which resulted in misunderstanding.

We would like to draw your attention to the following:

The Foundation possesses 5 absolutely new Super-technologies, which are unique, unconventional and have nothing to do with computer systems. No country in the world has those Super-technologies. Apart from the world monopoly, their capabilities make them the world leader among the research systems. The newest are the Mellon technologies (1998), which do not involve or need any computers, either. Whereas, they are capable of doing research no other technology can do.

As an example, please find enclosed the research on antiglobalism done in Washington and characterized by completeness and accuracy, which could never be achieved through older technologies. The Mellon technologies have other important advantages: radical acceleration of the research and making it far less costly.

The Foundation independently financed and did 30% of the research on Wallenberg, its findings published in the Internet and press. The Foundation assumed the publication was known; still, we sent its text to the Embassy of Sweden to the United States. The research can be continued if the topic is vital to Sweden.

The Foundation set very strict requirements for cooperation, so it can only cooperate with a few countries, which boast of a high level of culture and democracy (all of those countries are situated in Western Europe).

The Foundation has always treated Sweden with affinity. The Wallenberg and Palme cases as well as the exact date of Stockholm establishment are undoubtedly important and worth accurate research. But every country has its own vital problems, which are often super-complex. So the specific problem could be selected for research at the discretion of the Swedish Party. The Foundation could contribute to the Swedish interests in the noble cooperation.

This letter is to inform the Swedish Party on the newest unconventional Super-technologies and to confirm feasibility of cooperation.

With best regards,

Saar

Marianne Saar
LOIF Executive Director
Coordinator - International Relations
Director - Art and Science Sector

Enclosed: +8 pages.

Ink 21/10
UD/EC

EC/Hamain
02/105

a.a.

H.H.

ml

RAOUL WALLENBERG PROBLEM

The way the Ortega Foundation scientists view the Wallenberg problem

Problem Formula

The major facts of Wallenberg's life and death are unknown. The necessity to obtain the true and accurate facts of RW's life not affected by historical problems or concealed crimes belongs to the super-complex problems. That information class is **the least accessible**.

Problem Status

The problem cannot be resolved with the ordinary technologies. The experts in many countries have done durable research without satisfactory results. The inaccessible materials are quantitatively insignificant (8%) but essentially vital (98%). The hope for their publication by all of the countries is virtually zero.

Feasible Solution

The Swedish Party can hope for any progress in the problem solution only if **the Super-technologies** are engaged. The unconventional Super-technologies are logical computer-free detectors, which belong to five international non-government organizations. They are based on the quality ontology (and not quality epistemology, like the computers are) and capable of doing unlimited research of the M-biocode, DNA, RNA, information aspects of subatomic objects, etc. The Foundation sent the RW Project sketch to the Swedish Party, described its capabilities and suggested more questions be added. It goes without saying, the Foundation offered the reliable technology fully tested and registered (USA, 1998). For the problem solution, the most vital is **the Mellography**, the world leader in the investigation technologies. No country possesses the Super-technologies. The opportunities for the precise research in the inaccessible information classes emerged recently, in 1997, and reached perfection by 1999. As distinct from the rapidly aging computer systems, the Ortega Mellograph is devoid of the aging principle, capable of steady development and has unlimited use functions.

Method and Difficulties

The super-complex problem research is a very difficult task. The latest scientific findings in a few countries made it possible to identify a lot of information classes: 1. Unknown. 2. Inaccurate. 3. Concealed. 4. Lost. 5. Destroyed.

There were reliable methods developed for the fact verification. However, there exists an indirect aspect of the novelties and revolutionary discoveries: the science will be able to do repeated research and expert assessments in the future only. It's quite satisfactory to use the remaining four methods to confirm the fact accuracy. Currently, the Mellography abilities are **beyond the experience** of the present-day science. The Mellon semantics and parameter mellographing are an absolutely new, unorthodox, proven and superb method, unknown to the science.

Expected results

The Foundation is aware of its advantages, cooperates on the top level and is capable of resolving the super-complex contemporary problems.

The Foundation aim is not contemplative science but specific knowledge, **practical results and precise parameters** for the self-diagnostics mode research.

The Foundation, as an international non-government association, expresses the interests of the world scientific art artistic elite, rather than of a certain country. It refrains from getting involved

sello de confirmación

into inter-governmental disputes, politics, religion or commerce. It does not need any advertisement or financial donations.

At its own initiative, the Foundation financed and held 1/3 of the Raoul Wallenberg Project and published the results of the controlled representative research in the press and Internet.

THE CATALOG OF THE MELLOGRAPHY CERTIFICATION FUNCTIONS and result verification methods are presented in the program documents on the Mellon technologies.

RAY-MUNDO

Integral Research Center

Luis Ortega International Foundation, Inc.

Marianne L. Saar
The Luis Ortega International Foundation
Eastern Europe Office
Furmannyy Pereulok 24-28,
Moscow 103064
Russia

COPIA
sello de confirmación

Saar



LUIS ORTEGA

LUIS ORTEGA

Academician of information sciences (UNO, New York), academician of philosophy (USA, Russia). Expert in philosophical and ontological systems, philosophy of culture and newest Super-technologies. Protagonist of symbology, informatics philosophy and Mellon Systems. He made a fundamental discovery of the semantic unit of information measurement (Mellon) and created the Mellograph an unconventional logical machine essentially different from the computer.

Academician Ortega is the general councilor of the Ortega International Foundation, president of RAY-MUNDO Integral Research Center. He supervises the research of the Foundation's scientific centers in the USA and Europe.

Academician of art (Italy). Painter, engraver, illustrator. Creator of Initialism, his own creative method. Author of the unique works with the use of the rarest engraving techniques. Besides, he boasts of the top achievements in color metal engraving.

The works by Ortega are the world artistic treasure. They are exhibited in 106 museums and stored in 300 private collections of thirty countries.

70 personal exhibitions, 130 international and world exhibitions, 17 international prizes. Winner of the National prize in literature.

Poet, prose writer, essayist. Ortega's achievements in literature were nominated for the Nobel Prize by cultural organizations in a few countries.

Don Luis Ortega is a Spaniard, he was born in Spain. He works in the Ortega Foundation centers in Europe. The Ortega family lives in California (Beverly Hills).

Ortega's social work is connected with the Foundation, international congresses and philosophical seminars. The Ortega school consisting of his students has researched the most complex contemporary problems. Don Luis is a member of the United Nations International Jury and the head of the Commission on Health Care in Contemporary World.

ORTEGA INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION

The Ortega Foundation, an elite association of European and U.S. intellectuals, has patronized the top achievements in art, philosophy and liberal arts. The Ortega Foundation cooperates with the international organizations, governments, scientific and cultural centers, museums and academies basing on the world-class know-how and top achievements that won international awards.

The Foundation includes the RAY-MUNDO Integral Research Center, a graphics bureau, publishing house and the ARSOMA art galleries.

The world leader in a few cultural domains, the Ortega Foundation has taken part in fundamental research, creation of contemporary scientific encyclopaedias and in international congresses. The Foundation publishes bibliophilic rarities, holds philosophical seminars and prominent contemporary art exhibitions.

The Ortega Foundation has supported the world intracultural main, considering as secondary the rational, technical, reproductive and mass culture forms. The Foundation plays an especially significant role in creation of the newest research systems. The Ortega Foundation is a holder of five Unconventional Super-technologies representing the vanguard of contemporary science (absolute monopoly and world leadership. The Super-technologies do not need or involve any computers). The Foundation creed consists in advocating the priority of elite spirituality and protecting it from the profane forms of civilization.

ORTEGA MELLOGRAPH

STATUT

Auteur: Luis Ortega, académicien.

Priorité et Copyright © Luis Ortega 1997, 1998, 2001. Obligatoires en références. Tous droits réservés.

Destination: Système intégral de mesure. Paramètres précis des micro- macro- mégamondes. Système d'investigation universel des plus mobiles.

Appellation: Mellographe. Génération de machines logiques non traditionnelles pour l'analyse ontologique d'une précision record.

Echelle de base: mellonique. Le mellon est une unité de mesure de l'information sémantique.

Date de la création du Mellographe -3 : 1997. Date de l'achèvement des essais: Janvier 1998.

Enregistrement du Mellographe-3 et des termes des technologies Mellon : 1998, Washington DC.

Propriété : Copropriété privée. Gestion confidentielle de la Fondation Ortega.

Accès : Limité aux disciples de M.Ortega.

TECHNOLOGIE

Schéma technologique : Tenu secret.

Rapport avec d'autres technologies: Inexistant. (Les mellographes supplantent en tous points les machines à calculer actuelles et diffèrent dans le principe des ordinateurs).

Evaluation de l'état opérationnel du Mellographe : Automatique. Appréciation de la possibilité d'aborder l'étude: Classification automatique en unités Mellon.

Formule de l'investigation : Evaluation du bien-fondé philosophique et de la plénitude du projet, compte tenu des exigences de la philosophie de l'informatique. Transmellonisation du projet. Conformité à la loi sur la liberté de l'information.

Vitesse opérationnelle du Mellographe-5 : Constante à 40 téraflops: (40 trillions à la seconde, leader mondial).

Vitesse de pointe: 27+35+40 téraflops (Leader mondial).

Possibilités de modification et de perfectionnement: Sans limites.

Opérateur: Evaluation mellonique automatique de l'état de réactivité de l'opérateur.

Erreurs: Détection mellonique automatique et correction, immédiate.

ASPECTS TECHNIQUES

Alimentation autonome: Piles solaires.

Stabilité des systèmes: Correction automatique de la commande, de l'adaptation et de la vérification.

Sûreté du fonctionnement: 100%. Réglage automatique des 5 types de commandes.

Réalisation technique et sélection des matériaux: Ray-Mundo, Centre des Recherches Intégrales de la Fondation Ortega.

Niveau sonore: N'est pas perçu par l'oreille.

Niveau de sécurité des système de l'information: 100%.

Protection antivirus permanente: 100%.

Niveau de vérification des résultats: 99-100%. Triple processus parallèle.

DEFAUTS

Programmation: N'est réalisable que par des spécialistes éminents.

Processus opérationnel: Exige un enseignement spécialisé complexe.

Adaptation aux cinq supertechnologies : Accès au processus limité aux seuls disciples de M.Ortega.

AVANTAGES ESSENTIELS

Universalité: Accès à toutes les catégories d'informatioa. Vitesse opératoire du système et réduction des dépenses.

Précision des résultats: 98-100%, record mondial.

Accès à l'ontologie: Sur la base du Système Général des Catégories de Calderon. En exclusivité. Monopole mondial.

Autres avantages: Sûreté; absence de défaillances, de pannes, de surchauffe, de toxicité, de dépendance des communications; éthique scientifique rigoureuse; réduction sensible du délai de l'exécution des travaux et de leur coût.

SPECIFICITE

Potentiel de la vitesse opératoire: Plus de 50 TRF, 140 TRF pour la "dynastie".

Normes du langage de la programmation: Le jargon de la période avant-Mellon et l'anglais sont exclus.

Valeurs: Evaluation de la quantité des qualités, des valeurs unitaires et totales de la Réalité; des qualités adéquates à toutes les connaissances historiques classifiées.

Accès à l'information: du monde visible ainsi ~u'à celle de la mémoire informatique des objets subatomiques, du matrice fractal et du DNA.

Compatibilité avec d'autres super-technologies: Régime de navigation avec ZetaEpsilon pour l'étude des bio-codes et de la microradiation. Précision des détails de la causalité dans le système Modérateur D. Détecteur de base dans le système Synolon.

Sites favorables: Sélection optimale d'emplacements pour les mellographes en Europe et aux USA.

Erreurs possibles: 0-2% pour le monde du temps irréversible et de 0-14% pour le monde du temps futur.

Erreurs dans les opérations logiques: 0%.

Viabilité: 40 ans.

GRANDIOSE PERCEE TECHNOLOGIQUE

La Fondation Internationale Luis Ortega, Washington DC, vient d'annoncer que son Centre scientifique européen a mis au point une machine à calculer avec une vitesse opérationnelle record de 40 teraflops, (c'est-à-dire 40 trillions d'opérations à la seconde), ce qui dépasse considérablement les possibilités de n'importe quel superordinateur existant. Cette machine logique universelle non traditionnelle diffère radicalement des systèmes actuels et offre d'importants avantages. Cette nouvelle supertechnologie a été enregistrée aux USA, il y a deux ans, sous le nom de ORTEGA MELLOGRAPH, par l'académicien Luis Ortega, philosophe espagnol. La vitesse opérationnelle du Mellographe Ortega devrait atteindre 50 teraflops, à la fin de l'année. Les centres scientifiques de la Fondation Ortega emploient des savants d'Espagne, du Canada, d'Italie, de Russie, d'Estonie et de Grèce. La Fondation coopère avec un nombre limité d'organisations internationales et de gouvernements. Le Mellographe Ortega est utilisé pour des recherches fondamentales et pour la résolution des problèmes les plus complexes, tenus pour insolubles par la science traditionnelle.

Addenda

La transition des technologies des énergies physiques aux technologies de la culture informatique de la connaissance est à la base du processus présent.

La science du 3^e millénaire doit faire face à un problème alarmant: l'ambiguïté de la connaissance sera-t-elle encore plus accablante qu'elle ne l'est, ou plus constructive, ou bien la crise des notions actuelles serait un prélude à une ère nouvelle, totalement différente de la science désuète de nos jours.

La conception technocrate du monde ne permet pas d'éliminer la disparité entre l'éthique et la connaissance; de proposer une alternative à l'actuel dualisme des intérêts de l'individu et de l'Etat; de créer un langage symbolique pour une actuelle communication galactique.

Le Mellographe Ortega est une machine logique universelle, un détecteur digital des paramètres avec pour base l'échelle mellonique. Le Mellon est une unité sémantique de l'information (découverte fondamentale de l'académicien Ortega). Ce terme est homophone au mot grec μέλλω (manifestation) et au mot Mellon (flambeau) de l'espagnol ancien. Réussite totale des recherches faites au cours de deux années par quatre générations de mellographes.

Le mémorandum MELLOGRAPHY et un aperçu des recherches réalisées seront adressés aux organisations internationales et aux gouvernements démocratiques.

L.O.I.F.
Washington,DC

Publié en 1999 et en 2000
dans le Bulletin de la Fon-
dation Ortega, l'Internet
et par certains journaux.

NIVEAUX D'ACCES A L'INFORMATION / 2002

Etudes comparatives de l'accès à l'information de deux technologies: Des Systèmes à Ordination et des Supertechnologies non Traditionnelles. Position pour avril 2002.

1. Accès à l'information: 100% représente le niveau d'accès à l'information, adéquat aux problèmes contemporains. Pour les Supertechnologies l'accès à l'information est supérieure à 100%.

2. Taux d'erreurs: Pourcentage par rapport à la valeur absolue.

Les Supertechnologies sont d'ordre ontologique et diffèrent dans le principe des ordinateurs.

Non inclus dans la liste: Les nuances de discernement de l'ontologie, les irradiations nocives, les ratés ainsi que le niveau permanent de la vitesse d'action des technologies.

3. Vitesse de pointe: Exprimée en teraflops (TRF).

Centres de technologies	Accès à l'information (%)	Taux d'erreurs (%)	Vitesse de pointe (TRF)
A. TECHNOLOGIES A ORDINATION			
AA. Organisations internationales intergouvernementales			
1 O.T.A.N.	76	8	2.03
2 Union Européenne	74	13	1.4
3 O.N.U.	62	23	0.93
AB. Pays:			
1 Vatican	92	6	1.41
2 Pays-Bas	88	6	1.5
3 Belgique/Luxembourg	87.1	6	1.3
4 France	87	9	1.43
5 Italie	86	13	1.4
6 Japon	85	11	35.3
7 Espagne	83	9	1.81
8 Grande Bretagne	82	10	1.8
9 Suisse	80	7	2.7
10 U.S.A.	78	14	11.7
11 Russie	78	22	1.2
12 Canada	77	12	1.7
B. SUPERTECHNOLOGIES NON TRADITIONNELLES			
BA. Organisations internationales non-gouvernementales			
(Les supertechnologies non traditionnelles appartiennent à des organisations non-gouvernementales de différents pays et sont mentionnées ici sous la nomination admise dans les milieux scientifiques de ces organisations).			
1 M.D. FC-42	400	0.3	0.9
2 Système des mellographes	310	1.1	115
3 ORTEGA MELLOGRAPHE- 5	170	1	49.1
4 Synolon O.M.S. (Espagne)	170	0.7	109
5 ZetaEpsilon O.M.S.	154	1.1	35.9
6 Générateur F-IO HIL (France)	116	4	5.5
7 Teixidor SSD (Le projet sera réalisé en 2003)	211	?	151

Programme: Rado Fere, académicien

Opérateur: Manuel

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RECHERCHES SPECIALES VERIFIABLES

Tirage limité à 14 exemplaires. Priorité supérieure accordée aux chefs de cinq organisations internationales et de cinq gouvernements.

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REDEN- MATRIX № RM-ES-32

OBJECTIF DE LA RECHERCHE : Application indépendante de la MELLON-TECHNOLOGY®. Paramètres précis de la réalité. Analyse des problèmes les plus complexes. Recommandations aux organismes internationaux.

BASE SCIENTIFIQUE

RAY-MUNDO, Centre de Recherches intégrales près la Fondation Ortega. Trois centres partenaires en Europe avec accès aux technologies exclusives de LOIF. Directeur des activités scientifiques – l'académicien Luis Ortega.

TECHNOLOGIES

MELLON-TECHNOLOGY monopoleur. Créés en 1997 et 1999.

ORTEGA MELLOGRAPH-4, détecteur informatique universel.

Précision : 98-100%. Rapidité d'action : 40 teraflops (leader mondial). Machine effectuant des opérations logiques non traditionnelles.

Zeta Epsilon, nouveau système non standardisé pour paramétrer la réalité. Analyseur pour la reconnaissance d'objectifs donnés.

Capable de fonctionner en régime de navigateur sélectif satellite pour la recherche d'homme et d'objectifs. Efficace dans la recherche d'informations à distance (leader mondial).

AVANTAGES DE MELLON-TECHNOLOGY.

Différenciation de la valeur de l'information. Evaluation des paramètres à distance. Haute précision d'estimation des programmes internationaux et gouvernementaux. Evaluation qualitative. Pénétration de tout objet matériel. Direction des armes de destruction. Evaluation de la fiabilité des installations municipales (en tout genre).

Identification des codes biologiques d'êtres vivants avec informations approfondies. Examen des idées et des desseins. Examen du niveau d'efficacité de ces idées. Décryptage des codes de la Stéganographie.

Précision, rapidité des recherches et réduction des dépenses.

Inutilité des ordinateurs.

CONFIRMATION DES RESULTATS

Les résultats ne sont souvent confirmés que plus tard par des faits, si ces faits sont découverts ou s'ils sont l'objet d'études. Une partie des données ne peuvent être, aujourd'hui, corroborées par la science. Mais le seront dans le futur lorsque les scientifiques sauront faire des recherches analogiques.

COUT DES RECHERCHES : _____ million d'Euros.

FINANCEMENT : THE LUIS ORTEGA INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION, Inc.

Programme : Académicien Diego Fraga y Calderon

Opérateur : Manuel

REMARQUE : 28% des recherches sur la **STATISTIQUE DE L'ANTIGLOBALISME** sont réalisables par les technologies courantes, mais seulement 21% viennent à la connaissance du secteur gouvernemental.

Le Mémoire "MELLON-TECHNOLOGY" sera expédié à nos partenaires.

La Fondation Ortega est une association culturelle internationale non gouvernementale du niveau supérieur ; elle représente les intérêts des élites humanitaires et scientifiques, ne présente aucun pays particulier, ne participe pas à des désaccords des gouvernements, protège des valeurs culturelles dans le monde entier, ne fait pas de la politique, de la religion, du commerce ; possède 46 know-how de la classe mondiale et 5 super technologies leaders.

La Fondation porte le nom de Luis Ortega, l'un des plus grands génies contemporains, académicien de la philosophie, académicien des sciences informatiques, académicien de l'art, poète- lauréat, protagoniste des technologies – Mellon, personnalité publique.

LES STATESTIQUES DE L'ANTI-MONDIALISATION

Copyright © by Fundación Ortega, 2001

Investigation : Ray- Mundo, Centro de Investigaciones Integradas / LOIF

Les technologies : les plus récentes super technologies, telles que ZetaEpsilon, Ortega Mellograph (leader mondial) sont utilisées pour la recherche.

Erreur : 0-1 %. Publication : le 27 octobre 2001. Des références sont obligatoires.

Le coup de recherche : 3,7 millions Euros. Financement : LOIF

Catégorie de la recherche	Suède Goteborg Juin 2001	Italie Gênes Juillet 2001	Europe Monde Entier
STRUCTURE			
1. Le nombre de manifestants	22.870	17.230	
2. Les activistes parmi les manifestants	4.920	5.200	
3. Les anti-mondialistes à qui on n'a pas permis ou qui n'ont pas pu entrer dans le pays	4.300	8.900	
4. L'arrivée au préalable d'une partie de manifestants	14 jours avant	17 jours avant	
5. Les manifestants du pays	5%	8,4%	
6. Les extrémistes qui ont commis de la violence	687	1140	
7. L'arme à feu des manifestants	8 pièces	14 pièces	
8. Les terroristes camouflés de tous types	9 personnes	22 personnes	
9. Les manifestants pacifiques	32%	26%	
10. Le nombre de groupes	6	11	
COMPOSITION			
11. Les manifestants ultra gauches	70%	83%	
12. Les anarchistes	23%	9%	
13. Les fascistes	2%	5%	
14. Les activistes religieux	2%	2%	
15. Le pourcentage de fanatiques, refusant tous pourparlers	90%	88%	
Des autres petits groupes ne sont pas inclus à cette revue			
PROVENANCE			
16. Le nombre de pays, entraînés en manifestations	23	31	
17. Les manifestants de l'Europe	83%	87%	
18. Les manifestants des Etats Unis et du Canada	16%	12%	
LE NIVEAU DE L'INFLUENCE			
19. La population du pays, désapprouvant les idées des anti-mondialistes	92%	94%	
20. Le niveau du soutien dans le pays	1%	1,3%	
21. Le pourcentage de l'électorat en Europe, sympathisant des anti-mondialistes			4,8%,
22. Le niveau des idées raisonnables de l'anti-mondialisation			13%
23. Les adversaires des monopoles, du bureaucratisme, et des corporations bancaires.	92%	94%	
24. Sympathisants le fondamentalisme islamique	22%	41%	
25. Sympathisants la politique israélienne	0,4%	0,4%	
26. Le lien avec de différentes organisations terroristes	3%	6%	
27. Le capital financier des groupes dirigeants	€14 mln.	€41 mln.	
28. Le dommage total au pays en millions Euros	6,3	17	
29. Le nombre des anti-mondialistes au monde (passifs et actifs)			210 millions
30. L'augmentation du nombre en 4 ans au monde			32,3%
31. L'anti-américanisme			93%
32. Le nombre des dirigeants du courant			73 personnes

2002-10-22

Karin Höglund

Delgivning från
kryptoexpeditionen
enl adressering/samt
UMK
BMK
HMKI ME

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET,

För: EC (Hamrin)

Kopia: ch EC, EU (Berg)

Instruktion rörande fallet Raoul Wallenberg

Ert 2002-09-30

(1 bil)

EC/Hamrin/FvB
021023

O.t. Utredningen
om den svenska
utrikesledningens
agerande i fallet
Raoul Wallenberg
exp. 23/10/FvB
a.a.

Bifogat återfinns ett svar, författat av Christopher Baxter, historiker knuten till utrikesministeriets arkiv (*Records and Historical Department*), på departementets förfrågan gällande Herbert North respektive Vilmos Böhm, båda anställda vid den brittiska ambassaden i Stockholm under andra världskriget. Memorandumet ger tyvärr ingen ytterligare ledtråd till svaret på frågan varför UD underrättade North om att Raoul Wallenberg påträffats och ställts under de sovjetiska truppernas beskydd. Tyvärr framgår inte heller exakt vilken relation North och Böhm hade till varandra. Antagandet att North kan ha haft vissa underrättelseuppgifter kan ev. härledas deduktivt genom upplysningen att Böhm, Norths kollega på ambassadens *Press Reading Bureau*, stod upptagen på *FO Political Intelligence Department* daterad 1 september 1944.

Bergquist

mb

FROM: Christopher Baxter
DATE: 15 October 2002

Chris Brealey
EUD(B)

Herbert C. North and Wilmos Boehm: Stockholm, 1940-1945

1. My colleague, Richard Bevens (Deputy Head, RHD), passed me an enquiry that you had received from Karin Höglund on 2 October. The enquiry asked for information on Herbert North and Wilmos Boehm, who were attached to the British Embassy in Stockholm during the Second World War.
2. Wilmos Boehm, born in 1880, was a former minister in the government of Bela Kun, who fled from Hungary at the time of the "White Terror". During the Second World War, he was employed in the Press Reading Bureau of the British Embassy in Stockholm. In April 1943, Frank Roberts, Acting Head of the Central Department, FO, considered Boehm to be "the best source of information on Hungary" that the British had. Sir Cecil Parrott, who set up the Press Reading Bureau in late 1940, described Boehm as "anti-German by conviction, a great admirer of England, sympathetic towards Russia and, what is perhaps most important and quite unique for a Hungarian, on very good terms with the Czechs". I have also noted that a Mr W. Boehm appears on the staff list of the FO Political Intelligence Department for 1 September 1944.
3. Herbert Caird North who previously had been the representative in Stockholm of the firm Mather & Platt also worked in the Press Reading Bureau. North had been considered in July 1941 as a possible candidate for the Russian Section of SOE, but was not employed by SOE as he was judged to be unsuitable.
4. As mentioned in para. 2, the Press Reading Bureau was founded on 24 September 1940 by Sir Cecil Parrott. Its function was (a) to prepare to take over the reading of the German press at short notice in case of the invasion of Switzerland; (b) to arrange for the reading of Norwegian, Danish, Swedish, Protectorate, Polish, Soviet, Dutch and Belgian newspapers for the specific purpose of supplying urgently information of conditions in and material for propaganda to enemy and occupied territories. On 21 February 1941, the PRB was also instructed to collect so-called military information that was not of such a nature as to be included in the regular intelligence reports sent by the Attachés to London. It was consequently agreed that the Press Reading Bureau should send its military press material direct to the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office for them to distribute, although initially distribution was

sometimes poor if non-existent.

5. I am unable to answer why Herbert North was informed of the arrest of Raoul Wallenberg. If your enquirer wishes to pursue this matter in any more detail, there are files on the Press Reading Bureau in the Public Record Office (FO 898/252-253). It is also worth consulting Peter Tennant, Touchlines of War (The University of Hull Press, 1992) who talks about his time as a member of SOE in Sweden and the Embassy in Stockholm. I have also been told that there are references to Herbert North in C.J. McKay, From Information to Intrigue (Frank Cass Publishers, 1993) but I have not been able to obtain a copy.
6. I do hope my minute provides some answers to your enquirer's questions.

Dr. Christopher Baxter
Historians
RHD
Tel: 7008 1133

Raoul Wallenberg

ARLIVEX.

To: Daniel Larsson/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK
cc:
Subject: Re: Raoul Wallenberg

(EC)

INK. UTRIKESDEP.		
D.Nr. 295/007		
2002 11-15 10-22		
AVD. P	GR. 2	M.M. Eu' / spec a

Ink. 021022

(EC)

Dear Daniel Larsson,

Thanks for your note--we will help distribute this note via our publications and website, no problem.

Let me suggest two additional items:

1. Would the Swedish Foreign Ministry be interested in supporting research in Eastern European archives on RW. We have an extensive network of partners working on former communist period archives who could, with relatively small support, search the archives for any information on RW.
- 2) The Cold War International History Project might be interested in holding an international conference on RW based on such and other research if the Ministry would be interested in supporting it.

For further information, please see our website at cwihip.si.edu. We are the internationally leading clearinghouse for research on the Cold War period.

Best wishes,
Christian

Christian Ostermann
Director
Cold War International History Project
Washington, D.C. (CWIHP)

EC/Hansen
021028

b.

TH

Simone LUCKI

Avocat

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B-1050 BRUXELLES, le 2^e décembre 2002

Par fax 0046-8 723.1176 et poste

Annexes : 2 pages



INK. UTRIKESDEP.		
D.Nr. 336/003		
2002-12-03 02		
AVB. P	GR. 2	MÅL. Eu'

Monsieur Johan MATZ
Secrétaire de la Commission
c/o Ministère des Affaires étrangères
X EC-department
S - 103 35 STOCKHOLM
SUEDE

J Matz
021206

Överlämnas för vidare åtgärd
till UD-EC.

Johan Matz

Monsieur le Secrétaire,

Raoul WALLENBERG

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire parvenir, ci-joint, le texte
de la télécopie que j'ai adressée le 26 juin 2002
à Monsieur Ingemar ELIASSON.

N'ayant pas reçu de réponse à ce jour, je me permets
d'entrer en contact avec vous et d'insister pour que
la Commission d'enquête se saisisse de ma demande.

En espérant vous lire prochainement, je vous prie,
Monsieur le Secrétaire, d'agréer l'expression de
ma haute considération.

Simone LUCKI

Avocat

Président du Comité Belge pour Raoul WALLENBERG
Secrétaire Général de la Commission Internationale d'Enquête
sur le sort de Raoul WALLENBERG

EC/Homren/AB

021212

Svar t. S. Lucki,
Bruxelles

Attention à John MATZ

Simone LUCKI

Avocat

B-1050 BRUXELLES, le 26 juin 2002

Résidence EUROPE

Rue Dautzenberg 50 (bt 3)

Tel : 02 640 10 03

Fax : 02 647 21 30

E-Mail : mme.simone.lucki@skynet.be

Via fax 00 46 54 189904

Monsieur Ingemar ELLASSON

Président de la commission d'enquête
dans l'affaire WALLENBERG

Monsieur le Président,

J'ai l'honneur de vous écrire en ma qualité de Président
du Comité belge pour Raoul WALLENBERG.

Par la présente, j'aimerais attirer votre attention sur
une partie du matériel que j'avais rendu public lors
d'une Conférence de presse au Parlement européen et
remis au gouvernement suédois d'alors, consistant en
des documents photographiques et autres.

Je n'ai pas la conviction que ce matériel ait été
suffisamment exploité par les autorités suédoises.

Grâce à l'aide d'une série de personnes, j'avais fait
diffuser une photo datant de 1957 représentant 28 hommes
dans le Goulag, formant une chorale, dans le journal russe
Megapolis Express avec un appel à témoins, libellé
comme suit: "Qui se reconnaît sur cette photo?"

Il faudrait diffuser cette photo plus largement car
l'identification de plusieurs personnes y figurant
pourrait mener à de bonnes pistes.

2.

Je reste perplexe quant aux motifs pour lesquels la Suède a fait si peu de cas de ce matériel, lequel pourtant donne un aperçu intéressant de la vie dans le Goulag à travers le récit d'une ancienne détenue, l'Ukrainienne dénommée Shinkarenko.

Les autorités suédoises ont considéré qu'elle n'était pas crédible alors que la photo est bien d'époque et qu'une analyse minutieuse effectuée à ma demande par la Police Judiciaire de Bruxelles, n'a pu exclure qu'il s'agisse bien de Monsieur Raoul WALLENBERG.

De toute façon il doit y avoir moyen d'identifier les 28 personnes.

Sachez que je suis prête à vous éclairer quant à ce, autant que faire se peut.

Qu'en pensez-vous?

Dans l'attente du plaisir de vous lire et restant à votre entière disposition, je vous prie, Monsieur le Président, d'agréer l'expression de ma haute considération.



SVERIGES AMBASSAD
OTTAWA

T E L E F A X

Sid 1 (1)

2002-12-06

ambr Pontus Melander

EC

INKOM UD		
2002 -12- 09 06		
Avd P	Gr 2	Mal Eu'

Utrikesdepartementet, dnr 170 ✓

Till: EC-2 (Hamrin) X

Kopia till: AME, SB

X X

EC/Hamrin
021210

a.a.

HH

Raoul Wallenberg och "Levande historia"

(1 bil)

Bifogat insändes ett brev från Vera Parnes, ordföranden i den kanadensiska organisation "Raoul Wallenberg International Movement for Humanity", angående boken "Levande historia" där Parnes har negativa synpunkter på avsnittet om Raoul Wallenberg.

Alvin


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Web site: <http://www.swedishembassy.ca>



www.rwallenberg-int.org



#11

His Excellency Lennert Alvin
Ambassador of Sweden
377 Dalhousie Street
Ottawa, Ont. K1N 9N8

Your Excellency,

Thank you very much for sending me a book about the Holocaust. I read it from the beginning to the end. It is an important book. I highly appreciate the most part of it, but the part devoted to Wallenberg.

One of its authors, Paul A. Levine, has a bad reputation here, because of his constant attempts to diminish the role of Raoul Wallenberg in the history of mankind. His articles sent to newspapers of many countries under titles like "The Myth of Raoul Wallenberg" or "Raoul Wallenberg's Myth" disseminated a lie and are really disgusting. I think, it is due to his influence that a Swedish diplomat, an international hero, Raoul Wallenberg, who became a symbol of Rescue, Justice and Humanity, received only 7 lines (plus the inscription under the photo): a very small exposure in a book of 83 pages devoted to the Holocaust!

It is well known that among people saved by Raoul Wallenberg were those with Swedish Schutzpasses and also almost 70 000 inhabitants of the Central Budapest ghetto, which he did not mentioned at all. Being in Stockholm, I talked with Per Anger about the Central Ghetto. Wallenberg found out that leaving Budapest Adolf Eichmann had given an order to the German General August Schmidhuber to finish off the ghetto. Not losing a minute, Wallenberg sent a personal message to the general that it would be he, Wallenberg, in person, to charge him with murder and genocide by the war Crimes Tribunal. Receiving this message the General immediately countermand Eichmann's final order.

In every book about Raoul Wallenberg, we can read that he rescued about 100 000 Jews. But not in the book, where Mr. Levine is one of the authors. Is there another hero of the Holocaust who could be compared with Wallenberg? Every man and every woman who saved even one innocent persecuted individual at Hitler's time must be considered a hero,

but just a Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg became a Symbol of Rescue. Raoul Wallenberg is the only Swedish citizen who was granted honorary citizenship in three other countries: USA, Canada and Israel. His statues are displayed in many capitals and cities in Europe, America, and Australia. He inspired people in four continents - Europe, North and South America and Australia - to actively promote his recognition as an outstanding human rights champion, to organize committees, associations and political clubs named after him as well as schools, hospitals, parks and squares. It is a pity that Wallenberg is not properly presented in this book.

Considering the whole text of it, I must express my satisfaction that the book about the Holocaust was published in Sweden. Knowing the Prime Minister interest in humanitarianism, the Holocaust, justice and heroic deeds of Wallenberg, which is highly appreciated all over the world, I hope that the book will be republished with more solid material devoted to the Swedish hero in the nearest future.

I am really very thankful to you for presenting me with this book

With all the best wishes
Sincerely yours,



Dr. Vera Parnes
President

Raoul Wallenberg International Movement for Humanity



SVERIGES AMBASSAD

2002-12-05

Nr 103 ✓

Moskva

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

Fambs Stefan Gullgren

+7 095 937 92 00

EC

P 2 Eu 1

Raoul Wallenberg - note från MID med svar på svenska frågor

(1 bilaga)

Ambassaden får bifogat insända kopia av note från MID, jämte översättning till svenska, med svar på ett antal frågor från svensk sida i Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet. Frågorna ställdes i en aide-mémoire från ambassaden, överlämnad vid besök av ambr Mats Foyer i MID 28 juni i år. De var i sin tur en uppföljning och komplettering till tidigare ställda frågor, med svar från MID i en aide-mémoire från 16 maj i år. Denna insändes till departementet med fax 334 den 4 juni i år.

Sven Hirdman

EC/Hamrin
30109

a. a.

✓

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119 590 MOSKVA

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www.sweden.ru

E-post:
ambassaden.moskva@foreign.ministry.se

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
Moskva
Christina Johannesson

ÖVERSÄTTNING
2002-12-05

Översättning från ryska

Till Sveriges ambassad
Moskva

Note nr 10692/2ED

Ryska federationens Utrikesministerium betygar härmed Sveriges ambassad i Ryska federationen sin aktning och har med hänvisning till ambassadens aide-mémoire av den 28 juni 2002 äran meddela följande:

1. Under den tid som Vilmosz Langfelder och Aleksandr (Sandor) Katon befann sig i NKVD:s Interna fängelse kallades de till förhör hos Kartasjov, chef för 4:e avdelningen på Sovjetunionens MGB:s 3:e överstyrelse, den 27 juli 1947. Det första förhöret hölls mellan kl. 2.15 och 18.30, det andra förhöret hölls mellan kl. 2.35 och 18.30.
2. Iosif Antonovitj Chatsinskij dömdes under sitt riktiga efternamn, men gavs nummerbeteckningen 14 under förundersökningen. Han figurerar i ärendet om organisatörerna, ledarna och deltagarna i den polska underjordiska verksamheten bakom Röda arméns front på Polens territorium.
3. Det har inte varit möjligt att fastställa namnen på de personer som 1945-1947 hölls fångna med nummerbeteckningarna 19 och 20 genom att kontrollera registreringsjournalerna för fångarna på Interna fängelset och Lefortovo-fängelset och korrespondensen på avdelning "A" på Sovjetunionens MGB om fångarnas rörelser.

Ryska federationens Inrikesministerium har i sin kontroll kunnat fixera vilka personer, förnamn och efternamn som har likheter med Raoul Wallenberg. De uppgifter som man har fått fram kan dock inte hänföras till Wallenberg, då personernas biografiska uppgifter väsentligt skiljer sig från Wallenbergs. I kartoteket på Ryska federationens Inrikesministerium har man inte påträffat några uppgifter om "nummerfångarna" på Vladimir-fängelset.

Ministeriet begagnar tillfället att ånyo försäkra ambassaden om sin utmärkta högaktning.

/stämpel/

Moskva den 3 december 2002

INK. AMB. MOSKVA		
D.пг. <i>12/13/02</i>		
2002 -12- 0 4		
AVD. <i>R</i>	GR. <i>18</i>	MAL. <i>RA</i>

56.

№ 10692 /2ЕД

Министерство Иностранных Дел Российской Федерации свидетельствует свое уважение Посольству Королевства Швеция в Российской Федерации и, ссылаясь на памятную записку Посольства от 28 июня 2002 года, имеет честь сообщить следующее. *M. Fager*

1. Видмош Лангфельдер и Александр (Шандор) Катон, находясь во Внутренней тюрьме НКВД, вызывались на допрос к начальнику 4 отдела 3 Главного управления МГБ СССР Карташову 27 июля 1947 года. Время допроса первого — 2.15-18.30, второго — 2.35-18.30.
2. Хацинский Иосиф Антонович был осужден под своей фамилией, а под следствием находился под № 14. Проходит по делу об организаторах, руководителях и участниках польского подполья в тылу Красной Армии на территории Польши.
3. В результате проверки по журналам регистрации заключенных Внутренней и Лефортовской тюрем, а также по переписке отдела «А» МГБ СССР о движении заключенных установить фамилии лиц, которые в 1945-1947 годах содержались под номерами 19 и 20, не представилось возможным.

ПОСОЛЬСТВУ КОРОЛЕВСТВА ШВЕЦИЯ

г.Москва

AA: Amb
 Abs: MVD
 Re: Svens note
 om Wallenberg-
 fall

В результате проверки Министерством Внутренних дел Российской Федерации были установлены лица, имена и фамилии которых имеют сходство с Р.Валленбергом. Однако в связи с существенными расхождениями в биографических данных этих лиц с Р.Валленбергом полученные сведения к нему отнесены быть не могут. Данных о «номерных» заключенных, содержащихся во Владимирской тюрьме, в картотеке Министерства Внутренних дел Российской Федерации не обнаружено.

Министерство пользуется случаем, чтобы возобновить Посольству уверения в своем высоком уважении.



Москва, «3» декабря 2002 года



Raoul Wallenberg Institute

of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law

Reg → *aa*

LUND UNIVERSITY

UD-EP 02/12/04

2002-12-06

Helena Melin

Kopia brevst. budget som
utl. order till H.RÖD (G Engström)
02/12/04

Helena Melin

EP

Utrikesdepartementet

103 39 Stockholm

INK. UTRIKESDEP.		
D.Nr. 340/010 ₁₆		
2002-12-17		
AVD	GB	MAK
P	2	Eu

EP

Redovisning avseende anslag till Max van der Stoep Symposium i Lund 1999-12-03—04
(UD beslut UD 1999-1397-EP) (RWI Ö008-99)

Raoul Wallenberg institutet ber härmed att få översända ekonomisk redovisning avseende rubricerat symposium. Balansen, SEK 37785.-, kommer att insättas på UD:s postgirokonto 954491-7 med angivande av UD:s beslutsnummer.

Symposieanförandena har publicerats i "International Journal of Minority and Group Rights" (Volume 8, No. 1, 2001).

Ytterligare upplysningar lämnas av undertecknad eller, när det gäller den ekonomiska redovisningen, av Birgitta Jansson (046 222 1210).

Med vänlig hälsning

RAOUL WALLENBERG INSTITUTET


Rolf Ring
kanslichef

Raoul Wallenberg Institute

of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law

Redovisning av Max van der Stoel Symposium Lund 1999-12-03--04

Organiserat av den svenska regeringen i samarbete med Raoul Wallenberg Institutet

	Kostnader i SEK
Inkvartering (Hotel Lundia enkel rum inkl frukost)	
35 x 995x1	43 860
35 x 695 x 2	
Flygbiljetter	253 110
Måltider	
Mottagning RWI torsdagen den 2 december	6 115
Lunch fredagen den 3 december	4 907
Middag fredagen den 3 december ¹⁾	0
Lunch lördagen den 4 december	3 467
Kaffe / te	2 944
Transfer från flygplatsen (MMX eller HMA)	12 902
Konferens service och underhållskostnader inkl hyra av konferens rum,	53 149
Övriga kostnader	1 344
Enligt särskild överenskommelse med Anders Rönquist inköp av särtryck	11 205
Overhead 7%	27 466
TOTALT	420 468
Erhållet belopp	223 853
	234 400
Att återbetala	37 785

¹⁾ Har fakturerats Utrikesdepartementet direkt från Lunds Universitet

Volume 8 No. 1 2001

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON MINORITY AND GROUP RIGHTS

KLUWER LAW INTERNATIONAL

International Journal on Minority and Group Rights

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Preface

This issue of the *International Journal of Minority and Group Rights* is for the most part devoted to Max van der Stoep, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. Many of the contributions stem from a Symposium in his honour which was sponsored by the Swedish Government and hosted by the Raoul Wallenberg Institute in Lund in December 1999. The IJMGR is grateful to John Packer and Anders Rönquist who have served as Special Editors for the issue.

Admiration of Max van der Stoep and his accomplishments is a common theme of the authors and editors. The admiration is deserved. Thanks to him, the post of the High Commissioner has become a very useful and much quoted OSCE institution. His accumulated experience, his political leverage and courage, and his demand for justice and fairness in the long-term interests of all the parties to a possible conflict situation have made him a formidable spokesman of reconciliation based on law, practical solutions and common sense. In a number of instances, his input has made a real difference on the ground.

Early action to prevent violent ethnic conflicts is also a common theme of the present issue. When identifying multiple options for settling disputes, facilitating dialogues between governments and groups and keeping up the pressure on uncooperative parties, van der Stoep has made respect for minority rights a cornerstone of his approach. He has relied not only on standards of the OSCE but also those emanating from the Council of Europe and the United Nations. Furthermore, under his guidance and encouragement, groups of experts have further developed the educational, linguistic and political rights of minorities in the Hague, Oslo and Lund Recommendations.

An emphasis on the role of minority rights in preventing armed and violent conflicts is important. Many such conflicts arise as a result of brutalities, discriminatory practices and other rights violations, and the clashes might have been avoided if human rights and minority rights had been respected in the first place. In addition to loss of life and property, internal conflicts may spill across borders and other conflict consequences (like internal displacement and refugee flows) inevitably affect the international community. Prevention is also a lot less costly than peace-making efforts, peace-enforcement and other forms of crisis management.

In a preface to the latest issue of the IJMG, a call was made for direct exchanges of opinion. The same issue also contained an article which was quite critical of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, calling it a frame with an incomplete painting. A response to this article by Frank Steketee, published in the present issue, is therefore most welcome.

Gudmundur Alfredsson
Editor-in-Chief



REGERINGSKANSLIET

Stockholm, 10 December 2002

**Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Sweden**

Enheten för Central- och Östeuropa (EC)

Ambassadör Harald Hamrin

Telephone +46 8 405 33 43

E-mail: harald.hamrin@foreign.ministry.se

Dr. Leon Nikulin

The Danish Raoul Wallenberg Society

PO. Box 4035

DK 8260 VIBY J

Danmark

On the book "Raoul Wallenberg in the Danish Press"

Dear Dr. Nikulin,

thank you for your letter of November 6th, 2002 and for your kind words on the Swedish Government's initiative to allocate money for independent research on the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. On my part, I would like to express our appreciation for your and your Society's work to disseminate knowledge about Raoul Wallenberg.

As to your concrete question about a contribution to the costs for publishing a book on "Raoul Wallenberg in the Danish Press" I am afraid I have to disappoint you. While I find the initiative very worth while, this is not a project of the kind that the fund is meant to contribute to.

At the same time I would like to say that I would appreciate if you could disseminate information about our fund. More information can be found on our home page www.ud.se - click "in English" and "Raoul Wallenberg" and go from there.

Sincerely yours,

Harald Hamrin

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cap. 021210/
HB



THE DANISH RAOUL WALLENBERG SOCIETY

Member of the European Centre
for Minority Issues
(ECMI)



Date: 6.11.02

Nr. 1.11.02

Members of the committee:

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Founder

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pastor emeritus

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EC

INK. UTRIKESDEP.		
D.Nr. 310/008		
2002-11-18 08		
AVD. P	GR. 2	MAL. En

EC/Hamrin/JvB
02/210
Svar t. Nikulin

Att: Mr. Harald Hamrin
Swedish Foreign Ministry
Stockholm

Dear Mr. Hamrin

the Danish Raoul Wallenberg Society congratulates you on the grant of 750000 sv.kr. to disseminate knowledge of Raoul Wallenberg's mission in Budapest and his later disappearance in the communist Gulag camps. We enclose a copy of a new book, Raoul Wallenberg in the Danish Press, dr. Leon Nikulin's new analysis of the Smaltsov report and a picture of our exhibition in Danish libraries commemorating the 90th anniversary of Raoul Wallenberg's birth. Our Society was founded in 1982.

We should also like to draw you attention to the following points:

1. We are enthusiastic about the new fund's objective: finding new documents in the KGB and NKVD files, despite the fact that this has hitherto given few results in 10 years.
2. Dr. phil. Leon Nikulin is a former lector in soviet high schools and a former political prisoner in a Gulag prison camp. He has an extensive knowledge of the Russian language as well as KGB terminology, abbreviations and mystical expressions. Should there be a new effort made to



THE DANISH RAOUL WALLENBERG SOCIETY

Member of the European Centre
for Minority Issues
(ECMI)



Date:.....

Nr.....

Members of the committee:

Chairman

Leon Nikulin,
writer, ph.d.

Vice-chairman

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Hans Kristian Neerskov,
minister, author,
president of the International
Sakharov Committee

P.H. Bering,
writer
former dept. head (Aalborg
University)

Jesper Jacobsen,
cand.mag., journalist

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Denmark
Phone&fax:
+45 86 28 25 54

gain information from Soviet archives, he would be most willing to participate.

We hope that the fund will contribute to publishing RAOUL WALLENBERG IN THE DANISH PRESS, a book which not only recounts Wallenberg's fate, but also appraises the Danish press's references to the ten year Swedish/Russian research project which unfortunately has not shed much light on Wallenberg's tragic fate. Leon Nikulin has personally known Avraham Kalinski and the Dane Aksel Mikkelsen, who was arrested with Wallenberg and transported to Moskow with him in 1945. Aksel Mikkeslen is not mentioned in Redovisning but is mentioned in our book. We hope the fund will help finance its publication. At the moment we have 5000 dkr. This is only enough to print 125 copies. Hopefully the book will be read in Sweden and Norway. We are also planning to publish MYSTERIET WALLENBERG FORTALT I BILLEDER, and we hope that you and chairman Nina Lagergren will send us any pictures that we don't have in our exhibition.

Yours sincerely

Geoffrey Cain and Leon Nikulin

Enclised 1: a proof copy, 2. an appraisal of Smaltsov's report, 3. other items that corroborate our activity.

Viby J, den 22. oktober 2002

Til Det svenske Udenrigsministerium
Stockholm

Vedrørende Redovisning från den Svenska – Ryska Arbetsgruppen, utgivet af Utriksdepartamentet, Stockholm 2000, redaktion: Ingrid Palenklint og Daniel Larsson.

Kære Udenrigsministerium.


Sammen med min bog – antologien "Raoul Wallenberg i den danske presse" – fremsendes hoslagt min vurdering, vedrørende den såkaldte ekspertise af Smaltsov-rapporten angående Wallenbergs pludselige død i 1947 (Redovisning siden 318-323, som bilag 1212/020 af 29. august 1990).

- 1) Det var i forvejen klart, at Smaltsov-rapporten er falsk og ikke afspejler sandheden om Wallenbergs skæbne. Derfor kan man undre sig over, at rapporten blev undersøgt af kun to sovjetiske kvinder – eksperter -, der repræsenterer det sammen grusomme og hemmelige politi, KGB (tidligere NKWD), der har likvideret diplomaten Wallenberg.
- 2) Var det ikke meningen, at en sådan ekspertise af rapporten skulle foretages i et neutralt land eller i det mindste med deltagelse af to svenske eksperter? Tænk bare, at Middelhavsrullerne, som blev fundet i Israels grotter og ikke havde haft noget fælles med mord på uskyldige diplomater, blev undersøgt af mange internationale eksperter og heftigt diskuteret i forskellige videnskabelige skrifter i månedsvis.
- 3) De sovjetiske "eksperter" baserede deres konklusioner på Smaltsovs håndskrift i selve rapporten og ikke i forhold til hans kaligrafi af andre arkivdokumenter – rapporter, der blev skrevet af oberst Smaltsov, som var chef for fængselsvæsenets sanitetsvæsen i mange år, og som døde for kun få år siden.
- 4) Man kan undre sig over, at de svenske medlemmer ikke opfordrede de to KGB-damer til at finde de fingeraftryk, som utvivlsomt findes på rapporten, og dermed konstatere, om de tilhører oberst Smaltsov. En sådan laserteknik eksisterede i Vesten allerede i 80'erne. Dokumentarfilmen "Dødens detektiver" der blev vist i dansk TV den 17. oktober 2000, påviser, at det var muligt ved hjælp af en sådan teknik at finde fingeraftryk af en forbryder på et kort, skrevet for 40 år siden, i 1989.
- 5) I slutningen af ekspertise-rapporten undertegnet af de to sovjetiske damer den 29. august 1990, anerkender de, at "det blev umuligt at fastslå det konkrete tidspunkt, hvornår rapporten blev skrevet"... Det vil sige, det drejer sig bare om en bagatel, om at rapporten blev skrevet klokken 12 om natten eller klokken 2 om natten. Med en sådan sætning forsøgte de to KGB-damer at påvise, at der ikke skal herske tvivl om deres troværdighed.
- 6) Det er forbavsende, at der i den omtalte Redovisning ikke findes nogen kommentar eller protest fra svensk side vedrørende denne undersøgelse.
- 7) Allerede 7 år før den svensk-russiske rapport kom til verden, har de i den sovjetiske regeringsavis Isvestija af 3. juni 1993 med gengivelse i Jyllands-Posten den 4. juni 1993 kunnet læse følgende om Wallenbergs skæbne: "Isvestija offentliggjorde i går en række

dokumenter, som avisen har fået af den sovjetiske sikkerhedstjeneste, bl.a. et brev fra daværende viceudenrigsminister og tidligere chefanklager under de berømte skueprocesser Andrej Vysjinskij til udenrigsminister Vjatjeslav Molotov om nødvendigheden af at likvidere Raoul Wallenberg. "Eftersom Wallenberg-sagen fortsat befinder sig i et dødvande, beder jeg Dem forpligte kammerat Abakumov (daværende KGB-chef) til at præsentere et notat om sagens kerne og forslag om likvidering," skriver Vysjinskij til sin chef den 14. maj 1947. Den 18. august – en måned efter Wallenbergs død – meddelte viceudenrigsminister Vysjinskij den svenske ambassadør i Moskva, at "Wallenberg ikke befinder sig i Sovjetunionen". På de sovjetiske bødlers sprog betød det, at Wallenberg – der som følge af vedvarende forespørgsler fra vestlige diplomater om deres kollegas skæbne fremstod som et voksende problem for den sovjetiske ledelse – var blevet likvideret."

- 8) Som regel plejer man i en sådan rapport at nævne fangens navn og fødselsdata, fangens anklageparagraf og hans nationalitet. Men i rapporten er selv Wallenbergs efternavn stavet ukorrekt. Hvordan kunne det være, at en oberst og chef for fængselssanitetsvæsenet, der er uddannet på et militærakademi og af russisk oprindelse, laver så mange grammatiske og syntaktiske fejl i en enkelt rapport. Svaret er, at rapporten er skrevet af en person fra NKWD (senere KGB), eftersom der her var ansat mange af proletariats diktators analfabeter, som har udmærket kendskab til at affyre nakkeskud, udøve tortur, til bedrag og løgn, bare det tjente Kremls interesser, men ikke til deres eget sprog og historie. Årsagen til, at de danske og andre slavister fra de slaviske institutter i Norden ikke bemærkede disse fejl i rapporten, der verserede i mange år, er meget enkel: Deres kendskab til det russiske sprog er ikke bedre end den kommunistiske oberst Smaltsovs. Det skal bemærkes, at i selve adressaten, hvilken er skrevet af Smaltsov, findes der tre fejl, og i alt i rapporten er der mindst 8-9 grammatiske og syntaktiske fejl.
- 9) Når man læser de 414 siders svensk-russiske Redovisning som resultat af ca. 10 års forskning, kan man forstå, at svenskerne deltog i udforskningen vedrørende likvideringen af deres diplomat som passive gæster og observatører, men ikke som ligeberettigede forskere. For det er nemlig årsagen til, at der intet nyt er i rapporten om sagen: hvornår Wallenberg blev myrdet, og hvorfor han blev likvideret. Derfor kræver Wallenberg-sagen en ny forskningsrunde.

Med venlig hilsen


Leon Nikulin

Forfatter, dr.phil.

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Kopier modtager:

Den svenske ambassade, Jyllands-Posten, Berlingske Tidende, Politiken og Dansk Center for Internationale Studier og Menneskerettigheder (Uffe Ellemann Jensen).

DELSKEDER


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
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


Vagtårn

Vagtårn



Vagtårn



Sovjetkontor

fra alderingsstyrelsen, som
under diplomsstatut i Un-
garns hovedstad med selv-
optagne pasreddede Livest-
for tusinder af Jæder. — opus Vi smittede myrkræft i

Axel Mikkelsen: Kommandantur har haft en meget stor betydning for de mange, der har været i den, og det er en stor glæde, at de nu kan komme tilbage til deres hjem.

Svensk diplomat

var en gade, brolagt med
røde mursten. Daglig blev
denne gade glet ren ved
at fanger på vunde alebåde
røde mursten, rensede med
en anden mursten. På alle
dage, jeg lå og ejordenet
at jeg over på den anden
side af den aller gaden. Den
var et af de smukkeste

mere, men jeg har siden været på kontoret, hvor han arbejdede. Der lå svenske pas — og en pistol.

Signalet

At Raoul Wallenberg, hvis skæbne den dag i dag er et uantageligt forbold mellem Sovjet og Sverige, blev taget til fange af et sovjetrusisk specialkommando 16. januar og dagen efter sendt afsted på en

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
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 7. Martin Bormann
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 326. Albert Speer
 327. Martin Bormann
 328. Hans Frank
 329. Wilhelm Keitel

Raoul Wallenberg

- Symbol og martyrt

Diplomaten, der hjalp tusinder af jøder og forsvandt under russisk fremrykning, fylder 70 år - hvis han lever

Kronik




A' 37. april.
L. N. Nilén

Det er stadig en gåde, hvilken steds der er overgået den svenske diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, som hjalp tusinder af jøder, og som forsvandt under den russiske fremrykning mod Budapest. Forordning af Wallbergs 70 års dag gennemgås i dag af den phil. Deen Nilén i dagens tidning.

kræfterne. Han og hans venner ventede ved den ungarske grænse, hvor de krævede de pågældende udleveret. Andre ofre blev rent løjet domme i Budapest. På den måde undslap ydeltigst 1500 personer døden.

I JANUAR 1945 nåede de sovjetiske tropper Budapest. Wallenberg begære martske Malinowski for at bede om fædret af de jøder, som var under hans beskyttelse. Han fik liden en bl og en ledager men han vendte al indg albage til sin ambassade. Det sovjetiske haves streds ham mistænkt for at være spion. Sammen med ham blev også hans chauffør Langfelder og mange andre personer arreteret og sendt til en sovjetisk stanslejer.

Det er måske en forkert opfatelse i Venedig af Sovjetunionen har hemmeligt holdt af Raoul Wallenberg bekendelse, efter at han blev bortført den 17 januar 1945. I den franske bladet Jacques Doreys bog "Raoul Wallenberg" blev det påstået, at han som lejtning af den svenske Vjetunionens ambassade i Stockholm i maj 1945 blev sendt til Sverige. Indbudt den svenske ambassade i Stockholm blev Wallenberg for at modtage ham. Han blev vist rundt i byen og den unge diplomat mødte den berømt skulptør. Han bedrøftede i mangel af i Fodbold i Sovjetunionen. Viden om Wallbergs forsvinden blev først offentliggjort i 1945.



Det er Wallbergs 70 års dag i dag. Raoul Wallenberg blev født den 27. januar 1906 i Stockholm. Han var en af de mest kendte svenske diplomater. Han blev udnævnt til svensk konsulent i Budapest i 1944. Han hjalp tusinder af jøder og andre forfulgte mennesker at flygte fra nazistisk og sovjetisk undertrykkelse. Han blev arresteret af sovjetiske myndigheder i januar 1945 og forsvandt derefter. Hans tilfælde blev først offentliggjort i 1945, og hans søgen har været en af de mest kendte i den svenske historie.

**Sovjetunionen og den
nordatlantiske
pakt i Asien**

SAGDN OF den i Budapest i januar 1946 forvandede nogle svenske diplomater Raoul Wallenberg og ikke mere et anliggende mellem Sverige og Sovjetunionen.

Myteriet omkring forsvinden af Raoul Wallenberg har været et af de sidste år at blive ikke alene en svensk nationale tragedie, men til et verdensproblem.

I de sidste år er en ny række vidnesbyrd, dokumenter og bøger dukket op, som i det hele indholdt ikke adskillige i Sovjetunionens svar fra 1967 om, at Wallenberg er død. Man mener at han fortsat befinder sig i en af Sovjetunionens straffelejre ved Polotskiden. I et felt gyder han i august 75 år.

Wallenberg er ikke bare en skæffet mand, der blev udsat for en række fangelejer, han er et symbol i kampen mod nazismen og antisemitismen. Hans karriere som læge, sekretær ved det svenske ambassade, som også blev markedsavdelingen har repræsenteret Sovjetunionens interesser i de kun fem måneder han var i Sverige. Han blev i 1946 udsat i verdenshistorien for et diplomati som den mest usikre, voldsomme og dramatiske.

Wallenberg, som er ud af en kendt kristenbarndom, blev i 1944 udsat i Sverige. Han blev af det svenske diplomati i Budapest i juni 1944, fordi de allierede havde båret Sverige til at til med at sætte en stopper for.

Også den daværende udenrigsminister i USA, Roosevelt, var

af den mening, at Wallenberg var en af de mest vigtige personer i den svenske udenrigspolitik. Han blev i 1944 udsat i Sverige, fordi de allierede havde båret Sverige til at til med at sætte en stopper for.

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28 окт. 2002 г.

Должно быть правильно:

Министру Государственной Безопасности, Генерал-Полковнику тов. Абакумову В.С.

Все говорит за то, что в архиве НКВД, видимо, имеются два варианта рапорта Смальцова: в одном из них слово "трупа" написано правильно. В другом, который опубликован в *THE TIMES* №41, 1990 г., слово "трупа", как это видно, написано двумя п.

Так пишется это слово, когда речь идет о театральной труппе, но не о трупе человека.

Но главное в этом "рапорте" то, что это фальсификат, состряпанный на кухне НКВД.

Поэтому весьма важно установить отпечатки пальцев на этом документе, а не исследовать каллиграфию Смальцова.

О том что Валленберга "сняли" "списали", сообщила правительственная газета ИЗВЕСТИЯ.

Осталось только выяснить: когда и где он похоронен.

Рапорт исследовал: *Л.Н. Никулин*

Леон Никулин

ДАТСКОЕ ОБЩЕСТВО РАΟΥЛЯ
ВАЛЛЕНБЕРГА

Leon Nikulin, Ph. D. Writer

Raoul Wallenberg Forening

Box 4035, 8250 Viby J

DENMARK, Tel./Fax 4586282554

В.С. Абакумов

Министру Государственной Безопасности
Союза ССР - Генерал-полковнику
тов. Абакумову В.С.

Рапорт.

Восхищен, что цитировать Ваш документ
Валленберг сделал лично в качестве личного
свидетельства, приуроченного к Валленбергу
наступившим издательством.

В связи с этим, я бы хотел отметить, что
и лично наблюдая за Валленбергом, я могу
сказать, что он действительно был трупом
на предельно удалявшемся от центра.

Написано: Валленберг Герт
каждый из них имеет

17/12/47

Вопросы к...
17/12/47

Den meget omtalte oberst Smaltsovs rapport fra 17. juli 1947 vedrørende Wallenbergs "pludselige død", som på et senere tidspunkt viste sig at være usandt. Forfatteren til denne bog har understreget ikke mindre end 9 grammatiske og syntaktiske fejl i den tvivlsomme og hastigt skrevne russiske tekst.

INSTITUTET FÖR
OFFENTLIG OCH INTERNATIONELL RÄTT

Uggleviksgatan 9II

S-114 27 Stockholm

Tel. 08-21 62 44, 41 49 89

Pg 35 32 22-3. Pg klient 77 12 22-7

Svenska Handelsbanken 390 168 181

Organisationsnummer 556043-4481

Fax : 46 + (8) 21 38 74

Sagsbehandler fr. Lone Christensen
Hypoteksbanken, Landgreven 4
DK-1301 København K

Nordic-Baltic Conference


Raoul Wallenberg Foreningen i Viby J. (Århus) har 27.11.1996 hos Hypoteksbanken ansökt om bidrag till hållandet av en Nordic-Baltic Conference i Vilnius, Litauen. Ämnet för konferensen är att det gått 50 år sedan Nürnberg-rättegångarna. Jag sympatiserar med initiativet och har för egen del lovat att hjälpa till med en föreläsning om den kanske viktigaste effekten av dessa rättegångar, nämligen mänskliga rättigheter. I och med att rättegångarna markerade att enskilda statsmän, politiker och militärer hade ett personligt ansvar jämlikt den internationella rätten, så öppnades också dörren för tanken att, om individen hade ansvar så hade han också rättigheter. Ur detta steg fram den väldiga världsomspännande rörelse som hävdar de mänskliga rättigheterna mot all statlig verksamhet.

Under 1990-talet har Europarådet bakom den Europeiska Konventionen om de mänskliga rättigheterna (Europakonventionen) tagit ett väldigt språng österut. Man har som medlemmar upptagit alla länderna i det forna Socialistlägret och därmed nära nog fördubblat sitt medlemstal och utsträckt Europakonventionens garantier till ett hundratal miljoner nya människor. Med upptagandet av Ryssland som medlem, 1996, har denna utveckling fått ytterligare omfattning med närmast oöverskådliga konsekvenser. Ryssland är ingen vanlig europeisk makt.

Alla de nya medlemsstaterna i öst domineras fortfarande av sin nomenklatura, vars medlemmar i kraft av sin sakliga kompetens förblivit outhärliga i sina offentliga ämbeten och tjänster. Den allt överskuggande uppgiften måste därför vara att nå denna nomenklatura och att få den att lojalt anpassa sig till och anamma den nya civilisation som Europakonventionen för med sig. Jag ser konferensen som bl.a. ett modest försök i denna riktning, och jag kommer att anpassa min föreläsning till detta ändamål.

Jag finner det naturligt att man stöder dr Nikulins initiativ. Jag har sedan tidigare personlig erfarenhet av hans energi och organisationsförmåga när det gällt att ordna saker i Litauen. Jag finner hans initiativ förtjänt av allt stöd i Danmark, som efter annus mirabilis bland de nordiska länderna tagit på sig ett särskilt ansvar för just Litauen.

Stockholm den 3 maj 1997.


Jacob W.F. Sundberg
Juris professor emeritus

The Danish Raoul Wallenberg Society


LIST OF PEOPLE (IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER) WHO FROM 1998 TO 2001, HAVE BEEN AWARDED THE RAOUL WALLENBERG MEDAL AND DIPLOMA FOR THEIR EFFORTS IN LITERATURE, THE ARTS OR PUBLIC DEBATE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST EVIL.

1. Per Ahlmark, former Swedish vice-premier
2. Eduard Beltov, radio-journalist, Israel
3. Stéphane Courtois, professor and author, France
4. His Highness the Dalai Lama, formerly resident in Tibet
5. Explorer journalist team, Jyllands-Posten, Denmark
6. Birte Frandsen, journalist, Denmark
7. Metter Herborg, writer, Denmark
8. Bent Jensen, prof. dr. phil. Denmark
9. Yevgeny Yevtushenko, writer, Russia
10. Sergei Kovalyov, member of parliament, Russia
11. Eduard Kuznyetsov, writer, Israel
12. Ida Nudel, social critic and author, Israel
13. Per Michaelsen, writer, Denmark
14. Odd Myrdal, editor, Norway
15. Hans Chr Neerskov, author, chairman of the Int. Sakharov Committee,
16. Samuel Rachlin, tv journalist and film producer, Denmark
17. Chiune Sugihara, diplomat, Japan (posthumously)
18. Galina Sarovoytova, member of parliament (posthumously)
19. Jacob Sundberg, prof. dr. jur., Sweden
20. Christian Svendsen, editor, Denmark
21. Per Weber, gen. secretary of Ordet og Israel, Denmark

Leon Nikulin, writer, dr. phil., chairman

Geoffrey Cain, writer, cand. mag., vice-chairman

Leon Nikulin, Ph. D. Writer
Raoul Wallenberg Forening
Box 4035, 8260 Viby J
Danmark. Tel./Fax 4586282554





FOLKETINGET
1240 KØBENHAVN K

Bilag NG -

24.1.-1996

Leon Nikolin er en betydningsfuld personlighed, som i årevis utrætteligt har kæmpet for at bringe sandheden om Østeuropa frem i Danmark. Han har med sine skrifter og initiativer en væsentlig rolle for den offentlige meningsdannelse og for udbredelsen af kendskab til forholdene i Mellem- og Østeuropa.


Per Stig Møller



FRIHEDSKAMPENS VETERANER

Medlem af World Veterans Federation og Union Internationale de la Resistance et de la Deportation

Jørgen H. Barfod
Ved Fortunen 10 A
Kgs.Lyngby 2800

KØBENHAVN-DANMARK

den 20-9-02

Hr. dr.phil. Leon Nikolin

Tak for Deres brev vedrørende en ansøgning om støtte til udgivelse af bogen om Raoul Wallenberg. Vi i Frihedskampens Veteraner sætter Raoul Wallenberg overmåde højt og da jeg selv har været tidligere koncentrationslejr fange forstår jeg fuldt ud betydningen af den redningsaktion, som han stod for. Frihedskampens Veteraner er desværre ikke en velhavende forening, og vi kan derfor blot hjælpe med et beløb på 5000 kr., men vi håber, at man fra anden side kan få de fornødne midler.

Jeg tillader mig at vedlægge beløbet i check.

Med venlig hilsen

Jørgen H. Barfod

Formand for
Frihedskampens Veteraner.

Annika Jagander
+34 91 702 2019

(EC)

INKOM UD		
2002 -12- 13/12		
Avd. P	Gr 2	Mal EU
(P 40 B)		

UD-EC Dnr 328 ✓

Kopia (med e-post härifrån): SB

Utdelning av Raoul Wallenberg-pris på ambassaden
(2 bil)

Ambassaden stod den 9 december värd för en mottagning i samband med vilken Raoul Wallenberg-priset utdelades. Pristagarna var den spanska parlamentsledamoten Gustavo de Arístegui (Partido Popular) samt Israels härvarande ambassadör, Hertzl Inbar.¹ Initiativtagaren till priset, som utdelades för andra gången, är den Internationella Raoul Wallenberg-stiftelsen, en NGO grundad av argentinaren – och i New York bosatte – Baruj Tenenbaum. Omkring 110 inbjudna närvarade vid prisutdelningen, däribland anhöriga till pristagarna, företrädare för den spanska administrationen (bl.a. spanska JO, Enrique Múgica Herzog), media samt kulturpersonligheter. Evenemanget uppmärksammades bl.a. av TV och radio samt i pressen, särskilt i Baskien, som är de Arísteguis valkrets. Ett klipp ur den rikstäckande dagstidningen ABC (konservativ) från den 10 december bifogas.

Även det pressmeddelande som sändes ut med anledning av evenemanget bifogas (endast tillgängligt på spanska).

GRUNDBERG

¹ I pressmeddelandet nämns också en tredje pristagare, som dock pga av sjukdom kommer att få motta priset vid senare tillfälle.

CC:
UD-FMR
Hans Magnusson
Peter Landelius
Harald Hamrin
Daniel Larsson
Christoffer Berg
Generalkonsulat New York
Representation New York
Ambassaden BUDAPEST
Ambassaden BUENOS-AIRES
Ambassaden Washington
Ambassaden Moskva
UD-PIK-PR
Ambassaden TEL-AVIV

Comunicado de prensa

TRES DIPLOMATICOS RECIBIRAN DISTINCION INTERNACIONAL EN MADRID

El Embajador de Suecia ante el Reino de España, **Lars Grundberg**, su señora esposa, **Gunnel Grundberg**, y la **Fundación Internacional Raoul Wallenberg** serán los anfitriones de una velada internacional que tendrá lugar el próximo día **lunes 9 de diciembre a las 20.30 horas** en la residencia del jefe de la misión diplomática sueca, **calle Zurbano 27**, Madrid.

En la ocasión se entregarán los **Premios Raoul Wallenberg 2002** a tres distinguidos exponentes de la diplomacia mundial: el Embajador de Israel en España, **Hertzl Inbar**; el Cónsul General de Argentina en Barcelona, Embajador **Guillermo Mc Gough** y **Don Gustavo Manuel de Arístegui y San Román**, Diputado, Grupo Parlamentario Popular en el Congreso de Diputados de España y portavoz de la Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores del Congreso.

El premio Raoul Wallenberg fue entregado por primera vez en la ciudad de Buenos Aires en el año 2000. Lo recibieron el empresario petrolero ingeniero **Oscar Vicente** y el ex representante diplomático de Suecia en Argentina, Embajador **Peter Landelius**.

La **Fundación Internacional Raoul Wallenberg** es una ONG fundada por el argentino **Baruj Tenenbaum**. Lleva el nombre del diplomático sueco salvador de decenas de miles de vidas de judíos y otros perseguidos por el nazismo. Su misión es educar con el ejemplo de los valores de **solidaridad y coraje** puestos de manifiesto por los salvadores del Holocausto; mujeres y hombres que, a riesgo de sus propias vidas, auxiliaron al prójimo necesitado.

Durante la ceremonia se recordarán las gestas de los diplomáticos españoles salvadores de vidas durante el Holocausto.

IrisPrint 2

Datum: 2002-12-13 Kl: 08:27:03

Till Irismeddelandet
Wallenbergpriset.doc

finns minst en bilaga som inte har kunnat skrivas ut. Den (eller dessa) är markerad 'ej utskriven' i listan nedanför.

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wallenberg.JPG - ej utskriven



REGERINGSKANSLIET

ARKIVEX.
346/002, (EC) P 2 En'
Stockholm, le 12 décembre 2002

**Ministère des Affaires Étrangères
de Suède**

Enheten för Central- och Östeuropa (EC)
Ambassadör Harald Hamrin
Téléphone +46 8 405 33 43
E-mail: harald.hamrin@foreign.ministry.se

Madame Simone Lucki
Résidence Europe
Rue Deutzenberg 50 (bte 3)
Bruxelles

Raoul Wallenberg

Chère Madame,

Monsieur Johan Matz m'a remis votre lettre datée du 2 décembre ainsi que la lettre que vous aviez adressée à Monsieur Ingemar Eliasson le 26 juin dernier.

La photographie de 1957 que vous mentionnez dans votre lettre nous est bien connue. Elle fut soigneusement analysée à l'occasion de travaux qu'effectua en son temps le groupe de travail russo-suédois sur Raoul Wallenberg, travaux que débouchèrent sur le rapport de janvier 2001. Il fut malheureusement constaté à cette occasion que cette photographie ne fournissait aucun indice permettant d'apporter une solution au cas Wallenberg

Je vous prie d'agréer, chère Madame, l'assurance de ma considération distinguée.


Harald Hamrin

Harald Hamrin

cap. 021212 / Jv

To: UD-EC/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK,
UD-A-ARK-Kvartersarkiv-JohannesStörre/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK
cc:
Subject: HAPPY NEW YEAR 2003

EC



Forwarded by UD Registrar/FOREIGN/MINISTRY on 2002-12-23 11:02
falizwim <falizwim@inter.net.il> on 2002-12-20 23:26:35



000000

To: UD Registrar/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK
cc:
Subject: HAPPY NEW YEAR 2003

EC/Hamrin
030109

Swart. Alex
via mail

(have
address

Dear Sir/Madam,

Being sure that all the Swedish people will know how to spend this marvellous hours of Dec.31,2002-Jan.1,2003, I'll be much obliged to you for letting me know where is RAOUL WALLENBERG in the beginning of the year 2003, and - anyway - what is your state really doing just now in order to locate him (not what should it do).

By the way, what about the KAZAN psychiatric hospital ?
Does it really exist ?
May you have access to ALL its files and patients ?

As responsible for the Swedish foreign relations,
you may ask Mr.Putin same questions.

Respectfully waiting for your qualified answer,
Alex

Hamrin

Arxivex.

Y 2 Ka


(EC)

354/001

EC / Hamrin / JvB

021220

(exp. 14.13 t. amb.
Moskva)



Harald Hamrin
2002-12-20 14:13

To: Ambassaden Moskva/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK
cc: Hans Magnusson/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK
Subject: Mesinai

Re Raoul Wallenberg

Stefan Gullberg (eller i hans frånvaro annan i ärendet insatt tjänsteman),

Vi har studerat det ryska utkastet till avtalstext gällande Susann Mesinai's forskningsprojekt och funnit det acceptabelt. Ambassaden bemyndigas därför att genom utsedd representant underteckna avtalet så snart som möjligt.

Vi emotser tacksamt besked så snart avtalet skrivits på, så att vi kan underrätta Mesinai.

Harald Hamrin